Abstract
What influences Taiwanese public opinion on immigration? Taiwan faces the same immigration challenges as many other developed nations, where the demand for immigrant workers produces a domestic backlash. Our study addresses to what extent public opinions on immigration are influenced by two factors: the skills of immigrants and their place of origin. Our results show, besides the preference for skilled labour, that public opinion on the three Southeast Asian immigrant groups varies considerably, with the strongest negative reaction to Indonesian migrants. As Taiwan prides its progress on human rights among East Asian democracies, the results suggest the need for targeted policy efforts to overcome public biases towards Southeast Asian immigrants.
1 Introduction
What influences public perceptions of immigration in Taiwan? While a sizeable literature addresses immigration, especially into Western countries, little systematic analysis exists regarding Taiwan (e.g. Bélanger, Lee & Wang, 2010; Yang et al., 2014), a country widely regarded for its record on human rights since democratisation. The country’s immigration challenges mirror those in other developed nations, where the demand for immigrant workers faces a domestic backlash. Government regulations aim to prevent immigrant workers from transitioning to long-term settlers, and in Taiwan, the policies have been particularly effective at preventing illegal residence after visa expiration (Tseng, 2004; Tseng & Wang, 2013). For example, Taiwan’s most recent amnesty programme in 2019 allowed undocumented immigrants who had overstayed their visas a six-month period in which they could turn themselves in while facing only a small fine and no re-entry ban (Everington, 2019b). Yet, despite championing itself as a progressive liberal democracy, policies on immigration remain illiberal.
Taiwan’s immigrant population largely comes from three countries—Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines—which comprise 82 percent of immigrants as of March 2020 according to Taiwan’s National Immigration Agency (Ministry of the Interior, 2020)1 and which outpace immigration rates overall. Most of this immigration is poorly educated, low-skilled labour (Yuniarto, 2015). Due to the relatively high skill and education levels of young Taiwanese in combination with the shortage in the local labour market (especially in the low-skilled sections), Taiwan must attract workers from other countries (Lan, 2006; Tierney, 2007). Beginning in the 1990s, ‘low-paid, low-status’ jobs, such as domestic work, manufacturing, and construction, were labelled ‘dirty, demeaning, and dangerous’ also known as ‘3D’. Starting in 1989, labour shortages in these sectors grew to more than 10 percent and few young Taiwanese were interested in these roles, which led Taiwan to seek short-term labour from Southeast Asian countries. Decades later, shortages in these areas remain an issue and have been exacerbated further with the outbreak of Covid-19 as fewer immigrant workers are moving to Taiwan during the pandemic (Aspinwall, 2020).
Workers from Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines typically work in factories, manufacturing,2 or as domestic help (Yen, 2019),3 and usually lack the social capital to respond to contract violations and abuse (Chien, 2018; Pan & Yang, 2012). In recent years, however, immigrant workers have been more vocal about labour conditions (Chou et al., 2019; Shih, 2018) and the private broker system for employment (Hioe, 2019). Meanwhile, Taiwan continues to struggle to attract skilled immigrants (Huang, 2018), which are needed to counter Taiwan’s low birth rates and ageing population (National Development Council, 2018). This is despite efforts directly targeting Southeast Asian skilled workers in areas such as engineering and business administration (Fulco, 2018; Wu, 2019). In contrast, Kuomintang (kmt) presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu in 2019 not only criticised the quality of immigrant workers compared to the brain drain of skilled Taiwanese (Everington, 2019a), but questioned whether the public would accept skilled Filipino labour in particular (Drillsma, 2019).
Considering the broad literature on how framing and priming influences public opinion, and the growing literature specifically on these effects in Taiwan (Rich, Eliassen & Dahmer, 2018; Rich & Dahmer, 2018; Treumann & Rich, 2017), we designed two original experimental surveys to address immigration. Specifically, we wanted to evaluate to what extent public opinions on immigration were influenced by two factors: the skills of immigrants and their place of origin. We find not only clear biases against Southeast Asian immigration, but variation across the three main Southeast Asian immigrant groups in Taiwan: Vietnamese, Filipinos, and Indonesians. Despite Taiwan’s progressive records on human rights among East Asian countries, this work sheds light on the extent of public bias in Taiwan, particularly towards Southeast Asian groups, and should aid in advancing means to overcome such biases via targeted public education efforts.
This paper first addresses Taiwanese immigration policy, followed by literature on public perceptions on immigration, relating directly to the Taiwanese context. The basics of the research design follows, with empirical analyses finding higher support for skilled immigration and lower support for Southeast Asian immigration, especially from Indonesia. The conclusion addresses the policy implications of public perceptions of immigration and suggestions for future research.
2 Taiwan’s Immigration Policy
In the early 1990s the Taiwanese government initiated a migrant worker policy in response to intense lobbying by local industrial groups. Because of increasing production costs and Taiwan’s declining competitiveness in the global market, it was increasingly difficult for Taiwanese companies to find local workers for labour-intensive industries, especially for the so-called 3D jobs. According to a government survey, the percentage of manufacturing firms reporting a labour shortage increased from 16 percent in 1982 to 52 percent in 1987 (Tseng & Wang, 2013: 6). Employers claimed that the labour shortage had substantially decreased incentives for capital investments and was detrimental to the economic development of Taiwan. Local businesses and industries began lobbying for the legalisation of foreign labour in the 1980s. The National Industrial Association pushed for migrant labour to fill the labour shortage and threatened production would relocate to neighbouring countries (such as China or Southeast Asia) (Tseng, 2004). Responding to the call, the Taiwanese government implemented migrant worker policies to prevent the mass relocation of Taiwanese industries to overseas production sites, preserve job opportunities in the local labour market, and maintain domestic investments to keep the national economy growing. In May 1992 the legislature passed the Employment Service Act, the legal basis for the recruitment and regulation of foreign workers. It also benchmarked the Singaporean and Hong Kong models that emphasised temporality of labour migration and strict government control over immigrants to minimise the social costs of recruiting workers from overseas and prevent their potential settlement. Under the Employment Service Act, migrant workers are recruited on three-year work contracts that can be renewed up to four times (Surak, 2018: 494).
The implementation of migrant worker policies in Taiwan was ‘an active measure taken to respond to a globalising economy in defending economic nationalism’ which prioritises keeping Taiwanese business and investment within its territory (Tseng, 2004: 106). One example, the migrant care worker policy, was introduced as a national development strategy to encourage female participation in the labour market and to alleviate the care burden for dual-income families. For the Taiwanese government, allowing women to join the labour force en masse could create a large pool of educated workers contributing to economic development.
3 Public Perceptions of Immigration
A robust literature addresses public perceptions of immigration,4 especially in industrialised democracies. As a trend, these states are generally reluctant to accommodate additional immigrants (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002; Van Ramshorst, 2018; Zolberg, 1987), with strong opposition in East Asian democracies (Shim & Lee, 2018). In terms of demographic factors, survey research in multiple contexts finds that education level positively affects views of immigration, with higher levels of education corresponding with increased levels of support for immigrants (Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). Likewise, respondents with higher skill sets also tended to be more tolerant of immigration, skilled or otherwise (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Shim & Lee, 2018). Younger adults and those with higher incomes are also more supportive of immigration (Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019). Shim and Lee (2018) found household income positively corresponded with supporting immigration in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, while age, marital status, and being female negatively corresponded with support in Taiwan.
Economic concerns also likely affect opposition to immigration. Economic arguments against immigration often stoke public fears of job loss and economic stressors (Artiles & Meardi, 2014; Cochrane & Nevitte, 2014; Zolberg, 1987), whether due to competition over jobs or expansion of social services (Burns & Gimpel, 2000). A more pessimistic view of the economy overall may also decrease acceptance of immigration (Chandler & Tsai, 2001). For example, Esipova et al. (2015) found that 57 percent of Taiwanese said immigrants mostly take jobs that citizens do not want, compared to only 18 percent that said immigrants mostly take jobs that citizens want, results comparable to sentiments in Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea.
Moreover, although 45 percent of Taiwanese citizens between 25 and 64 have a university or advanced degree (Hsueh, 2018), 59 percent of the workforce is employed in low-paying and low-skilled jobs (Chung, 2016). In addition, Taiwanese women and married Taiwanese both were more likely to view immigrants as economic threats (Wong et al., 2019). However, this is not always the case. Many upper-class Taiwanese women require domestic, live-in helpers to balance managing their households and participating in the labour market by working outside the home. The majority of these helpers are immigrants, specifically from Indonesia (Liu & Yamashita, 2019). Economic concerns often focus on the particular abilities of the immigrants. Such factors would also seem relevant among immigrants to Taiwan. Taiwan does not require its care workers to hold high school diplomas or college education, and they only need 90 hours of language training rather than the six months mandated in Japan (Tsubota, 2018). Among Chinese and Vietnamese immigrant wives in Taiwan, over half of participants in two studies were illiterate or lacked a high school education (Yang et al., 2014; Yang, Wang & Anderson, 2010). While the majority of Thai (99.30%), Vietnamese (87.76%), and Filipino (81.22%) immigrants work in industries such as construction and manufacturing, the majority of Indonesian (72.75%) immigrants work in social welfare, primarily as family nurses (Ministry of Labour, Republic of China, 2021).
The gender balance of the immigrant population potentially influences public perceptions as well, often due to the gendered workplaces of immigrants. In Taiwan, women comprise 54.1 percent of the total immigrant population according to March 2020 data, but this ranges considerably across the three Southeast Asian countries of interest (Vietnam: 40.9%, Philippines: 60.7%, Indonesia 73.3%). Filipinas and Indonesian women primarily work as caregivers or in domestic roles, which potentially makes them more visible to the local population, while employers commonly rely on stereotypes of Filipina workers as ‘smart yet unruly’ and Indonesian women as ‘stupid yet obedient’ (Lan, 2003b: 110). This may also be based on the language skills of Filipinos as many speak English before immigrating to Taiwan and can communicate if they feel their rights are violated (Liu & Yamashita, 2019). Indonesians, by contrast, are viewed as more docile and obedient perhaps due to stereotypes that they lack formal education and are primarily from rural areas in their home country. Additionally, Indonesians increasingly comprise a larger share of domestic workers, from 15 percent in 1998 to 68 percent in 2002 (Lan, 2003b), with such a rapid increase likely noticeable by the Taiwanese public. Between 2000 and 2017, the population of Indonesian immigrants grew again, sixfold, from roughly 2,000 migrants to more than 33,000 over the 17-year period.5
Cultural arguments tend to focus on whether a particular immigrant group shares similar values to the native population and, for those that intend permanent residence, whether the group can or will assimilate to Taiwanese norms. Wong et al. (2019) found that Taiwanese women and married Taiwanese were more likely to perceive immigrants as a cultural threat. Considerable research in Taiwan focuses on immigrant spouses (Tang & Wang, 2011; Tsai, 2011). Those who do attain citizenship generally remain politically inactive, although Filipino mothers appeared more willing to vote than their Vietnamese and Indonesian counterparts (Cheng, 2017).
The majority of guest workers in Taiwan return to their home countries after working for a number of years, primarily using the time in country to earn remittances to send home. Though, as long as immigrants do not overstay their visas, they are eligible to return to Taiwan to work at a later time (Everington, 2019b). Tsai (2011) found no statistical difference among respondents who believed there should be no restrictions on the right to work for migrants from Southeast Asia versus migrants from industrialised countries.
Language skill often accompanies cultural arguments, with the language barrier a common hurdle for immigrants in practical terms and in broader acceptance from the native public. Foreign language learning as a means to reduce outright discrimination, if not also assimilate, often leads to marriage migrants not teaching their children their native tongue. Cheng (2017) states that immigrant mothers married to Taiwanese citizens often feel such pressure regarding their native tongue in favour of local languages. Notably, Filipinos speak some English, which provides an advantage compared to other Southeast Asian immigrants. Filipina domestic workers are commonly discouraged from speaking languages such as Tagalog, and while English spoken to children under their care can be seen as an alternative to hiring a tutor, this may also lead to concerns that children will acquire an accent that is perceived as undesirable (Lan, 2003a). Often, Indonesians face a language barrier and have a smaller community support network than Filipinas, further contributing to an image of docility (Lan, 2003b). However, for some Indonesian workers, job agencies provide them with Mandarin language training so they can communicate when they arrive. After one year of study, they can typically communicate their needs (Lan, 2003b).
One cultural component that distinguishes Indonesian immigrants is religion. Whereas the religious practices of most Vietnamese and Filipino immigrants (Buddhism and Catholicism) have sizeable local practitioners as well, Islam remains a religion primarily practised by immigrant populations. The limited number of Muslim Taiwanese are viewed as outsiders by the general population while also not seeking to establish a close relationship with the immigrant Muslim community (Loveband, 2009). Moreover, while religion constitutes a central experience of many immigrants, Indonesian Muslims are the most notable immigrant population to Taiwan participating in diverse religious activities (Yuniarto, 2015). The wearing of hijabs for women and avoidance of pork, the preferred meat in Taiwan (Loveband, 2009), may underscore key differences with Taiwanese. Loveband (2009) also found that due to the strength of Christian organising, Filipina workers tend to have access to the strongest support networks, and Muslim religious organisers cannot provide such strength of resources. Filipinas are also able to negotiate for Sundays off from work based on church attendance requirements in Christianity, but Muslim Indonesians have no such argument to support their requests for more time off. The Taiwanese government recognises these religious differences. In 2019 the National Immigration Agency accelerated the repatriation of immigrants from Southeast Asia in order to return practising Muslims to their home countries prior to the start of Eid al-Fitr (Everington, 2019b).
Finally, security concerns often factor into public perceptions of immigrants, especially those from the Middle East or those who are Muslim (Dunaway, Branton & Abrajano, 2010; Nowrasteh, 2016), even if the host country has no history of Islamic fundamentalist attacks. Creighton and Jamal (2015) discovered that US respondents were more likely to oppose the entrance of Muslim migrants than Christian migrants into the United States. While Taiwanese society has not exhibited levels of Islamophobia seen elsewhere, isolated cases of violence among Muslim immigrants have been used as examples to question further migration (Lan, 2003b).6
Media coverage may also influence public views of immigrants. Bos et al. (2016) analysed media representation of immigrants in the Netherlands and found that while negative media coverage of migrants led to less support for immigrants, positive coverage did not boost support. Fryberg et al. (2012) found that US news coverage fell along partisan lines, with conservative newspapers more likely to frame immigrants as security and economic threats to Americans. Evidence from Taiwan appears mixed. Yuniarto (2015) states that Taiwanese media depicts migrants largely in a negative light, while Cheng (2016) finds that only five of the 506 news articles about migrants analysed portray migrants as beneficial to Taiwanese society. In contrast, Liu (2019) finds that unlike US and UK newspapers, Taiwanese newspapers were less likely to frame immigrants as threats but remained sympathetic to those seen as contributing to society, often portraying immigrants as victims. More broadly, views of immigrants often are reinforced or reshaped by television dramas and movies (Hsia, 2001; Innes, 2017).
Building off the broader priming and framing literature (Druckman, 2001; Iyengar, Peters & Kinder, 1982; Scheufele, 2000), work suggests that how immigration is presented influences public support. For example, Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008) found that news about the costs of immigration boosts white Americans’ opposition to Latino but not European immigration. Diehl, Hinz, and Auspurg (2018) found that both skill sets and origin (Eastern Europe versus Germany) influence Swiss perceptions of migration. Igartua and Cheng (2009) provided respondents from Spain with different sample articles, each describing different ethnic groups or economic conditions, and found that respondents who received an article portraying immigrants negatively tended to view them unfavourably. However, whether less explicit priming and framing effects would shift public sentiment remains unclear. For example, if the public is sensitive about the origins of migrants, perhaps due to cultural concerns, or sensitive to migrant skill sets due to economic anxieties, we should expect variation in experimental work.
H1:Support for immigration will increase when framed in terms of skilled immigration
H2:Support for immigration will decrease when framed in terms of Southeast Asian immigration
H3:Support for Indonesian immigration will be lower than other Southeast Asian immigrant groups
4 Research Design and Empirical Results
Version 1: Taiwan should encourage immigration
台灣政府應該鼓勵移民政策。
Version 2: Taiwan should encourage immigration of skilled workers
台灣政府應該鼓勵具專業技術人員移民至台灣。
Version 3: Taiwan should encourage immigration from Southeast Asian countries
台灣政府應該鼓勵東南亞國家移民至台灣。
Version 4: Taiwan should encourage immigration of skilled workers from Southeast Asian countries
台灣政府應該鼓勵具有專業技術人員從東南亞國家移民至台灣。
Version 1: Taiwan should encourage immigration
台灣政府應該鼓勵移民政策。
Version 2: Taiwan should encourage immigration of skilled workers
台灣政府應該鼓勵具專業技術人員移民至台灣。
Version 3: Taiwan should encourage immigration from Vietnam
台灣政府應該促進越南移民。
Version 4: Taiwan should encourage immigration of skilled workers from Vietnam
台灣政府應該促進越南技術人員移民至台灣。
Version 5: Taiwan should encourage immigration from the Philippines
台灣政府應該促進菲律賓移民。
Version 6: Taiwan should encourage immigration of skilled workers from the Philippines
台灣政府應該促進菲律賓技術人員移民至台灣。
Version 7: Taiwan should encourage immigration from Indonesia
台灣政府應該促進印尼移民。
Version 8: Taiwan should encourage immigration of skilled workers from Indonesia
台灣政府應該促進印尼技術人員移民至台灣。
Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents who agree with encouraging immigration for each version present in the March 2018 survey. For simplicity, we combined those who stated they disagreed and strongly disagreed into one category and those who agreed and strongly agreed into a second. Here we clearly see that Taiwanese are more supportive of encouraging immigration when framed as skilled immigration, a 46.2 percent increase from the baseline of Version 1. However, support decreases by 21.4 percent from the baseline when simply focusing on Southeast Asian countries, with opposition increasing by 36 percent. In addition, we see while the version focusing on skilled Southeast Asian immigrants increased support compared to the baseline by 14.8 percent, this was roughly half the rate of support for skilled immigrants in general. In contrast, respondents were three times more likely to oppose encouraging skilled Southeast Asian immigration compared to skilled immigration with no regional reference.
Encouraging immigration. (November 2018, compiled by the authors).
Citation: International Journal of Taiwan Studies 6, 1 (2023) ; 10.1163/24688800-20221240
Encouraging immigration. (November 2018, compiled by the authors).
Citation: International Journal of Taiwan Studies 6, 1 (2023) ; 10.1163/24688800-20221240
Encouraging immigration. (November 2018, compiled by the authors).
Citation: International Journal of Taiwan Studies 6, 1 (2023) ; 10.1163/24688800-20221240
Figure 2 provides a similar breakdown for the December 2019 survey. Again, we see a bump in support between versions that mention skilled immigration versus those that do not. When no country of origin is mentioned, support for immigration increases by 48.8 percent (28.6% to 77.4%) when framed as skilled immigration. Yet the boost in support for skilled immigration from the three Southeast Asian countries assessed is noticeably smaller (Vietnam: 12.5%, Philippines and Indonesia: both 19%). Moreover, we see clear variation in public perceptions across the three Southeast Asian immigrant groups. First, in versions that do not mention skills (V3, V5, V7), the public was far less supportive of Indonesian immigration, with 79.4 percent disagreeing with encouraging immigration, compared to 50 percent for Vietnam and 47.6 percent for the Philippines. When the focus shifts to skilled immigration from Indonesia, a majority of respondents (55.6%) answered ambivalently, neither agreeing nor disagreeing with encouraging immigration (V8), compared to only 19.4 percent of respondents when no reference to skilled immigrants’ country of origin was presented (V2).
Encouraging immigration. (December 2019, compiled by the authors).
Citation: International Journal of Taiwan Studies 6, 1 (2023) ; 10.1163/24688800-20221240
Encouraging immigration. (December 2019, compiled by the authors).
Citation: International Journal of Taiwan Studies 6, 1 (2023) ; 10.1163/24688800-20221240
Encouraging immigration. (December 2019, compiled by the authors).
Citation: International Journal of Taiwan Studies 6, 1 (2023) ; 10.1163/24688800-20221240
Next, we conducted a series of ols (ordinary least squares) regression models on support for encouraging immigration. Starting with the 2018 data, the first model in Table 1 uses Versions 2–4 of the experimental design as independent variables, leaving the generic Version 1 as the baseline. The second model includes controls for age (continuous variable), gender (female), education (a five-point measure), income (a ten-point scale), and a seven-point left-right political ideology scale. Model 1 finds support for immigration increases by over a point on a five-point scale when the emphasis is skilled immigration, decreases by four-fifths of a point when the focus is Southeast Asian immigration, and increases by a fifth of a point when the focus is skilled Southeast Asian immigration, with all three significant at .01 or stronger. Put differently, the evidence suggests the public prefers encouraging skilled immigration, but the perception boosts are considerably lower when emphasising the region of origin. Model 2 finds similar results, with only gender and ideology also reaching statistical significance.
Table 2 moves to the 2019 data, producing similar models. The first uses Versions 2–8 of the experimental design as the independent variables, leaving the generic Version 1 as the baseline. The second model includes the same controls as before.7 Starting with Model 3, we find the public supportive of skilled workers when no home country is mentioned (Version 2) compared to the baseline (significant at .001). Meanwhile all of the versions mentioning a country negatively corresponded with public support for immigration, although none of the skilled versions reached statistical significance. Additional controls produce largely similar results, with limited influence of demographic factors.
As a second specification on the December 2019 data, we replaced the independent variables for Versions 2–8 and instead generated a single dummy variable for the four versions mentioning skilled immigration, while also producing similar dummies for each of the three countries mentioned (Table 3). As expected, skilled immigration corresponds with nearly a point higher on support for immigration. Meanwhile, all three country dummies correspond with lower evaluations, with the largest coefficient on the Indonesian variable, decreasing support by over one point.
Additional models were tested but omitted for brevity. In the first survey, we separated the sample into Versions 1–2 and Versions 3–4 and ran models that only included the demographic controls as well as the relevant skilled immigration version. Here we found that in both the general immigration versions and the ones that mentioned Southeast Asia in particular, those who received the skilled immigration prompt corresponded with over a point increase on the five-point scale, significant at .001 in both cases, with both models generating similar adjusted R-squares (.253 for general, .230 for Southeast Asian). For the 2019 survey, we similarly ran separate models by country as well as the unspecified origin version. Across all versions, we see that public approval is higher among those that received a version emphasising skilled immigration, significant at .05 or stronger, with coefficients ranging from .378 for the Philippines model to 1.40 for the Indonesia model. Similarly, the adjusted R2 ranges from .074 for the Philippines model compared to .333 for the Indonesia model.
In sum, the results show a clear perceptual bias against Southeast Asian immigration, even when skills are taken into consideration. Moreover, our December survey suggests subtle variation in public views towards the three largest immigrant groups, with Indonesians eliciting the largest opposition. According to government statistics, among the total number of 713,933 low-skilled immigrant workers in Taiwan, Indonesians account for 36 percent, the largest population among the four major sourcing countries (Indonesian, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand).8 Specifically, as mentioned in the previous section, in the social welfare sector, more than 72 percent of the migrant caregivers are from Indonesia (Ministry of Labour, Republic of China, 2021). Therefore, one potential indirect cause of the differences in perceptions across these groups could be the differing legal routes for immigration, with Indonesians lately having the most direct route, although it is more likely that the public, unaware of these distinctions, is responding more to the recent influx of Indonesian immigration. Stereotypes of Southeast Asian immigrants may also factor into the lack of public support.
5 Conclusion
Our findings confirm a bias against Southeast Asian immigration which, focusing simply on skills alone, will not be overcome. Moreover, our second survey suggests the importance of disaggregating the countries of origin when we talk about immigration. Admittedly, further unpacking is necessary of the discursive effect of the phrase ‘Southeast Asian’, as we cannot identify here whether this phrase leads Taiwanese specifically to think of a particular group (e.g. Indonesians) or if they envision immigrants beyond the three largest immigrant groups in Taiwan. Likewise, we are unable to determine if the public is responding to how politicians talk about these immigrant groups or generating assumptions largely on their own.
Whether certain attributes or skill sets can aid in overcoming regional biases also remains unclear. For example, previous research would suggest that knowledge of a local language would warm views on immigration. Additionally, it may be important to analyse further core demographic differences between each Southeast Asian immigrant population that might have increased the support of local Taiwanese public opinion. For example, Indonesian immigrants may be further ostracised due to their stereotypes as ‘other’. This could stem from a lack Taiwanese familiarity with the Muslim faith as compared to Buddhism and Christianity, which are common among other immigrants, or even immigrants’ lack of linguistic familiarity with English and Mandarin. It may also be interesting to note differences in the employment sectors in which immigrants from each Southeast Asian country work. For example, Indonesian immigrants are most likely to work in domestic, live-in help positions, which enable wealthy Taiwanese women to re-join the labour force while also rearing children (Liu & Yamashita, 2019); however, at the same time, married Taiwanese men and women are more likely to view immigrants as a threat.
Future work should also identify to what extent the public knows an immigrant personally. The contact hypothesis suggests improved perceptions by a majority group due to increased interactions with minority groups (Silver, Devlin & Tamir, 2020), with research specifically on immigrants finding perceptions improve after contact (Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010; Voci & Hewston, 2003). Assuming that such findings are not an artefact of self-selection of those not opposed to immigration, the challenge for policymakers thus becomes finding ways to encourage constructive and continued contact with immigrant groups. Perhaps, the lack of public support for Southeast Asian immigrants stems from fear of the unknown and otherising a core segment of Taiwan’s working and immigrant populations. Just as South Koreans are less supportive of North Korean immigrants when they have not personally met them, generally associating them with unskilled labour, Taiwanese may be less supportive of Southeast Asian immigrants because of their limited interactions within them beyond that of domestic caregivers.
Finally, little research on Taiwan addresses the Southeast Asian immigrant experience. In particular, while we would expect immigrants to be cognisant of some of the stereotypes and hostilities towards them in broad strokes, it is unclear whether they identify variation in treatment across countries of origin consistent with the survey findings here.
Notes on Contributors
Timothy S. Rich is Professor of Political Science at Western Kentucky University and Director of the International Public Opinion Lab.
Isabel Eliassen is a 2021 honours graduate of Western Kentucky University. She triple-majored in international affairs, Chinese, and linguistics.
Madelynn Einhorn is a 2022 honours graduate of Western Kentucky University. She majored in political science and economics.
Andi Dahmer is a first-year law student at the University of Louisville. She is a 2019 honours graduate of Western Kentucky University and a 2018 Truman Scholar.
Yi-Chun Chien is Assistant Professor of Political Science at National Chengchi University, Taiwan.
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These three countries comprise a similar percentage of undocumented immigrants (Yuniarto, 2015: 97).
In 1989 Taiwan’s manufacturing sector needed 45,000 migrants to complete existing tracks on the mass rapid transit (mrt) among other projects with existing contracts (Tierney, 2007).
Lan (2003b) argues that live-in domestic workers, especially attractive ones, are often seen as a status symbol in Taiwan.
This is separate from the often conflated literature on perceptions of refugees, although perceptions of these two groups may share certain similarities.
While Taiwan in the past may have used immigration quotas to reward or punish Southeast Asian countries based on their political stances vis-à-vis China (Lan, 2006: chap. 2), this seems to have ended with the development of the New Southbound Policy in 2016.
In 2003 Shia Liu, a Taiwanese writer, was killed by an Indonesian caregiver suffering from conversion disorder, leading to debates not only about migrant working conditions but threats posed by migrant workers. In 2018 an Indonesian immigrant killed her ex-husband and daughter in Taiwan (Everington, 2018).
Education in the 2019 survey was measured on a three-point scale.
See https://statfy.mol.gov.tw/index12.aspx, retrieved 20 May 2021.