1 Introduction

It has been more than three decades since Harvard University professor Joseph Nye coined the term ‘soft power’. This term, which was initially used to describe America’s ability to utilise its culture and values in its international conduct, quickly left the hands of academicians and has been swiftly incorporated into policy discourse in many parts of the world, fuelled by a wide range of academic and popular writing. The soft power theory, initially described by Nye (1990) as a top-down policy where governments utilise their cultural resources as part of state-led action, has also become multidirectional in the sense that many soft power initiatives rather originate from below, such as transnational business-led endeavours and cross-border cultural entrepreneurships, and the state merely attempts to tap into them.

For a rising power like China, and for countries that attempt to increase their international profile like Japan and South Korea, soft power and image management have been viewed as effective ways to advance their foreign policy goals. Soft power supposedly helps win friends and allies, creates understanding towards countries’ international positions, and advances their agenda. It is therefore no surprise that in East Asia, the soft power argument has found a receptive audience of journalists, academicians, media personnel, politicians, and reform-minded bureaucrats, who are eager to utilise this new and unexpected resource of power to both initiate internal change and to promote their country’s diplomacy in the world.

Given the above global and regional settings, how does Taiwan tap into the soft power competition and promote its international agenda, and how powerful is ‘soft power’ in advancing Taiwan’s international position? In this paper I address Taiwan’s soft power repositioning in the region and examine some of the advantages and disadvantages of this process. Based primarily on interviews conducted in Taiwan with state officials involved in promoting Taiwanese cultural and public diplomacy, I analyse the geopolitical and institutional constraints Taiwan is facing when trying to implement its soft power policy and discuss the possible soft power resources it can utilise as part of advancing its international agenda. The central argument of this paper is that despite the utility of soft power in pursuing its foreign policy agenda, Taiwan faces a few major obstacles in utilising its soft power relations, both institutional and conceptual. For one, the resources available for a state-led proactive soft power policy are scarce and the official thinking on soft power lacks inspiration. As observed by Gary Rawnsley (2020: 7), successive governments have failed to embrace the potential of Taiwan’s soft power and neglected to develop coherent programmes that could advance the country’s interests. The result is that old-style diplomacy continues to loom over Taiwan’s public diplomacy and soft power-related initiatives remain marginal. Moreover, there is a politically embedded disagreement about what Taiwanese culture is and thus what should be displayed and promoted abroad, while contemporary Taiwanese contemporary culture is generally overlooked and not incorporated enough into Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts. There is a lack of new thinking on diplomacy and a reliance on old habits. Nevertheless, Taiwan seems to be in a transitional period from old thinking about culture and diplomacy while hesitantly evaluating its soft power resources.

Theoretically speaking, Taiwan provides a good test case for the soft power theory as a society undergoing a transitional period: from an old-style, politically authoritative regime that emphasised its Chinese identity and ruled the island up to the end of the 1980s, to a vibrant democracy and pluralistic society with wider participation of different civil groups including the indigenous community, and with some of Asia’s most liberal legislation (Chang, 2018; Hsiao, 2018). During the Tsai Ing-wen presidency, Taiwan was the first in Asia to legalise same-sex marriage. Moreover, Taiwan exemplifies the notion that soft power is a process rather than a plan of action or a policy designed by a set of institutions. Taiwan shows that for a state to attain soft power it needs to go through a preparatory stage where the benefits of such actions are internalised and bureaucratised, the discourse on soft power becomes more common, and there is a change of priorities and in the allocation of state resources (for benefits and critiques of soft power, see Hayden, 2017; Kearn, 2011; Layne, 2010; Weissmann, 2020). Similar processes, as I suggest later in this paper, took place in Japan, South Korea, and more recently China, where it took some time until the state started to take soft power more seriously and initiate actions.

In what follows, I define the soft power argument, refer to its critics, and discuss the soft power competition in East Asia, focusing on Taiwan’s bigger neighbours—Japan, China, and South Korea. Taiwan’s soft power takes place within a regional setting where it needs to emphasise its position and legitimise its actions. I then examine the geopolitical and institutional impediments Taiwan faces when trying to implement its soft power policy. Finally, I discuss the way policymakers in Taiwan view two of the most important soft power components Taiwan can offer: democracy and culture. The conclusion emphasises the notion that soft power is a process rather than an action plan and offers policy recommendations.

2 Soft Power Competition in East Asia

Soft power, as Nye (1990, 2004) has defined it, is the power of a country to fascinate other countries and societies using its values, ideas, and culture, and not only intimidate them by its military or economic force. Nye initially referred to the US, but would later cite Japan, China, and India as having vast resources of soft power. Soft power rests on the notion that states should be proactive in their soft power management and not simply wait for things to happen. This derived power, according to Nye, stems from a country’s values, culture, and institutions, and enables it to advance an agenda in international institutions, present an attractive economic model, or pursue its interests more effectively. Like propaganda, soft power is a politically motivated set of initiatives designed to influence mass opinion by appealing to the emotions rather than rational thinking. The effectiveness of both soft power and propaganda also depends heavily on the acceptance of the receiving audience, which is difficult to utilise and measure. However, unlike propaganda, soft power includes a much broader set of activities and fields, which, rather, work implicitly and in the long term.

The utilisation of soft power is premised upon applying proactive approaches, such as international cultural exchange, cultural cooperation, cultural diplomacy, and public diplomacy. These terms refer to practical ways to advance a country’s interests in the international arena using non-violent means such as economic and technological aid, cultural exchange initiatives with other countries, campaigning to encourage the inflow of tourists, international broadcasts, and exchange students (Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010; Snow, 2020). In recent years, ‘new public diplomacy’ has come to describe a mixture of new media and old diplomacy also integrating digital technologies, social media, and public relations campaigns—measures that were previously associated with the private sector (Cull, 2019).

Analytically, however, soft power is an elusive term as it mainly points to the cultural and normative resources available to a country and the potential of turning them into power in international politics (Hall & Smith, 2013; Winkler, 2019). A few scholars have criticised soft power for its lack of analytical clarity, ambiguity, and inconsistence, which confuses attention, attractiveness, and persuasiveness (Bohas, 2006; Bukh, 2006; Hayden, 2017; Kearn, 2011; Layne, 2010; Weissmann, 2020).

Despite its analytical fuzziness, the theory of soft power has been incorporated into academic and popular discourse in East Asia, both as an invigorating rhetorical term and as a possible tool for diplomacy. As Jan Melissen (2011: 249) has noted, ‘soft power is a term that was coined in the West, but it fits East Asia like a glove’. This term, however, has different meanings in different countries. In Japan, soft power has emerged as a conscious decision by the government to strategically advance its international position without threatening other countries with the use of force, which is prohibited by the Japanese constitution, and without utilising its economic might in a way that will make Japan look threatening. This is especially useful in the context of Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbours, particularly China and South Korea, where ‘soft’ diplomacy serves to influence mass opinion in these countries without stressing the already troubled relations and avoids skirmishes over historical or territorial disputes (Otmazgin, 2018). Nowadays, soft power is not only used as part of the Japanese government’s attempt to seek new arenas for state intervention, but also as part of the struggle among different governmental ministries and agencies over resources. The struggle between Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the newly established Cool Japan division in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, both attempting to utilise contemporary Japanese culture as part of a wider policy abroad, is one example.

In China, this term was initially viewed as another tool in the hands of America’s cultural imperialism but was later regarded as a way to improve the country’s governance and to facilitate better relations between the state and the media industries (Scott, 2012). More recently, soft power is understood to be a means of improving the country’s image abroad and reducing fears of China’s economic might and depict it as a ‘peaceful rise’ (heping jueqi), a move that Joshua Kurlantzick (2007: 37) calls ‘China’s charm offensive’. Soft power initiatives have also become more explicit and more directly linked to political and strategic considerations. The media, exchange programmes, foreign aid, and participation in international organisations are viewed as complementary tools to ease the fear of its rising hard power presence in many parts of the world.

The Chinese government has been investing heavily in promoting the teaching of Chinese culture and language through its Confucius Institutes. Launched in 2004, the number of these institutes mushroomed to nearly 500 in 134 countries by 2016. The opening of these institutes, however, ignited controversy. In recent years, allegations over undermining academic freedom have forced the closing down of Confucius Institutes at universities in the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Australia. On New Year’s Day in 2012, the Chinese government inaugurated the China Public Diplomacy Association—its first non-profit organisation dedicated to ‘promoting China’s soft power’. According to some observers, the use of cultural diplomacy in China is now viewed as a way to counter Japan’s appeal as a democratic country and long-time ally of the US (Okawa, 2007; Yoo, 2007; Zhao, 2019).

In South Korea, the soft power discourse came rather late, but it is now widely voiced by state officials, ambassadors, and opinion leaders attempting to cash in on the country’s economic and cultural success and to better its position in the world (Elfving-Hwang, 2013; Lee, 2019). As in Japan, there has been a strong marriage between Korea’s booming contemporary culture and lifestyle, known as Hallyu (Korean Wave), and soft power. The popularity of Hallyu in many parts of the world, together with the global success of Samsung, Hyundai, lg, and other Korean manufacturers, provide Korea with significant new resources of soft power. The Korean government has been strategically utilising its cultural appeal in the service of the nation and organises the bureaucracy accordingly. One example is the establishment of two special semi-government agencies—Korea Creative Content Agency and the Korea Foundation for International Cultural Exchange—to mediate between state policy and the private sector to boost Korea’s contemporary cultural production presence abroad.

There is obviously growing attention in East Asia to promote soft power strategies as part of bettering states’ images abroad and approaching people of other countries more effectively. Accordingly, East Asian governments invest heavily in educational and cultural programmes meant to foster their acceptance and influence within the global community. This is especially important in the age of social media, where images and messages circulate constantly with limited interference by the state. At the same time, however, there is very little regional collaboration in advancing joint projects to promote mutual understanding, and each country views public diplomacy as a zero-sum game. Unlike ongoing bilateral and regional political and economic dialogues in East Asia (for example, the asean Plus Three collaboration framework), and the various official and unofficial links that have been formed in this region (Panke & Ruland, 2021), soft power strategy continues to be solely national, and each country insists on displaying its own achievements and advancing its own narrative.

3 Taiwanese Soft Power?

The drawn-out animosity across the Taiwan Strait has been one of the most protracted conflicts in the region and a source of worldwide concern. Taiwan’s foreign relations and security concerns are focused on China while both countries are attempting to build up their military with the other in mind (Lipinsky & Hsiao, 2021). Concurrently, Taiwanese society, contemporary art and culture, and social participation are growing vibrant as the Taiwanese become more globally minded than ever, with social groups having their voices heard (such as indigenous communities and lgbt activists), local activists developing innovative policies towards Taiwan’s indigenous communities, and local communities tackling local problems in a participatory and democratic way (Chang, 2020; Hsiao & Kuan, 2016). About 40 percent of members of parliament are women, one of the highest rates of representation in the world. The president is a woman and unlike other female presidents in other parts of Asia, she does not come from a political dynasty.

Now that Taiwan has largely shed its Cold War Kuomintang (kmt) image and gone through a deep process of democratisation, it has projected itself as a peaceful, prosperous, and, above all, democratic country that might be a good ally for pro-democracy forces across the region and beyond (Krumbein, 2019). Moreover, given the unidimensional Western media coverage of Taiwan, framing it almost exclusively within the context of cross-Strait relations and Sino-US relations (Sullivan & Lee, 2018), soft power policy has the potential to highlight other aspects of Taiwanese politics and society besides geopolitics. However, as mentioned earlier, attaining soft power is not about waiting for historical and market forces to shape a country’s image but actively engaging in promoting its interests abroad using its soft power resources. To do so, Taiwan is expected to initiate a proactive cultural and public diplomacy, as any other democracy with international ambitions should.

In the case of Taiwan, however, there are a few geopolitical and institutional impediments preventing it from implementing an effective soft power policy. For one, Taiwan is excluded from many international organisations and cannot influence or have its say in these important forums. This is a major disadvantage. Given Taiwan’s international legitimacy problem, the fact that at present only 15 countries maintain official diplomatic relations with it, and the fact that it is excluded from international organisations (the latest example being Interpol), means that proactive public diplomacy is difficult to pursue. In the Olympic Games, Taiwanese athletes compete under the title ‘Chinese Taipei’. When Taiwan dispatches artists abroad, they appear as individuals and often cannot represent the state. Thus, the association between these individual artists and Taiwan is rather weak.

Institutionally, the Ministry of Culture (moc) is very small, receives approximately only 1 percent of the budget, and its focus is predominantly domestic.² While soft power policy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mofa), the moc is also involved in public diplomacy initiatives through its 13 overseas offices, in addition to cultural exchange issues coordinated by the local representative point in each country. There are four cultural office points in the US (New York, Los Angeles, Washington, Houston), four in Asia (Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Hong Kong), and five in Europe (Paris, London, Madrid, Berlin, Moscow). In addition, under the framework of the ‘Taiwan Academy’ the moc offers various scholarships and educational and cultural exchange opportunities, like studying Chinese and learning calligraphy. More recently, given the government’s Southbound Policy,³ the moc has to abide by this direction and explore more cultural exchange opportunities within Southeast Asia.

The Ministry of Education is involved in Taiwan’s cultural diplomacy efforts mainly through encouraging foreign students to study on the island with the hope of boosting educational and cultural ties with other countries. Before the outbreak of Covid-19, the number of overseas students steadily increased, reaching almost 150,000 in 2018. Under the Southbound Policy, introduced in 2016 to encourage closer economic and cultural ties between Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand, the number of students from these countries has increased steadily, accounting for a third of all overseas students. In 2020, however, overseas students at colleges and universities in Taiwan numbered 98,247 people, of which 62,387 were degree students including overseas Chinese students, and only 5,766 short-term exchange students. In a similar vein, the Taiwan Fellowship Program under the auspices of mofa, invites junior and senior scholars to collaborate with Taiwanese scholars with the hope of developing academic and cultural ties. By 2021, 1,117 scholars from 83 countries had been accepted by this programme.⁴

The mofa, for its part, is not so much interested in the field of soft power and image management and focuses more on traditional political-economic aspects of diplomacy. Not enough budget is allocated to public diplomacy and the two departments in mofa concerned with public diplomacy—the Department of International Information Services and the Public Diplomacy Coordination Council—are not primarily focused on this goal. The former department, a remnant of the past, merely invites journalists to write about Taiwan, while the latter basically deals with domestic media and is heavily focused inward. One example of mofa’s initiatives is sending diplomats to give lectures on world affairs in remote parts of Taiwan. In terms of budget, a majority of the resources and attention go to the political division.

There is also lack of interest in or acknowledgement of the importance of image promotion abroad. Many times, Taiwanese policymakers must first be persuaded that they should invest in attaining soft power. The former director of the American Institute in Taipei (2009–2012) gave me an illustrative example.⁵ For weeks he tried to arrange an interview between President Tsai and star journalist Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, who confesses his second most loved country is Taiwan. When asked, he was told that the president does not do such interviews. A former mofa official responsible for media relations at that time confirmed privately that during her first presidency President Tsai generally refused such interviews which she saw as pointless. The director saw it as a staggering missed opportunity to better present Taiwan to an American audience. ‘Who refuses an opportunity like this!?’, he commented.

From interviews I conducted with state officials in Taiwan and from studying state reports and soft power-oriented initiatives, it was clear to me that while soft power is generally regarded as a positive development, its importance has not been internalised and initiatives in the field are still managed carefully and without much enthusiasm. Old-style diplomacy continues to be a priority.

4 Contesting Visions of Democracy and Culture

In addition to the institutional constraints outlined above and a general unwillingness to actively invest in soft power diplomacy, there is also disagreement on what the ingredients should be for Taiwan’s soft power move. As explained by Nye (2004) and by the plethora of literature on soft power (e.g. Chitty et al., 2017; Feklyunina, 2016; Kearn, 2011; Layne, 2010; Weissmann, 2020), the principal idea of attaining soft power is displaying a country’s normative and cultural achievements as part of its approach to people of other countries. In the case of the US, Nye has argued that its ideals about democracy, human rights, and freedom, the American way of life, and American contemporary culture, ranging from Coca-Cola to Levi’s jeans, are powerful political engines that complement its military and economic might.

The question is: what kind of norms and ideas should Taiwan utilise as part of its soft power move, and what makes its soft power distinct from other countries in the region and beyond? Based on insights from interviews with 17 officials in Taiwan, in this part I present their visions of Taiwanese soft power and opinions on what Taiwan should display as part of a soft power strategy.⁶

Listening to my interviewees, two central soft power resources were repeatedly emphasised: democracy and culture. Taiwanese democracy, as described in the interviews, includes a set of values such as rule of law, human rights, social rights, and restraint of state power. According to the deputy minister for foreign affairs: ‘Taiwan is a model for the Chinese-speaking world in terms of social values: democracy, human rights, rule of law, advanced social legislation like for gay and lesbian rights . . . the first place in Asia where Journalists without Borders set up their office was Taiwan.’⁷ Similar views were voiced by other informants. The head of the international relations committee at the Democratic Progressive Party (dpp) thought that ‘Taiwan’s civil society should be celebrated and exposed as a basis for collaboration with other democratic countries, using local governments as the main actors’.⁸ According to another state official: ‘[Taiwan’s soft power should] tell success stories: promote Taiwan as a vibrant democracy and a major technologically innovative place.’ Similarly, the deputy director of the American Institute in Taiwan observed that ‘Taiwan needs to emphasise its values: universal endorsement of democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, respect for human rights—this is very different from the mainland and in the long term, this perhaps can influence China as a whole’.⁹

In the case of democracy, there is a general agreement that this is one of Taiwan’s most important achievements and should be emphasised and displayed to a global audience. In particular, the acceptance of democracy is viewed as something that differentiates it from its Chinese neighbour and is considered a valuable currency that can advance its international conduct vis-à-vis other democratic countries in the region and in the West. Indeed, Taiwan has made important democratic achievements since the 1970s, transforming itself from an authoritarian state to a vibrant democracy. Direct presidential elections started in 1996, successive governments have endorsed the rule of law, there is restraint of state power, and, generally, Taiwan’s public life is characterised by an active civil society, freedom of speech, and advanced legislation towards minorities and underrepresented groups. According to the Economist’s global diplomacy index, in 2020 Taiwan ranked 11th, preceding the UK (14th), Japan (21st), South Korea (23rd), France (24th), the US (25th), and China (151st).¹⁰

The connection between democracy and soft power in Taiwan is well covered in academic literature. According to deLisle (2010), democracy is one of Taiwan’s strongest international assets and emphasising its democratic values is exactly what it needs to build support and form alliances with political partners in Europe and the US. Rawnsley (2014) and Wang and Lu (2008) view it as an important venue for communication with international audiences in democratic countries and a way to counter China’s opposition to the island. My findings from the interviews support their arguments and show that there is a general agreement that Taiwan should emphasise its democratic achievements as a way of displaying itself both at home and abroad.

The second major component that is viewed as an important resource for soft power is Taiwanese culture. The connection between soft power and culture is pronounced, as soft power is most basically an instrument that international actors use to influence others with the attractiveness of their own values, culture, and institutions. However, while there was a general agreement on the meaning of democratic values, in culture things are more complicated. There seems to be a disagreement on the question of what Taiwanese culture is and thus what should be displayed to a global audience. Specifically, the disagreement is on how much ‘Chineseness’ there is in Taiwanese culture. This is not only a theoretical question or a matter of nuance, but a question that can have wider political consequences related to Taiwan’s relations with and independence from the mainland.

A few of the interviewees said that Chinese culture should be the basis for any display of Taiwanese culture and that we cannot throw our Chinese heritage away, while others thought that Chinese culture is only one component in a long list of ingredients that makes up contemporary Taiwanese culture. ‘We cannot step in one place and just hold onto Chinese culture; we must develop Taiwanese culture as well’, according to the chair of the National Culture and Art Foundation.¹¹ In other words, there is the fundamental disagreement about what Taiwanese culture is, what it includes, and how it should be displayed abroad.

The issue of Chinese/Taiwanese culture is a politically contentious one related to Taiwan’s self-definition and its relations with mainland China. In fact, the issue of what Taiwanese culture is also runs along party lines—kmt supporters vs. dpp supporters. The kmt adheres to the idea of Taiwan as a preserver of traditional Chinese culture, whereas the dpp stresses Taiwan’s indigenous and multicultural identity (Karvelyte, 2022; Wang & Lu, 2008: 432–433). Paraphrasing China’s slogan about capitalism with social characteristics, former president Ma (kmt) argued that Taiwanese culture is ‘Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics’.¹² For Ma, Chinese culture is at the core of Taiwanese culture, while indigenous and imported cultural influences are only an addition. Similarly, the former national policy adviser under the kmt regime argued that ‘we cannot ignore that we are part of the Confucius civilisation. This is why when Chinese come to Taiwan, they feel at home’.¹³ In this sense, they both saw the role of Taiwan as ‘preserving traditional Chinese culture’, according to their description, and promoting it abroad in such ways as dispatching calligraphers, teaching the language, and displaying Chinese art and artefacts such as those stored at Taipei’s National Palace Museum.

A senior dpp legislator, who lived in the US for ten years and closely observes Taiwan’s foreign policy, summarised that ‘all Asian cultures are concentrated in Taiwan’.¹⁶

Curiously, in the interviews not much attention was given to the role of the media industries in the process of attaining soft power and generally towards emphasising Taiwanese contemporary culture and lifestyle to foreign audiences. As we know from Japan and South Korea, nowadays the strongest marriage is between soft power and pop culture and this provides the two countries with vast resources of soft power and great success in presenting themselves to global audiences, especially to young people (Michell, 2021; Otmazgin, 2018). In Taiwan, however, the discourse about connecting contemporary pop culture with soft power is still in its embryonic stage and this connection is usually ignored or referred to only in passing.

Taiwan, however, is a central location for the production of contemporary Chinese culture consumed not only within the island but more broadly in the region. Together with Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, Taipei has evolved as an incubator site for Chinese cultural production, especially in animation, digital television, and video games. Chinese pop music, in both Mandarin and Cantonese, is increasingly popular among young Chinese audiences in East Asia. At the turn of the century, Taiwan replaced Hong Kong as the regional hub of Mandarin-language pop and a few Taiwanese singers became highly popular in the mainland although the Chinese government occasionally ban their music and image (Otmazgin 2013: 38). This no doubt provides Taiwan with vast resources of soft power which, unfortunately, are underexplored.

When I asked about the reluctance of incorporating Taiwanese pop culture into the country’s soft power strategy, my impression was that my interviewees, overwhelmingly state officials in their fifties and above, know very little about contemporary popular culture or are generally uninterested. One official, however, commented that there is a decline in the film industry and that less than 20 movies are now produced every year. Another interviewee noted that the government has been encouraging Taiwanese corporations to invest in the media sector, to upgrade the economy, and to provide the hardware industry with cultural content. But overwhelmingly, the lack of interest in pop culture diplomacy is very noticeable.

5 Conclusion: Taiwan’s Soft Power in Regional and Global Context

Soft power is a tool to convey a state’s core values and ideology and to serve as its front window abroad. In such a context, the competition between countries, especially those with global ambitions, to use their vast material and cultural resources can be seen as part of an attempt to shape a regional and global hegemony in the Gramscian sense—whoever gets to shape the nature of the evolving and dynamic regional and global identity will end up operating in a more comfortable international environment (Press-Barnathan, 2012). At the same time, however, soft power is something that should be attained actively. A state wishing to exercise power in international politics should not simply wait until its culture, ideals, norms, institutions, and values disseminate ‘naturally’ to other countries and societies. Rather, soft power is the product of long-term action, ‘a wide variety of basic resources that can be converted into soft power by skilful conversion strategies. Basic resources include culture, values, legitimate policies, a positive domestic model, a successful economy, and a competent military’ (Nye, 2011: 99). By ‘skilful conversion strategies’, Nye specifically refers to such resources and mechanisms as national intelligence services, information agencies, public diplomacy, exchange programmes, assistance programmes, training programmes, and various other cultural and educational measures. Soft power is a continuous process involving not only government actions but also discourses, bottom-up initiatives, and eventually the allocation of state resources.

The question is, where does Taiwan fit in and why has it so far failed to embrace the potential of its soft power compared with its neighbours? As we saw, Taiwan faces a number of geopolitical and institutional constraints as well as an overall lack of interest in promoting a proactive soft power policy. As emphasised in this paper, soft power has not been internalised by the relevant state actors due to the rigidity of some of the ministries involved. Putting it more bluntly, at the time the interviews were conducted (summer 2017), Taiwanese soft power as a proactive policy did not exist. Unlike in Japan, South Korea, and China, the rising interest in soft power has not triggered an institutional change at state level, for example by establishing specifically designed bureaucratic units to handle its soft power resources (like the Cool Japan division, the Korea Creative Content Agency, and the China Public Diplomacy Association), or by rethinking state priorities and the allocation of more resources for this purpose. Taiwan seems to be in a transition period between old thinking about diplomacy and culture and new attempts to utilise some of its soft power resources in the service of bettering its international relations. Even though a proactive soft power policy may help Taiwan gain international legitimacy amid continuous pressure from Beijing by emphasising its economic and democratic achievements, institutionally, at least, the state is not yet convinced that soft power is crucially important.

Another critical point is regarding the issue of culture and, more specifically, which Taiwanese culture to present to the world. As we saw in the interviews, there is a disagreement on the most basic definition of what Taiwanese culture is and the answer to it is divided along domestic political lines. Everyone agrees that culture is important for Taiwan’s foreign diplomacy, but what Taiwanese culture is and how to display it remains vague. This disagreement means that Taiwan’s soft power strategy lacks one of its central components: culture! Going back to Nye’s description of soft power, culture and ideals play a central role in advancing a state’s international agenda, but this move cannot be too opaque as it competes with various other messages and narratives coming from other countries and only the successful messages survive.

We often hear that Taiwan is home to a ‘mixture’ of cultures, but what does this actually mean? According to the head of the Taiwan Broadcasting Authority’s poetic description, who has also published a two-volume book titled The Diamond of Taiwanese Culture, Taiwanese culture is ‘like a diamond: when buried in the mountain there is not much to do with it. You have to take it out, polish it, work with it, and expose its different facets and different dimensions . . . but we need to invite everyone to polish it’.¹⁷ Cultural diversity, however, can be both a strength and a weakness. On the one hand, emphasising Taiwan’s diversity may help it distinguish itself from mainland China, which attempts to monopolise affinities for Chinese culture through huge investments in the global spread of its Confucius Institutes. On the other hand, emphasising diversity and the ethnolinguistic character of Taiwanese society makes it difficult to conceptualise it as a separate nation, in comparison to the more homogenous conception of the nation in the cases of Japan and South Korea. This makes it harder for Taiwan to distinguish and articulate its unique qualities and in this context, the diversity of Taiwanese society is closer to that of Southeast Asian nations such as Singapore and Malaysia.

What can Taiwan do to better utilise its soft power resources? As emphasised in this paper, attaining soft power is a proactive process which should be taken seriously by governments. This suggests a change not only in the way that diplomacy is being practised but also in the way ‘power’ is conceived in international relations. This change implies the reconsideration of what counts as influential in international relations, what modes of action the state should wield, and what is the desired communication between the state and the citizens of other countries. Learning from the experience of other countries, soft power policy starts with an expanding academic and popular discourse about its advantages, continues with this discourse being internalised and bureaucratised within the state, and results in state action including the allocation of resources, exploring new ways to connect contemporary cultural and media production with state diplomacy, and collaborating with bottom-up initiatives steaming from society.