Abstract
The article analyses the rise and fall of the Kuomintang candidate in the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election, Han Kuo-yu. It examines how three leading Taiwanese newspapers, the China Times, the Liberty Times, and the United Daily News, have reported about him and his populist strategy and style. Han Kuo-yu is almost uniformly viewed as a populist due to his anti-elite discourse, self-styling as a common man, and use of simple and direct language. The analysis of Han Kuo-yu and the media coverage about him is based on three leading approaches to defining and understanding populism—the ‘ideational’, ‘political-strategic’, and ‘socio-cultural’ approaches—and academic definitions of populism that have been used and invented by scholars in Taiwan since the island’s democratisation in the 1990s.
1 Introduction
The main objective of this article is to analyse whether and how Han Kuo-yu is classified and discussed as a populist in Taiwanese media discourses. Han was the Kuomintang (kmt) candidate in the 2020 presidential election and is the most clear-cut example of a populist in Taiwan in recent years, if not since Taiwan’s democratisation in the 1990s. The analysis undertaken in this article is based on three frequently used approaches to defining and understanding populism—the ‘ideational’, ‘political-strategic’, and ‘socio-cultural’ approaches—and on definitions of populism in Taiwanese academic debates. While Taiwanese academics have identified populism as a prevalent phenomenon in Taiwan, on the basis of the ideational, political-strategic, and socio-cultural approaches it is difficult to find unambiguous examples of populist politicians besides Han Kuo-yu. This is even more the case for political parties as no major populist party exists in Taiwan.
The following section will introduce the ideational, political-strategic, and socio-cultural approaches to populism. In the third section, Taiwanese academic definitions of populism will be analysed and compared with the three approaches introduced in the second section, as well as examining how and why Taiwanese scholars have categorised politicians, the Sunflower Movement, Taiwan’s democracy, and certain attitudes of Taiwanese citizens as populist. The fourth and fifth sections will discuss the case of Han Kuo-yu as a recent and clear-cut example of a populist in Taiwanese politics. In particular, the fourth section will analyse Han’s career as a populist politician, the reasons for his meteoric rise and equally abrupt fall, and reasons for his classification as a populist. The fifth section will analyse Han’s coverage in three leading newspapers, the China Times (中國時報), the Liberty Times (自由時報), and the United Daily News (聯合報), and examines whether the newspapers view Han Kuo-yu as a populist and for what reasons.
2 Defining Populism
Populism has become a frequently occurring phenomenon in many countries in the world. Consequently, research on populism has entered the mainstream in political science (Kaltwasser et al., 2017a: 1–2). However, many authors do not present a definition of populism, or instead develop a conceptualisation that is very unclear (Kaltwasser et al., 2017a: 12). As such, Kaltwasser et al. state that ‘scholars should make an effort to present a clear conceptualisation of the phenomenon. This implies clarifying not only what is populism but also what is not [populism]’ (Kaltwasser et al., 2017a: 17).
I use three approaches to defining populism following the Oxford Handbook of Populism: the ideational, political-strategic, and socio-cultural approaches (Kaltwasser et al., 2017b). The three approaches focus either on populist ideology, the populist leader, or the style of populists (see Figure 1). The reasons for selecting these approaches are threefold. First, they are among the most widely used definitions of populism, with the ideational approach probably being the most prominent (Mudde, 2021; Olivas Osuna, 2021: 5; Rueda, 2021: 167). Second, they are not mutually exclusive, but rather shed light on different facets of populism when considered alone or in combination. Third, contrary to certain other approaches to populism,1 they each view populism as a threat to liberal democracy. Populism that does not threaten liberal democracy is often better classified in terms of social movements, participatory democracy, or demagoguery.
The triangle of populism.
Citation: International Journal of Taiwan Studies 7, 2 (2024) ; 10.1163/24688800-20231313
According to Cas Mudde (2017), one of the main representatives of the ideational approach, the core of populism is the perception and construction of a conflict between the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’. The people and the elite are defined in moral terms. The essence of the people is their moral purity, while the elite are corrupt. The people are homogenous and have the same interests and preferences, which are often portrayed as ‘common sense’. The people as defined by the populist represent the general will, while the elite put their own special interests and moral ideas over those of the people. Monism—that is, the people are homogenous—and morality—that is, the people are pure—are at the heart of the relationship between populism and democracy (Mudde, 2017, 2021: 579; Müller, 2016). Populism is a ‘thin’ or ‘thin-centred’ ideology that can incorporate different sets of ideas (Mudde, 2017: 30). Accordingly, who comprises the people and the elite can vary between right-wing, left-wing, and other types of populism, but the moral divide between the people as pure/good and the elite as corrupt/bad always remains the core of populist ideology (Mudde, 2017: 32).
Populism has two counterparts: elitism and pluralism. Elitism is populism’s ‘mirror-image’ (Mudde, 2004: 543). It shares the Manichean world view of populism, but it considers the elite to be pure and virtuous, and the people to be impure and corrupt. Pluralism rejects the homogeneity of both populism and elitism and the moral divide between the people and the elite. Pluralism sees society as a heterogenous collection of groups and individuals with different views, wishes, and interests (Mudde, 2004: 543–544, 2017: 34–35). Populists and their supporters claim that they—and only they—represent the people, which makes them anti-pluralist. In a democracy, nobody can claim to represent the entire people because every society consists of individuals and groups with different interests (Müller, 2016: 197, 199). Homogeneity and exclusion are thus key elements of populists’ interpretation of society (Olivas Osuna, 2021: 11).
Kurt Weyland, a leading proponent of the political-strategic approach, defines populism as a ‘political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers’ (Weyland, 2021c: 1). According to this approach, a populist leader needs to provide direction and mobilise their followers for the goals that the leader identifies as the ‘will of the people’. The leader serves as the unifying bond for the followers, reaches them directly, and seeks to give these bonds extraordinary intensity, especially by attacking enemies. But populism based on personalistic leadership is ultimately a flexible and opportunistic variant (Weyland, 2021b). In cases in which ideology takes priority and where the leader embodies a dogmatic ideology and acts as its monopolistic interpreter, such as in the fascisms of Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini, this does not qualify as populism (Weyland, 2017: 50). But it is difficult to clearly distinguish between cases in which a populist only uses ideology as a vehicle to gain power and in which someone is mainly driven by ideology and thereby would not be classified as a populist according to Weyland (Rueda, 2021: 170–173). Weyland’s approach has some similarities with Max Weber’s classification of rule by a charismatic leader (Weyland, 2021a: 44–45). Populism can thus mainly be conceptualised and analysed by focusing on the behaviour of its leaders (Rueda, 2021: 168).
An important element of the political-strategic approach is the direct connection between the populist leader and ‘the people’. Populism sees power emanate from ‘the people’. But because ‘the people’ are much too heterogeneous and amorphous to act on their own, it falls to the populist leader to provide direction and mobilise the followers for the goals that the leader identifies as the ‘will of the people’. The leader principally reaches their followers directly, for instance through mass rallies, television, or social media, and largely foregoes organisational intermediation, such as that of political parties. The leader seeks to give these quasi-direct bonds with their followers extraordinary intensity, especially by attacking dangerous enemies and mobilising the followers for ‘heroic’ missions. Many people in turn crave the sense of belonging to the community forged by strong commitment to a leader. Leaders deliberately foment an intense bond between themselves and ‘the people’ because the support of ‘the people’ remains unreliable and fickle due to the absence of a direct personal exchange relationship (as in clientelism) and the lack of organisational discipline and programmatic commitment (via an institutionalised political party) (Weyland, 2017: 50–58).
Following his approach of a direct connection between the populist leader and the people, Weyland observes an erosion of political parties as a result of populism. Representative democracies without parties or with weak parties reduce the quality of democracy. He views Latin America as an example, where parties have eroded and no populist movement has turned into an organised, institutionalised party since 2000 (Weyland, 2021a). Weyland’s approach, however, runs into difficulties when it comes to explaining populism that rests on strong support from an institutionalised party and voters with ideological dispositions (Rueda, 2021).
Pierre Ostiguy is a representative of the socio-cultural approach that emphasises a distinction between high and low politics, with populism being on the low side. This approach highlights a mainly socio-cultural divide in societies. It thrives on the terrain of a societal divide that stretches alongside cultural and educational differences or divides (Baykan, Gürsoy & Ostiguy, 2021: 795–796). ‘The high—low axis has to do with ways of being and acting in politics …. High and low have to do with ways of relating to people; as such, they go beyond “discourses” as words’. High and low political appeals and positions allow the voter to recognize a politician as ‘one of ours’ (Ostiguy, 2017: 77–78). The ‘low’ in politics, when it comes both to politicians and the electorate, is not synonymous with people from lower social strata. ‘On the low, people frequently use a language that includes slang or folksy expressions and metaphors, and display more raw, culturally popular tastes’ (Ostiguy, 2017: 78). Rich politicians, like Silvio Berlusconi in Italy or George W. Bush in the United States, can be ‘low’ (Ostiguy, 2017: 78–79). ‘On the high’, people publicly present themselves as well behaved and composed. Politicians ‘on the high’ are often well mannered and tend to use either a rationalist or ethically oriented discourse. Within the social-cultural dimension of the high—low divide, typical expressions of the low are an identification with nativism versus cosmopolitanism (Ostiguy, 2017: 80–81). The socio-cultural approach fits both right-wing and left-wing populists, for example Venezuela’s former leader Hugo Chávez (Ostiguy, 2022). Ostiguy views his approach not as an exclusive definition but as a concept that can and should be combined with the other two approaches mentioned above (Baykan, Gürsoy & Ostiguy, 2021: 795–796).
3 Defining Populism in Taiwan
Overall, research on populism in Taiwan is limited. In Taiwan, the three politicians that are most frequently described as populists are former presidents Lee Teng-hui (1987–2000) and Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008) and the former mayor of Kaohsiung and kmt presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu. In addition, former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je and the Sunflower Movement are characterised as populist by a few researchers.
3.1 Lee Teng-hui
Huang Guang-Guo characterises Lee Teng-hui’s politics as ‘anti-expert’ and ‘anti-intellectual’, which can be classified as populist according to him. Promoting Taiwan’s identity is part of wider ‘anti-intellectual’ and thus populist policies (Shyu, 2008: 131; G. G. Huang, 1995, 2004). Huang contends that the protection of the rights of the people is the core of democracy, not elections. Lee Teng-hui’s democratic reforms are another reason to categorise him as a populist because Huang associates a democratic political system that is responsive to the people with populism (Shyu, 2008: 131; Schafferer, 2010: 140–141).
Chien Yong-Siang and Wang Jenn-Hwang (1995) classified Lee Teng-hui’s presidency as ‘populist authoritarianism’ (民粹威權主義, mincui weiquanzhuyi). They describe Lee as constructing a Taiwanese identity and a homogenous Taiwanese people and view this as populist and authoritarian for two reasons. First, it stresses the support of the masses by emphasising the people’s exclusively Taiwanese identity. Second, the elections instead of the civil and human rights of a liberal democracy are favoured (Lin, 2009: 244–245; Chien & Wang, 1995: 17). Huang also uses the term ‘populist authoritarianism’ but defines it differently. On the one hand, Lee implemented democratic reforms and relied on the support of the Taiwanese people (populism). On the other hand, he still used the kmt’s political dominance over Taiwan’s state and society to govern the country (authoritarianism) (G. G. Huang, 2014: 54). Hsieh and Wei criticise the concept of ‘populist authoritarianism’. They think that the concept does not explain sufficiently the ‘authoritarian’ dimension of this definition and applies a simplistic view in which the democratic transformation in the 1990s is portrayed as a power transfer from the kmt elite to local factions and the capitalist elite (Hsieh & Wei, 2009: 97–98).
Lee Teng-hui is classified by Huang Yu-Ting and Tsay Ruey-Ming as a populist following Weyland’s definition of a populist leader. They compare him with populist leaders in Latin America (Y. T. Huang & Tsay, 2015: 155). But Huang and Tsay also define the core of populism as the mobilisation of ‘the people’ against varying and expanding ‘others’ (人民對抗他者, renmin duikang tazhe) (Y. T. Huang & Tsay, 2015). According to them, Lee depicted the old kmt elite as ‘the other’. Among the authors who have discussed whether Lee is a populist or not, only Huang and Tsay have explicitly referred to the triangle of populism, mainly to the ideational and the political-strategic approaches.
3.2 Chen Shui-bian
Huang and Tsay classify Chen Shui-bian also as a populist because he mobilised ‘the people’ against ‘the other’, in this case against the broader elite stemming from Taiwan’s authoritarian past and mainland China. His objective was to construct a Taiwanese identity separate from the kmt elite and mainland China (Y. T. Huang & Tsay, 2015: 156).
Olli Hellmann also mentions Chen Shui-bian as a populist, who aimed his attacks against the kmt as ‘the elite’, based on the argument that the party had, for decades, been ruling the country as part of mainland China, thereby ignoring the voice of the Taiwanese majority of ‘the people’ (Hellmann, 2017: 163–164). In some academic circles, which did not necessarily follow academic standards of inquiry, Chen Shui-bian’s policies were described as ‘populist fascism’ (民粹法西斯主義, mincui faxisizhuyi). As summarised by Christian Schafferer (2010), the political commentator Nan Fang-Shuo, prominent academic Huang Guang-Guo, political activist and writer Huang Zhi-Xian, and others have argued that Chen’s emphasis on a new Taiwanese identity created tensions between the majority ‘benshengren’2 (本省人) and the minority ‘waishengren’3 (外省人) in Taiwan, that he had manipulated the Taiwanese people to elect him by inciting these tensions, and that he would create a fascist dictatorship (Schafferer, 2010: 142–143). Chen was even compared with Hitler (Schafferer, 2010: 143–144; G. G. Huang, 1995, 2004). Similar to Lee Teng-hui, Chen was also viewed by Huang Guang-Guo as ‘anti-expert’ and ‘anti-intellectual’, and thus as a populist (Shyu, 2008: 131; G. G. Huang, 1995, 2004).
John F. Copper has used a very wide definition of populism: as related to democracy as the rule of the people—the positive side of populism—or as associated with emotional and irrational politics, racism, fascism, and communism—the negative side (Copper, 2015: 1). This wide definition makes it easy for Copper to classify all Taiwanese presidents as populists, albeit to varying degrees. Chen Shui-bian pursued ‘ethnic populism’ according to Copper because he advocated Taiwan’s identity and portrayed mainland China as Taiwan’s enemy (Copper, 2015: 3).
According to Huang (2014), Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party (dpp) needed to use strategies of mass mobilisation. Although the dpp had come to power in 2000, the party was unable to effectively control the government and the administration because the kmt continued to have a majority in parliament and many in the elite, such as civil servants in the administration, still supported the kmt. This is why the dpp under Chen Shui-bian needed to turn to ‘electoral populism’ and to appeal to the people directly in order to be able to govern. Chen portrayed himself as a common man, having a modest background, and as a true ‘son of Taiwan’. He described the kmt as an elitist organisation full of privileged people (Huang, 2014: 64). Hellmann (2017) and Huang and Tsay (2015) refer to ideational and political-strategic approaches to populism to analyse Chen Shui-bian. Some of the other scholars viewed Chen Shui-bian as a populist mainly because of his critical stance towards mainland China and do not refer to any of the three approaches to populism.
3.3 Ko Wen-je
According to Wu Chin-En and Chu Yun-Han (2021), the former mayor of Taipei, Ko Wen-je, and his Taiwan People’s Party (tpp), as well as the New Power Party (npp), are populist because they follow the Manichean dualism of the ‘pure people’ against the ‘corrupt elite’ and consider representative democracy to have failed (Wu & Chu, 2021: 47). The npp was founded after the Sunflower Movement by some of its participants and others to advocate for social and democratic progress and Taiwan’s sovereignty. Ko Wen-je has promoted people’s direct participation in political decision-making processes, such as through online participation methods and participatory budgets (Wu & Chu, 2021: 48). Hu Cheng-Kuang and Chiang Su-Hui (2020: 156) view Ko Wen-je also as a populist, but they view contradictions in his classification as a populist, as they consider him elitist as well. These authors use the ideational approach in classifying Ko Wen-je as a populist.
3.4 Han Kuo-yu
The latest, and maybe the most clear-cut, example of a populist in Taiwan since democratisation has been that of Han Kuo-yu, the former mayor of Kaohsiung and presidential candidate for the kmt in the general election in 2020. Ho Jeng-Sheng (2020) identifies four factors of Han’s discourse and style as populist. First, Han’s ‘left-leaning romanticism’ with his special emphasis on farmers, fishermen, small business owners, night market vendors—that is, the ‘common people’ in general—is considered to be populist. Second, his direct and simple language that imitates ‘common people’s language’, and his simple slogans that centre solely on economic development—such as Kaohsiung is ‘both old and poor’ (又老又窮, you lao you qiong) or ‘Politics zero points, the economy hundred points’ (經濟一百分，政治零分, Jingji yibaifen, zhengzhi lingfen)—and which ignore complex political problems, are stylistically populist. He also communicated with the voters directly, often through social media and mass rallies. Third, his working-man style of dress—his blue shirt is his personal brand—and modest living style—saying he only needs one bowl of braised pork and a bottle of mineral water a day—are also populist characteristics. Fourth, he was also an outsider in the kmt. His rise reflected the poor situation of the kmt, as he captured the party’s candidacy in the general election but was not part of the kmt establishment (Ho, 2020: 104–108).
Hu and Chiang (2020) also describe Han as a populist by the time of the 2020 presidential election, on the basis of three criteria: first, anti-elitism and the use of conspiracy theories; second, distrust of the media; and third, an anti-expert discourse, even though he left the government of Kaohsiung mostly in the hands of technocrats. But other criteria for populists, such as authoritarianism, anti-pluralism, and discriminatory discourses, were not strongly evident in his case (Hu & Chiang, 2020: 175). Furthermore, his personal anti-elite discourse was limited to the dpp, but his supporters attacked the entire Taiwanese elite and used the dichotomy of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. His supporters were also more anti-pluralist than he was (Hu & Chiang, 2020: 176). Nathan Batto identifies largely similar criteria as those of Ho (2020) and Hu and Chiang (2020) for characterising Han as a populist: his anti-elite discourse and his use of the style and language of a ‘common man’ and ‘political outsider’. Han claimed that Taiwanese presidents since Lee Teng-hui and the political elite in general had betrayed the Taiwanese people by focusing only on their own power and wealth and by neglecting the needs of the people. As a result, Taiwan was portrayed as being in economic and moral decay. Han would reverse this decline by focusing on Taiwan’s economic situation (Batto, 2021a, 2021b). In the classification of Han Kuo-yu as populist by the above-mentioned scholars, we can find recourse to the ideational, political-strategic, and socio-cultural approaches to populism; but the only approach referred to and applied by all scholars is the ideational approach.
3.5 The Sunflower Movement
Wu and Chu (2021) follow Mudde’s definition of populism, but mainly emphasise a model of so-called ‘bottom-up populism’, in which the Sunflower Movement of 2014 takes centre stage (Wu & Chu, 2021: 39). The antagonism of the people versus the elite in this case consists of the confrontation between the kmt government and the elite, led by President Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016), and the Sunflower Movement, a social movement of mostly young people (Wu & Chu, 2021: 40). According to Wu and Chu, Taiwan’s bottom-up populism does not pose a threat to Taiwan’s democracy because the supporters hold liberal values, believe in the superiority of democracy, and their main goal was to protect and to strengthen Taiwan’s democracy. The participants in the Sunflower Movement viewed a closer relationship with the Chinese mainland as the main threat to Taiwan’s democracy. Consequently, they wanted to prevent the Ma government from concluding agreements with the mainland Chinese government. In addition, they advocated for citizens’ initiatives and referenda to expand direct participation in politics (Wu & Chu, 2021: 52–53).
Ho (2020: 110) also classified the Sunflower Movement, Ko Wen-je, and Han Kuo-yu as populist phenomena and politicians and viewed the rise of the two politicians to be the result of a crisis of confidence in the kmt and dpp. Copper (2015: 5–6) also assesses the Sunflower Movement and Ko Wen-je as populist, while Kuang Szu-Sheng (2017: 82) also mentions the movement as an example of populism.
3.6 Populist Attitudes and Populist Dispositions in Taiwan’s Democracy
Chang Yu-Tzung (2009), Lin Wen-Cheng and Lin Thung-Hong (2020), Tsai Ming-Chang and Pan Hsin-Hsin (2021), and Wei-Ting Yen (2021) analyse populist attitudes in Taiwan. The dominant definition of populism that is used by all scholars is the ideational approach, while the socio-cultural and political-strategic approaches can also be found. Chang uses data from the 2006 Asian Barometer Survey and concludes that over 60 percent of Taiwanese are oriented towards populist democracy and only 20 percent are oriented towards liberal democracy. For his analysis, he distinguishes between ‘populist democracy’ (民粹式民主, mincuishi minzhu) and liberal democracy. According to Chang, ‘populist democracy’ stresses elections as the key characteristic of democracy and is sceptical towards the separation of powers, rule of law, or human rights, which are characteristics of liberal democracy (Chang, 2009).
Lin and Lin analyse the socio-economic factors that contributed to the rise of Taiwanese populism in recent years. Their article utilises two telephone surveys in 2018 to examine two political figures with populist characteristics, Han Kuo-yu and Ko Wen-je. Their analysis shows that support for the kmt markedly increased among the unemployed, unskilled workers, and the self-employed when Han Kuo-yu was the party’s candidate in Kaohsiung’s local election. However, Ko Wen-je attracts more support from the younger generation, and less from the typical groups of supporters of populism (Lin & Lin, 2020).
Yen (2021) explores the social roots of populism in Taiwan, in particular whether and how economic insecurity contributes to populism. She uses data from the 2014 and 2018 Asian Barometer Survey for her study. According to Yen’s analysis, income is a good predictor of support for populism, more than occupation or employment status: in Taiwan, people with a low income tend to be more supportive of populism.
Tsai and Pan used data from the 2019 wave of the World Values Survey and found that about two-thirds of Taiwanese citizens hold anti-elite sentiment and are either ‘mild’ or ‘strong’ populists, while most of the remaining citizens are ‘weak’ populists. They conceptualise populism as supporting direct democracy, anti-elitism, and the desire for strong leadership. The anti-elite dimension also includes a dichotomy between a corrupt elite and the sincere common people, in line with the ideational approach to populism (Tsai & Pan, 2021).
Four other Taiwanese scholars discuss populism in Taiwan more generally. Yun-Peng Chu views Taiwan’s democracy as populist because it lacks proper deliberation. Chu (2015: 119) argues that ‘when most emerging economies imported western democracy they imported only the skin, not the essence’; the essence, in Chang’s (2009) view, is deliberation. According to Chu, populism adopts short-sighted politics and has contributed to Taiwan’s sluggish growth in the 2000s and 2010s (Chu, 2015: 143–144). Like Chang (2009), Kuang Szu-Sheng (2017) views Taiwan as a ‘populist democracy’. The reason is that Taiwan’s political struggle is based on the cleavage of Taiwan’s national identity and that emotions (‘emotional populism’ [情緒式民粹, qingxushi mincui]) play an important role in Taiwan’s elections. He also mentions the Sunflower Movement as an example of this populism (Kuang, 2017: 82). Kuang sees this focus on national identity and emotional politics as the main problem that Taiwan’s democracy faces, and advocates rational politics based on the tradition of Sun Yat-sen and the constitution of the Republic of China (Kuang, 2017: 83). Hu and Chiang (2020) focus on the role of the internet in populist politics and introduces the concept of ‘internet technological populism’ (網路科技民粹主義, wanglu keji mincuizhuyi), having three main features: First, big data experts are core decision-makers in the candidate’s electoral campaign; second, populists cooperate with extremist writers on the internet who spread hate speech and fake news; third, political leaders are non-traditional and anti-elite. Han Kuo-yu is viewed as a populist but does not belong to the category of internet technological populism according to Hu and Chiang (2020).
In sum, there are six major characteristics of the definitions of populism in Taiwan that have been analysed in the previous paragraphs (see Figure 2). First, the three dominant approaches to populism—ideational, political-strategic, and socio-cultural—can all be found in academic research on Taiwan, but they are not always rigorously applied. For example, according to the scholars discussed above, populism mobilises the people against someone, ‘the other’ and/or an elite. This divide between the people and an elite is consistent with the ideational approach, but some scholars do not clearly define a moral standard on which this divide is based and/or do not incorporate Müller’s ‘anti-pluralist’ dimension. The moral standard for distinguishing between the people and the elite seems sometimes be based on the author’s personal political convictions (see below). The most widely used approach by far is the ideational approach, which confirms the dominance of this approach in research on populism worldwide.
Definitions of populism in Taiwan.
Citation: International Journal of Taiwan Studies 7, 2 (2024) ; 10.1163/24688800-20231313
Second, many researchers in Taiwan have developed their own definitions of populism. These definitions often build on or incorporate one or more of the components of the ‘triangle of populism’ outlined above. It certainly makes sense to view and evaluate populism against the distinct background of one’s own political system and its political culture. However, not all the newly invented definitions contribute to a better understanding of populism in Taiwan and/or expand the existing definitions of populism in a significant way. These definitions often cast a wider net to categorise politicians as populists, who would otherwise not be put in this category.
The Taiwanese definitions of populism can be classified into three (loose) categories: anti-elitist populism, anti-China populism, and emotional populism, which partly overlap. The anti-elite factor is dominant in Taiwanese research on populism. This underlines an important similarity with global research on populism in which the ideational approach seems to be the most widely used. The most important streak in Taiwan is a combination of anti-elitist populism with anti-China populism. This dual approach to populism often has a strong normative bias because it only views pushing a Chinese identity on Taiwan and rapprochement with the Chinese mainland as rational.
Third, the widespread anti-elite dimension in definitions of populism by Taiwanese scholars is consistent with the ideational approach. However, the ‘moral standard’ for distinguishing between the people and the elite is, for some scholars in Taiwan, the relationship with mainland China, which is not consistent with the ideational approach (or the other two approaches). It seems that some scholars tend to use their own research to classify politicians that they dislike as populists (e.g., Copper, 2015; G. G. Huang, 1995, 2004). Politicians who advocate for Taiwanese national identity are often considered to be irrational, emotional, and thus populist. But populism is not about political content, it is about a Manichean conflict between the elite and the masses, where both are defined in moral terms, anti-pluralism, political style and methods, and/or the role of the populist leader. More recent research on populism in Taiwan is more academic and adheres less to this normative bias, compared to this greater tendency toward politicisation in older research on Taiwan.
Fourth, populism is mainly seen as a negative phenomenon. Almost all discussions about populism include an ‘anti-elite’ and/or ‘anti-expert’ factor, which is usually considered to be a negative characteristic. Only Wu and Chu (2021), the proponents of bottom-up populism, view the Sunflower Movement’s anti-elitism as positive, because the objective of the movement was to defend Taiwan’s democracy and human rights. The authors claim that the Sunflower Movement was a social movement that aimed to defend Taiwan’s liberal-democratic values and human rights against the authoritarian threat of mainland China. At the same time, Wu and Chu claim that the participants in the Sunflower Movement advocated direct or participatory democracy, such as more referenda, which is a contradiction. The movement seems to be better classified as a social movement that promoted human rights and democracy. Even though the movement opposed the government of Ma Ying-jeou, the political elite at that time, it is questionable whether this is sufficient to classify it as a populist movement. At least, it would be hard to do so while following the ideational, political-strategic, and/or socio-cultural approaches.
Fifth, many definitions in academic debates stress the anti-liberal character of populism (e.g., Chang, 2009; Chien & Wang, 1995). A frequently repeated point is that populists and their supporters emphasise the electoral dimension of democracy instead of the liberal form of democracy. Even if this might be the case, this hardly counts as populism. Electoral democracy is a well-established type of democracy, associated with Joseph Schumpeter and other scholars (Coppedge et al., 2011). Some Taiwanese authors go even further and associate populism in Taiwan with authoritarianism or even fascism (e.g., G. G. Huang, 1995, 2004). This is the most puzzling assessment, as the two first democratically elected presidents of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, are put into this category. By all independent standards of inquiry, neither qualifies as a dictator. On the contrary, both presidents considerably expanded democracy and the protection of human rights.
Sixth, most of the analysed Taiwanese politicians possess some populist characteristics, but ‘strong populists’, who fully conform to at least one of the three approaches or contain distinct elements of two or three of the approaches, are rare in Taiwan. Han Kuo-yu is probably the clearest example of a populist Taiwanese politician. The scholars in Taiwan who have analysed him all agree that his anti-elitist discourse and his style—that is, his self-portrayed ‘common and simple man’ status, living style, and appearance—are the main elements that categorise him as a populist (Batto, 2021a, 2021b; Ho, 2020: 104–108; Hu & Chiang, 2020: 175). These classifications thus follow to a large extent the ideational and the socio-cultural approaches.
4 Han Kuo-yu: the Rise and Fall of Taiwan’s Latest Populist
This section examines the case of Han Kuo-yu as Taiwan’s most recent and probably most clear-cut populist, in particular his rise and fall as a politician and the reasons for both developments. Han experienced a rapid rise as a politician from 2018 to 2020. In November 2018, he was elected mayor of Kaohsiung, which is traditionally a stronghold of the dpp. Han’s rise as a populist politician was remarkable for several reasons. He was not an outstanding politician, or businessman, before he appeared in 2018 on the political stage. He was a rather unremarkable kmt legislator from 1993 to 2001. Later, he served as the director of the Taipei Agricultural Products Marketing Corporation. In 2017, he ran for kmt party chair, but only finished fourth with 6 percent of the vote. In 2018, he wanted to run for mayor of Taipei, but the kmt pushed him to become a candidate in Kaohsiung’s local election. The kmt had not won Kaohsiung in the past 20 years, so everyone thought it was a hopeless race. Yet Han unexpectedly became a media star and created the so-called ‘Han wave’ that led to him winning a decisive victory with 54 percent of the vote. After his victory, he was immediately considered a potential candidate for the presidency, even though he had promised his constituents in Kaohsiung that he would not run. Nevertheless, he decided to become a presidential candidate for the kmt and was selected by the party for the 2020 presidential election (Batto, 2021a: 48, 2021b).
Han’s electoral campaign and his initial success were built on four consistent themes that he reiterated constantly. First, he said that Taiwan was once prosperous but had slid into decline, in particular compared to the three other ‘Asian tigers’: Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore. Second, he said that all presidents since Taiwan’s democratisation in the 1990s did not do enough to develop Taiwan’s economy, including the kmt presidents. During the presidential campaign, he portrayed the dpp as corrupt and accused its members of spending taxpayers’ money on themselves and their cronies, even though there was no major corruption scandal involving dpp politicians during President Tsai Ing-wen’s tenure. Third, Han claimed that the ‘common people’ just wanted to make money and were mainly materialistic. As such, Taiwanese politicians should not concern themselves with complicated questions of international politics or cross-Strait relations. Fourth, Han reiterated that voters could trust him because he was a ‘simple commoner’ himself who constantly worked for the benefit of ‘the people’ (Batto, 2021a: 55–64, 2021b). Initially, many Taiwanese liked that Han styled himself as an outsider and a ‘common man’ and had a fresh style. Furthermore, during the 2018 Taiwanese local elections, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the Tsai government due to a comparatively low economic growth rate during her first term, the enactment of controversial pension and labour reforms and same-sex marriage legislation, and strained cross-Strait relations (Ho, 2020: 103–105). Growing social inequality and fewer economic opportunities for small business owners fuelled the rise of Han Kuo-yu, too. Many small business owners, low-skilled workers, and unemployed people liked his promise of more economic opportunities and his rhetoric of being a ‘common man’ himself. Such groups are more or less the same as those that support populist parties and movements in Europe and the Americas (Lin, 2020; Lin & Lin, 2020).
Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Taiwan on 11 January 2020. In the presidential elections, President Tsai Ing-wen received 57.1 percent of the vote, Han Kuo-yu 38.6 percent, and the third candidate, James Soong from the People First Party, 4.3 percent. In the end, the incumbent Tsai Ing-wen won in a landslide against Han. In June 2020, Han was even removed as mayor of Kaohsiung (Batto, 2021b; Krumbein, 2020).
Several factors explain Han Kuo-yu’s ultimate failure in the presidential election. First, he often seemed incompetent and chaotic in his management of municipal affairs and could not keep his promises to stimulate economic growth. Second, trust in his character eroded during the electoral campaign. He had broken his promise to the people of Kaohsiung that he would not run for president. Additionally, he was involved in scandals, such as speculation in luxury real estate, which undermined his populist brand as a ‘common and simple man’ (Batto, 2021b; Krumbein, 2020).
Third, internal conflicts within the kmt and the so-called ‘blue camp’ or ‘pan-blue coalition’ (consisting of the kmt and smaller parties closely aligned with it) also contributed to his poor election results. The aforementioned third candidate in the 2020 general election, 77-year-old James Soong, a veteran of Taiwanese politics who was running for president for the fourth time, was supported by Terry Gou, founder of Apple supplier Foxconn and one of the richest men on the island. Soong and Gou both belonged to the ‘blue camp’. Gou himself had been defeated by Han in the kmt primary and then resigned from the kmt. He and Soong, as well as parts of the elite of the kmt, disputed Han’s competence to govern Taiwan. In contrast to this, the ‘green camp’ around Tsai Ing-wen and the dpp was not only united, but also able to mobilise its electorate, including the younger generation. Voter turnout in the presidential election was 74.9 percent, significantly higher than four years earlier, when it was 66.3 percent (Krumbein, 2020).
Fourth, though Han’s stance against ideology, that is, largely ignoring cross-Strait relations, worked in a local election in Kaohsiung, national elections in Taiwan generally tend to be dominated by the ‘China factor’. This was particularly true for the 2020 election. On 2 January 2019, prc President Xi Jinping reaffirmed in a keynote address on Taiwan that a union of the mainland with Taiwan was inevitable, by force if necessary, and that it should be carried out under the ‘one country, two systems’ formula (Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the prc, 2019). Xi’s speech was perceived as a hardening of the prc position towards Taiwan, even though Xi only reaffirmed the country’s long-standing position on cross-Strait relations. However, he missed the opportunity to present new options for better relations with Taiwan. The already widely unpopular ‘one country, two systems’ formula lost further credibility due to the protest movement in Hong Kong, which reached its climax in 2019. Though the prc still insists on the ‘one country, two systems’ formula for Taiwan, the Taiwanese see that even the much more limited democratic freedoms and rights in Hong Kong—compared to their democracy—are being undermined by the ccp. Tsai Ing-wen has stressed in several speeches and statements that Taiwan’s democracy is non-negotiable and that ‘one country, two systems’ is not an acceptable solution. She also expressed her solidarity with Hong Kong’s democracy movement. Even though the kmt has also rejected ‘one country, two systems’ and Han Kuo-yu said during the election campaign that this concept would be applied ‘over his dead body’ (Chan, Huang & Ho, 2019), the Hong Kong protests further galvanised support for President Tsai. Most Taiwanese feared that mainland China could expand its political influence over Taiwan if there were closer economic cooperation, as envisaged in Han’s election platform (Krumbein, 2020).
In summary, Han Kuo-yu can well be classified as a populist following the ideational and the socio-cultural approaches. But his populism only had limited success for three main reasons. First, his populist credibility as a ‘common and simple man’ was undermined by reports about his wealth and lavish living style. Second, he also failed to define clearly in moral terms what ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ were. For example, he did not exclude a specific minority from ‘the people’ and attack it, as many populists do with migrants or rich people. Third, the dominant theme during the electoral campaign was the ‘China factor’ but his strategy focused on socio-economic topics.
5 Media Analysis: Han Kuo-yu and Populism in Taiwan
This article uses qualitative content analysis to examine narratives in three leading Taiwanese newspapers, the China Times, the Liberty Times, and the United Daily News, during the period from 15 July 2019 to 31 January 2020. All articles containing the terms ‘Han Kuo-yu’ (韓國瑜) and ‘populist’ (民粹) were selected, a total of 63 articles. The database WiseSearch (慧科資訊) was used for the search and to access the articles. A full list of the articles is provided in the appendix. The time period was selected because Han was chosen as the kmt’s presidential candidate on 15 July 2019 and the Taiwanese presidential and parliamentary elections in which he was the candidate took place on 11 January 2020. The three newspapers are among the most widely read newspapers in Taiwan. The China Times and the United Daily News are considered to be pro-kmt and to favour close relations with the Chinese mainland. The Liberty Times is viewed as a pro-dpp newspaper that displays a more sceptical attitude towards the mainland. The main objective is to analyse whether and how Han Kuo-yu is portrayed as a populist and how populism in general is discussed as a phenomenon in Taiwan. Three broad narratives can be found in the three newspapers.
5.1 First Narrative: Taiwan as a Populist Democracy
According to the first narrative, populism is a general problem in Taiwanese politics (Table A1, no. 19). Populism is associated with appealing directly to the people’s likes and dislikes but neglecting dialogue and deliberation (Table A1, no. 8). Taiwan is seen not as a democracy, but as a populist polity because it lacks checks and balances and proper supervision of government (Table A2, no. 11). Here the journalists refer to anti-elitist and anti-liberal elements as characteristics of populism.
The two main parties, the dpp and kmt, are both seen as populist parties (Table A2, no. 9). For example, the common characteristic of both the ‘blue’ and ‘green’ political camps is ‘not to read, not to be diligent and mindful, and to engage in populism’ (Table A1, no. 14). One reason for the classification of the dpp and the kmt as populist parties is that the two presidential candidates in 2020, Tsai and Han, made too many promises to increase spending during their electoral campaigns (Table A2, no. 13). But making too many promises in an electoral campaign is viewed as demagogy, which can be defined as politicians who say whatever the people want to hear in an opportunistic attempt to gain popularity (Mudde, 2017: 31).
Four elements characterise populism according to Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao in the Liberty Times: a right-wing and anti-immigrant ideology, charisma of populist leaders, anti-elitism and a discourse of ‘the people’, and the simplification of political problems and solutions. The final three elements exist among Taiwanese politicians, and Hsiao mentions Han Kuo-yu in particular. But he views populism as a trend in Taiwanese politics that is not limited to Han (Table A3, no. 8). In another article, Han Kuo-yu is described by the author Tzou Jing-Wen as representing the global trend of populism (Table A3, no. 20).
5.2 Second Narrative: Han Kuo-yu as a Populist
In a second narrative, Han Kuo-yu is portrayed in all three newspapers as a populist, in particular with regard to his political style (Table A1, no. 7). However, in the China Times, Han’s populism is sometimes seen positively, or downplayed as being necessary, because it is either a general trend in Taiwanese politics or because President Tsai is also a populist. According to journalists in the China Times, Han thus needs to adapt to this overall populist trend in Taiwanese politics and/or Tsai’s populism in order to gain votes (Table A1, nos. 7, 8). Today’s populist zeitgeist obliges politicians to use direct and politically incorrect language like that of Han Kuo-yu to connect with the people’s hearts (Table A1, no. 10). One article praises Han Kuo-yu’s populism because it represents a grassroots movement of the people, based on pureness, trust, and determination (Table A1, no. 1). However, some articles in the China Times and the United Daily News also criticise Han’s populism for causing him to lose support during the electoral campaign. Some authors urge him to avoid populism and to build up his own expertise and political competence (Table A1, nos. 11, 15; Table A2, nos. 7, 8). After Han lost the election, one article in the United Daily News clearly attributes his defeat to his populism and personal scandals and to well-educated young voters’ rejection of his populist language and style (Table A2, no. 15).
Whereas in the China Times and the United Daily News Han’s populism is seen ambiguously, the Liberty Times views Han’s populism as unequivocally negative. After Han is selected as the kmt’s presidential candidate, the newspaper reports that several international media have characterised him as a populist (Table A3, no. 3). For example, the New York Times described him as a ‘China-loving populist’ (親中民粹主義者, qinzhong mincuizhuyi zhe) (Table A3, no. 10).
One author criticises the kmt in general because it often labels Taiwan’s pluralist democracy as populist, but at the same time the party enjoys operating in Taiwan’s free and democratic political system. The author compares this attitude to that of the overseas Chinese, who frequently criticise democracy, but also enjoy the freedoms and rights of the countries that they live in (Table A3, no. 7).
Several articles mention different factors and reasons why Han Kuo-yu can be classified as a populist: His anti-establishment and anti-elite discourse (Table A3, nos. 8, 17); his simple and direct language and empty slogans (Table A3, nos. 4, 8, 11, 17); his deliberate ‘faking’ of the language of the ‘common man’ (Table A3, no. 22); his self-proclaimed status a political outsider and styling of himself as a ‘common man’ and his savvy use of social media (Table A3, no. 17); his attacks on political opponents and stoking of hatred and political confrontation (Table A3, nos. 8, 13); and a lack of rational thinking and rational discussions about policies (Table A3, no. 13). The factors that are mentioned in these articles are to some extent in line with the ideational and the socio-cultural approaches to populism, as well as the anti-elite component that many scholars in Taiwan view as a main characteristic of populism. The definitions are not applied as rigorously and comprehensively as in academic publications, which is natural given the different objectives and background of journalists and scholars.
Han is also put in historical and cultural context and is compared to literary figures that have rebelled against the strict Confucian system of propriety and ethics (Table A3, no. 17). Finally, Han’s populism is viewed as a ‘populism with authoritarian values’ (威權價值的民粹, weiquan jiazhi de mincui), which displays nostalgia for Taiwan’s authoritarian past and a positive attitude towards mainland China’s authoritarian political system, because Han views Taiwan’s democracy as a reason for Taiwan’s economic and social problems (Table A3, no. 19).
5.3 Third Narrative: President Tsai and the dpp as Populist
In the China Times and the United Daily News, another narrative about populism exists, a counter-narrative that paints President Tsai and the dpp as populist (Table A1, nos. 16, 18; Table A2, no. 10). For example, Tsai is described as a ‘populist president’ (民粹總統, mincui zongtong) (Table A1, no. 7). Two reasons are cited several times for why President Tsai and the dpp are populist: their ‘anti-China’ stance and the government’s alleged authoritarianism.
First, a frequently repeated point is that Tsai Ing-wen and the dpp stir up cross-Strait tensions to gain popular support and to advance their own selfish interests (Table A1, nos. 4, 12; Table A2, nos. 3, 6, 14). President Tsai and the dpp are accused of using populist strategies to advance their ‘anti-China’ political objectives (Table A1, no. 5). For example, the slogan ‘loving Taiwan’ is viewed as creating a populist atmosphere that impedes rational discussions whether to promote teaching the Taiwanese language in schools or not (Table A1, no. 13).
Second, the dpp government is portrayed as an authoritarian government. One author even compares the Tsai government’s authoritarian threat with Hitler and Mussolini (Table A1, no. 19). In two other articles, the government is seen as populist, because it does not respect the rule of law (Table A1, no. 12) and is described as ‘authoritarian populism’ (威權民粹主義, weiquan mincuizhuyi) because the dpp is doing whatever it wants while in government and that there is a lack of checks and balances and control of the government in Taiwan (Table A2, no. 16). But concrete examples of Tsai’s alleged authoritarian rule are largely missing. The dpp majority in the Legislative Yuan is cited as a threat to Taiwan’s democracy because the dpp controls both the executive and legislative powers, but how the dpp has used this combined power to endanger Taiwan’s democracy is not described (Table A2, no. 16).
5.4 Discussion
The media analysis reflects some of the global and Taiwanese academic debates about populism in Taiwan, even though media and academic debates address different audiences, and the objectives and methods of inquiry are also not alike. With the exception of one article in the Liberty Times (Table A3, no. 8), the Taiwanese media do not address in-depth academic discussions of populism.
An initial similarity is that some articles in the China Times and the United Daily News classify the Tsai government as authoritarian. This reflects the (older) academic debate in Taiwan that has classified Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian as authoritarian or even fascist leaders. But this assessment of President Tsai is mainly fact-free, if not entirely ridiculous. Taiwan’s democracy is—like many others—not perfect, but under Tsai Ing-wen’s leadership it ranked as Asia’s most democratic country and the eight most democratic country worldwide in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2021 Democracy Index (Economist, 2022). Other independent assessments have come to similar conclusions and put Taiwan among the most democratic countries in the world (Freedom House, 2022).
Furthermore, among the analysed newspapers, the China Times and the United Daily News characterise President Tsai and the dpp as populist in some articles due to her and her party’s cross-Strait positions and policies. To oppose closer cross-Strait relations is often portrayed as irrational (e.g., Table A1, nos. 4, 12; Table A2, nos. 3, 6, 14). But ‘irrational’ here usually means to advocate political positions that are not shared by the authors of the articles. This hardly qualifies as populism. Populism in general is not about political content, but about a Manichean conflict between the elite and the masses, anti-pluralism, political style and methods, and the role of the populist leader. This same strand of thinking can be found in parts of the academic debate about populism in Taiwan. Interestingly, both in the media and in academic debates, only opposition to cooperation or further integration with mainland China is viewed by some as populist. A pro-China stance is never considered to be a characteristic of populism. While Han Kuo-yu is often viewed as a populist, it is not because of his stance towards the mainland. This connection between populism and a sceptical view towards mainland China is probably influenced by the mainland itself. For example, the ccp and its proxies have helped Han Kuo-yu during his campaign. The mainland Chinese media also uniformly cast politicians from the ‘green camp’ in a negative light and their discourse is often echoed by ‘pan-blue’ media in Taiwan (P. Huang, 2019).
Additionally, a good indicator for the classification of a politician as a populist by a newspaper seems to be the political standpoint of the journalist or commentator. Part of the media debate about populism is clearly politicised and uses the term populism to discredit politicians or parties from the opposite political group, often actors that promote Taiwan’s identity and/or view mainland China’s influence critically. At worst, these definitions are nonsense, akin to viewing Tsai Ing-wen as an authoritarian leader. At best, they may point out that identity politics of some politicians can foster political tensions, hatred, and exclusion of parts of the population, which could conform to the ideational approach. However, the authors often fail to identify where the boundary lies between, on one side, the legitimate promotion of a Taiwanese identity and understandable scepticism towards mainland China’s authoritarian threat, and on the other side, the incitement of hatred towards mainland China and a Chinese identity. They also overlook the fact that the kmt did engage in identity politics as well and did—often ferociously—impose a uniform Chinese identity on Taiwan that neglected Taiwan’s indigenous and local traditions. The three newspapers seem all to be influenced by biases and the political orientation of their editors and/or owners. The China Times seems to be the most partisan, followed by the United Daily News, and the Liberty Times (see, e.g., Table A1, nos. 4, 12, 16, 18, 19; Table A2, nos. 3, 6, 10, 11, 14, 16). The Liberty Times is the most rigorous among the three newspapers in applying academic definitions of populism. The partisan orientation of the newspapers was to be expected as the Taiwanese media has a reputation for being strongly politicised and not necessarily having a high standard of journalistic ethics.
Finally, Han Kuo-yu is categorised uniformly as a populist. Recurrent factors for his classification as a populist in media debates are as follows: Han’s ‘anti-elitist’ and ‘anti-expert’ discourse; his simple and direct language and his simple slogans; his direct connection with voters through social media and mass rallies; his self-styling as a ‘common man’ and political outsider; and his negative views on Taiwan’s democracy and positive views on Taiwan’s authoritarian past. The media thus largely echo global and Taiwanese academic debates in their classification of Han Kuo-yu as a populist. His discourse conforms to the divide between a ‘pure people’, which he claims to represent and to be a part of, and a ‘corrupt elite’. He is also ‘low’ and uses the language of the ‘common man’ and tries in every aspect to style himself as such a person. Han establishes direct communication with his supporters through social media and mass rallies as well, but he has still relied on the party establishment and has not captured or dominated the kmt. Even though he has praised Taiwan’s authoritarian past and criticised the dpp elite, anti-pluralism is not a hallmark of his discourse. Following the ideational and socio-cultural approaches to populism, we can classify Han Kuo-yu as a populist. The political-strategic approach and Müller’s definition seem less well-suited for labelling Han as a populist but still contribute to the overall populist assessment of him.
6 Conclusion
Populism in Taiwan has not been a widespread and dominant phenomenon since Taiwan’s democratisation, even if some of the academic and media debates on the island suggest otherwise. Han Kuo-yu is probably the most unambiguous example of a populist in Taiwan’s democratic history, and he was defeated in a landslide by President Tsai Ing-wen in the 2020 general election. Overall, Taiwan’s democracy has so far proved to be largely resilient to populism, a characteristic that the island shares with the other two East Asian democracies, Japan and South Korea. The island is Asia’s most democratic country and possesses strong democratic institutions, such as an independent judiciary. Taiwan also possesses a high level of socio-economic development and has a well-educated population. These are key factors that increase the resilience of democracies against populism (Weyland, 2021c). Taiwan also lacks a substantial ethnic, national, or religious minority, and the number of migrants is also small. The typical Western right-wing populist discourse juxtaposing (national and ethnic) ‘insiders’ against ‘outsiders’, such as migrants, does not work in Taiwan (Lie, 2019). That does not mean that populism cannot be successful in Taiwan but the hurdles that populists are facing seem rather high.
Appendix
Notes on Contributor
Frédéric Krumbein has been Heinrich Heine Visiting Professor at Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel, since 2020. He was a 2019 and 2014 Taiwan Fellow at the National Taiwan University in Taipei, Taiwan. Until 2020, he has worked as a researcher in the Asia Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (swp) in Berlin, Germany. He was also a lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at the Free University of Berlin and holds a PhD in political science from the same university. He obtained his master’s degree in international relations at the Institute of Political Science (SciencesPo) in Paris, France. His research interests include human rights policies of Taiwan and mainland China, lgbtiq+ rights in East Asia, cross-Strait relations, populism in East Asia, and EU—China and EU—Taiwan relations.
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One frequently used definition of populism was developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. They view populism as the essence of radical democracy and a potential solution to the limitations and shortcomings of liberal democracy. According to them, populism can function as an emancipatory, counter-hegemonic, and left-wing force that challenges ‘corrupt elites’. It can function as an innovative force that can change a sclerotic and unjust political order by reintroducing conflict into politics (Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 2018). This definition will not be used here because it has a normative bias, views populism as mainly positive, and Laclau and Mouffe’s approach is not clearly distinguishable from definitions of social movements and participatory democracy.
Descendants of the ethnic Hoklo or Hakka Taiwanese who settled in Taiwan prior to or during the Japanese colonial era.
Descendants of the mainlanders who arrived after 1945.
