Abstract
This article applies a three-level framework based on the logic of ontological security to the case of party interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwan in the post-handover years. Rather than through domestication and subversion, as the literature suggests, this article argues that liminal actors enhance their ontological security through interacting with like-minded partners. Establishing the case of liminality for Hong Kong and Taiwan, this article also finds that both conventional and movement parties in the two political units interacted to strengthen their stable sense of self. However, their practices differed based on their political positions within the political systems and their available resources. This article provides the first empirical mapping of the conventional party interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwan. It seeks to contribute a theoretical framework explaining the close links between political units and their movements.
1 Introduction
The 2020 presidential election in Taiwan reminded us of the close connection between events in Hong Kong and Taiwan, given the large-scale protests against the extradition bill in Hong Kong that preceded and elevated the importance of the Hong Kong issue in the election in Taiwan. The victory of the Democratic Progressive Party was also the culmination of years of party interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwan. Given recent events, it is perhaps not surprising that an increasing amount of academic scholarship has addressed the interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwan. Most studies have revolved around the framework of the ‘China Factor’ articulated by Jieh-min Wu (2016) and further expanded in Fong, Wu, and Nathan’s edited volume (2020). Wu defined the China Factor as ‘the process by which the prc government utilises capital and related resources to absorb other countries and “offshore districts” (jingwai diqu, such as Hong Kong) into its sphere of economic influence, thereby making them economically dependent on China in order to further facilitate its political influence’ (2016: 430).
Recognised as a ‘framework concept’, the China Factor also became a useful shorthand to illustrate the impact brought to Hong Kong and Taiwan by the rise of China. In response to the influence of the China Factor, Wu’s framework also referred to the resistance or reaction against pressures from China by shedding light on the agency of civil society actors and others in the form of social movements. Similarly, other scholars have broadly regarded interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwan as part of the transnational resistance movement against the China Factor. For instance, Ming-sho Ho discussed the ‘Taiwan-Hong Kong nexus’ (2019: 91–93) regarding transnational social movement networks that facilitated the mutual sharing of information, strategies, and identities in different areas (Fominaya, 2014). Identifying the ‘Hongkongisation’ in Taiwanese society (Kaeding, 2014), Malte Kaeding conceptualised the transnational interactions between non-state actors in Hong Kong and Taiwan as three stages of development, which included strategic cooperation and normative expression (2015: 214–215).
While these studies helpfully highlighted the importance of the transnational interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwan, there were two gaps that this paper hopes to contribute to. First, existing work has primarily focused on the interactions between social movements. That is understandable, given the large-scale protests against the People’s Republic of China (prc) echoed between the two societies in the past decade. This paper sheds light on the interactions between political parties who also enjoyed close links throughout the years but perhaps in a less high-profile fashion than movement activists. Second, recent works on Hong Kong–Taiwan interactions have rarely considered the question of change or compared the interactions historically. Such longer-term considerations can allow fruitful reflection on the key factors that explain the interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwan throughout the post-handover period.
Therefore, this article seeks to answer two research questions: (1) How and why did political parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan interact in the post-handover period? And (2) what explains the change in the practice of party interactions over the 23 years since the handover (i.e. 1997–2020)? This paper answers these questions by comparing conventional parties with movement parties. Specifically, I have selected those conventional and movement parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan who were the main parties throughout the post-handover years and more experienced in party interactions, though their year of emergence differed. In the case of Hong Kong, only parties from the pro-democracy camp were selected because of the methodological difficulty of recruiting participants from the pro-Beijing parties.1 The parties selected were the Democratic Party (dp), the Civic Party (cp), the Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (adpl), the Labour Party (lp), the League of Social Democrats (lsd), and Demosisto in Hong Kong and the Kuomintang (kmt), the Democratic Progressive Party (dpp), the Green Party (gpt), and the New Power Party (npp) in Taiwan.
Methodologically, content analysis of media reports and elite interviews was employed for this article. The fieldwork was carried out between October 2019 and August 2020 in two stages informed by praxiography, which is the specific methodology by scholars studying practices (Bueger, 2014). In the first stage, between October 2019 and January 2020, document analysis was conducted using Chinese-language media reports. Utilising the online Wisenews search engine, I used keywords such as ‘Fangkang’ (visiting Hong Kong) and ‘Fangtai’ (visiting Taiwan) and the party names to search for a wide range of media reports. It produced many reports which provided helpful indications of the basic information of the interactions. For instance, it found there were a total of 25 interactions between the parties in the 23 years. These valuable data helped formulate the interview questions in the second stage of my fieldwork. I interviewed participants and observers of interparty interactions, including party politicians and staff and officials of the intermediate organisations. Although the interviews simply represented practices by the participants, they are still a helpful method in political science to gain behind-the-scenes knowledge of political operations and decision-making, complementing the shortcomings of document analysis.
As my title suggests, I will answer the research questions through a three-level framework based on the logic of ontological security (os). I will argue that the interactions between political parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan were motivated by a desire for os, specifically in response to being in a liminal position. Based on the constructivist logic of identity formation, interacting with like-minded parties with a shared ideological framework helps enhance os. Thus, from such a perspective, the change of practices signals a shift in the shared ideology between the parties. Finally, my framework also explains the patterns of party interactions based on the resources at the parties’ disposal.
Section 2 will introduce the logic of os. Next, I will illustrate the three-level framework based on that logic that can specifically explain the interactions between political parties. The fourth section will apply the macro level of the framework to the case between Hong Kong and Taiwan by explaining the liminality of Hong Kong and Taiwan. In Section 5, I will demonstrate how the meso level of the framework can compare some of the practices employed by conventional and movement parties in their interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwan. Utilising the micro-level factors, the sixth section will then assess the different kinds of change witnessed in conventional and movement parties. The final section will conclude the argument. This article aims to provide an empirical mapping and description of the party interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwan in the post-handover years, which is the first study to do so. It will also seek to explain these interactions and how they changed through a framework based on the os logic.
2 The Logic of Ontological Security
The concept of os originated from the work of social theorist Anthony Giddens, who argued that the transformations of modernity threaten an individual’s sense of self. According to him, all individuals encounter a sense of anxiety in their early life. He used the example of the relationship between the infant and caretaker to illustrate the emotional protective cocoon that helps individuals against existential anxiety (1991: 36–42). Such anxiety hinders individuals from practising agency and getting on with everyday life. Thus, instead of understanding security in the conventional realist sense of physical and territorial security, os takes a psychological-cognitive approach and refers to the ‘security of the self’ or having a stable sense of self (Mitzen, 2006). Instead of seeking security regarding power and wealth, os seeks a stable sense of self—an identity based in time and space, or what scholars have called a biographical narrative of political units (Berenskoetter, 2014b; Giddens, 1991). Given that assumption and the constructivist logic that a sense of self is established through interactions, it is safe to suggest that enhancing os is a key motivation for political units to interact (Mitzen, 2006).
Having established the basic logic that enhancing os drives political units in interactions, the next question is why political units would feel ontologically insecure; where are the sources of insecurity, and why are some more insecure than others? Here, the concept of liminality might offer some clues. Originating in cultural anthropologists exploring the rites of passage, liminality refers to the rituals at play when an individual transitions from one social status to another, for instance, entering adulthood from adolescence (Thomassen, 2009). Turner described these in-between situations and conditions where these individuals are ‘neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, conventional, and ceremonial’ (1977: 95). This capture of in-betweenness was taken up by political scientists to specifically refer to marginal political actors not just in the temporal sense, as originally construed, but also in the spatial and discursive sense. For instance, the hegemonic status of the state-centred discourse in international politics creates a liminal relationship with many entities that struggle for state recognition (Bouris & Fernández-Molina, 2018; Pace & Pallister-Wilkins, 2018). Not only does this provide a new level of analysis, but the focus on liminality also sheds light on relationality, which is often overlooked in the international relations literature (Jackson & Nexon, 1999; Mälksoo, 2012).
Indeed, in the literature, the concept helps capture many different empirical instances where liminality results from contrasting sources. For instance, while Bouris and Fernández-Molina (2018) considered Palestine and Western Sahara to be liminal because of their contested states’ status striving for recognition, Rumelili (2003, 2007) saw Turkey as being liminal because of its geography and culture in relation to Europe. As contrasting as they seem, Pace and Pallister-Wilkins (2018) regarded both the European Union and Hamas as liminal due to their non-state status. Mälksoo (2009) used liminality to describe post-Soviet Baltic states for their lack of ‘Europeanness’ historically. Closer to the case explored in this paper, Corcuff (2012) argued that Taiwan’s liminality vis-à-vis China results from historical and geopolitical ambiguity. From these previous studies, it is safe to conclude two points. First, it seems certain that history and recognition are important elements that create that in-betweenness for liminal actors. Geography matters as well in the sense that they are in the periphery, such as in the case of Turkey and the Baltic states. Second, it is evident that liminality only exists in relation to a hegemon, whether that is a hegemonic discourse or another powerful political actor.
Thus, from the os perspective, because of their differing histories or the lack of recognition, one can plausibly argue that liminal actors are prone to be more ontologically insecure than normal and dominant actors. Since they are located in the periphery by being liminal, their sense of self is more unstable, and anxiety is more likely to be created, obstructing political actors from practising their agency (Rumelili, 2012). In other words, they also need to be more active in enhancing os and pursuing a stable sense of self through their practices. For that purpose, Rumelili (2012: 503–505) helpfully suggested two options liminal actors can pursue to enhance their os. First, liminal actors could seek to domesticate themselves to existing social categories or discourses. In practice, for instance, actors could try to learn the culture or imitate the practice of formal state actors. She calculated that this is the option that most liminal actors would seek since it does not challenge the existing power structure. However, other liminal actors also enhance their os by embracing their ambiguity and in-betweenness and subverting the existing social categorisation. In practice, it could mean rejecting the political project of nation-states or engaging in resistance movements.
Nevertheless, I argue that there is a key blind spot within these responses to enhancing os. Both domestication and subversion are practices that focus on relations with a hegemon or hegemonic discourses. Whether actors decide to reproduce or challenge the existing social structures, such a thesis assumes that only practices focused on the relationship with the hegemon could stabilise the sense of self of liminal actors. In this paper, I suggest an alternative type of relationship that can enhance os. Although constructivism has established the logic that interactions help enhance os, I suggest that a specific type of interaction, cooperation between two like-minded political units, can particularly reflect the practices of liminal actors seeking os. Thus, I would argue that the practices of cooperation between them are the specific response to actors being in a liminal position, not simply through domestication and subversion vis-à-vis the hegemon. Cooperation, in this sense, might not involve acts or projects of collaboration. It might simply provide ideational reinforcement and support that enhances the stable sense of self and reduces the anxiety as liminal actors.
3 Ontological Security and Political Parties: a Three-Level Framework
Up to this point, I have deliberately omitted political parties from the discussion in order to clearly illustrate the basic logic of os and the fact that it could work regardless of the political units. Hence, irrespective of the nature of the political units—whether they are states, ngo s, rebel groups, or political parties—links are expected to be formed under the circumstances explained in this framework. By engaging with political parties specifically, this section will demonstrate how the logic of os can understand and explain the interactions between political parties on three different dimensions, namely the macro, meso, and micro levels. Whereas the macro level refers to factors or conditions shared between both types of parties, namely their liminal relationship in relation to the hegemon, the meso level refers to factors specific to one type of political party. In other words, they are properties distinct from either conventional or movement parties. Finally, the micro level refers to factors that apply only to individual party interactions. These three levels of factors, underpinned by the logic of os, might explain the different practices of interaction between political parties that we can see empirically. Crucially, this framework offers the potential to account for the change of practices that have traditionally been a problem of the os framework.
On the macro level, the main factor for the logic of os to work is the existence of a hegemonic neighbour shared by both liminal actors. As seen above, a hegemon creates a primary source of insecurity for political units, in this case, political parties, in the liminal actors. In other words, the hegemon is a destabilising factor. The hegemon is destabilising or threatening, and not just in the realist sense of being powerful and resourceful in relation to the small and vulnerable periphery. According to the logic of os, the hegemon is also intrinsically destabilising because it threatens the biographical narratives of the liminal actors—imposing a political project that the political parties within the liminal actors are not sure about. In the previous section, the literature discussed illustrated that differing histories and the struggle for recognition are important elements in creating that hegemonic—liminal relationship that threatens os. They are important because a biographical narrative involves both a temporal dimension that includes a historical and future self and a spatial dimension where communities feel ‘at home’ (Berenskoetter, 2014b). The differing histories create the disconnection in the temporal sense, and the struggle for diplomatic recognition sows doubt on the stability of the spatial dimension. In that sense, it is also plausible to suggest that uncertainty about the future is also part of the insecurity or anxiety because of the existence of the hegemon vis-à-vis the liminal actors.
Undoubtedly, as mentioned earlier, os is a psychological-cognitive approach, and what is described here is a psychological state of mind of political actors, which makes it hard to find clear indicators to analyse empirically. Nonetheless, it could be inferred from the practice and rhetoric of the participants of the interviews. Indeed, such difficulty in observing ontological insecurity and security and demonstrating that a political unit is anxious has always been a critique of the os approach (Lebow, 2016). However, I believe that even a theoretical argument that is hard to show empirically does not diminish its analytical value as an approach. Indeed, previous literature has demonstrated that enhancing os could be used as a factor to analyse the actions of liminal actors that fit with the empirical narrative (Pace & Pallister-Wilkins, 2018).
Due to their positions in relation to the hegemon, my framework argues that liminal actors need os more than actors who are not in a liminal relationship. The discussion so far has remained on the level of a political entity without unpacking the sub-entity level of political actors. According to this logic, all political actors within the liminal entity share the same level of insecurity because of their relationship with the hegemon. Based on the predictions of the framework, we would expect all political actors (parties) within a liminal entity to interact with like-minded partners in another liminal entity in the same way to enhance their os. However, that is rarely the case empirically. Thus, in addition to the macrostructure of the liminal—hegemonic relationship that creates insecurity for political actors, I would further hypothesise that different types of political parties have various degrees of ontological insecurity based on their positions within the power structure and the resources they must employ to make them feel more ontologically secure. In that sense, the meso level offers an argument to explain and compare the different practices of interactions of the two types of parties selected in this paper. Although these parties all share the ontologically insecure situation as part of the liminal entity, they employ different responses.
Although the concept of having a different degree of insecurity within liminal actors remains underexplored, one empirical study has identified ‘degrees of liminality that relate to social and political hierarchies and structural power arrangements’ (Pace & Pallister-Wilkins, 2018: 224). The authors went on to illustrate that the identification also affected the practices liminal actors used to enhance os. The obvious contrast between the two types of political parties in this paper in their hierarchies and power arrangements is their positions within the political system. Whereas conventional parties are the ideal type of political party, focused on winning elections and gaining the power to govern, movement parties are like challengers who struggle to balance social activism and electoral politics (Kitschelt, 2006). In that sense, one can intuitively argue that conventional parties are in stronger structural positions when compared to movement parties, which are more marginalised within the power structure. As the subsequent empirical discussions indicate, such positions would influence their practice of interactions.
More importantly, conventional parties also possess more formal party institutions and structures than movement parties. From the perspective of os, institutions are important os providers and support mechanisms that political actors can fall back on to control anxiety and stabilise a sense of self (Zarakol, 2017). Even when they are less stable and secure as political units due to their liminal positions, conventional parties can rely on institutions and party structures to provide a stable framework for parties to operate. In contrast, movement parties often do not have these institutions to support them and rely instead on charismatic individual leaders. Thus, I contend, movement parties are more in need of constant strengthening of their os through non-institutionalised means such as reaching out to their personal networks transnationally. Because of this difference, I would expect more institutionalised links in the transnational interactions between conventional parties. In contrast, for movement parties, their interactions would be less institutionalised and more personal through their informal networks of social movements.
Moreover, due to the meso-level factors, the types of changes in the two kinds of interactions can be differentiated. As a result of the likely higher level of institutionalisation between conventional parties’ interactions, the change of interactions or the switching of partners will be slow and gradual because institutional change is sticky (often shorthanded as institutional inertia). Those interactions and practices that have already been established between institutions last and take time to change. Thus, even when the perception of an ideational shift occurs, conventional parties take a long time to decide whether to invest in alternatives. Those are the contestation phases for the party interactions as conventional parties search for an ideologically aligned counterpart. Even when a switching decision is made, there will be a lot of lingering elements between the parties because of the institutional relations established earlier. On the contrary, movement parties do not have institutions and institutionalised links to ‘hold’ the change of interactions. Thus, rapid changes would happen between movement parties’ interactions because of their flexibility. The interactions can rapidly increase when they have the potential to enhance the sense of security. However, the decision to stop and drop interactions when the parties no longer share the same ideology can also be made quickly without the mediating effect of institutions. Indeed, because of their flexible and informal networks, movement parties can recreate those links where they can provide a high level of os in a way that the conventional parties cannot.
The final micro level addresses factors specific to each party’s interactions and how parties relate to one another. How do political parties identify like-minded parties where they can stabilise a sense of self and enhance os? Comparative politics scholars have made an identity-based argument for party ideology, which defines it as a ‘belief system that goes right at the heart of a party’s identity’ (Mair & Mudde, 1998: 220). Political parties worldwide identify with each other through party ideology and join transnational party federations with similar ideological frameworks (Day, 2006; Van Zyl and Vorster, 1997). Thus, it seems plausible to argue that party ideology is the medium through which parties identify close partners. According to the logic introduced above, contrary to comparative politics studies, party ideology is perceived through interactions rather than judged from specific policy proposals. Moreover, it suggests that the shared ideological frameworks between political parties help to stabilise each of their senses of self and provide os because the interactions reinforce and find ideational support for each other’s political project. In other words, shared ideology is a stabilising mechanism for parties where they are strengthened through their interactions. This explains why political parties within the European Union continue to coalesce into transnational party groupings according to party ideology—such as the European People’s Party and the Party of European Socialists—because it helps validate the ideology of individual parties (Johansson, 2008). It was also part of the Europeanisation process to socialise newly joined parties to the European norms and ideals (Ladrech, 2002). Thus, according to this argument, I would expect to see party interactions occur when the parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan have strong ideological alignment reinforced by their interactions.
The micro level also offers the potential to explain change itself. As party ideology is a perception borne out of interactions, the perception of ideational shift creates instability and anxiety for political parties, especially for those in liminal positions because they are no longer sure that they still share biographical narratives. We will likely see ideological disagreements develop in interactions between both types of parties. That sense of insecurity created because of that shift would force parties to contemplate an attempt to halt the interactions and seek compensation for the loss of stability. Parties would have to decide whether to drop that interaction altogether, invest in an alternative that is potentially more ideologically aligned, or continue in that decline and hope for an improvement. Because of their different structures, conventional and movement parties might vary in how quickly such a decision can be made. However, this is not ideal for these parties because ideological disagreements and the lack of like-minded parties create anxiety. This insecurity continues until a new phase where a stable partnership with shared ideology is created. Thus, although it may seem stable for parties to interact and cooperate to enhance their os, change is also possible through that same interaction process because of the perceived shift of party ideology.
4 The Liminality of Political Parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan
As suggested at the macro level of the framework, the assumption that liminal political actors have a greater need for os is the first condition on which this argument is based. In other words, it is crucial to establish the plausibility of this assumption in our case, namely the liminality of the political parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In the previous section, the literature suggested that the source of liminality ranges from history, culture, and diplomatic recognition. I further suggested that the geographical locations and change of dominant actors also matter. In the case of Hong Kong and Taiwan, I would argue that political parties in these countries have a particularly unstable sense of self because of their positions vis-à-vis mainland China. In other words, the China Factor is the cause of their instability and drives anxiety among political parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan. This comes close to the China Factor framework discussed in the introduction. But, as I will argue, the China Factor presented here is more fundamental and long-standing than the current literature suggests. It is not just a reaction to China’s encroaching influence in recent years. China itself is a fundamental cause of anxiety and instability by its very nature of existing as a hegemon in relation to Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Before the handover in 1997, Hong Kong was a British colony for more than 150 years. The long colonial history and separation from mainland China were perpetuated throughout the years to become part of the biographical narrative and collective memory of people in Hong Kong, including the political actors (Hampton, 2016: 160–185). In other words, such historical facts gave them a stable sense of self as they knew who they were and their places in the world. Actors were able to suppress anxiety and exercise everyday agency because of this stability despite their liminal position. Such historical development has also established a unique relationship, particularly with the regime in mainland China in various eras, one characterised by both relation and distance (Matthews, Ma & Lui, 2007). Undoubtedly, identity formation is a long and complex process, and according to constructivism, identity is how individuals make sense of the world based on their social, spatial, and temporal order (Berenskoetter, 2014a; Wendt, 1999). From the os perspective, the 1997 handover did not simply represent the change in the external sovereignty of Hong Kong. It also destabilised the existing biographical narratives that used to provide political actors ontological security.
That was reflected by the multiple identities manifested concerning Hong Kong and mainland China in the post-handover years, ranging from outright local to outright national identities.2 Obviously, some embraced the new reality of returning to China and the Chinese identity. In 1997, those identifying as Chinese accounted for 32 percent of the population, the biggest among all options (Fung, 2004; Fung & Chan, 2017). That was also represented by the transformations of the business elites from pro-London to pro-Beijing, who became the leading political class after the handover of Hong Kong (Ma, 2007). On the other hand, others, including political actors, similarly felt insecure because of the handover. They felt Hong Kong had lost its connection with Britain and encountered a new sovereign master. The geographically larger China did not share the biographical narrative of Hong Kong (at least the one that was held during the British colonial period). Thus, domestication was not available for them to re-establish their stability. This was reflected by the quarter that identified itself as only Hong Kong citizens in 1997 (Fung, 2004; Fung & Chan, 2017). Many studies have also found evidence of a ‘localist’ identity focused on preserving local culture and practices emerging in the recent decade (e.g. Fong, 2017; Kaeding, 2017; Wang, 2019). The nostalgic sentiment in Hong Kong in recent years only illustrated the rejection of the political project propelled by Beijing (Chin, 2014; Lowe & Tsang, 2018). This study focuses on this latter group of political actors.
Moreover, apart from the change of dominant actors, Hong Kong’s liminality is compounded by the fact that its postcolonial fate did not end in independence like other colonies but a transfer of sovereignty and an untested project of ‘One Country, Two Systems’. Such an in-between state of postcolonial Hong Kong created anxiety for political actors (Adorjan, Khiatani & Chui, 2021; Lui, 1999). Amid these uncertainties, it explains why the narrative of ‘democratic reunification’ (民主回歸)—accepting the handover to the prc but fighting for democracy to resist communism—became popular before and after the handover among those who felt insecure and unstable since it attempted to reconcile the change of external master and stabilise the sense of self. As one of the proponents of the democratic reunification narrative, Albert Ho (何俊仁) of the dp, explained, ‘It was a desperate attempt and we didn’t have a choice. Nobody had any wishful thinking. We knew it was difficult and required hard work. We fought ferociously for democracy in the Basic Law and direct election in the early years.’3
In the previous section, the literature demonstrated that contested states struggling for diplomatic recognition have been considered liminal actors because they are in an in-between transition process to recognised statehood (Pace & Pallister-Wilkins, 2018). Taiwan has been a contested state that has been eternally fighting for diplomatic recognition since 1971 when the United Nations voted to recognise the prc as the only legitimate representative of China. So, the concept of liminality clearly applies to it. Compared to other contested states, Taiwan has arguably more elements to be recognised as a state, including a permanent population, defined territory, functioning government, and agencies with the capacity for relations with other states. It also enjoys unofficial but substantial relations with significant members of the international society, such as the United States. Nevertheless, due to opposition from the prc and its territorial claims on Taiwan, Taiwan has only been able to obtain diplomatic recognition from a small minority of nation-states. From the os perspective, being liminal in terms of formal statehood is undoubtedly a source of insecurity for Taiwan as it struggles to establish a biographical narrative based on that (Loh & Heiskanen, 2020).
Scholars’ characterisation of Taiwan as a ‘laboratory of identities’ epitomises the unstable sense of self for Taiwanese political actors (Corcuff, 2012). Taiwan was ceded to Japan as a colony in the late nineteenth century until the end of the Second World War, followed by the kmt regime’s authoritarian rule for a few decades before democratisation. Though its historical circumstances are different from those of Hong Kong, Taiwan’s identities were similarly shaped in relation to China, which remains a salient divide in the party politics of Taiwan since democratisation (Fell, 2005). However, identity formation was even more complex in Taiwan as the cultural affiliation with China did not necessarily correspond with political association (Schubert & Damm, 2011). Authoritarian rule and the massive re-Sinicisation programme of the kmt regime created a divide between Mainlanders and Taiwanese within the population, which became a prominent point of division in self-identification in the early years of democratisation (Schubert & Damm, 2011). As indicated by empirical data, identification as Chinese was closely correlated with support for eventual unification in Taiwan’s future, a desire shared by the ruling kmt at the time. Though a Chinese identity was the majority when the survey began in the late 1980s, it dropped substantially after the beginning of the democratisation process, as did support for unification. Dual and pure Taiwanese identities gradually replaced Chinese identity as the majority identification on the island. Even many Mainlanders compromised on their support for unification (Corcuff, 2011). However, the shift to Taiwanese identity did not correspond with support for independence, which stalled in the late 1990s (Fell, 2018). In short, the range of views held by different segments of the population in Taiwan throughout the years reflected the unstable sense of self because of the kmt authoritarian rule in the early decades and the lack of diplomatic status as a nation-state since the 1970s.
This section has illustrated that some quarters in Hong Kong and Taiwan were particularly liminal and unstable in their identity because of their respective historical and diplomatic circumstances. However, it is also clear that such instability is related to the position of these entities vis-à-vis the prc, which makes claims to both territories. In this sense, their insecurity is not just separate and owing to their respective contexts; there is also a common and mutual aspect. First, they are both geopolitically located on the margins or the peripheries of the vast and powerful Chinese mainland. Hong Kong is a single mid-sized city in the south of mainland China, while Taiwan is a small island off the coast of the Fujian Province with a population about the size of a mid-ranking Chinese province. The vast geography and political power differential will likely consolidate the sense of liminality for both political units.
Furthermore, the prc also presided (and still presides) over a political project that seeks to include Hong Kong and Taiwan in its orbit of control and sovereignty. As mentioned above, it destabilised the biographical narratives of the political parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan selected for this project (Mitzen, 2006). Given the authoritarian political system of the prc, it is plausible to assume that it would extend its authoritarian system to territories under its control. As described in the China Factor literature, such expansion, or ‘Mainlandisation’, was already occurring in Hong Kong and was resisted in Taiwan (Kaeding, 2015). China’s political influence was exerted directly and indirectly through proxy actors in the two entities. Thus, uncertainty about the political future driven by the hegemonic power was another source of anxiety shared by conventional and movement parties alike in Hong Kong and Taiwan.
5 Conventional and Movement Party Interactions
Though Taiwan and Hong Kong were encountering a similar set of macro-level circumstances, the meso level of the framework suggests that we can expect different practices of party interactions between conventional parties and movement parties because of their different levels of insecurity based on their positions in the political system and their institutionalisation level. Whereas conventional parties’ transnational interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwan focused on governance and electioneering, with relatively institutionalised interactions and a gradual change of interactions, movement parties had more discussions on extra-institutional means for their party survival, with their interactions based more on informal networks and experiencing rapid changes.
The first contrast was in the content of their interactions. As suggested by the framework, since conventional parties are generally in stronger power positions within the political system, given their focus on winning elections and being in government, conventional parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan attempted to reinforce these strengths within their narratives to stabilise their sense of self through their interactions. First, this was reflected in the timing of the interactions. Several senior members from different conventional parties in Hong Kong recalled the same pattern: they had participated in the election tours in almost every local and national election in Taiwan since the handover. During the peak period, their party had visited Taiwan nearly every year.
I think [the interactions] were mainly about the dpp’s journey from an opposition party to a governing party—how we fought for democracy, freedom, and human rights during the dangwai or martial law era. [Parties from Hong Kong] were concerned about the experience and strategies against an authoritarian regime and how we eventually become an important political force or even a political moment. These were the focus of our exchange.5
Since the political analysis and ideological views were roughly fixed, it was rare that you could learn something new or change your perspective. Thus, I think most Hong Kong politicians put more effort into the technical side of things.7
This theme was consistent throughout the post-handover years, though the emphasis varied. In the early years, conventional parties in Hong Kong invested a lot in electoral strategies in their interactions with Taiwanese counterparts. As former dp secretary-general Cheung Yin-tang (張賢登) described, ‘To be honest, everything was very new when we visited Taiwan 20 years ago. Hong Kong’s election started in the 1980s, but when you saw how lively Taiwan’s election was, you would even bring back some campaign materials and flags to share and learn.’8 Campaign materials (文宣, wenxuan) were a key item on the lists of lessons learned from Taiwan over the years. Various parties’ efforts were invested in making election advertisements more attractive to voters, such as choosing the right colour tone or the right angle for the candidates’ photos. Lo also recalled how Hong Kong pro-democracy parties would take many such materials when they visited Taiwan.
[H]ow to quickly respond or pay attention to the development of stories is what we need to catch up on. Other social media strategies focus on how you obtain seo [search engine optimisation] and how you utilise all social media platforms …. These things are novel for a conventional party of our size.9
Thus, from the os perspective, conventional parties have focused their interactions on electioneering because it helps reinforce their positions within the political system and provides a stable framework in which they can operate. It is also worth noting that the learning experience regarding electioneering has not been reciprocal between Hong Kong and Taiwan parties. As admitted honestly by figures from both the kmt and dpp in Taiwan, since the elections were quite limited in scale in Hong Kong, they had no desire to learn from their counterparts either in terms of election or policy.
In contrast, movement parties are in a more insecure position in the political system. According to Kitschelt (2006), a movement party possesses three properties. First, it must have very little formal organisational structure. Second, it will often focus on a small set rather than a broad range of issues. Third, it frequently combines electioneering and extra-institutional mobilisation, such as social movements. Like conventional parties, movement parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan also attempted to reinforce these properties to acquire a stable sense of self through interactions—but they did so in a different way. First, movement parties were much less keen on learning election strategies. For instance, Leung Kwok-hung (梁國雄), a former leader of the lsd in Hong Kong, described the interactions during election campaigns as ‘superficial’ and a ‘mixture of visiting and sightseeing’.10 Movement parties in both entities also agreed that the difference in political culture was a significant barrier to having more fruitful interactions about elections. One former staff member of the npp recalled the interactions with Demosisto during the 2018 local election campaign: ‘Regarding the election-watching in 2018, since the election culture was quite different in Taiwan compared to Hong Kong, it was more like “how do you do it?” and “how do we do it?”’11 Chen Wei-ting (陳為廷) of the npp had a similar experience: ‘There was nothing practically useful to learn—we knew what they knew.’12 lsd leader Raphael Wong (黃浩銘) expanded on this idea: ‘Those so-called election campaigns … and wenxuan [campaign materials] …. We [in] Hong Kong had our own culture established already. It would be bizarre to copy others.’13
Movement parties preferred to interact on the issues that could help with their biographical narratives and thus their os. For prophetic parties14 like the lp and gpt, that meant advancing the cause of their left-wing values and advocations, and the interactions reflected that to reinforce their political purposes. Hence, the lp and gpt insisted on having policy discussions in their interactions because they helped enhance each other’s support for being a prophetic party and surviving in the political system. Cheng Sze-lut (鄭司律), a former deputy leader of the lp, characterised the party’s interactions with the gpt as ‘policy-oriented’,15 for instance, on environmental and labour policies.
The main agenda was focused on the ccp [Chinese Communist Party] and how we can resist the ccp together …. We shared each of our experiences and saw whether we can have some cooperation or mutual support and so on …. The second part was primarily about … how Taiwan could help support those who had resisted the ccp in Hong Kong, whether they were youngsters or social movement organisations.17
In addition, the parties also subsequently discussed social movement strategies, where, unlike the conventional parties, parties in Taiwan were eager to learn from their counterparts in Hong Kong. Lin continued: ‘The Umbrella Movement inspired participants of 318 like me … because of their movement strategies. Whether it was their public statements or their guerrilla-like strategy at the end, we [were] learning [a lot],’18 Lin continued. Rather than emphasising elections, movement parties focused on issues that provided os to them as movement parties, that is, actors in a marginalised position within the political system.
The degree of institutionalisation of interactions was also dissimilar between the two types of parties. Transnational interactions between conventional parties were relatively more institutionalised, which corresponds to the framework. I suggest that they were relatively institutionalised because they were in no way comparable to their counterparts in Europe, who regularly conduct interactions within the framework of transnational party federations (Smith, 2001). Nevertheless, they were more institutionalised than interactions between movement parties. Two indications in my interviews support this claim.
Chang An-guo (鄭安國) [the Taiwanese representative] was very active in Hong Kong at that time [1997–1999]. He acted as the middleman to coordinate and organise some groups in Hong Kong to visit Taiwan during the election. He was very active in doing so. In other words, Chung Hwa Travel Agency is an important coordinating organisation.19
The coordinating role of the official agency was subsequently inherited by a government-funded arms-length organisation called the Friends of Hong Kong and Macao Association (fhkma). According to its secretary-general, Chang Shih-hsien (張仕賢), these interactions between conventional parties were part of a ‘participatory’ and ‘observing’20 process that allowed the landscape of Taiwan’s democratic development to be examined.
The second indication of greater institutionalisation was the settings in which these interactions unfolded. Rather than meeting informally over meals or on campaign trails, conventional parties’ interactions often occurred in formal meetings between parties or even in academic conferences, where politicians from both Hong Kong and Taiwan were invited to speak. For example, the public seminars organised by the Mainland Affairs Council every year often invited party politicians and academics, allowing the policy community to grasp the latest developments in Hong Kong. High-profile politicians such as former leaders Alan Leong (梁家傑) of the cp and Albert Ho of the dp remembered that they had attended a few of them and met some Taiwanese party politicians there. In 2011, the cp organised a tour of Taiwan to meet the two major parties and their think tanks. The dp visited Taiwan multiple times to meet politicians and examine various policy areas. The adpl met Kaohsiung dpp members as part of its party retreat programme. Thus, formal meetings were the favoured setting for conventional party interactions. Even when these interactions took place during the election period, they were primarily meetings between parties in the party headquarters. From the os perspective, the conventional parties pursued these more institutional arrangements because institutions provide stability and security for the sense of self. It was what they could use to help them feel secure.
When you talk about the broader movement circles, there were a few different branches in the Taiwanese context. For example, some people could be closer to left-wing activists in Hong Kong …. So, they could also be closer to the traditional labour movement. Other friends, such as Wang Hsing-Chung (王興中) of the New School of Democracy, were closer to the older generation of pan-democrats like Lee Cheuk-yan (李卓人) [of the lp].21
The localists within the pro-democracy camp had [many] contact channels with young parties such as the npp and vice versa. So we didn’t intervene in this part because they didn’t need our coordination when they had their ways of contact.22
Such patterns of interactions also had implications for the settings and changes of the interactions.
In contrast to the formal meetings of the conventional parties, the movement parties interacted in various informal settings, such as over meals, as their relationships were based on pre-existing personal networks. Since 2010, the younger generation within the parties has especially cherished these opportunities. Former Demosisto deputy leader Tiffany Yuen (袁嘉蔚) offered one reason for this preferred setting: ‘Sometimes, when you have a big group, it becomes super formal and official, and you don’t have the time to have a deeper discussion. So we decided to meet up on our own.’23 For instance, as part of the lp delegation’s interaction with the gpt, the party also visited a site of urban renewal in Taipei to examine how the victim’s family organised their resistance. As former npp secretary-general Chen Hui-min (陳惠敏) recalled, apart from a formal interparty forum in January 2017, many of the interactions between Demosisto and the npp occurred in an ad hoc and informal fashion. Some even took place off the back of casual trips to Taiwan by Joshua Wong (黃之鋒, former Demosisto leader) and other party members. Like the conventional parties, but without their institutional resources, the movement parties were also committed to pursuing practices that could maximise their gains through the interactions.
6 The Gradual and Rapid Changes in Party Interactions
As my framework predicted, the two types of party interactions also witnessed different changes. While a gradual shift in interactions was observed in the conventional party interactions, movement parties experienced rapid changes. According to the framework, this difference is because of different institutional levels, where institutional links are much more ‘sticky’ for conventional parties. The pattern of interactions for the conventional parties in Hong Kong in this study was also much more similar. Here, I focus on the interactions among the dp, kmt, and dpp.
Perhaps surprisingly, the dp and the kmt developed a close relationship in the early years after the handover. Being the governing party at the time, kmt Taipei representatives in Hong Kong actively sought to establish links with parties in Hong Kong. As Cheng An-kuo, formerly Taiwan’s representative in Hong Kong, recalled in his interview: ‘The Taiwanese government was always concerned about pro-democracy parties in Hong Kong. Some of the interactions were always very close.’24 Apart from the close personal relationship between Frederick Fung (馮檢基, a former leader of the adpl) and Cheng, the dp also visited Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) and Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) as Kaohsiung and Taipei mayors respectively in the late 1990s. As part of the visit to the 1998 mayoral and Legislative Yuan election, the dp delegation led by chairman Martin Lee (李柱銘) even met then kmt president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝). In his interview, Albert Ho recollected a heated discussion about the Sino-Japanese War in the meeting.
The kmt, in fact, belonged to ‘democratic reunification’ to a certain extent—a Taiwanese-style one. ‘As a beacon of democracy in Chinese society, although I [Taiwan] don’t want unification now, it can become a condition that when [the] mainland democratise[s], I can consider unification.’ This, to a certain extent, was ‘democratic reunification’.26
This shared ideological framework provided ideational support to both sides.
We just had the first presidential election under the threat of missiles. Then, the following year was the handover of Hong Kong. [If you are] facing the same situation, for your own interests’ sake, shouldn’t you be doing something about it? Nothing but peaceful and quiet! Then that’s okay for us because Hong Kong people were exactly like what we thought.27
In general, Hong Kong didn’t seem to care about Taiwan because Taiwan was only a ‘peanut’ to them when they preferred to look towards China. They especially kept their distance from the dpp. They had a bias to think, ‘Why are you so stupid to want independence?’28
For the dp, the dpp’s position lacked desire and ambition. As Albert Ho said, ‘Sometimes I teased them, “Why don’t you have the ambition to rule over the whole of China?” Of course, they would disagree and argue that the mainland was none of my business.’29
In terms of ideology, if you speak of the ‘Greater China’ mentality, it was probably [closer to] the kmt, but they had changed in the recent decade. To be blunt, they had ‘joined the Communists’ (tougong) and talked about kmt–ccp cooperation. We certainly would not go down that route. So [comparatively] we began to get close to the dpp in terms of relationship and ideology.30
Because of the insecurity created by these disagreements, the dp attempted to invest in an alternative, a party more ideologically aligned to itself, to compensate for that loss with the kmt. Thus, there was a decline in relations with the kmt and an improvement in relations with the dpp during this period. For instance, there was a high-profile forum between then dpp chair You Si-kun (游錫堃) and dp leader Albert Ho in 2007 discussing ‘the prospect of democratisation in Hong Kong under Beijing’s authoritarian rule’. While this meeting was widely reported in the media, another secret online meeting that year between Albert Ho and Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) also discussed similar topics.
In 2008, according to my understanding, many friends in Hong Kong thought that since President Ma was born in Hong Kong, his administration should have better interactions with different sectors in Hong Kong. But this didn’t happen, so they were quite upset.33
I discussed the problem of Hong Kong with some dpp people eight years ago [in 2012]. They lacked knowledge of Hong Kong, not to mention interacting with Hong Kong parties …. So when you look [at it] from this aspect, interactions around 2014 were actually quite a big turning point. The dpp was ignorant before 2014, but the student-led Sunflower Movement alerted [them to] China’s threat of infiltration through political economy and business.34
I would say the dpp had a closer view or judgement of the ccp regime in China with us …. Since the current political situation pushed us towards a confrontational situation … we seemed to have more commonality with the dpp because the ccp used the same tactics against both of us. But this commonality doesn’t mean ideological closeness.35
[After] President Ma stepped down, the kmt’s thinking [became] even more narrow. So its interactions with Hong Kong may become even less or single-sided and no longer have the leading role. The high degree of linkage was also lost … since parties must always think from their own interests and perspectives; [the kmt’s] judgement on mainland China and Hong Kong parties has surely affected the quality of their interactions.36
It was often the case that the Sunflower and Umbrella Movements were considered the beginning of interactions between movement parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan (e.g. Ho, 2019). However, this paper seeks to track the early experience of movement parties’ interactions before that. Because of the multiple informal networks established by the parties, as mentioned above, one of the main contrasts in their pattern was that the trajectories and targets of the movement party interactions were much more diverse between different movement parties. Indeed, these informal networks also enabled the rapid change of interactions observed in the recent decade.
Before the gpt joined forces with the sdp [Social Democratic Party] in the last election [in 2016], I remember I visited them. I think their left-wing politics was, to a certain extent, quite compatible with [ours, and] at that time, we had more interactions with them. We went to speak with them once, and they also came to Hong Kong to visit us. So, we had more interactions with the gpt.37
Unlike the conventional parties that shared their ideological frameworks on the Tongdu issue, the lp and gpt based their appeals on left-wing values. Specifically, they shared criticisms of the conventional parties’ failures to address what they regarded as important issues, such as environmental and labour issues. Stephen Kwok (郭永健) recalled their meeting: ‘When the gpt was not so close to the dpp, they also critiqued the two conventional parties for standing on the side of corporates and so on. We also shared these views and felt their frustrations.’38
I was quite disappointed …. From our perspective, to a certain extent, if a left-wing party in Taiwan which advocated some left-wing stuff can make certain transformations happen, that could be useful to us …. But if they couldn’t achieve [anything] or even left-wing [parties] were not successful … [the interactions] have no benefits for us.40
Similar to the conventional parties, these shifts and doubts destabilised the shared framework that had been developed between the movement parties. But rather than gradually shifting to another like-minded party as the conventional parties did, movement parties did not have the institutional arrangements to maintain the interactions, which resulted in the rapid demise observed between the lp and the gpt.
I think there must be [mutual empowering]. Instead of [Taiwan] fighting alone as an international orphan … after the awakening of self-determination in Hong Kong, we had more and more friends through interactions and our goal became clearer every day. We all knew the true face of ccp and had a clear sense of fighting together.42
This again validates my central argument that parties were motivated to interact because of concerns about ontological security, and the interactions were sustained by shared ideological frameworks.
Nevertheless, the transnational interactions between Demosisto and the npp ultimately ended in 2019 when the anti-extradition movement allowed Demosisto to shift its investment towards the dpp amid the election campaign. The worsening domestic relationship between the dpp and the npp and the contradiction between pushing for new refugee law and offering immediate support for Hong Kong protestors forced Demosisto to choose between the two parties. Although Demosisto and the npp shared their ideology in the early interactions on providing more concrete support to Hong Kong, the npp’s support for legislating a refugee law caused disagreements since it was merely perceived as an electoral device. These disagreements and the clash of political projects destabilised the interactions, which had been based on trust and certainty. After the refugee law row, it was doubtful whether the interactions between the two parties could be reconvened in 2020 even without the National Security Law, as some participants from Hong Kong close to Demosisto expressed the bruising impact of the breakdown: ‘The row over the Refugee Law damaged our trust in the npp, regarding them as rash and attention-seeking.’43 Another concurred that ‘refugee law was merely an electoral device deliberately drummed up by the npp and Taiwan People’s Party for its advantage’.44 A former npp staffer also conceded, ‘How close can the current Legislative Yuan caucus work with Hong Kong parties was in doubt.’45 Once again, in contrast to the conventional parties who took almost ten years to switch their partner of interactions, the interactions between movement parties can change quickly because of the absence of institutional arrangements and the reliance on personal friendships.
7 Concluding Remarks
To answer the research questions posed in the introduction, the three-level framework based on the logic of os would argue that both conventional parties and movement parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan engaged in interactions with each other to stabilise their sense of self because of the instability created by being in liminal positions. It also demonstrated that the framework can explain and compare some of the practices of the two types of party interactions based on their positions and resources. Finally, it also illustrated that whereas the changes between conventional parties’ interactions happened gradually over 23 years, movement parties experienced rapid changes in their short few years of history. The empirical findings also substantiate the framework’s claim that the shift in shared ideological framework between the parties explains the change of practice. These empirical findings and theoretical arguments will hopefully contribute not only to studies in the context of party politics and transnational interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwan. The logic that stability is created through developing close links with a like-minded partner in a similar liminal position could also be plausibly applied to other transnational contexts. In other words, whenever two political actors feel insecure or unstable ontologically, one would expect links to be formed between them. Another possible example of links between insecure liminal actors is the recent development of Taiwan–Somaliland relations. Further exploration of the dynamics of such relations would be a worthwhile project to pursue.
Acknowledgements
This paper was presented at the 19th Annual Conference of the European Association of Taiwan Studies, 6–8 April 2022, Larnaca. The author would like to thank Dr Malte Kaeding and Dr Dafydd Fell for their helpful questions and feedback on the article. The comments and suggestions from the two anonymous reviewers are also much appreciated.
Notes on Contributor
Adrian Chiu received his PhD in politics and international studies at soas, University of London. His research interests include interactions between Hong Kong and Taiwan, the Hong Kong diaspora, Taiwan’s party politics, and international relations in East Asia. He is also an editor of Taiwan Insight.
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As the following sections will show, these participants chose another possible response to their liminality, which echoes Rumelili’s research (2012: 503–505).
Identity formation in the post-handover period remains a major topic in Hong Kong studies. Apart from the local and national identities, it also experienced the process of hybridisation throughout different periods in the post-handover era. Indeed identity, despite being elusive, was arguably the most important factor in understanding the main cleavages in Hong Kong, such as attitudes towards Beijing, democratisation, the Basic Law, and the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy.
Albert Ho, interview with the author, 17 July 2020, Hong Kong.
Interview with the author, 19 May 2020, Tainan.
Lo Chih-cheng, interview with the author, 17 June 2020, Taipei.
The Basic Law of Hong Kong bars the Chief Executive of the City from coming from any political party. In other words, candidates must withdraw from their parties to be a candidate. Moreover, the design and constitution of the election committee, partially selected by functional constituencies, who select the Chief Executive ensured Beijing has the final say on any Chief Executive candidates. It effectively excludes the prospect of pro-democracy candidates winning the election.
Andrew Wan, interview with the author, 31 July 2020, Hong Kong.
Cheung Yin-tang, interview with the author, 21 July 2020, Hong Kong.
Li Ting-fung, interview with the author, 5 August 2020, Hong Kong.
Leung Kwok-hung, interview with the author, 27 July 2020, Hong Kong.
Interview with the author, 20 April 2020, Taipei.
Chen Wei-ting, interview with the author, 5 June 2020, Hsinchu.
Raphael Wong, interview with the author, 5 August 2020, Hong Kong.
Parties that focus their appeal on alternative issues. See Lucardie (2000).
Cheng Sze-lut, interview with the author, 27 July 2020, Hong Kong.
Parties that pursue ideology diluted by conventional parties. See Lucardie (2000).
Lin Yin-meng, interview with the author, 15 May 2020, Taipei.
Lin, interview. “Participants of 318” refers to those involved in the Sunflower Movement.
Sin Chung-kai, interview with the author, 21 July 2020, Hong Kong.
Chang Shih-hsien, interview with the author, 10 June 2020, Taipei.
Interview with the author, 4 June 2020, Taipei.
Chang, interview.
Tiffany Yuen, interview with the author, 13 August 2020, Hong Kong.
Cheng An-kuo, interview with the author, 6 May 2020, Taipei.
Such a dichotomised choice (unification vs. independence) of Taiwan’s future in relation to mainland China was a salient issue in every Taiwanese election until recent years (see Fell, 2005).
Interview with the author, 19 May 2020, Tainan.
Chang Chih-hao, interview with the author, 7 April 2020, Taipei.
Yen Chien-fa, interview with the author, 10 April 2020, Taipei.
Ho, interview.
Sin, interview.
Emily Lau, interview with the author, 23 July 2020, Hong Kong.
Ho, interview.
Chang, interview.
Benson Wong, interview with the author, 10 August 2020, Hong Kong.
Wan, interview.
Chang, interview.
Lee Cheuk-yan, interview with the author, 28 July 2020, Hong Kong.
Stephen Kwok, interview with the author, 11 August 2020, Hong Kong.
Kwok, interview.
Lee, interview.
According to Chen Hui-min, such a proposal attempted to address two issues. First, it sought to deter notorious human rights offenders or people oppressing democracy from entering Taiwan. Second, it would add a clause to the immigration laws to welcome immigrants who were prosecuted because they participated in democracy protests. Chen Hui-min, interview with the author, 14 April 2020, Taipei.
Lin Yin-meng, interview with the author, 14 April 2020, Taipei.
Interview with the author, 27 July 2020, Hong Kong.
Interview with the author, 25 August 2020, Hong Kong.
Interview with the author, 20 April 2020, Taipei.
