Abstract
Over the past 30 years, articles in this journal and elsewhere have offered insights and advice about making our world more peaceful through negotiation. This time in history provides a moment for reflection about the contributions we have made. This article shows how research findings add value for solving practical problems. Examples include two contemporaneous conflicts, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war in Gaza. We also explore issues that could trigger tipping points and spur greater global unrest, as well as avenues that could help reduce growing tensions: the world of international diplomacy, global climate diplomacy, insights on summitry, and negotiation skills training. These contributions are evaluated for ease of application, attentiveness of practitioners, and impact. We conclude optimistically: While research will not save us from the horrors of war, it can enhance our understanding of how to make the world a little safer for peace.
“They’re rioting in Israel, there’s strife in Iran.
What nature doesn’t do to us, will be done by our fellow man.”
“And we know for certain that some lovely day
Someone will set the spark off, and we will all be blown away.”
These lyrics from the Kingston Trio’s song, “They’re Rioting in Africa,” capture the current state of the world.
Applying research findings to practice has been a continuing challenge for negotiation researchers. Progress has been made since the founding of this journal in 1996. Celebrating the journal’s 30th anniversary, we reflect on that progress and project the paths ahead for researchers and practitioners. We develop this theme by reviewing applications of research findings in six areas, including two contemporaneous conflicts, a variety of historical diplomatic negotiations including climate change, the case of summitry, and skills training. Before delving into these examples, we call attention to the barriers that exist in making research relevant to practice.
Attention has been given to the two cultures problem in attempts to bridge research and practice (George 1993) and specifically with regard to negotiation (Druckman & Hopmann 1989). The differences occur along several dimensions of professional activity. One is the speed for making decisions. Research studies are for the ages, pulling out all the stops to ensure validity by working their way through a slow peer review process. Practitioners respond to exigencies that require action on a daily basis. The usefulness of research knowledge is judged in the moment, not over a long time frame.
Another difference is the incentive structure: researchers get credit for publication, practitioners for making the right decisions or solving problems. Graduate school admissions in schools of international relations evaluate candidates on scholarly achievements while recruitment to positions in policy-making bureaucracies value a record of real-world achievements. These differences are compounded by increasingly complex methodologies and associated jargon that guide the way research is designed and conducted (see, for example, Hayes & Rockwood 2020). Together these differences in culture, tempo, language, and incentive structures account for difficult communication across the divide.
One remedy is to use the ideas generated from relevant research findings as contributions to solving problems in the course of managing conflicts. These ideas can be conveyed in consulting roles or through training workshops. In this article we show how this is done with several examples including two current cases that pose serious threats to the world order and more general discussions of diplomacy followed by a more specific treatment of global climate diplomacy, which seeks to reduce a growing trigger for changes in the global climate system. Relevant to these examples is the challenge of effective negotiating. Our final example treats negotiation training. More general implications of the applications are addressed along with suggested avenues for influence in the discussion section.
Managing or Resolving an Intractable Conflict: The War in Gaza
Conflict research is uniquely positioned to offer evidence-based advice on reducing tensions in the war in Gaza. A key aspect of this conflict is the way it is framed on both sides: Israel and Palestine. The Israeli government views the conflict as an existential threat to its survival. The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, provided sufficient evidence for their intentions. Palestinians (in Gaza and the West Bank) view the ongoing attacks by Israel as further attempts to subjugate the Palestinian people, if not eliminate them. There has been very little progress in changing these views or in finding a modus vivendi that allows these people to cooperate as neighbors. Progress in this direction has proven all but impossible as both sides cling to all-encompassing national identities. A mutual framing along the lines of a proposed two state solution has vanished. Frame changes are highly unlikely in the face of intractability (Shmueli et al. 2006). As a result, managing rather than resolving the conflict is a more plausible goal.
An opportunity for managing the conflict is provided by attempts to negotiate a release of the hostages held by Hamas. This focus switches the dialogue from unresolvable to negotiable issues. Several areas of research bear on this approach.
Fractionation, Framing, Linkage, and Order
Introduced originally by Fisher (1964), issue fractionation is based on the premise that smaller issues are easier to settle than larger issues. They also allow negotiators to build gradually toward the larger issues that prevent a broader, long-term solution to the conflict. Early experimental evidence showed that smaller issues were more easily settled than larger issues (Deutsch et al. 1971). Later research showed that settlements on smaller issues were less likely to be integrative (as opposed to distributive) outcomes (Druckman et al 1988). The hostage issue in Gaza is a relatively small issue in the context of the larger conflict.
Size is one aspect of issues. Other aspects include issue framing, issue linkage, and issue order as discussed by Druckman and Wagner (2021). Framing refers to how the issues are discussed. Different framings are evident in the Gaza conflict: For Hamas the key issue is subjection, for Israelis it is obliteration. The challenge is to avoid these framings by focusing on negotiable issues of hostages and prisoners. Linkage refers to adding issues that facilitate trade-offs. In the Gaza context this may consist of the delivery of humanitarian aid as a way into the trades on hostages and prisoners. Order focuses on the distinction between sequential and simultaneous discussion of the issues. Sequential is the better strategy for getting agreements; simultaneous can work better for achieving the goal of integrative agreements (Perreault et al. 2017). If the hostages-prisoners trade is the most promising framing, then treating them together would facilitate the needed trade that provides a path for discussing larger issues.
Values and Interests
A related line of research is also relevant to this conflict. This research shows that when opposed values or ideologies are included as issues in a negotiation along with or linked to interests, the talks are less likely to lead to agreements (Druckman & Zechmeister, 1973; Zechmeister & Druckman 1973; Druckman et al. 1988). Within the Gaza war context, this means talks about hostage releases would be burdened by allusions to the contrasting narratives. More recent research has shown that positive affirmation exercises can reduce the intransigence caused by contrasting values (Harinck & Druckman 2017, 2019). Although these exercises are unlikely to work in intractable conflicts, they offer the possibility of a change in course from unresolvable issues to interpersonal relations (Druckman 2023).
Moderates on Both Sides
Early research by Evan and McDougall (1967) showed that moderates on both sides of a conflict can be effective in moving their more extreme team members toward the center. In other words, they have a moderating influence in a negotiation (see Druckman & Zechmeister 1973). Identifying moderate factions in difficult conflicts has been challenging. It is especially challenging when identities are at stake. Efforts made by moderates in Israel and Palestine are likely to be risky due in large part to perceptions of traitorous behavior. These efforts would be less risky in, and encouraged by, less extreme political leadership. The current escalation cycles are fueled by commitment to narratives that vilify the opponent and exaggerate the threats rather than the opportunities.
Positive Engagement
Nincic (2010) argues persuasively for the value of using positive inducements to change the behavior of national adversaries. His case evidence shows that offering rewards is a more effective influence strategy than punishments. This argument is compatible with bargaining studies that find a gradual increase in the size of concessions leads to better agreements by encouraging mutual concession-making on, for example, hostage/prisoner exchanges (Druckman et al. 1972). Interestingly, the reward strategy is more likely to work at critical junctures when adversaries perceive opportunities for change or when they become desperate for a way out of an impasse (Druckman 2019; Rana et al. 2022). These junctures may occur in the hostage negotiations at moments when alternatives to negotiating a release are less attractive.
Biased Mediation
Svensson (2013) reviewed some advantages of biased mediation in the context of peace negotiations in civil wars. He concluded first that biased mediators can be more effective in delivering concessions from the preferred side as illustrated by Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy (Rubin 1981). A second conclusion was that the preferred side – for example, rebels or government in a civil war – matters. Favoring the weaker party can level the playing field while favoring the stronger party can provide essential institutional resources for sustaining an agreement. Lessons from the much-studied Colombian peace agreement highlight the value of involving multiple mediating countries to balance the support from outside actors each side receives (Segura & Mechoulan 2017). And third, by bringing the favored side into the “tent,” the mediator creates perceptions of enhanced legitimacy as a peace-maker. Qatar’s role in the hostage negotiations may be seen as biased in favor of the Palestinian side. This has the advantage of providing leverage for encouraging concessions from the side that has a power advantage from holding the hostages.
Strategy and Tactics
As discussed by Hopmann and Druckman (1981), Kissinger’s mediation in the 1973 negotiations was more of a tactical than strategic victory. He succeeded in getting the parties to agree on such matters as military engagement and territorial autonomy. By doing so he managed the conflict. Less evident was an overall strategy for long term peace. To an extent, our research-based suggestions above are also in the realm of tactics rather than broad strategy. Indeed, this is the point of a fractionation approach to an intractable conflict. Releasing the hostages is regarded as a step in the direction of a cease fire that, while not resolving the larger issues, does reduce if not eliminate the military violence. To sustain a cease fire, it would be necessary to deploy a UN peacekeeping force with a strong enforcement mandate.
The value of the cited research is to provide a basis for policy decisions on how to proceed with a negotiation on the release of hostages. The decision to fractionate leads the parties to focus their current efforts on the hostages. The focus on interests removes the major barrier for resolution of the larger conflict. Encouraging the participation of more moderate members of the negotiating delegations is likely to reduce flaming during the talks. Emphasizing the expected rewards of an agreement on hostage/prisoner exchanges increases the chances of reaching that agreement. Encouraging Qatar to play the mediator role increases the chances of concessions from the Palestinian side. All of this contributes to tactical progress that may be a step on the road to discussing the larger issues that have stood in the way of reconciliation and a two-state solution. The research also contributes more generally to strategies for dealing with conflicts in a perilous world.
Total National Identities: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine
The Russian invasion of Ukraine places the world on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, we have an intense nationalism expressed by the Ukrainian government and its citizens. On the other hand, we are faced with an authoritarian political system in Russia that legitimizes Vladimir Putin’s uncontested rule. When pitted against each other, as in the current war, we have a deadly conflict of wills. Further complicating the situation is the substantial difference in military power between the two countries. That power is on display as Russia has devastated much of Ukraine. These are the factors that have fuelled the intractability evident to date. How then can progress be made toward a negotiated solution?
The first challenge is trying to get the belligerents to the table. The distinction between a loss and gains frame is relevant (for example, Kahneman & Tversky 1979). A loss frame emphasizes the costs of continuing the war. It is a risk-averse strategy based on the idea of a mutually hurting stalemate (Zartman 2000). When both sides agree the war is no longer worth fighting, they are ready to negotiate a cease fire. A gains frame emphasizes the possible rewards from stopping the war. This is a risk-seeking strategy based on the idea of readiness (Pruitt 2015). When both sides agree they can realize gains through negotiation, the chances are improved that they will come to the table with a forward-looking agenda. The risks are that the talks can quickly break down with the prospect of further escalation. At present, neither incentive is evident, although there are ways of changing the situation. Here are some ideas from the research literature.
Total Identities
The major stumbling block to a negotiated solution is the depth of national identities, particularly among the Ukrainians. Urged on by their leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, they show a willingness to fight and die for their country. This kind of total identity reduces the strength of sub-national identities. There appears to be less zeal expressed by the Russians and more division within their society. Their leader, Vladimir Putin, pulls the strings supported by a provocative narrative that envisions a historical Russian empire that includes Ukraine. Until these nations and their citizens move away from this kind of essentialism, there is little prospect for any formula or framework that conceptualizes trades. The move from a divisive nationalism to an inclusive patriotism requires a collective realization that lives are not worth the price of clinging to these conflicting identities (Druckman 1994). An alternative to this sort of change is to focus attention on manageable issues, similar to our recommendation for the Gaza war case.
Trading Territory for Security
Rather than addressing existential issues, the conflicting nations can focus on trades that would go some of the way to satisfying their goals. This is in the spirit of fractionating the conflict. The Russians are keen on annexing territory – a tangible issue – as they did with Crimea. The Ukrainians need to have security guarantees, a less tangible issue. Is there a give and take on these issues? The details of this trade were presented by Druckman and Meerts (2022). The essentials are that Ukraine cede the eastern part of the Donbas province and provide a land bridge that connects Donbas to the annexed territory in Crimea. This provides a route from the Sea of Azov to continental Russia. In return, the Russians agree to an immediate cease fire monitored by UN peacekeepers, to provide security guarantees, to acknowledge the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, to provide opportunities for the safe return of Ukrainian refugees, and to provide reparations for the damage inflicted on Ukraine.
A key barrier to agreeing to these provisions is the worry that critical values are being compromised in this outcome. The research literature provides some guidance: superordinate goals, delinking strategies, and other affirmation exercises have been shown to be effective by increasing perspective taking, willingness to engage in log rolling, increased pro-social orientation, and an enhanced commitment to problem solving (Deschamps & Brown 1983; Druckman et al. 1988; Harinck & Druckman 2017; Druckman 2023). Reasons for expecting progress along these lines stem from the idea of re-framing the conflict in terms of more concrete trades.
Parties at the Table
There are reasons to suggest that the talks must be between the principals. Putin has the sole power to enter into or dissolve any agreement made by his country. Emissaries are beholden to him and have no authority to sign agreements on behalf of their country. Following the research on representing groups, principals are likely to be more flexible than their emissaries. This means they could alternate between tough and soft postures at will. Emissaries are likely to be cautious, fearing they will suffer sanctions for what is perceived as deviation from the party line (Druckman 2015). In this case an agreement reached by representatives would be fragile. Zelensky, on the other hand, is subject to the checks and balances of Ukraine’s parliament as well as the challenge of sustaining the political support of the Ukrainian population. His role is closer to being a representative accountable to his legislature. Indeed, this difference in the political systems would test Putin’s patience and could lead him to abandon any proposal or retract any agreement. But it is also the case that Putin is unlikely to agree to negotiate with any other representative of Ukraine. Moreover, an emissary of the Ukrainian President would have two layers of approval to navigate: the President and the legislature.
Procedures and Venues
There are a host of procedural decisions that will need to be made. The first challenge is to decide on the location for the bilateral talks. The key distinction is between a central (international city such as Geneva or Vienna) or peripheral (Camp David-like isolation) location. Uppermost in the considerations are the symbolic significance of the location and media coverage. In Druckman’s (1993) study of situational levers, location and coverage had strong effects on negotiating flexibility: peripheral locations and secrecy were instrumental in getting agreements. A second procedural concern is the way an agenda is developed. In their review on the role of issues, Druckman and Wagner (2021) showed that whether issues are discussed simultaneously or sequentially makes a difference: simultaneous discussion facilitates issue packaging and trades; sequential discussion facilitates early agreements on less sensitive issues. Simultaneous discussion also orients the talks toward the seeking of a comprehensive agreement. Third, the way parties plan for the talks matters. Unilateral strategizing reduces flexibility; unilateral or bilateral study enhances flexibility (Bass 1966; Druckman 1968). Fourth, an agreed timeline for the talks reduces the uncertainty that comes with open-ended discussions. While deadlines can move the principal toward premature agreements, a stage-like structure can provide some predictability without an expectation of reaching agreement. (See Iklé’s (1964) three-fold choice.)
The literature on procedural justice (pj) and turning points also come into play. Knowing that adhering to pj principles is more likely to result in fair agreements and successful implementation (Druckman & Wagner 2019), it is important to create norms and rules that encourage these behaviors. Knowing that process crises lead to re-framing (Druckman & Olekalns 2013) leads to recognizing the value of taking breaks at critical moments to reconsider the motivations on both sides (Druckman 2020).
Global Security Implications
The negotiation advice given above must be considered in the context of global implications. Stakeholders for this conflict come from all corners of the world: the NATO alliance, the EU, neighbouring countries, and Russian allies including China. Micro-level adjusting has implications for macro-level interests, particularly with regard to implementing an agreement involving territorial shifts and security institutions. Focusing on the adjusting, two questions arise: To what extent should stakeholders be involved during the negotiation process?, and, How should they be involved in discussions about security guarantees? Studies on crowding at the table suggest a limited role for other parties, including civil society (Cunningham 2006; Cuhadar & Druckman 2023). A key to implementing security guarantees is the UN Security Council. With Russia as a member of the Council, it is important to obtain a consensual commitment to guarantees as well as the deployment of peacekeepers. A staged process is likely to work best, with the UN entering the discussion after an agreement has been reached between the principals on the prospect of guarantees. More generally, developing strategies based on research opens a door to turning the conversation from ideologically-driven discourse to empirically-inspired ideas.
Diplomatic Negotiation Challenges
The Gaza and Ukraine examples depict failures of diplomacy. They raise a more general question about how to address diplomatic challenges. These questions are discussed in this section with an emphasis on relevant research.
One of the author’s involvement in an advisory group with the Foreign Service Institute in the 1980s led to a realization about the value of scholarship for addressing diplomatic problems. The connection to research and scholarship more broadly is documented in two book chapters, one on four disparate contemporary cases (Druckman 1986) and another specifically on US involvement during the Cold War in three base-rights negotiations (Spain, the Philippines, Turkey) (Druckman 1990). Insights from the scholarly literatures on diplomacy and negotiation were relevant to the negotiators participating in these talks.
Structural Asymmetries
In most of the negotiations studied, the parties differed in military and economic power, with the US being the more powerful player. Studies by Hopmann and his colleagues (1974; 1978) have shown how these factors influence the negotiation process and outcome. The message is not that powerful countries dominate their weaker allies and opponents. Rather, it is that weaker countries can use bargaining strategies to assert their influence. They can gain leverage by exploiting the mutuality of interests between themselves and their more powerful counterparts. They can advance their interests by holding concessions hostage to gains on larger issues as in base rights negotiations. An example is the way Spain demanded entry into NATO in return for the base leases. They can also create “coalitions of the weak” to present a stronger response to demands made by more powerful opponents. This tactic was evident, for example, in cleavages between nuclear and non-nuclear nations in the Seabeds denuclearization talks, in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and in the UN Special Session on Disarmament.
Alternatives
The well-known idea of best alternatives to negotiated agreements (batna) (Fisher & Ury 1981) comes into play in a wide variety of diplomatic negotiations. The US delegations in the various base rights talks were caught in a predicament of finding bases in other countries to protect them from a Soviet overreach. Thus, they were stuck with accepting Spanish demands on the parameters of a mutual defense treaty, with having to provide protection against the insurgent groups in the Philippines, and with dealing with the Greek obsession over the threat posed by their neighbor Turkey. Adding to these challenges were the complexities posed by the need to find balances among the negotiations going on simultaneously with each of these countries. They were able to leverage agreements reached with the US in another base rights negotiation. We see this as well in the multiple simultaneous bilateral trade agreements being negotiated with the US (Crump 2007).
Cultural Asymmetries
Results from many experimental and case studies on culture in negotiation make evident the strong effect of national culture on tactics, convergent vs adversarial negotiating styles, conceptions of what it means to negotiate, and on the ratification process for treaties (see, for example, Gelfand & Brett 2004). Equally interesting is the distinction made between socialized and working cultures. There is reason to believe the professional diplomatic culture – which stresses similarities among national representatives – is a stronger source for negotiating behavior than national cultures, which emphasize differences (Sjöstedt & Lang 2003). A way of conceptualizing these influences is to distinguish between values and practices, with the former stemming from early childhood socialization while the latter are developed during the diplomatic training process, which is similar from one country to another.
Tactics
A wide range of tactics are on display in case studies of international negotiation. Many of them have been discussed in the research literature, which also provides insights on how best to deploy them. Examples are discussed in this section.
The idea of positioning is critical to seeking agreements. Ramberg’s (1978) analysis of the Seabeds Arms Control Negotiation highlights a difference between maximalist and minimalist tactics in contrast to what he refers to as equitable positioning. Maximalist positions perpetuate impasses as each party demands that the other concedes to its proposals or to use its text as the basis for negotiation. The challenge is to move from this kind of positioning to an equitable approach where both (all) parties recognize the others’ needs and interests. Recognizing the consequences of a continuing impasse (no extension of the lease on bases, no reduction of arms, end of a trading relationship), the parties can find a face-saving solution to making the needed concessions. This outcome is less likely when the talks are used as an instrument for achieving other aims such as appearing to negotiate in good faith, getting information, or serving other side effects.
Other tactics that have received attention in the research literature surface in cases. One of these is the ploy of using earlier agreements between the same parties or parallel negotiation between other parties on the same issues as proof of concessions. The idea here is to place the burden of concessions on the shoulders of the other party. Referred to as commitment tactics or as the art of casuistry (Schelling 1960), this tactic was used by Greece during negotiations in the 1970s and 1980s with the US over base rights. Their demands for US concessions were based on framing earlier proposals as agreements that bound the US delegation to honoring them. They also offered the carrot of friendship, an intangible reward, for control of the bases, a tangible benefit. In the end, however, Greece relented due largely to a lack of viable alternatives and the risk of being the only ally to prevent the US from stationing troops on its territory.
An age-old tactic that has received considerable attention in the research literature is the “good cop/bad cop” strategy (Brodt & Tuchinsky 2000). It is used in negotiations characterized by divided delegations. It was used successfully by the US Ambassador, Monteagle Stearns, in the 1982-1983 negotiation with Greece. He used Washington as the tough face to complement his Embassy’s soft face in order to communicate that he has little room to offer further concessions. This division of labor was carefully orchestrated and proved to be effective (see Stearns 1990).
Choice of locations for the talks may also be a tactical decision. Typically, peripheral locations outside of the glare of the media have advantages shown as well in simulation studies (Druckman 1993). But it is also the case that being in a capital city has the advantage of access to the bureaucratic apparatus that supports the home delegation. Alternating between capital cities – such as Madrid and Washington – reduces perceptions of favoritism. Neutral locations such as Geneva or Vienna have served as the chosen venue for many negotiations including both bilateral summits and multilateral arms control conferences. Insufficient research on these decisions leaves us with few guidelines. Nonetheless it may be the case that smaller countries enjoy front page coverage of talks receiving little attention in countries with a larger global reach where there is an overwhelming number of issues competing for coverage on any given day.
In the next section we turn attention to a specific type of diplomacy with clear implications for global survival in a perilous world (Burke et al. 2009).
Global Climate Diplomacy
Many view climate change as the most important challenge of our time. The economic, social, and environmental challenges that must be incorporated into response measures are immense. Couple this multi-sectoral issue with the need to bring almost 200 governments to consensus on solutions that incorporate principles of equity and fairness and you will be at the heart of what has been labelled a “super wicked problem” (Levin et al. 2012).
A Sub-system of Negotiations Driven by the Two-level Game
Although negotiations to address climate change at the international level seem to move at a snail’s pace, it is useful to consider the “sub-system” of negotiations they comprise (Kremenyuk 2002). Far from static, Spector and Zartman (2003) theorize this sub-system consists of an ongoing, dynamic series of interactions, where the outcome from one negotiation sets the stage for the next negotiation. Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) gather for their annual Conference of the Parties to address agenda items that will lead to “system adjustments,” such as the adoption of the Paris Agreement on climate change, or “system maintenance,” such as the biannual adoption of the programme and budget. Druckman’s (2001) consideration of the internal and external factors that drive turning points to move from one stage to the next help us further understand this regime in motion.
Based on the decisions adopted each year, government delegates and civil society alike will return to their respective countries and “learning loops” will be put into motion (Spector & Zartman 2003). This learning could contribute to changes in the government’s understanding of the requirements to implement change, or to changes in pressure from constituencies on the actions they desire their leaders to take (DeSombre 2000). New coalitions may emerge, as could changes in a country’s position in the next round of negotiations. Keeping track of these dynamics requires careful monitoring of changes in concessions and preferences (Druckman 1978) as parties balance moves at the domestic and international levels (Putnam 1988). It also provides an avenue for considering campaigns to move a country’s position as the sub-system evolves.
Multilateral Complexity, Management and Leadership
Multilateral negotiations present unique challenges for reaching a negotiated agreement. From a structural perspective, we can look at these challenges in relation to parties’ use of coalitions, which can shift the power dynamics among participants. From a strategic perspective, the complexity of keeping track of one’s own positions and preferences for an outcome on a large number of positions, let alone tracking other negotiating parties’ and coalitions’ preferences, can be daunting. Negotiators will need to identify compromise packages and integrative solutions in order to reach an agreement, but processing all of the information required to do so requires a lot of organization, along with creativity. During the Law of the Sea negotiations, delegates embraced a computer program that allowed all parties to calculate expected outcomes from their proposals (Antrim & Sebenius 1992) using the shared underlying assumptions incorporated into the program itself.
Under these circumstances, the process will require attention to “negotiation management.” Monheim (2014, 2016) finds effective negotiation management for multilateral climate negotiations can increase the probability that agreement will be reached. Lessons detailed above with regard to issue framing, issue linkage, and issue order (Druckman & Wagner 2021) apply in this case as well. However, effective management in this case also extends to a transparent and inclusive process, a lead organizer with authority, and more problem-solving than bargaining. Monheim (2016) suggests that these conditions are expected to increase the zone of possible agreement and create a willingness of negotiators to agree.
In this vein, the roles of the chairperson and other key drivers of the negotiation are essential variables in whether a negotiation succeeds or fails. Researchers identify several modes of leadership in climate negotiations: structural, directional, and idea based. Each mode influences a different group of actors and draws on different strengths (Karlsson et al. 2011; Andresen 2013). Structural leadership is power-based and focuses on creating incentives or identifying the costs and benefits of an issue. Directional leaders act unilaterally and lead by example. Idea-based leaders may be entrepreneurial or draw on intellectual strengths and seek to support efforts to name and frame problems. A key lesson from Tommy Koh’s leadership during the Law of the Sea negotiations can help guide the meeting organizers and governments as they navigate multiple issue areas with a variety of leadership claims: identify patterns of deference among negotiating countries to build small but representative groups of trusted delegates to facilitate progress (Antrim & Sebenius 1992).
Procedural Justice
Researchers identify several reasons to adopt procedurally just processes for the climate change sub-system of negotiations in which agreements must be self-implementing (Barrett 1998). Wagner and Druckman (2019) identify ways in which trust between the Conference of the Parties (cop) presidency and negotiators has been built, or lost, through transparency, predictability, fairness, and voluntary agreement. The difference between the 2009 and 2010 cop s, presided by Denmark and Mexico respectively, has been examined for lessons in this regard (Park 2016; Monheim 2014).
Research tells us that procedurally just outcomes are more likely to be implemented, even by those whose preferences were not favored in the agreement (Druckman & Wagner 2019). Better joint outcomes have been found to result from processes that are deemed to be more collaborative (Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler 2008; Wagner & Druckman 2012). Procedural justice also influences the level to which negotiators integrate their interests in the outcomes (Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler 2008). Links between effective management and procedurally just processes are clear: negotiations in processes that are deemed to be just involve more information disclosures, higher joint outcomes, and more Pareto-optimal outcomes. Wagner and Druckman (2019) highlight that, while bringing almost 200 countries to consensus is challenging, negotiation processes such as the 2009 cop in Denmark, which was not procedurally just, can result in backlash from negotiators and build mistrust that future negotiations and leaders, such as the Mexican Presidency in 2010, must manage.
Summitry
An age-old form of diplomacy is practiced by leaders when they meet with each other usually in bilateral talks. It may not be an exaggeration to suggest that the fate of the world hangs on the outcomes of these conversations, particularly in the current conflicts in Gaza (Biden and Netanyahu) and Ukraine (Biden and Putin).
In this section we shed light on an important but under-studied type of international negotiation. Summitry has been in the limelight of international relations since the first summit meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin in 1943. And yet, despite the attention, we know little about their impacts. Druckman and Wallensteen’s (2016) analysis of the complete set of summits between the Soviet Union/Russia and the US – 104 in all—provides important insights on these impacts. In this study the authors addressed a number of questions by analyzing the historical record of summit meetings. Following are the questions addressed and the findings obtained.
How often have presidential summits between these countries occurred since the first meeting in 1943? There have been 104 meetings between 1943 and 2014.
Did the popularity of summit meetings vary by administration in each country? Summit popularity increased dramatically following the Cold War. Indeed, there were only 14 summits before the Cold War ended. More than half of the summits occurred during the Putin/Medvedev era with a roughly equal distribution among the post-Cold War US administrations. During 30 of the 47 years of the Cold War there were no meetings. This is a striking result. The relationship between these countries was fragile. A small mistake could have disastrous consequences. That mistake could have been made in a summit meeting as we learned with Reagan’s total disarmament proposal in the 1987 meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. That proposal was walked back by the US delegation. The shift from mortal enemy to reluctant ally increased the need to manage their relationship. Summits were one way to address the stresses and strains of new relationships.
What topics received more or less attention in the history of summits? Security issues took front and center stage in summit meetings following the Cold War. Again, the risks involved in discussing the hot button issues in light of the consequences of first use of nuclear weapons encouraged them to steer clear of those discussions. The idea of mutual security motivated many of the post-Cold War meetings.
What kinds of summits – bilateral or multilateral – have been preferred by each of these countries? A clear difference was found between the two countries with the Soviet/Russian leaders preferring bilateral and US leaders preferring a multilateral format. This difference may have been due to the historical status anxiety of Russian leaders. A bilateral format is more likely to encourage a “ratcheting up to parity” opportunity as was also relevant when they walked out of the start talks in 19833. For the US, a multilateral format is preferred to steer international relations away from the tense encounters in bilateral meetings.
Have summits been effective in managing conflicts between these countries? The analyses make evident that summits may be motivated by conflicts but have not been effective vehicles for changing the course of those conflicts. Virtually no changes from before to after the meeting were evident and there was little evidence for long term changes, referred to as “sleeper effects.” They have not triggered turning points in the relationship between the nations represented at the meetings. At best they have been largely symbolic meetings that may serve to stabilize rather than improve relationships. There is an element of negotiating for side effects by the leaders (Iklé 1964). A willingness to participate sends a message of championing peace while pursuing their interest in dominating the direction of other nations such as, for example, Ukraine.
Perhaps most interesting is what was learned about Soviet/Russian motivations. The authors uncovered a dual motivation. On the one hand they demonstrated cooperation in international fora such as the UN Security Council while prosecuting wars in many parts of the world. Their quest for respect on a world stage has been offset by a strong imperialism marked by an ideological zeal to control regimes that teetered on the brink of democracy and authoritarianism.
These findings illuminate the value of research in perilous times. A lesson learned is that the “reality” suggested by these data tarnishes the hope that summitry can be a tool for managing, if not resolving, bilateral conflict. This conclusion should not however diminish national administrations from seeking these kinds of face-to-face meetings.
It is not a foregone conclusion that summit meetings have little discernible effect on relations between warring nations. An answer to the counter-factual question about what would have happened without the meetings remains unknown. Yet it is at least conceivable that the meetings have had a stabilizing function more difficult to measure. The appearance of cooperation may have political consequences with more dovish components of the national populations. Surely the signing of arms control agreements hammered out by negotiating delegations provides political advantages for the leaders: In inf, it was a step in the direction of unilateral disarmament by the Soviet Union.
Other advantages include opportunities to discuss the low politics issues of trade, aid, and the global environment. These may be less contested issues but need the push of a summit to resolve sticking points among the delegations in multilateral fora. More generally summits are opportunities to coordinate those aspects of the bilateral relationship that could stand in the way of progress in multilateral meetings, particularly when blocs are formed along ideological lines that effectively block agreements. Summits may be linked to the voting resolutions in the UN and other international bodies. They provide international recognition for renegade nations who continue to prosecute wars on other fronts as illustrated by the finding about Russia’s dual motives.
Unlike the other conflicts addressed in this paper, summitry is an area where practice may be ahead of research. Policy makers still need to know whether it is advised to propose or accept invitations for such high-level encounters to manage acute conflicts. The Druckman and Wallensteen (2016) study reveals that, although summits may not directly lead to immediate solutions, they could be managed to bring indirect benefits.
Applying Research in Training Programs
The premise of this article is that research can support practitioners. Training is a key channel through which practitioners can learn to apply research recommendations. Research also provides recommendations for how to design such negotiation training programs.
Negotiation Training Programs
The previous sections call attention to the challenges of diplomacy both historically and with regard to current intractable conflicts. We have been stymied by questions about whether there are negotiated solutions to Gaza, Ukraine, and global climate change. The historical record on summitry has shown a lack of effectiveness in altering the trajectory of the conflicts that motivated the meetings. And, yet, we have a large body of research and practice on developing negotiating skills. In this section we capture lessons learned from attempts to bridge research with training.
The process of translating research findings into training modules requires careful attention. For example, the body of research on how to attain integrative agreements would seem ripe for application. A number of prescriptions follow directly from the research. One is to adopt a problem-solving rather than a settlement orientation toward the negotiation (Kressel et al. 1994). The key contrast is between cooperatively exploring solutions rather than alternating concessions for an eventual settlement. To do this effectively entails exchanging information about needs and interests rather than about willingness to yield on stated positions. Like most things about negotiation this is easier said than done. Success depends on trust and previous experience with similar processes. Mediators can be helpful if they earn the parties’ trust and this can be done if the mediator tutors the disputants to understand the differences between compromise or capitulation and the joint benefits that derive from problem solving (Conlon et al. 1994). The ideas of orientation, information exchange, and mediator communication can be incorporated in training programs with virtually any population.
One approach to training with a focus on attaining integrative agreements is found in the work of Druckman and Robinson (1998). They developed a training system consisting of 16 topics including emotions, power, time pressure, alternatives, culture, relationships, and flexibility. The findings were presented in the form of two-page narrative summaries and used with professionals and students in workshops. Upon demonstrating that they understood the research on each of these topics, the participants performed four exercises where they applied the research. One exercise put them in the role of analyst, another in the role of strategist-advisor, a third as a designer of training exercises, and a fourth as a negotiator in a multilateral negotiation. The evaluations were generally positive for both student and professional participants (Druckman & Robinson 1998; Druckman 2006). Perhaps most important were the long-term effects of the workshops in terms of remembering the lessons and using the insights in their professional work.
Concept Learning through Design
One of the four roles intrigued Druckman and Robinson sufficiently to follow up with new research. The role of designer was unusual for students and professionals. It was also found to be the most difficult to pull off. Yet it was also the kind of experience most likely to enhance conceptual learning. This was demonstrated in a series of experiments (Druckman & Ebner 2008) that showed designers learned negotiation concepts—such as those used in the workshop narratives – better than role players in the exercises in two national samples, Israel and Australia. Negotiating tactics were less influenced by a design experience. These findings encouraged further exploration of the design experience in other settings. One of these was in a course on management (Druckman & Ebner 2018).
The class was a lecture on four cognitive bias concepts: over-confidence, framing, anchoring, and availability. In a first experiment, students performed a design task in the form of developing a theatrical skit that incorporated the concepts following a lecture on those concepts. This condition was compared to a lecture only on the bias concepts. Strong statistical results provide support for both short and long-term learning: the design experience following a lecture was shown to enhance learning of the bias concepts. In a second experiment, a case analysis experience following a lecture on the concepts was compared with a lecture-only condition. Short term learning favoured the case analysis on some of the bias concepts. There were no differences in retention between the conditions a week later. A comparison across the experiments between design and case analysis showed design effects on learning were stronger than case-analysis effects on the bias concepts of availability and framing. Overall, the experience of designing a script adds more value to concept learning than both a case analysis and a lecture. These findings contribute to the cross-context validity of the impact of design on learning.
A question arises about the implications of these findings for research-based advice. Recall that the first designer exercise was part of a set of exercises used to apply research findings on negotiation. Focusing specifically on design, strong effects were found for learning negotiation concepts through designing role play scenarios rather than participating in role playing (Druckman & Ebner 2008). Stronger effects were also found on learning through design than through listening to lectures or doing case analyses (Druckman & Ebner 2018). Thus, learning about negotiation concepts or cognitive bias is enhanced when it is used in the process of designing simulations or creating scripts. This knowledge is a contribution to teaching as well as to learning outside the classroom. Turning to real-world applications, Diehl et al. (2024) report learning difficulties in the course of peacekeeping operations: Peacekeepers rarely benefitted from analysing early mission failures. They had difficulty understanding the concept of mission interdependence. The authors recommended training exercises in which peacekeepers design multi-mission operations. (See the section in chapter 7 on preparation/training.) Evaluations of effectiveness in the peacekeeping context remain to be demonstrated.
Discussion
A key theme of this article is the value of research on negotiation and related processes for dealing with difficult conflicts in a perilous world. Although we featured three areas of current intractability (Gaza, Ukraine, and climate change), our lens was opened more widely on the historical threats we have encountered (diplomacy, summitry). The examples discussed show how relevant research could be used to address practical problems. In this section we ask how are we doing in our attempts to bridge the gap between research and practice.
Although it is difficult to calculate a batting average, we can reach conclusions about ease of application, attentiveness by practitioners, and how the research suggestions worked. With regard to ease of application, the training approaches may be easier to implement and assess than the other examples. This is due largely to having captive groups of trainees – particularly students – and some degree of control over implementation. However, it is also the case that ease of application may not translate into use over the short and long-term. The diplomatic applications take second place. Access to critical documents in a consulting/research role facilitated the analyses that led to advice. Participant observation and interviews with negotiators contribute to a great deal of the research on climate change negotiations. Access to the complete set of summit meetings between the Soviet/Russians and the US made possible a variety of statistical analyses with implications for practice. The two current intractable conflicts (Gaza and Ukraine) present the largest challenges. Research is limited to open-source publications and media reports about these unfolding conflicts.
With regard to attentiveness, consulting on diplomatic negotiations and training received the most attention by heads of delegation or agencies and by trainees. The proposal of a trade between the Soviet advantage in heavy nuclear weapons for the US advantage in cruise missiles went directly to the chief of the US mbfr delegation. The proposal about Soviet intentions in start had the ear of the director of acda. In recent years, the host country – or presidency – of each climate cop has engaged with consultants, including some of the researchers highlighted here, for advice in organizing this annual meeting. The summitry and intractable conflict recommendations were developed without direct inroads to policy makers.
With regard to how well the advice worked, feedback was obtained on the mbfr and start consulting and on the training workshops. The proposal to end the mbfr deadlock fell on deaf ears because the delegations were negotiating for side effects. The start proposal may have gotten some traction as part of the overall approach taken by the US State Department. As discussed above the various training projects were evaluated. Better ratings occurred when research findings were embedded within training narratives. The low bar for success in climate change negotiations – the closure of the meeting with an agreement – may indicate the advice is working, as there has not been a major failure since the 2009 cop that spurred several of the studies cited here. Whether the outcomes will lead to the achievement of global climate goals remains an open question. As noted, the other recommendations were not developed in the context of direct applications.
As might be expected, the recommendations from the examples focus primarily on tactical advice rather than longer term strategic issues. Policymakers want to know how to react in the moment. In response, the research outlined in this paper has offered advice on how to frame or reframe the issues, the size and types of concessions to propose, and who should be invited to participate as parties and facilitators or mediators. Options to leverage one’s own influence and otherwise attempt to manipulate alternatives, as well as to play good cop/bad cop, are also presented. The need to monitor all negotiating parties’ preferences and ensure positions are based on shared assumptions is also revealed. Longer term considerations related to the context in which the negotiations take place receive less attention, however. Although policy makers adopt a shorter horizon for the recommendations they may request, researchers could couch their recommendations with attention to the longer-term context in which the shorter-term options would be most effective.
Avenues of Influence
On a more practical note, we can suggest three avenues for influencing diplomatic practices. Our experience has shown that contracted consulting roles may be the most direct conduit to influence. The contracts we have had in the US, Sweden, and Australia contained a requirement to develop and present policy-relevant recommendations. In the US, these were working relationships with heads of delegations and lead agencies responsible for the negotiations. In Sweden, these consisted of involving policy makers in the research and holding debriefing meetings on application. In Australia, our findings on peacekeeping strategy and evaluation were part of a continuing dialogue with the sponsoring agency.
A second avenue consists of serving as a knowledge broker through direct involvement in the negotiations. One of us has been participating in global climate change conferences for three decades. Through the vehicles of daily conference summaries and newsletters, opportunities for introducing research-based knowledge were available. These avenues for influence were complemented by daily interactions with the delegates. The loop back to academic communities was accomplished in presentations at annual academic conferences. Picking up on this loop, a third avenue for influence filters through the opportunities provided by the conferences and through publications in journals read by practitioners. Fireside chats with diplomats provide occasions for exposing practitioners to evidence-based knowledge. This was done with the Singapore Ambassador to the US at the 2024 annual meeting of the International Association for Conflict Management. Translations of academic research would get on the diplomats’ radar if written in familiar language and disseminated through media that garner their attention.
Training the future generation of decision makers and negotiators, including through graduate courses on international bargaining and negotiation as well as training courses for upcoming negotiations, also serves to bring new ideas and research to practitioners. Courses focused on applying the research are a direct avenue to bring the conflict literature to negotiators.
Conclusion
Anniversaries are opportunities to take stock of what has been accomplished in our role as applied researchers. The body of research reviewed, including our own work, covers a large swath of topics on resolving conflicts with implications for application. The examples discussed provide a sampling of how this research has been used in applied contexts. Although the conditions for successful application may not have been met in all of the examples, there is little doubt about the usefulness of research-based knowledge. We can regard this work as a legacy for the next generation of scholar-practitioners who manage to survive the perilous world in which we live.
Happy thirtieth anniversary to the journal’s editors, contributors, and publisher. We look forward to toasting many anniversaries to come.
Notes
Daniel Druckman is Professor Emeritus of Public and International Affairs at George Mason’s Schar School of Policy and Government, and an Honorary Professor at Macquarie University in Sydney and at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia. He has been a member of International Negotiation’s editorial board since its founding. His recent book, Negotiation, Identity, and Justice: Pathways to Agreement, was published by Routledge in 2023.
Lynn M. Wagner is Co-Editor-in-Chief of International Negotiation and teaches classes on bargaining and negotiation at the Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She is also Senior Director at the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). She began working with IISD in 1994 as a writer for the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, and she continues to observe and analyze multilateral environmental negotiations with IISD’s flagship publication.
This motivation was evident when the Soviets walked out. One of us was asked by ACDA to help the agency think through the reasons for this behavior and to propose ways to induce them back to the START table. Realizing that the key issue was perceived parity, we developed an approach that could motivate a return, which happened a year later.
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