Abstract
In this paper, I examine ideas on creation, nature, and the ethical self as conceptualized by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ (Brethren of Purity, fl. ca. 350–369/961–980) and al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. before 409/1018), with a particular focus on Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111). Drawing from the classical scholarship on kalām, taṣawwuf, and falsafa, I analyze texts by these ethicists who wrote on nature and the role of the human as part of their ethical understanding of the universe as a means to achieve salvation in the Hereafter. By cross-referencing the abovementioned classical scholars and their ideas, I ask how nature is conceptualized in the classical Islamic tradition as part of the divine creation and how closely it was conceived in relation to obtaining a virtuous character. Looking at these three figures who show a degree of cross-influence, indicates that these scholars wrote on creation and nature from an integrative perspective, encompassing theological, philosophical, and cosmological questions as ethical concerns. Reading these scholars presupposes that nature was not separated from other domains but rather amalgamated in a web of approaches and movements that addressed, for instance, the creation of the cosmos and its conservation based on a utilitarian perspective that was nonetheless ingrained in a metaphysical understanding of the universe. In a similar vein, this paper invites us to rethink the contemporary designations of nature/environment as a monovalent concept, encapsulated in a particular division of sciences as it appeared in modern Europe, and hence welcomes a critical take on the current debates on environmental sustainability as a common ethical concern.
1 Introduction: Creation, Nature, and the Role of the Human in the Qurʾān
Ethical norms and behavioral patterns are crucial in the study of the environment within an Islamic context. In light of the scholars discussed below, I argue that a historical-ethical analysis of human behavior toward nature in the Islamic intellectual tradition is cosmological in that it also entails a study of creation as a divinely ordained act. The paper is hence an invitation to rethink and critically address environmental concepts as they do not belong exclusively to the realm of scientific paradigms and/or the empirical study of natural phenomena, but also to the psychological traits and the ethical self.
Even though ecological criticism and environmental humanities1 as conceptualized in the twentieth century did not exist in the pre-modern period, as will be indicated in the following pages, classical Muslim scholars envisioned a so-called righteous living that was imparted by the moral substratum of dīn as a comprehensive way of life. This is not to say that they anticipated modern economic trends or hazards of environmental health but based on the integrative perspective of the environment, their natural philosophy necessitated a metaphysical understanding of the universe. Often however, in the post-classical period, Muslim scholars portrayed an anthropocentric vision of life in relation to environmental questions (Afrasiabi 2003, 283) by positioning human salvation at the forefront of their vision.
In this paper, I interrogate ideas on creation, nature, and the ethical self as conceptualized by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ (Brethren of Purity, fl. ca. 350–369/ 961–980) and al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. before 409/1018), with a particular focus on Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111). The ethical self is concerned with moral norms and ethical standards of selfhood; it is expressed through qualities that make a person virtuous, point to a person’s (good) character, and is often based on both the Qurʾānic metaphysics and classical Muslim scholars’ exposition of various theological, philosophical, and Sufi conceptualizations. I ask “How is nature conceived by these thinkers as part of the divine creation and how closely is it conceived in relation to the attainment of a virtuous character?” While this is a rather large topic to be discussed in a paper, I specifically focus on the comparative aspect of these scholars’ exposition to and understanding of creation and nature that is inextricably linked to building a moral character, since these thinkers show a degree of intellectual influence and reciprocity. At first, one might correctly assume that these scholars come from different epistemological backgrounds. In the same vein, however, they also share ideas on creation and write on nature and the environment from an integrative perspective, encompassing theological, philosophical, and cosmological questions as ethical concerns. This pinpoints to an intricate relationality between human actions and one’s responsibility toward the environment that was often encapsulated in the notion of the Hereafter (ākhira) as the ultimate aim of the purified soul. Reading these scholars presupposes that the process of creation and composition of nature were not treated as acts devoid of ethical reasoning, but rather amalgamated in a web of approaches that addressed, for instance, conservation of nature based on the Qurʾānic metaphysics, rational observation, and ethical principles that permeate various spheres of human life. In the context of the abovementioned scholars, the natural environment – that is, the conditions in which all living and non-living things exist on Earth – is interdependent and closely intertwined with the psycho-epistemological techniques of nurturing the ethical self by managing qualities of the character in how one behaves toward the lived environment. In this context, the ethical self pertains to one’s comprehensive outlook toward nature, linked to the physical substratum as well as to the celestial realm (Langermann 1997, 185–213). The concept of the environment (in modern Arabic usually referred to as bīʾa) is hence multifold and not disassociated from the metaphysical; nor is the metaphysical understanding of the universe unrelated to broader ethical considerations.
In what follows, I briefly discuss the concept of nature (ṭabīʿa) in the Qurʾān since Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī often base their views on creation on the Qurʾānic epistemology. Following that, I introduce these scholars’ theories on creation and human relation toward nature, more specifically analyzing their views on emanation, creationist views on the cosmos, and distinguishing features of human beings in the lived environment.
In modernity, nature is often manipulated through the technological realm and hence at the mercy of human exploitation, yet the conception of nature does not need to be essentialist or static for us to attach a moral significance to the human condition. Concomitantly, the metaphysical understanding of creation and nature in the Qurʾān and the Islamic tradition more broadly might provide alternative views to modernity on the so-called ethical sagacity of the natural environment.2 Understandably, only referencing the Qurʾān when analyzing the genealogy of ecology and environmental thought does not do justice to the multifold viewpoints that are to be found in the classical period, roughly from the third/ninth to the ninth/fifteenth centuries, in various legal, philosophical, Sufi, and ethical treaties. Yet, the Qurʾān is often regarded as the foundational text when describing an ethical approach toward the natural environment, which classical theologians, philosophers, and Sufis adopted, re-envisioned, and redefined within the respective boundaries of their own disciplines and theories.
In the Qurʾān, nature is depicted as a theophany that both veils and reveals God (Nasr 1998, 121), whereas the ultimate Being is God Himself. The destruction of the environment or economic development that encroaches upon the natural habitat, is, in the context of such intervention, seen as human re-appropriation of nature. The Qurʾānic understanding of nature differs from the modern concept of environment, which is according to Seyyed Hossein Nasr the outcome of “modern man’s attempt to view the natural environment as an ontologically independent order of reality, divorced from the Divine Environment” (Nasr 1998, 121). In Nasr’s view, the traditional Islamic view of the natural habitat “is based on this inextricable and permanent relation between what is today called the human and natural environments and the Divine Environment which sustains and permeates them” (Nasr 1998, 121). Despite that, the Qurʾān states that God subjected (sakhkhara) nature to man,3 the term does not indicate a violent vanquishing of nature, but rather an ability that human beings can utilize nature in the context of viceregency (explained more in detail below).4
The Arabic word ṭabīʿa is usually referred to in English as nature, which was also used by classical Muslim scholars, while the word for environment is bīʾa. Ṭabiʿā does not appear in the Qurʾān, whereas ṭabʿ as “natural inclination” is used several times. The Qurʾānic portrayal of nature, as found in numerous sūras and verses, is multifaceted. Nature is part of the divine creation, whereby the divine is characterized by the Unity of Being or absolute monotheism (tawḥīd). Unlike the divine, nature is characterized by opposites and the idea of duality (as denoted by the Arabic term zawj).5 Another important characteristic of nature found in the Qurʾān as well as in the theoretical works is that of mīzān or a philosophy of balance. The creation (khalq), also based on ordinances in an organized manner, such as command (amr) and guidance (hidāya), is concomitant with natural laws and processes that pertain to human behavior. According to the numerous verses in the Qurʾān,6 these ordinances often suggest, that nature is subservient to human beings. This subservience, however, should not be taken as a sign that human beings can subdue nature, but only that one can benefit from it as a source of ecological and economic sustenance, including natural resources, such as fire and water. Water, for example, is not only an essential element in the chain of life on earth and a source of growth, but also has a profound significance for Muslims as it provides (physical) purity.
The Qurʾān further addresses three levels of the relationship between the cosmos and human beings – metaphysical, naturalistic, and human. For Haq, for instance, the Qurʾānic concept of the natural world and the natural environment is semantically and logically connected to the concept of God. This concept, however, is linked to the general principle of the creation of mankind and the world. The three levels of Qurʾānic discourse do not manifest any independent conceptual tendency but rather a continuity between the three realms. Those three levels constitute the cosmological realm, which means that, ontologically, the divine permeates the natural environment. At the human (individual) level, the cosmological realm generates a particular attitude toward the world and the natural environment. Nature has a transcendental significance in the Qurʾān, seen also as a sign that was not created frivolously.7 In its Qurʾānic conception and through the act of creation, nature is anchored in the divine, both metaphysically and morally.8 The very principle of the autonomy of nature, which operates according to its own laws, is manifested in the actual cosmological processes of natural phenomena (Haq 2003, 146). The human being is part of this creation9 and as such a natural entity, part of the ecological balance. Such a consideration presupposes that any imbalance in the natural environment caused by human beings, including its deployment in economic life, is an imbalance (or destruction) of oneself (ẓulm al-nafs). This epistemological posture has also consequences for the human understanding of nature10 and reinforces the idea of human vicegerency or stewardship (khalīfa) as the protector of nature (Lutfallah 2006, 213–228).
The above Qurʾānic injunctions showcase a relationship between human beings and the natural environment that is grounded, first and foremost, in moral principles.11 Below, I provide examples from a few select classical scholars who wrote on creation, nature, and the lived environment not from a technical standpoint but in light of a cosmological understanding of the universe, enmeshed in ethical subjectivity.
2 Creation, Nature, and the Role of the Human Being in Classical Sources
Various classical Muslim scholars discussed righteous living in relation to how one engages with the natural environment, rooted in an ethical epistemology that encompasses the very study of the creation, development of the universe, and the role of humans in it. This is not to claim that classical Muslim scholars’ thought was purely normative, but based on this integrative perspective, their natural philosophy is rooted in a metaphysical understanding of the universe through an array of techniques of nurturing, modeling, and recasting the self (nafs) to attain virtuous traits of character. The ethical self – concerned with the moral etiquette of selfhood and with relegating virtues through techniques of self-examination – is based on various theological, philosophical, and Sufi conceptualizations, as indicated especially by al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī and al-Ghazālī and is ultimately about relegating one’s inner qualities and social responsibilities in the natural world. Muslim theologians (mutakallimūn) developed a theological system that also resorted to cosmological doctrines, by engaging with astronomy, philosophy, physics, and science, writing on heavens, time, space, and nature (Setia 2004, 161–180; Saliba 2007). Since Islamic cosmology has its roots in the Qurʾān, which provides a metaphysical basis to the mutakallimūn for the integration of Greek cosmological doctrines and Islamic sciences (Jachimowicz 1975, 143), those scholars coalesced Greek intellectual heritage with Islamic theology. The very metaphysical principles of the Qurʾān, such as the unity of being (tawḥīd), imply that the whole creation adheres to the divine (Q 6:102, 17:44), whereas the emanationist perception of the creation in Islamic tradition is a concept that was developed by Muslim philosophers (falāsifa), such as al-Fārābī (d. ca. 339/950) and Ibn Sīnā (d. 427/1037).
Numerous scholars addressed the role of humans in nature and how ethical standards of conduct undergird one’s existence in relation to religious values. For instance, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ compiled their Rasāʾil (“Epistles”) based on the scientific materials available to them, while also supporting more esoteric doctrines of taṣawwuf. Their influence on the notion of the Hereafter as the ultimate aim of the human condition is furthermore noticeable also in al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī and al-Ghazālī’s thought, who understood akhlāq to mean the science of the human soul (ʿilm al-akhlāq) through the study of various psychological processes (see, e.g., al-Ghazālī 1964; 1982; al-Ṭūsī 1964).
2.1 The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ
The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ described nature as an emanation or one of several potentialities of the universal soul, following both Qurʾānic metaphysics and Neoplatonic views.12 The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ introduce an emanationist (fayḍ) view of the universe (De Callataÿ, 2005, 17; Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1957), based on a Neoplatonic idea, which includes four main concepts – the One, the spirit, the soul, and the material world. More specifically, the very process of creation is divided into two parts. First, God creates ex nihilo the intellect; second, after the intellect’s emanation, the process of creation occurs gradually in the following order: The Creator/God (al-Bārī) is the First or the Eternal Being, which has no anthropomorphic attributes and sits at the top of the hierarchy of the cosmos. The intellect (ʿaql) is the very first being that originates from God and is regarded as the representative of God. The universal soul (al-nafs al-kulliyya) is perceived as the soul of the whole universe, emanating from the intellect and is sometimes called creation. Prime matter (al-hayūlā al-ūlā, arabicized from the Greek hylē) is a spiritual substance that is not capable of emanating independently. Instead, it is initiated by the intellect and assumes different forms, namely ṭabīʿa (which is discussed in greater detail below). The absolute body (al-jism al-muṭlaq) appears when prime matter acquires physical properties, and it is the very physical substance that forms our world. The celestial spheres include stars and heavenly bodies (e.g., Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon). The four elements are fire, air, water, and earth. Finally, the three kingdoms consist of minerals, plants, and animals (see Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1957, vol. 1).13
In such a system, humankind occupies a position at the top of the terrestrial realm, as it is the culminating point of the cosmos. Their Rasāʾil explain the origin of the world and cosmos, seen as a unified whole, whereby the material realm reflects the spiritual. The harmony between the two worlds is evident also in human beings, indicating a unity in the universe. Their immanent God bridges the gap between the creation and the Creator (Mohamed 2000, 659), whereby the human being, who is meant to transcend his physical nature, is only a part of the cosmic life. Apart from human beings, the creation emanates from the universal soul (nafs), including the four elements in nature, which are mixed up to form minerals, plants, and animals. The universal soul is active by nature but bound by its performance only through and by the intellect. The human being is, as an entity that strives toward the divine and a combination of both material and spiritual realms, the last result of such a process and hence expounded as microcosm (al-ʿālam al-ṣaghīr) (Mohamed 2000, 669).
For the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, the universal soul is the cause of all action: “Nature is none other than one of the faculties of the universal soul of the spheres which is propagated in all the bodies existing in the sublunary region beginning from the sphere of the ether until the center of the world” (Ikhwān al-Safāʾ in Nasr 1978, 60). Ṭabīʿa expands in all sublunary bodies and is seen as an embodiment of spiritual forces performing all actions. Nature permeates organic and inorganic bodies, and it is regarded as the cause of movement, life, and changing processes. All subsequent emanations from nature are viewed as more material (and hence more defective). According to the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, the universe is made up of all the bodies in existence, and it is finite and spherical in shape. It is believed that in the Rasāʾil they adhere to Pythagoras’s (d. ca. 495 BC) philosophy, but they rejected his view that the earth has two different motions – a revolution around a central fire and a rotation on its axis. Instead, they believed that the earth is moving forward and backward on its axis and that it was set in motion the moment it was created and brought to a standstill (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1957, 3:309 f.). While they made various erroneous scientific propositions, for instance, that the earth stands in the center of the world (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1957, 1:73 ff., 2:21 f., 3:189 f., 4:321), when it comes to sciences, geometry (handasa), for instance, aims at training the soul (nafs), by which it realizes promotion in knowledge from perception to conception, from the physical to the spiritual realm, and from the concrete to the abstract. The soul itself has three major faculties or powers: the vegetative pertains to growth, nutrition, and reproduction; the beastly belongs to both animals and humans, and also includes sensations; and finally, the human soul intertwines all three faculties.
They believe that a person’s character is either inborn or acquired. Inborn characters – which can be either good or bad – commence forming already in the fetus, and they develop gradually (while connected to bodily organs) under the influence of diverse celestial planets (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1957, 1:259, 4:144, 372). The human being acquires virtues until death, while good is designated as something that has been affirmed by religion. Not only one’s societal functions, but also an array of other factors, such as disposition of the body, climate, geography, and so forth, help determine and modify virtues. Since they believe that one should not read religious scriptures literally and stipulate that one must acquire good not to receive a reward, but for the sake of avoiding harm or loss, their approach is much less instrumental or empirical, even though it relies on various empirical and philosophical sources.
Drawing from diverse sources, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ have emphasized communal lifestyle and integrative cooperation in order to attain personal salvation. While their purpose is educational in order to provide practice and wisdom for salvation, one can also think of their philosophy on environment and nature through the study of astronomy and embryology, by examining also their material existence. Their affiliation with taṣawwuf indicates the quest for spiritual knowledge, even though as a group they were divided into four categories: the pious and compassionate (al-abrār al-ruḥamāʾ); the religious and learned men (akhyār and fuḍalāʾ); men of learning and virtue (al-fuḍalāʾ al-kirām); and those that receive divine assistance (Nasr 1978, 31). The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ treat philosophy as a way of finding the truth and ḥikma (Nasr 1978, 33) and do not perceive it as a philosophical system similar to that of Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 595/1198) or Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d. 427/1037). Any description or definition of nature and the lived environment, by default, includes a human relationality toward that very environment as a means to pursue virtuous character. This is especially evident in ethical typologies and deliberations discussed by philosophers and Sufi thinkers.14
Other philosophical and Sufi-inspired accounts on creation and nature – as indicated below, in part stemming also from the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ – are to be found in al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī’s Kitāb al-Dharīʿa ilā Makārim al-Sharīʿa (“The Means to the Noble Qualities of the Sharīʿa”) and al-Ghazālī’s Mizān al-ʿAmal (“The Balance of Action”), Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn (“Revival of the Religious Sciences”), and Kitāb al-Ḥikma fī Makhlūqāt Allāh (“The Wisdom behind the Creations of God”).
2.2 Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī
Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī was a multidimensional scholar who wrote treatises on Qurʾānic exegesis, ethics, and Arabic language (Key 2011, 298–306; 2018, 41 f.). While his philosophy of language and texts on the Qurʾān have been important for the development of the Arabic-Islamic language tradition (Key 2012, 26 ff.), in the following pages, I focus on his views on creation and the role of the human in the lived environment by primarily engaging with his ethical treatise Kitāb al-Dharīʿa ilā Makārim al-Sharīʿa.
Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī’s al-Dharīʿa attempts to combine philosophical reasoning with religion (Mohamed 2006b, 95), whose essence is an ethical system based on the Qurʾān with references to Platonic and Aristotelian thought. In the preface of al-Dharīʿa, the editor Abū al-Yazīd Abū Zayd al-ʿAjamī states that al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī aims to show how Islamic tradition developed its own ethical system based on akhlāq or the study of the human soul. The so-called fikr al-akhlāq or ethical thought allegedly commenced with Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), however, al-ʿAjamī argues that this thesis neglects other important scholars who came before al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, such as al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857), al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. 320/932), al-Junayd (d. 298/910), al-Kharrāz (d. 286/899), and others. As will be evident below, al-Dharīʿa contains many passages on virtues, vice, and human character, discussing rational, concupiscent, and irascible faculties and virtues, some of which extend also to the cosmology and the lived environment, including cooperation between different spiritual forces (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 73–76), the difference between human and animal qualities (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 78), the position of human being over other creatures (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 79), and human relation toward animals (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 81).
Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī views God as the Creator of the universe, who created the heavens and the earth out of nothing. Natural elements come into play in the function of the earth and heavens, while the human being was created for the cultivation of one’s crafts and qualities (Mohamed 2006b, 124). In the process of creation, the human being is of particular importance, who was made of both material or terrestrial and non-material or celestial elements, following a Qurʾānic understanding of its origin, and not emanationist scheme. Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī’s approach to knowing God is rational in that it observes natural phenomena, whereby the human being is defined as a microcosm (al-ʿālam al-ṣaghīr), similar to what the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ advocated (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 73). Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī’s notion of the microcosm, however, is rooted in a theory of creation and hence differs from the emanationist cosmology, and serves as a concept of knowing the divine, which by extension means that it also serves human ethical qualities, including one’s management of nature and natural resources through the concept of khalīfa. For al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, God constructed human beings not only through senses but also through the rational faculty in the form of the world, reflecting everything that exists in this world. In this context, the human being is like a microcosmos and therefore a reflection of the cosmos (al-ʿālam al-kabīr), since the aim of knowing the world is to know God (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 73). His treatment of the universe and nature is rooted in the Qurʾānic worldview of creation, where the relationality between nature and man is heeded through an intelligible formation, despite one’s appropriation of nature’s benefits, advocating for a holistic view that considers humans an integral part of nature.
In other words, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī offers a creationist view of the cosmos, whereby the human being is an indispensable part of the created environment. For him, God is not immanent but transcendent, whilst the creation affirms the divine (Mohamed 2006b, 124). While human beings are composed of both earthly and heavenly elements, Qurʾānic teachings indicate that one’s essence ultimately returns to God. Similar to the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, however, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī holds that human beings and nature share certain similarities in that they correspond in both body and soul. Namely, there is a need for both physical and spiritual realms of existence and the lower forms of existence are more dependent on the higher forms. The universe’s elements are meant to serve the human being’s rational faculty, and a similar scheme is followed for animals who also benefit from them (Mohamed 2006b, 127). This is illustrated by al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī’s idea of the human being as a microcosm, displaying one’s affinity with nature, to understand divine reality (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 73). This teleological view is encapsulated in a broader cosmological context of knowing one’s material reality, based on both rational observation and experience, which extends also to knowing deeper metaphysical truths, whose ultimate aim is the knowledge of God (Mohamed 2006b, 128). One could then state that for the human being to know the various functions of nature is key to obtaining one’s understanding of knowing God through the inner (bāṭin) processes of the soul (nafs). Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī adopted the idea of a human as a microcosm from the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, yet through a creationist framework as a means to knowing God. Knowing the divine entails acting upon ethical virtues that extend also to the natural environment as part of God’s creation (Mohamed 2006a, 158–159). His view of the creation can be seen as a spiritual progress, whereby the human soul gradually progresses toward the divine, and includes both material and spiritual dimensions (Mohamed 2006b, 132).
Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī holds that the human being is positioned higher than animals on the scale of creation, in that one possesses true knowledge (ʿilm ḥaqq) and decisive work (ʿamal muḥkam), even though human being requires food and procreates like plants and moves like animals. Nonetheless, a human being scores higher on the scale of creation in that one has certain advantages over animals, by using (human) speech and by possessing specific qualities (quwwāt) and obligations (muqtaḍāt) (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 79). For al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, the human being is positioned between the animal and the angelic realms, since the human being resembles both bodily desires, such as eating/drinking and procreation, and angelic elements, since one also possesses spiritual faculties, such as wisdom and justice (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 79; Mohamed 2006b, 470). By referring to the Qurʾān (11:61), one of the key human functions is to achieve prosperity in this world and to exercise the role of khalīfa (Q 7:129), through which one imitates God. The ultimate aim is, however, the Hereafter (Mohamed 2006b, 472).
Practicing vicegerency relates to the process of purifying the soul, by striving for virtuous actions (Mohamed 2006b, 477). The soul can be purified by cleansing the rational faculty (quwwat al-fikr) through training (riyāḍa), wisdom (ḥikma), and knowledge (ʿilm). The concupiscent faculty (quwwat al-shahwa) is purified by engaging in modesty (ʿiffa) and generosity (jūd), whilst the irascible faculty (quwwat al-ḥamiyya) is purified when it gives precedence to the intellect. The correct balance of the three faculties generates justice or ʿadāla (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 81, 88, 95; Mohamed 2006b, 480). In view of this, the human being has three tasks: maintaining the earth (ʿimārat al-ʿarḍ), in that one can utilize earth’s bounty to sustain oneself and others; devotion (ʿibāda) in order to accept divine decrees and prohibitions; and to occupy a role of God’s vicegerent on earth or khilāfa in the framework of his ability to govern according to Sharīʿa (makārim al-sharīʿa). Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī explains that makārim al-sharīʿa entails wisdom (ḥikma), justice (ʿadāla), clemency (ḥilm), goodness (iḥsān), and virtue (faḍl). Human beings should resort to all these qualities to achieve a certain balance in the lived environment, otherwise, as al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī explains, they might turn out “like a horse who cannot run or a sword that lost its sharpness” (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 82). Also, the notion of siyāsa – perhaps in this context mostly aptly translated as leadership – is for al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī inextricably related to obtaining the role of khalīfa on earth. Before engaging in managing others, one must manage one’s own vice, both bodily and spiritually (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 84). More specifically, one cannot be khalīfa if one does not purify the soul (najāsat al-badan tudrak bi-l-baṣar wa-najāsat al-nafs lā tudrak illā bi-l-baṣīra).15 Akhlāq, then, is closely associated with khuluq (character), which can be nurtured and depends on one’s spiritual insight (baṣīra), and khalq (creation), which is predetermined (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 89; Mohamed 2006b, 493, 494).
2.3 Al-Ghazālī
In this section, I analyze al-Ghazālī’s view on creation and the natural environment in light of his theory of the science of the path of the Hereafter (ʿilm ṭarīq al-ākhira). By doing so, I am more interested in looking into al-Ghazālī’s arguments on creation/nature and the human disposition toward it, rather than solely emphasizing which methods he used in delivering those arguments.
While Ahmed El Shamsy has advocated for an empiricist-teleological reading of al-Ghazālī’s theory of creation, by paying attention to the observation of natural phenomena as the macrocosm of the human being, also by providing evidence in support of al-Ghazālī’s following the Galenic scheme (El Shamsy 2016, 90–112), al-Ghazālī’s approach to nature can also be placed within a broader context of his theory of happiness (saʿāda) that permeates some of his most important works. Indeed, al-Ghazālī observes natural phenomena as part of a whole, seen as cooperative manifestations of divine will, and can be found in both the Iḥyāʾ (al-Ghazālī 1982, 4:435 f.; al-Ghazālī 1993, 370) and in al-Ḥikma fī Makhlūqāt Allāh (al-Ghazālī 1978, 13). The goal of creation, he asserts, is to promote benefit and avoid harm, similar to his understanding of the divine law, and his teleological structure in part stems from Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy and the famous physician Galen’s (d. 216 CE) anatomical work De Usu Partium (“On the Usefulness of the Body Parts”), as convincingly shown by El Shamsy (2016, 99). However, the functionality of creation and its parts to serve human needs is also a constituent of his theory of happiness and his overall system of the science of the path of the Hereafter (ʿilm ṭarīq al-ākhira), which is largely constructed through numerous psycho-epistemological techniques of the ethical self in order to purify the heart and achieve salvation in the afterlife and include theoretical knowledge of the divine and an engaged praxis, encapsulated in various Sufi stations, such as dhikr (remembrance), tawakkul (trust), tawba (repentance), and others (al-Ghazālī 1982, 3:2 ff., see also vol. 4). The science of the Hereafter covers theoretical and practical aspects: the science of praxis (ʿilm al-muʿāmala) and the science of unveiling (ʿilm al-mukāshafa). The latter includes ʿibādāt as one’s relation to God and ʿādāt or one’s social relation, including the very knowledge of the soul, and it is based, among other concepts, on patience (ṣabr), gratitude (shukr), fear (khawf), hope (rajā), renunciation (zuhd), envy (ḥasad), and pride (kibr) (Al-Daghistani 2021, 34; ʿUmaruddin 1996, 102). ʿIlm al-mukāshafa confirms a purified heart and serves as a path to obtain a direct vision of the divine (al-Ghazālī 1982, 3: book 1). The science of unveiling combines philosophical ethics with moral law in achieving the Hereafter.
This further presupposes that analyzing a towering figure such as al-Ghazālī, who deftly navigated the intellectual terrain of his era and whose ideas percolated the fields of kalām, falsafa, fiqh, and taṣawwuf, means that one could read al-Ḥikma fī Makhlūqāt Allāh in tandem with his other major texts. Since it is believed that al-Ḥikma fī Makhlūqāt Allāh was written in the so-called Iḥyāʾ period (Watt 1952, 44), during which al-Ghazālī further developed his ethical system, it could be analyzed in relation to his theory of the science of the Hereafter. After all, multiple methodologies used by al-Ghazālī in his numerous writings do not necessarily showcase lack of clarity or consistency, but rather pinpoint his hybrid scholarship centered on the notion of the Hereafter as an ethical axiom. Therefore, I am interested in exploring not al-Ghazālī’s innovation of integrating Qurʾānic verses into Galen’s teleological scheme in his al-Ḥikma (El Shamsy 2016, 106), but the correlation between human disposition toward saʿāda and ākhira in the context of creation and the natural environment.
Al-Ghazālī’s theory of ethics alludes to a distinction between what is righteous and wrong conduct (see, e.g., al-Ghazālī 1964b, 194 f.; 1982, 2: book 4). He believed that good souls would produce righteous actions, and evil souls would produce evil actions. It has been well documented that al-Ghazālī’s work, especially his treatise on ethics, Mīzān al-ʿAmal, was inspired by al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī’s al-Dharīʿa, which influenced al-Ghazālī’s ethical system (see, e.g., al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 3–48; Madelung 1974; Mohamed 2015, 1:186–206), however, similar ideas on the learning process can be in part also found in the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s Rasāʾil (Abdullah 2018, 157). One of the major themes in Rasāʾil is that their authors speak of purifying one’s soul through knowledge (ʿilm) and righteous behavior. The purification of the soul (or the heart, for al-Ghazālī) and a person’s moral refinement is one of the core principles of the Rasāʾil. The purification of the soul occurs by obtaining knowledge that leads toward the path to the Hereafter (ṭarīq al-ākhira) (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1957, 1:75, 78; Abdullah 2018, 176). Like al-Ghazālī’s ethical system of the science of the Hereafter that can be found in Iḥyāʾ – which is meant to revive the lost sciences and wisdom – also the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s Rasāʾil can be seen as a step-by-step guide for spiritual progress toward the path to the Hereafter. It is clearly stated16 that their ultimate objective of moral education is the improvement and refinement of the soul and can lead toward the Hereafter, which is not meant for those who are unaware of it (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1957, 1:76–77; Abdullah 2018, 177).
Al-Ghazālī believes that God is the only being that is necessary in itself, whilst the creation is dependent on Him (Griffel 2009, 146). The world is not eternal but has a beginning in time since it would otherwise generate logical inconsistencies. It is believed that by following the Ashʿarī school’s doctrine of predetermination, al-Ghazālī affirms the occasionalist doctrine that God is the only true cause that sets creation in motion, and that there is no causal connection between separate created things.17 This conviction, which has been contested, extends also to his view on moral action, in that rightful actions are those that conform with God’s commands. Occasionalist doctrine assumes that God is the primary cause of all created things, and that the created and natural environment, including minerals, plants, animals, planets, the universe, and so forth, rely on God for their existence. God is understood as possessing the characteristics of will (irāda), knowledge (ʿilm), and power (qudra) relevant to the issue of creation. For Ashʿarīs, existence can be broken down into atomistic units, which entail both matter (e.g., plants) and categories (e.g., space or time) (Koca 2020, 29–32). In other words, the whole existence is fundamentally contingent (Ormsby 2017, 52–55). When God designs the universe, He puts it into being at one point in time and supplies it with “being” (wujūd), which is passed down to the next ontologically highest creation (Griffel 2009, 236–253).
Al-Ghazālī perceived the human being as a microcosm that contemplates the very creation to obtain an understanding of the divine (al-Ghazali 2001, 91 f.; 1964). The wonders of human beings have parallels with the wonders of the world and God (Mohamed 2006b, 134). Contemplating creation and the natural environment has a direct relation with contemplating the human soul and the nature of the divine will. In this process, knowing the world and its creation, means knowing the divine, whereby exercising the virtuous traits of character – which lead to the path to the Hereafter – is essential. For al-Ghazālī, God created the universe to pursue a certain goal (qaṣd). Nature then can be seen as a process in which all elements harmoniously concur with one another – including celestial movements, natural processes, and human actions – all of which seek salvation in the Hereafter. The human being’s actions in this world determine one’s faith in the Hereafter (al-Ghazālī 1982, 4:60 f.). Al-Ghazālī holds that God created the universe through the three stages – judgment (ḥukm), decree (qaḍāʾ), and pre-destination (qadar) (al-Ghazālī 1971, 98 f.; 1964, 12). God alone is the only proper cause (fāʿil) in this chain that employs all creation (Griffel 2009, 236–253; al-Ghazālī 1982, 4:243 ff.). One can then assume that God empowers everything through His causes (Marmura 1965, 183–204), including natural processes.
In al-Ḥikma fī Makhlūqāt Allāh, al-Ghazālī discusses the heavens, the sun, the moon, the planets, the sea, water, air, fire, human body, birds, beasts, bees, ants, silkworm, fish, and plants (al-Ghazālī 1978, 5). Each section is divided into a chapter, which describes the wonders of God’s wisdom about creation. Additionally, there is also a chapter about the position of the heart in relation to the greatness of the “unseen teachings” or the divine (ʿallām al-ghuyūb). The path to know God is the path to ponder the creation to understand the wisdom behind the diverse phenomena in the universe. All of this leads toward conviction in certainty (yaqīn) (al-Ghazālī 1978, 13–14). Al-Ghazālī states that he composed this book for the intellectual elite (al-Ghazālī 1978, 14), and he also informs the reader that the human being was awarded with the intellectual faculty that is nonetheless accompanied by the revelation. He specifically mentions that God ordained humans to ponder upon makhlūqāt, including the natural environment. The chapter dedicated to the human being honors the human faculty of reason or intellect (ʿaql) (al-Ghazālī 1978, 66 f.). While the human being has been elevated above the natural environment because of ʿaql (see also Q 17:70) it also brings about inner contentment (bahja) (al-Ghazālī 1978, 66). Because of it, the human being becomes part of the angelic realm. While man can engage in hawā or lustful deeds, if ʿaql prevails, one potentially avoids destruction and preserves self-honor (karāma) (al-Ghazālī 1978, 68). The heart (qalb) is then generally considered as a vessel that brings one closer to God, through which one maintains human dignity (sharaf).
His description of the natural phenomena is supported by a corresponding Qurʾānic verse. The functionality of body parts – to sustain, support, and preserve human life as the best possible design, especially the human intellect, which is a sign of God – is considered in the context of their utility. Yet, the utility of the human body and its organs is nonetheless imbued with higher aims,18 in that man strives with his physical body (and mental faculties) through his carnal desires to cleanse the heart of various impurities. While the human being with his body utilizes nature for survival, he also exhibits a desire for higher moral standards. The design of human body mirrors the construction of natural elements, whose goals are to promote maṣlaḥa or common good and avoid ḍarar or harm. For instance, water is necessary and beneficial for human consumption, hence it is related to intentions of God’s creation. Al-Ghazālī equates the signs in nature and signs in religious scripture. Yet, this apparent utility-based relationship between humans and the creation through nominal functionalism is certainly not devoid of Sufi introspection and mystical experience that permeates his ethical system, especially as laid down in Iḥyāʾ and Kīmiyā-yi Saʿādat (“Alchemy of Happiness”).19 The vastness of the unseen world makes it impossible to be fully comprehended by human beings, since the universe (samāʾ) is infinite in comparison to the earth (arḍ) (al-Ghazālī 1978, 110). Whenever the intellect ponders upon the wonders of construction (ṣunaʿ) and beauty of creation (khalq), one’s knowledge, conviction, and devotion increase.
Along with al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ghazālī adopted a creationist view of the world and cosmos, including the idea of the human being as a microcosm of the universe, since observation means obtaining a rational knowledge of the divine (see al-Ghazālī 1964), however, he compared human vices with animals rather than with nature. Unlike the Neoplatonic theory of emanation, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī and al-Ghazālī perceived the cosmos as a product of a transcendental God who is the origin of all creation (Mohamed 2006b, 137–138; al-Ghazālī 1982, 4:243). Observation then leads to the knowledge of God. And because a human being is a manifestation of the creation, one is observing one’s own faculties through the natural world, by also trying to comprehend the deeper meaning of nature.
3 Conclusion
Metaphysical views on the creation of the universe and nature were closely related to the Qurʾānic revelation,20 seen also in various classical philosophical and Sufi texts. The analyzed texts by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, and al-Ghazālī show, despite their different scope and methodological reasoning, that, one, the process of creation is deeply intertwined with God’s omnipotence, and two, that psychological and virtuous traits of character are built into these scholars’ cosmology and the utility of nature. While the human being utilizes nature for one’s benefit, the natural environment is also meant to provide for introspection and wisdom of the created world, to bring one closer to the vision of the divine.
The question however remains, in what ways can Islamic intellectual history with its ethical theology contribute to the modern debates on environmental crisis and ecological exhaustion? In traditions that foster a cosmological vision of environmental philosophy, the integration of the diverse phenomena of nature into conceptual schemes and applied ethics reflects its central idea (Nasr 1978, 1). Thinking of environmental ethics as rational systems that emphasize not only personal but wider communal and structural responsibilities toward nature in modern societies offers vistas that go beyond current denominational boundaries of environmental, economic, political, and legal studies. While it seems that Islamic sciences pay attention to the individual approach to environmental engagement, ultimately, the individual is often addressed within a collective entity through one’s societal functions. In this sense, while legal injunctions and policies for environmental and climate protection are crucial, they simultaneously also carry spiritual significance. In the context of classical Islamic scholarship, methods of studying nature are multifold and polyvalent and often pertain to the study of the human soul. Unlike the modern scientific approaches to studying the natural environment, methods used by these classical scholars were based on observation and technical experimentation, rational thinking, and moral engagement in light of the Hereafter.
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“See you not that Allah has subjected to you (mankind) all that is on the earth, and the ships that sail through the sea by His Command? He withholds the heaven from falling on the earth except by His Leave. Verily, Allah is, for mankind, full of Kindness, Most Merciful” (Q 22:65).
The Qurʾān translation I use in this article is by Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali and Muhammad Muhsin Khan (1996).
For a critique of the Jewish and Christian traditions and their views on nature, see, e.g., White (1967) and Singer (1975; 1993).
For instance, day and night, adulthood and old age, winter and summer, rain and drought, satiety and appetite, health and disease; and prosperity and adversity, etc.
See, e.g., “And (remember) when Musa (Moses) asked for water for his people, We said: ‘Strike the stone with your stick.’ Then gushed forth therefrom twelve springs. Each (group of) people knew its own place for water. ‘Eat and drink of that which Allah has provided and do not act corruptly, making mischief on the earth’” (Q 2:60, see also 6:165).
“Nature, then, is an emblem of God; it is a means through which God communicates with humanity” (Haq 2003, 146); “There is nothing like unto Him” (Q 42:11); “And We created not the heaven and the earth and all that is between them without purpose!” (Q 38:27; see also Q 3:191, 23:115).
For the comparative argument on the notion of Islam’s moral tradition, see Hallaq (2013).
According to the Qurʾān, Adam as the first human being was fashioned out of clay. See, e.g., “Indeed, the example of Jesus to Allāh is like that of Adam. He created Him from dust; then He said to him, ‘Be,’ and he was” (Q 3:59).
Amr as the command to perform good is the specific principle of being of each thing in relation to that of all other things, inhering in it according to the command it uniquely receives from God … But at the operational level – and here is the methodological point – amr can be viewed legitimately to be a system of independent, self-governing, and self-sustaining laws of nature. Thus it was the amr of a mango seed to grow into a mango tree; and that of an egg to hatch into a bird; and that of sperm to develop into an embryo; and that of the oceans to sustain a multiplicity of life in their bosom; and that of the sun to rise from the far horizon.
Haq 2013, 159
Amr is, however, without a reference to Sharīʿa’s moral law – anchored in the cosmological structure –, meaningless. Sharīʿa is not a given corpus of divine instructions or a technical law, but an understanding (fiqh) of a moral order, which humankind is invited to follow through intellectual faculties. In this light, scholars who believe in all-encompassing functions of the moral law claim that nature is an embodiment of divine raḥma (Haq 2013, 159).
On the argument that the Qurʾānic laws are not physical per se but moral in essence, see Hallaq (2009).
The great majority of Western scholars consider the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ and their Rasāʾil to be associated with the Ismāʿīlī movement (Nasr 1978, 29). For works on the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ in English, see, e.g., De Callataÿ (2005) and El-Bizri (2008).
While in this paper I do not analyze human relation with animals, for the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s views on animals, see their 22nd Epistle, entitled Fī Aṣnāf al-Ḥayawānāt wa-ʿAjāʾib Hayākilihā wa-Gharāʾib Aḥwālihā (“On the Kinds of Animals, the Wonders of their Shapes, and the Strangeness of their Conditions”), known in English as The Case of the Animals versus Man Before the King of the Jinn. This Epistle describes a group of animals who can talk and decide to testify against humans in front of a jinn. For the English translation of the Epistle, see Goodman and McGregor (2009).
Among the philosophers, Ibn Sīnā, for instance, who was versed in natural sciences and philosophy, wrote about ṭabīʿa, describing it as a first principle or movement, following Aristotelian philosophy. Ibn Sīnā, whose philosophy of Being divides the existence into possibilities (mumkināt) and the Necessary Being (wājib al-wujūd), describes the three substances of intellect (ʿaql), soul (nafs), and body (jism) as separate entities, yet within the domain of cosmology. Cosmos is hence the manifestation of Being, and whatever is more perfect is also closer to the Necessary Being. For more, see Ibn Sīnā’s Kitāb al-Shifāʾ (“Book of Healing,” 1952).
Human being is composed of body that is endowed with various faculties, including the faculty of sight (baṣar) and a soul that carries the faculty of insight (baṣīra) (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī 2007, 86; English trans. Mohamed 2006b, 456, 458).
See the beginning of the seventh epistle of Rasāʾil.
Al-Ghazālī’s determinist cosmology in principle follows the Ashʿarī understanding of divine pre-determination, even though in some instances in the Iḥyāʾ (and his later works) he distances himself from other principles of Ashʿarism. While al-Ghazālī ascribes to an occasionalist model (cosmology based on an understanding that in each moment God assigns the accidents to bodies by creating new accidents after each moment ends) – which does not fully explain how God can make humans responsible for their own actions if they do not cause them – he also employs the so-called Avicennan model of secondary causes. Nonetheless, in the Iḥyāʾ (and Mishkāt al-Anwār, “Niche of Ligths”), his language is much more causalistic, but without a belief in a necessary connection between a cause and effect (for al-Ghazālī, God may create the two separately, or through the mediation of secondary causes). For the discussion on al-Ghazālī and occasionalism, see, e.g., Griffel (2009, 149 f., 123–174).
Body accommodates the soul (see, e.g., al-Ghazālī 1982, 3: 2–10).
See a comparison of al-Ḥikma 47 and Tafakkur in al-Ghazālī (1982, 4: 423 f.).
The objectives of the usage of the natural resources are to be based on mediation on, and consideration and contemplation of the universe and all what it contains (Bagader et al. 1994, 2 ff.).
