Abstract
Nordic countries are similar when it comes to migratory trends. However, when the ‘multicultural question’ erupted in the 1970s, they opted for different policies. In the early 2000s, some scholars analysed a retreat from multiculturalism policies and a civic integrationist turn. Yet, our knowledge of the processes of convergence or divergence per se of these policies is still limited. Using the comparative method, this article shows that, during that period of time, the five Nordic countries were divided into two camps, with little mixing in terms of policy content: multiculturalist (Sweden and Norway) and assimilationist (Denmark and Iceland). Finland shifted its policy from assimilation to multiculturalism in the 1990s, when it became a country of immigration. It adopted the same range of multicultural policies as Sweden and Norway; Sweden was the leader on this and Denmark was the least multiculturalist. Negative feedback was the most recurrent mechanism of policy reproduction.
Introduction
Nordic countries, or ‘Norden’ have in the words of Przeworski and Teune, a ‘most-similar systems design’.1 They are parliamentary democracies with a tradition of consensual politics and advanced economies with highly developed welfare states.2 They also have a long tradition of close policy cooperation, including in the area of migration and integration. Since 1952, they have had a passport union that gives freedom of movement and easier pathways to citizenship acquisition to their citizens, and, since 1954, a common labour market.3 In 1971, the Nordic Council of Ministers, an inter-governmental organ of cooperation, concluded an Agreement on Cultural Cooperation requiring member-states to consult each other on cultural policy and, as much as possible, work collaboratively.4 However, as Sweden shifted its policy from assimilation, its default policy, to multiculturalism for immigrants in the early 1970s, some other Nordic countries like Denmark did not. In the early 2000s, some scholars analysed a retreat from multiculturalism policies5 and a civic integrationist turn.6 Some authors have claimed that despite the much-touted idea of a common Nordic model,7 Nordic countries are more different than assumed.8 The problem in this regard, as Ulf Hedetoft wrote, is how to ‘understand the relationship between traditional divergence and a possibly greater actual convergence’ in migration policies9 until the so-called retreat of multiculturalism in the 2000s.10 This article seeks to compare and contrast all the five countries’ policies over time along the same theoretical and methodological axes. Specifically, it asks, on the one hand, what was the nature and mechanisms of the reproduction of these policies and, on the other hand, what were their trajectories?
Literature Review and Arguments
how each country has responded to four international human rights instruments: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against All Women, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.15
The book lacks methodological unity. While one chapter looks at multiculturalism policy at the municipal level, the others investigate policies at the national level or within a neighbourhood of Copenhagen, the capital city of Denmark. Then, only one Nordic city, Malmö is included in the comparison, the others being Mission District in San Francisco, the Elmhurst section of the New York City borough of Queens and Spain’s Costa del Sol.16 The chapters also lack thematic unity despite being relevant in their respective substantive scopes. Only a few chapters tackle policy continuity. In unison, these chapters detect weaker policies prior to the 1990s and stronger ones afterwards, but they acknowledge that obtaining a fine-grained picture is contingent upon a better conceptualisation. Based on ‘the score that Sweden received on the Multiculturalism Policy Index – over three points from before 1980 and ending in 2010’, Karin Borevi notes that Sweden’s policy was passive earlier and became active only later but ‘how one assesses the historical trajectory of Swedish multiculturalism depends to a large extent on how one defines the concept’.17
Sune Laegaard detects a milder form of Danish assimilationism prior to the 2000s, and a ‘hostile policy to multiculturalism afterwards’. Interestingly, he argues that some policies adopted before the labour and refugee immigration of the 1970s, already incorporated ‘multicultural policies’.18 In the chapter on Norway, Grete Brochmann and Anne Britt Djuve lament the ‘conceptual confusion’ and write ‘the provocative juxtaposition of assertions that Norway has become multicultural, has always been multicultural, and has never been a multicultural society’.19 In another chapter on Norway, Yngve Lithman writes, in the same vein, that Norway ‘positioned itself somewhere between the multiculturalism of Sweden and the anti-multiculturalism of Denmark’, but was leaning towards anti-multiculturalism in the 2000s. Regarding Finland, Saukkonen ‘concludes that although the inheritance from the past appeared to offer the basis for a particularly robust multiculturalism, in fact the reality is one in which multiculturalism is often embraced in a more tentative and ambivalent way’. Interestingly, he examines multiple policy domains (integration, state cultural policy), and even educational and minority organisations. Grete Brochmann and Anne Britt Djuve conclude that ‘the multiculturalism/assimilation continuum has proved to be unhelpful’, and suggest instead ‘the Marshallian typology of rights’ which pins citizenship onto three registers of rights: civil, political and social.20 However, the Marshallian triptych is geared towards socioeconomic integration and redistribution.21 In my view, it is preferable, as Favell has indicated, to distinguish between cultural, socioeconomic and political integration policy domains, even though traces of other domains may be found in each.22
Drawing upon new materials (archival documents), more refined conceptualisations, and applying tested methodologies from connected fields, this article argues that most policies were path dependent with negative feedback as the prevalent mechanism of constraint. The policies enacted in Sweden and, contrary to prevailing assumptions, Norway, were multicultural from the beginning and continued in parallel to Danish and Icelandic policies of assimilation. Only Finland shifted its policy from assimilation to multiculturalism in the 1990s, when it became a country of immigration. Overall, Sweden was the leader in multiculturalism followed by Norway, Finland was in the middle, with Iceland and Denmark the least so.
Mapping Multiculturalism Policy for Immigrants in Theoretical Terms
Multiculturalism has been the object of multiple definitional conjectures,23 and therefore is difficult to conceptualise for operationalisation.24 Broadly speaking, multicultural policies are governments’ actions and programmes that promote cultural difference and advocate the equal recognition of immigrants’ cultures in the form of group rights.25 Claims in support of these policies range from the impossibility of privatising culture,26 to the dialogical or communitarian nature of human beings, as well as the significance of cultural embeddedness for the good life of immigrants.27 In contrast, assimilationist policies give predilection to the resident-majority’s culture, and encourage immigrants to abandon or at least keep their cultural beliefs and practices in the private sphere.28 Assimilationist policies are predicated upon individual rights, conformity and the right of the nation-state to self-definition and so, to a common culture.29 Multiculturalist theorists have criticised assimilation for falsely claiming that the public sphere is neutral and failing to acknowledge structural inequalities that affect migrants, such as discrimination and racism.30 By contrast, proponents of assimilation attack multiculturalism for sapping social cohesion31 and oppressing women.32 They also postulate that equal recognition is impossible because cultures have different values,33 or they will have no value if they were recognised as equal.34 Assimilationist policies are also said to be conservative and less normative,35 but they are assumed to have positive connotations when immigrants share the resident majority’s position on the socioeconomic ladder and status.36 Both assimilationists and multiculturalists, however, agree to a liberal minimum. That is, the rejection of immigrants’ beliefs and practices that contradict those of the resident-majority, such as sexism or homophobia, or are considered unacceptable, such as polygamy.37
Regarding policy change over time, Erik Bleich differentiates between assimilation as defined above, preparationism, and passive and active multicultural policies. Preparationism encourages cultural differences in preparation for the deportation or departure of immigrants. Passive multiculturalism allows for a dose of cultural pluralism by making certain exceptions for immigrants, while limiting the effects of change on the majority. Active multiculturalism attempts to create a new national culture which encompasses both minority and majority cultural expressions.38 These definitions are of relevance not per se for their content, but for their reference to the strength of the movement: either ‘passive’ or ‘active’.
Recent efforts at renewing the concept have seen the emergence of two approaches: interculturalism, and the Queen’s University Index of Multiculturalism Policies in Contemporary Democracies. Interculturalism casts multiculturalism as a fluid exchange between majority and minority cultures with the majority culture retaining its status as the culture of reference. Meer and Modood portray it as ‘encouraging communication, recognising dynamic identities, promoting unity and critiquing illiberal cultural practices.’39 But for Wieviorka, ‘interculturalism functions at a much less sophisticated level, and a much less political one for us to be able to assert that it can act as a substitute […] it may be possible to envisage it as complementary.’40
The Queen’s Index is based on metrics and is used among quantitatively-oriented scholars.41 It usefully differentiates between policy domains and treats them as different objects of study: multiculturalism policy for national minorities such as Quebeckers in Canada; multiculturalism policy for immigrant minorities; and multiculturalism policy for indigenous people such as Sámi in Sweden, Finland and Norway. Studies that conflate the three policy types often yield contradictions, as in the case of Denmark, which boasts a strong score for multiculturalism for national minorities for the 1980s and 1990s (7/10) but a very low score for multiculturalism for immigrants (0/10). Another example comes from the drafters of Sweden’s first integration policy in the 1970s, who initially set out to formulate such a policy for both immigrants and national minorities, as the bill’s title, Guidelines for an Immigrant Integration and National Minority Policy, shows. Ultimately, however, it dealt only with immigrants as its task proved difficult. The Index uses eight indicators: a) constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism; b) the adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum; c) the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing; d) exemptions from dress-codes, Sunday-closing legislation etc.; e) allowing dual citizenship; f) the funding of ethnic group organisations to support cultural activities; g) the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; h) affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.
The Index lends itself better to this study as it measures multicultural policies by categorising them and awarding scores. In conformity to principles of the comparative method and quantitative analysis in general, a case is either present (1) or absent (0), or if one applies a fuzzy lens, either ‘more in’ or ‘more out’.42 A country’s policy can be more multicultural (0.75) or less (0.65), but this policy cannot be wholly multicultural and assimilationist at the same time.43 In reference to Norway, it cannot sit in the middle (0.5). However, I use only two of the eight indicators: affirmation of immigrants’ cultures; and state funding of ethnic group organisations to support their cultural activities. The rationale behind that choice is that only these indicators were present in Sweden’s multiculturalism policy during the policy change in the 1970s and the policy continuity, and thus can be held constant for a proper systematisation of the study. Funding of bilingual education and mother-tongue instruction were introduced in Sweden and Denmark in the 1970s. This was with the belief that they would facilitate majority-language acquisition by immigrants’ children, including Nordic children.44 Dual nationality, affirmative action, the introduction of multiculturalism in the school curriculum, and exemptions from dress-codes were not legislated in these countries until the 2000s.45 As the Index’s authors state, this is ‘not an exhaustive list of every possible form of public policy intended to recognize or accommodate immigrant groups … [However the list] captures core elements of the “multiculturalist turn”’.46 There is also a rationale for excluding other types of multiculturalist policies (national minorities and indigenous people). The Index’s authors explain that: ‘Whereas the multicultural turn in relation to national minorities and indigenous peoples is now widely accepted, multiculturalism in relation to immigrants remains highly contested, and some commentators argue that [it] is now subject to full-scale backlash and retreat.’47
The Comparative Method: a Mixed Methodology
The comparative method, or method of focused comparisons, is a mixed method combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, interpretivism and positivism, and thus ‘the best of two worlds’.48 It is relevant for small or medium N studies like the five Nordic countries. It spans a spectrum of techniques that differ fundamentally from one another on the number of cases. e.g. paired comparisons (2 cases)49, small N (about 5 cases)50 and medium N (about 5–100 cases).51 Generally speaking, the lower the number of cases, the higher the incidence of qualitative enquiry. The study is a ‘modified’ most similar/different outcome (msdo) design.52 In contrast to the most different/similar outcome (mdso) design, msdo entails that cases be as similar as possible, but with different outcomes. I call it modified because two of the outcomes are different, although all the cases share similar backgrounds. The study is structured along a ‘sequential exploratory design’. This design entails, as a first step, the collection and inductive analysis of qualitative data, and, as a second step, the use of qualitative results to deductively ‘develop a new instrument or taxonomy for [a] quantitative strand’.53
Qualitative Enquiry and Path Dependency
a time during which there are a number of plausible alternatives (t0–t1), followed by a ‘critical juncture’ where contingent events lead one of these alternatives to emerge (t1–t2), after which actors are constrained to remain on that path (t2–tn).55
The authors distinguish four dimensions: causal possibility; contingency; closure; and constraint. Causal possibility corresponds to equifinality, which is the existence of alternative causal factors or independent variables at the phase of policy initiation. Contingency ‘implies that the causal story can be affected by a random or unaccounted factor’,56 e.g. a crisis or a government change. Meanwhile, closure denotes the gradual loss of alternative paths over time. One policy orientation will gradually gain ground over competing options. Constraint refers to the prohibitive effects of a shift to an alternative policy and underpins path dependency.57
Bennett and Elman58 provide four plausible constraint mechanisms after critical juncture, as depicted in table 1. The first mechanism emphasises the concept of ‘increasing returns’. This concept hypothesises a linear policy evolution based on the positive feedback received by policymakers. The second mechanism is negative feedback. In contrast to increasing returns, it claims that policy failure may prompt decision-makers to change some of their practices and behaviours in order to achieve their initial goal. The third mechanism is reactive sequences. It posits that the implementation of a policy may occasion the social mobilisation of its opponents and a series of different events, which eventually lead to the achievement of the initial goal. The fourth mechanism conceives path dependence as occurring through cyclical ‘ping-pong’ policy processes. Policy reversals would themselves give way to reinstatements of initial policies ad eternam.
Path dependency, like most qualitative enquiries of the policy process, is performed through some form of process-tracing. The latter consists, in the search of causal mechanisms, through the procurement of historical narratives based on description and sequence.59 The researcher uses in that aim all kinds of data (interviews, archival documents, statistical documents, etc.) in order to organise their arguments.60
Quantitative Enquiry and Policy Convergence Research
For quantitative analysis, I use tenets of policy convergence research. Like connected methods, such as comparative historical analysis, it relies on correlational logic and the search of patterns. However, it focuses on policy content or policy style, the time factor and conceptualisation and assessment for measuring growing similarity over time.61 To overcome methodological challenges, such as the combinatorial multiplicity of factors or domains of convergence, e.g. multiculturalist policies for immigrant, national minorities and indigenous people,62 policy convergence research analyses ‘the isolated effects of different mechanisms [whereby] the primary interest is to theoretically investigate the effects and operation of single convergence mechanisms’.63 This means purposefully selecting variables, such as the Queen’s Index’s affirmation of immigrants’ cultures and the state funding of ethnic group organisations to support their cultural activities.
Policy convergence research has only been applied to studies of immigration control and not immigrant integration.64 These studies found limited convergence in most cases, but did not offer sophisticated methodological models. Holzinger, Knill, and Sommerer’s model,65 drawn from their study of the transposition of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (mea s) by EU member-states, is more insightful. It is based on three dimensions of convergence and the measurement of standard deviation, as illustrated in table 2.
The first dimension, the degree of convergence, deals with similarity in policy contents, and postulates that increased homogeneity reduces variation among cases. It also suggests that an increase in the degree of convergence corresponds to a decrease of standard deviation from time t1 to t2. Conversely, a decrease in the degree of convergence correlates with an increase of standard deviation. The reference point for this degree of convergence is the subgroup of countries affected by the dependent variable.66
The second dimension of policy convergence, the direction of convergence, refers to mobility: a shift upward or downward, a slow increase, or a race to legislate.67 Who was in the front, who was in the middle and who was at the back? The direction of convergence is measured through the mean change of standard deviation, with the reference point as the subgroup of countries affected by the dependent variable. That is, for example, a high standard deviation for the countries that adopted a multicultural policy from the mean (0.5), means a high policy divergence, and vice-versa.68 The third dimension, the scope of convergence, refers to the number of countries or groups of countries which converged. The reference point is the total number of countries under study.69 However, Holzinger and Knill caution that there is ‘no straightforward relationship between degree and scope of convergence.’70 So, a subgroup of countries might converge towards a point far away from the other countries.
Data Collection
Data was drawn primarily from policy documents from Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland published during the period under study. Relevant information for each country was found in other countries’ policy documents. Government commissions systematically took stock of policy developments in the other Nordic countries. This made the comparison easier. Immigrant issues fell within the remit of different ministries at different points in time in each country, making reading across various policy domains imperative. Thus, I sourced policy data from the ministries in charge of employment, culture, immigration and integration. The main policy documents examined were the first policy bills formulated in the 1970s, their preliminary commission reports, and follow up bills and reports up to the 2000s, as well as governments’ executive decisions.71 Two little-discussed Norwegian policies – St. meld. nr. 74 (1979–1980) om innvandrere I Norge (About immigrants in Norway) and St. meld. Nr. 39 Om innvandringspolitikken (About immigration policy) – yielded crucial evidence about the nature of the country’s policies in the 1970s and 1980s. I also used newspaper articles and academic publications.
Part one sets the context and reviews policy change in the 1970s. Parts two and three examine content homogeneity respectively among multiculturalist countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland) and assimilationist countries (Denmark and Iceland), and the mechanisms of path dependency herein. Part four measures the degree, direction and scope of convergence/divergence among the five countries.
Background
The multicultural question surfaced in Sweden in the mid-1960s when a heated debate broke out between opponents of a ‘mixed culture’ society, who opposed state support for immigrants’ cultural activities and mandated assimilation, and advocates of a multicultural society, who claimed that such a policy would coerce immigrants into assimilation.72 Those immigrants who were considered different were mainly southern Europeans, Yugoslavs and Turks.73 One of the first Swedish multicultural policies – the New Cultural Policy report – was published in 1972.74 It stated that immigrants were in the process of losing their cultural traditions in the absence of any means of preservation. Immigrants were isolated from mainstream society because they lacked knowledge of cultural codes and did not know the Swedish language. The subsequent bill – The New Cultural Policy – published in 1974, recommended the ‘systematic’ monitoring of immigrants’ cultural situation and financial support for cultural associations that, in light of their close links and their wealth of experience with immigrants, were considered the most effective mechanism of policy implementation.75
The same policy principles were included in the 1974 Constitution76 and the 1975 Integration Bill Guidelines for an Immigrant and National Minority Policy. These were, respectively: recognition of ethnocultural diversity; and immigrants’ freedom of choice as to what extent they wanted to preserve their cultures or adhere to the majority culture.77 Freedom of choice, that was considered to be the mark of Sweden’s multicultural policy, entailed that immigrant groups receive financial support and other kinds of support to develop cultural activities of their own. ‘Actions aiming at preserving immigrants’ cultures and their children’, it was observed, ‘will make their reintegration easier at home if they chose to return’. While the notions of adopting Swedish culture and migrants’ return could be interpreted respectively as state-mandated assimilation and preparationism (expulsion), this was not the case because they were non-coercive, as the use of the conditional tense and the notion of free will included in the provision attest.78
This policy change, according to several authors, was the result of a combination of factors: the actions of a policy entrepreneur David Schwarz, who helped put the issue on the political agenda;79 Sweden’s internationalist foreign policy;80 the trade union confederation Landsorganisationen i Sverige’s (lo) veto power;81 the welfare state’s problem-solving logic;82 Olof Palme, the slain Social Democratic Prime Minister and his pro-multicultural ideas;83 and the impact of experts.84
As I argued in a previous publication,85 Swedish multicultural policy diffused into Norway as a result of norms emulation rooted in a similar policy: multiculturalism for national minorities – the Sámi – promoted by the government. Brochmann and Hagelund explained this choice as a consequence of the Norwegian welfare state’s problem-solving attitude.86 As for Denmark’s assimilation policy, there is broad consensus over the causal influence of the Lutheran pastor Nicolaj F.S. Grundtvig’s (1783–1872) ideological legacy. Following Sanders et al., as well as Duelund, and Tawat,87 it was Grundtvig’s revivalist movement, based on Christianity and Danishness (Grundtvigianism) born after the country’s defeat by Prussia in 1864, that was the well-spring of ideas for Danish policymakers.
Yet I found that – based on a comparative study of the five countries including Finland and Iceland – it was immigrant population size or the numbers of dissimilar immigrants in the entire population that was in fact the earliest and most prevalent factor in the policymaking process.88 Immigration size determined this agenda-setting as to whether a country would initiate the process of formulating a policy. Increased immigration provoked policy launches in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.89 Conversely, very low immigration numbers in Finland and Iceland delayed policy making.90
Immigrant population size was also more prevalent (although not exclusively so) than other factors claimed by other studies for policy formulation (whether a country would choose assimilation or multiculturalism).91 It justified both Sweden’s multicultural policy and Denmark’s assimilation policy.92 Specifically, the Swedish government justified the choice of a multiculturalism policy by the increase of dissimilar immigrants from Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia and especially Turkey, who were considered more culturally distant by policymakers.93 The largest immigrant group, Finns, were considered Nordic by the Swedish government, although their linguistic distance from other Nordic languages was considered to be a barrier, which was the basis of claim-making by Finnish and other ethnic (Estonian and Jewish) policy entrepreneurs.94 Denmark justified its policy of assimilation by the low percentage of dissimilar immigration from Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey (together with Grundtvig’s policy legacy). Only Norway’s multicultural policy, as mentioned previously, was motivated by another factor: policy diffusion based on norms emulation. Thus, all the causal mechanisms, besides the constraint mechanism inherent to path dependency at policy inception, were present: 1) causal possibility or the presence of alternative causal factors or independent variables; and 2) contingency, specifically the appointment in Sweden of Olof Palme, a gatekeeper with pro-multicultural ideas, as Culture Minister in 1967 and his nomination as Prime Minister in 1969.95
The Multiculturalists: Sweden, Norway and … Finland
The study of policy continuity or the evolution of Swedish and Norwegian multicultural policies from the 1970s until 2006, when a retreat of multiculturalism occurred, uncovers processes of path dependency.96 Prior to the 1990s, multicultural policies were passive. Sweden and Norway formulated multicultural policies, but their implementation was limited. On the one hand, there was not a sense of ‘crisis’ as there would be later in the 1990s, on the other hand, the 1973 oil crisis and the economic downturn that followed led to budget cuts.97 Looking at the degree of convergence, there was a high degree of content homogeneity between Swedish and Norwegian multicultural policy provisions.98 The two countries’ cultural policies published in the 1970s had identical titles: New Cultural Policy (Ny kultur politikk) in Norway99 and New Cultural Policy (Ny kultur politik) in Sweden.100 Almost identical terms were used in the two bills. On pages 6 and 7, in a special section of the Norwegian bill called ‘Special Groups’ (Spesielle Grupper), emulating the Swedish bill’s section ‘Disadvantaged Groups’ (Eftersatter Grupper), immigrants and guestworkers were mentioned together with national minorities as needing support from the state. Immigrants’ freedom to retain or abandon their cultures is translated in the same terms as the Freedom of Choice Goal of the 1975 Swedish integration bill.101 This high degree of homogeneity shows that Norwegian policy was multicultural in the 1970s.
the interpretation of the freedom of choice goal based on the notion that immigrants were entitled to the preservation of their cultural practices without any checks lacked evidence […] where a relativist interpretation was made, it will generate conflict situations in schools. For example, where some immigrants’ cultural beliefs (Islamic) about gender equality are at odds with those of the mainstream society.105
In St. meld. 74 for 1979–1980, it is stated that immigrants should be able to choose to what extent they want to preserve their language and culture. Little is said about the content, limitations and conditions for that freedom of choice. A common interpretation is that freedom of choice is valid for the whole lifestyle, that is, norms, values, customs. Practically, it is unlimited. Immigrants have the same obligations as other residents when it comes to the acceptance of the norms and values that exist in our societies no matter their personal opinion. There is a political consensus on some fundamental values in Norway for example values on democracy, gender equality and children rights. That is a clear limit to freedom of choice for all.107
… the government recognises that Norwegian society has been and will increasingly be multicultural. Cultural pluralism is enriching and a strength for the Community. In every sector, openness and dialogue, interaction and innovation must be encouraged. Racism and discrimination are in contradiction with our fundamental values and must be countered actively.
In the 2000s, multicultural policies were strengthened with the launch of an Agenda for Multiculturalism in the years 2003–2006 in Sweden,110 and government funding increased for cultural programmes in Norway from 4.2 per cent in 2003 to 7.5 per cent in 2006.111 Thus, the period stretching from the 1990s to 2006 was marked by active multiculturalism. Overall, the mechanism of path dependency involved in this process of convergence was negative feedback because of the double policy reversal following the intercultural interlude.
this regulation includes not only the negative right not be interfered with by public authorities while practicing one’s own culture, but also the responsibility of the Finnish state to support the maintenance and development of the language and culture of the groups in question.114
These provisions were codified in the Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers (493/1999).
Concerning the funding of immigrant associations, the Finnish government launched in 2001 an ‘Action Plan to Combat Ethnic Discrimination and Racism’, through which material support was delivered. The Ministry of Education and Culture was also tasked with setting up a ‘support system for immigrant and ethnic minority organizations, culture and publication activities and the coverage of this system’.115 Consequent financial resources were earmarked for professional artists and organisations of immigrant background.116 In this way, Finland sided with Sweden and Norway.
The Assimilationists: Denmark and Iceland
Denmark kept the same assimilation policy over time, even as it witnessed increased immigration.117 In the 1970s, the Cultural Policy Statement to the Parliament (Betænkning nr 517), published in 1969, made no mention of immigrant cultural policy.118 Another important report – the Report on Conditions of Foreign Workers in Denmark,119 published in 1970 – stated in its section ‘On Leisure’ (Om fritidsforanstaltninger), that ‘guestworkers who stay should assimilate into Danish culture’, maintaining that ‘it was not the state’s responsibility to provide material support for foreign workers’.120 In the 1980s, state cultural policies did not include provisions for immigrants even as they promoted a notion of ‘cultural pluralism [...] incorporating cultural expressions of diverse socio-economic groups’, such as youth groups, rural communities and foreign visiting cultural groups.121 In the 1990s, as immigration growth gave rise to xenophobia, and heated debates erupted over the compatibility of non-Western immigrants’ cultures with those of Denmark,122 Jytte Hilden, the Social Democratic Culture Minister (1993–1996), launched a cultural policy project (1993–1996) in which she set a ‘multicultural Denmark’ as an objective. Her initiative was met with negative feedback.123 After this, a comprehensive immigrant policy, the Integration Act, was passed in 1998,124 mandating the acquisition of Danish cultural beliefs and practices for immigrants. Thus, the Council for Ethnic Minorities, created by the Integration Act, functioned as an instrument of policy advice, not for the promotion of ethnic minority issues.125 Similarly, the Cultural Fund established between 1989 and 1998 to provide material support to projects involving both native and professional ethnic artists, came to view ethnicity ‘as a problem rather than as a potential’.126 Ad-hoc programmes, such as that of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ ‘When People Meet’, and the Co-operative Council for Popular Education’s ‘One Country-Different People’, ran out of funding.127 In 2006, a Cultural Canon aimed at preserving and helping immigrants acquire Danish culture, was published.128
Icelandic governments avoided multiculturalism from the 1990s onwards, when immigration increased and the government began to address the issue. Specifically, labour immigration increased following the country’s accession to the European Economic Area in 1994 and the establishment of the European Union’s single market.129 In 1980, foreigners formed 1.4 per cent of the population. In 1998, they made up 3 per cent of the workforce130 and 2 per cent of the population.131 These immigrants came mostly from the EU. Politicians now agreed on the need for a coherent policy but developed a critical discourse toward multiculturalism around the ‘crisis of multiculturalism’.132 Thus, while the parliament, Althingi, approved the launching of a Multicultural Centre in 2000, its central function was to ease communications between Icelanders and foreigners, to enhance the delivery of social services, and ‘to facilitate the integration of foreigners into Icelandic society’.133 Even after the country opened its labour market in 2006 to the eight Eastern European countries who joined the EU in 2004, and immigration increased, the government continued to avoid multiculturalism. The nature of this immigration explains this. While in the 1970s, such immigration would have been considered to be dissimilar to the native population, it was at that time considered to be similar as a consequence of ‘Europeanisation’. Another explanation was the existence of assimilationist ideas and norms at various levels of society, as in Denmark. Writing on multicultural education in Iceland, Jónsdóttir and Ragnarsdóttir state for example that ‘Curriculum guides for preschools and compulsory schools […] contain numerous references to nationalist ideology and do not allow for, or presume, contributions from other cultures and religions in compulsory or preschool education or curriculum development’.134
Neither Convergence, Nor Divergence but Movement in the Same Direction
The measure of σ-convergence, as Table 3 illustrates, corroborates the findings above. As conceptualised, we calculated the standard deviation for the population at inception in the 1970s and at the endpoint in 2006 to show if an increase or decrease occurred in the degree of convergence. Results show neither a decrease nor an increase over time. The standard deviation for the 1970s is 0.49, and that of the 2000s is 0.49. The conclusion is that the gap that opened in the countries’ policy contents in the 1970s did not close. There was no policy ‘mixing’ or ‘dilution’. As figure 1 shows, policies stood at opposite poles (0 and 1), with no score between. When Finland joined Sweden and Norway in the 1990s in their multiculturalism, it adopted the very same type of policies, not different ones.
Convergence and divergence of multiculturalist policies in the Nordic countries (1974–2006)
Citation: Journal of Migration History 10, 2 (2024) ; 10.1163/23519924-10020004
The direction of this convergence was upward, albeit at a slow pace. With Finland’s policy change, the mean of multiculturalist countries increased from 2 to 3 out of 5. Regarding the scope of convergence, as figure 1 also illustrates, there were two core groups of countries, distinct and parallel. There was a multiculturalist group, including Sweden and Norway, which were forerunners in this approach, and an assimilationist group, including Denmark and Iceland, which took a different approach. Sweden was, as Karin Borevi wrote, the ‘flagship of multiculturalism’,135 and Denmark the beacon of assimilation. In sum, as per the potential configurations of convergence indicators, enumerated by Knill and Holzinger, as in the 1970s ‘there was neither convergence, nor divergence but movement in the same direction’.136
Conclusion
This article has sought to measure the similarity between Nordic countries’ multicultural policies from the 1970s, when multiculturalism became more prominent on the policy agenda in Sweden – the first time in a Nordic country – to its retreat in the early 2000s, and investigated the causal mechanisms involved in these processes. More specifically, measuring the degree of convergence shows a high level of homogeneity between the multicultural policies of Sweden and Norway, as well as between the policies of assimilation of Denmark and Iceland. When Finland changed its policy from assimilation to multiculturalism in the 1990s, upon becoming a country of net immigration, it formulated the same range of policies as Sweden and Norway.
Multicultural policies stated that immigrants should be given freedom of choice. That is, they should have the possibility of choosing to what extent they wanted to preserve their cultural beliefs and practices or adopt Swedish ones. Immigrants could lose their cultures and get isolated from mainstream society. Assimilationist policies either failed to legislate (default assimilation) or urged immigrants to adopt the majority culture’s beliefs and practices. Measuring the direction of this convergence shows that it was upward but slow. Both multicultural and assimilationist policies were passive until the 1990s, when they became more active. Qualitative enquiry shows that these policies were reproduced through path dependency in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, the countries which legislated throughout the period of study. The constraint mechanisms involved in these processes was negative feedback. Specifically, as difficulties about immigrant integration mounted, policymakers sought to revise their policies. However, they simply reverted to the original policies. In doing this, the study has helped to clarify the nature of Norway’s policy by anchoring it in the multiculturalist camp during that period. Sweden and Norway were forerunners in multiculturalism, Finland was in the middle, Denmark and Iceland were assimilationist.
Measuring the scope of convergence reveals that there were two core groups of countries, distinct and parallel throughout the time period. On the theoretical level, the study has argued for, and offered, a more syncretic conceptualisation of multiculturalism for operationalisation. On the methodological level, it has introduced a set of novel approaches and successfully applied them. Firstly, it has shown that cases with no information, such as Finland and Iceland, which have been excluded in most case selections because of non-policymaking, deserve as much consideration as cases with an outcome (positive or negative). Secondly, it has evidenced how change in multiculturalist policies over time can be measured. Thirdly, it has offered a comprehensive and integrated model for studying multiculturalism policies, and by extension integration policies, over time, which future studies can get attuned with.
Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The logic of comparative social inquiry (New York 1970) 33.
David Arter, Democracy in Scandinavia: Consensual, majoritarian or mixed? (Manchester 2006); Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The three worlds of welfare capitalism (Princeton 1990).
‘Agreement concerning a common Nordic labour union’, Norden, Signing of agreement 6 March 1982 Effective date for the agreement 1 August 1983, https://www.norden.org/en/treaties-and-agreements/agreement-concerning-common-nordic-labour-market (last accessed 4 December 2023).
‘Prop 1971: 54 Angående Godkännande av Avtal mellan Danmark, Finland, Island, Norge och Sverige om Kulturellt Samarbete’ (About the ratification of an agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden on cultural cooperation), Riksdagen, https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/proposition/kungl-majts-proposition-angaende-godkannande-av_FU0354/html/ (last accessed 4 December 2023).
Christian Joppke, ‘The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: theory and policy 1’, The British Journal of Sociology 55:2 (2004) 237–257, 243; Will Kymlicka, ‘Multiculturalism: Success, failure, and the future’, in: Bertelsmann Stiftung, Migration Policy Institute (eds), Rethinking national identity in the age of migration (Gütersloh 2012) 33–78; Karin Borevi, ‘Mångkulturalism på reträtt’, in: Sverker Gustavsson et al. (eds) Statsvetare ifrågasätter. Uppsalamiljön vid tiden för professorsskiftet den 31 mars 2008 (Uppsala 2008) 408–424.
Karin Borevi, Kristian Kriegbaum Jensen and Per Mouritsen, ‘The civic turn of immigrant integration policies in the Scandinavian welfare states’, Comparative Migration Studies 5 (2017) 1–14; Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, ‘Is there really a retreat from multiculturalism policies? New evidence from the multiculturalism policy index’, Comparative European Politics 11 (2013) 577–598.
Peter Duelund (ed.), The Nordic cultural model: Nordic cultural policy in transition (Copenhagen 2003).
Anne Elisabeth Stie and Jarle Trondal, ‘Introducing the study of Nordic cooperation’, Politics and Governance 8:4 (2020) 332–341.
Ulf Hedetoft, ’Divergens eller konvergens? Perspektiver i den dansk-svenske sammenstilling’, in: Ulf Hedetoft, Bo Petersson and Lina Sturfelt (eds), Bortom stereotyperna? Invandrare och integration i Danmark och Sverige (Lund and Göteborg 2006) 390–407, 392.
Christian Joppke described how Britain and the Netherlands, where multiculturalism has been official policy, abandoned the policy as well as a tendency to take multiculturalism as the description of a society rather than as a prescription for state policy due to: (1) the lack of public support; (2) the continued socio-economic marginalisation and self-segregation of migrants; (3) the liberal minimum newly imposed on the dissenters by the states: Joppke, ‘The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state’, 244.
Ulf Hedetoft, Bo Petersson and Lina Sturfelt, Bortom stereotyperna? Invandrare och integration i Danmark och Sverige (Lund and Göteborg 2006); Mahama Tawat, ‘Danish and Swedish immigrants’ cultural policies between 1960 and 2006: toleration and the celebration of difference’, International Journal of Cultural Policy 20:2 (2012) 202–220; Greta Brochmann and Anniken Hagelund (eds), Immigration policy and the Scandinavian welfare state 1945–2010 (New York 2012).
Peter Kivisto and Östen Wahlbeck, Debating multiculturalism in the Nordic welfare states (London 2013).
Pasi Saukkonen, ‘Multiculturalism and cultural policy in Northern Europe’, Nordisk Kulturpolitisk Tidsskrift 16:2 (2014) 178–200; Mats Wickström, ‘Comparative and transnational perspectives on the introduction of multiculturalism in post-war Sweden’, Scandinavian Journal of History 40:4 (2015) 512–534.
Kivisto and Wahlbeck, Debating multiculturalism, 9.
Ibid., 14.
Ibid., 12.
Ibid., 16.
Ibid., 16.
Ibid., 17–18.
T.H. Marshall, ‘Citizenship and social class’, in: T.H. Marshall (ed.), Class, citizenship and social development (Garden City, NY 1968) 528.
Erik Bleich, ‘Immigration and integration studies in Western Europe and the United States: the road less traveled and path ahead’, World Politics 60:3 (2008) 509–538.
Adrian Favell, ‘Integration policy and integration research in Europe: a review and critique’, in: T.A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer (eds), Citizenship today: global perspectives and practices (Washington, DC 2001) 349–399; Han Entzinger, ‘The dynamics of integration policies: a multidimensional model’, in: Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (eds), Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics: Comparative European perspectives (Oxford 2000) 97–118.
Douglas Hartmann and Joseph Gerteis, ‘Dealing with diversity: mapping multiculturalism in sociological terms’, Sociological Theory 23.2 (2005) 218–240.
Christophe Bertossi and Jan Willem Duyvendak ‘National models of immigrant integration: the costs for comparative research’, Comparative European Politics 10 (2012) 237–247.
Paul Kelly (ed.), Between culture and equality in multiculturalism reconsidered (Cambridge 2002) 4; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights (Oxford 1995).
Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship.
Charles Taylor, ‘The politics of recognition’, in: Amy Gutman (ed.), Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition (New Jersey 1994) 25–73.
Tawat, ‘Danish and Swedish immigrants’.
David Miller, On nationality (Oxford 1995).
Iris Marion Young, Justice and the politics of difference (Princeton, NJ 1990); Bikhu Parekh, Rethinking multiculturalism. Cultural diversity and political theory (Cambridge 2000); Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (eds.), Multiculturalism backlash: European discourses, policies and practices (London 2010) 6–12.
Arthur Schlesinger, The disuniting of America (Knoxville, TN 1991); Samuel Huntington, The Clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order (New York 1996).
Susan Moller Okin, Is multiculturalism bad for women? (Princeton 1999).
Brian Barry, Culture and equality (Cambridge 2001) 270.
Sartori Giovanni, Pluralismo, multiculturalismo e estranei (Milan 2000) 69.
Hartmann and Gerteis ‘Dealing with diversity’.
Laura Morales, ‘Conceptualising and measuring migrants’ political inclusion’, in: Laura Morales and Marco Giugni (eds), Social capital, political participation and migration in Europe. Making multicultural democracy work? (Basingstoke 2011) 21.
Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship; Parekh Rethinking multiculturalism, 272.
Erik Bleich, Race politics in Britain and France: ideas and policymaking since the 1960s (New York 1998); Saukkonen, ‘Multiculturalism and cultural policy in Northern Europe’.
Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, ‘How does interculturalism contrast with multiculturalism?’, Journal of Intercultural Studies 33:2 (2012) 175–196, 175.
Michel Wieviorka, ‘Multiculturalism: a concept to be redefined and certainly not replaced by the extremely vague term of interculturalism’, Journal of Intercultural Studies 33:2 (2012) 225–231, 230.
Rebecca Wallace, Erin Tolley and Madison Vonk, ‘Multiculturalism Policy Index: immigrant minority policies’, School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, 2021, https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant-minorities (24 March 2024).
Charles Ragin, Fuzzy-set social science (Chicago and London 2000).
Grete Brochmann and Anniken Hagelund, ‘Comparison: a model with three exceptions?’, in: Greta Brochmann and Anniken Hagelund (eds), Immigration policy and the Scandinavian welfare state 1945–2010 (New York 2012) 225–275.
Linus Salö, Natalia Ganuza, Christina Hedman and Martha Karrebæk, ‘Mother tongue instruction in Sweden and Denmark. Language policy, cross-field effects, and linguistic exchange rate’, Language Policy 17:4 (2018) 591–610.
Christian Fernández and Kristian Kriegbaum Jensen, ‘The civic integrationist turn in Danish and Swedish school politics’, Comparative Migration Studies 5:5 (2017) 1–20.
Wallace, Tolley and Vonk. ‘Multiculturalism Policy Index.’
Ibid.
J.W. Creswell and J.D Creswell, Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches (Newbury Park 2017).
Sidney Tarrow, ‘The strategy of paired comparison: toward a theory of practice’, Comparative Political Studies 43:2 (2010) 230–259.
Theda Skocpol, States and social revolutions: a comparative analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge 1979).
Ragin, Fuzzy-set social science.
Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The logic of comparative social inquiry (New York 1970).
Harvard Catalyst, ‘Getting started with mixed methods research’, Harvard University, https://catalyst.harvard.edu/community-engagement/mmr/ (24 March 2024).
Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics’, American Political Science Review 94:2 (2000) 251–267. Mahoney, James, ‘Path dependence in historical sociology’, Theory and Society 29:4 (2000) 507–548.
Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, ‘Complex causal relations and case study methods: the example of path-dependence’, Political Analysis 14:3 (2006) 250–267, 252.
Bennett and Elman, ‘Complex causal relations’, 252.
Bennett and Elman ‘Complex causal relations’, 252.
Ibid., 259.
David Collier, ‘Understanding process tracing’, ps: Political Science & Politics 44:4 (2011) 823–830, 823.
Jack Goldstone, ‘Comparative historical analysis and knowledge accumulation in the study of revolutions’, in: James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds), Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences (New York 2003) 41–90; Unnur Skaptadóttir and Kristín Loftsdóttir, ‘Becoming an immigration country. The case of Iceland 1990–2019’, in: Kristín Loftsdóttir, Unnur Skaptadóttir and Sigurjón Hafsteinsson (eds), Mobility and transnational Iceland. Current transformations and global entanglements (Reykjavík 2020) 7–21.
Katharina Holzinger and Christoph Knill, ‘Causes and conditions of cross-national policy convergence’, Journal of European Public Policy 12:5 (2005) 775–796, 776; Jack A. Goldstone, ‘Comparative historical analysis and knowledge accumulation in the study of revolutions’, in: J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds), Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences (2003) 41–90.
Holzinger and Knill, ‘Causes and conditions’.
Ibid., 777.
Thomas Holzer and Gerard Schneider, Asylpolitik auf Abwegen: Nationalstaatliche und europäische Reaktionen auf die Globalisierung der Flüchtlingsströme (Opladen 2000); James Hollifield, ‘The politics of international migration: how can we bring the state back in?’, in: Caroline Brettell and James Hollifield (eds), Migration theory: Talking across disciplines (London 2000) 137–186.
Katharina Holzinger, Christoph Knill and Thomas Sommerer, ‘Is there convergence of national environmental policies? An analysis of policy outputs in 24 oecd countries’, Environmental Politics 20:1 (2011) 20–41. See also Holzinger and Knill, ‘Causes and conditions’, 776–778.
Holzinger and Knill, ‘Causes and conditions’, 776–778.
Ibid., 776–778.
Ibid., 777.
Ibid., 778.
Ibid., 778.
Saukkonen, ‘Multiculturalism and cultural policy in Northern Europe’, 183.
Henrik Román, En Invandrarpolitisk oppositionell. Debattören David Schwarz Syn på Svensk Invandrarpolitik Ären 1964–1993 (Uppsala 1994).
Statens offentliga utredningar (sou) 1972: 66 Ny Kultur Politik, 293. https://lagen.nu/sou/1972:66 (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Ibid.
Proposition 1974: 28, Sveriges Riksdag Ny Kulturpolitik, 299–300 https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/proposition/kungl.-majts-proposition-angaende-den-statliga_fx0328/html/ (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Kungörelse 1974:152 Sveriges Riksdag. Om Beslutad ny regeringsform. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/kungorelse-1974152-om-beslutad-ny-regeringsform_sfs-1974-152/ (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Proposition 1975: 26, Sveriges Riksdag Riktlinjer för invandrar- och minoritetspolitiken (Guidelines for an integration and national minority policy), 15. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/proposition/regeringens-proposition-om-riktlinjer-for_fy0326/html/ (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Mahama Tawat, ‘The tip of the iceberg: Prop. 1975:26 and its freedom of choice goal in Sweden’s multiculturalism policy’, Malmö Institute for the Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare Working Paper Series 19:4 (2019) 1–19.
Henrik Román, En Invandrarpolitisk oppositionell. Debattören David Schwarz Syn på Svensk Invandrarpolitik Ären 1964–1993 (Uppsala 1994).
Lars-Erik Hansen, Jämlikhet och valfrihet: en studie av den svenska invandrarpolitikens Framväxt (Stockholm 1994).
Johansson, Jesper, Så gör vi inte här i Sverige. Vi brukar göra så här’Retorik och pratik i lo:s invandrarpolitik 1945–1981 (Växjö 2008) Thesis Växjö University. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:206116/FULLTEXT01.pdf (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Karin Borevi, ‘Sweden: the flagship of multiculturalism’, in: Greta Brochmann and Anniken Hagelund (eds), Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State 1945–2010 (New York 2012) 25–96.
Mahama Tawat, ‘The birth of Sweden’s multicultural policy: the impact of Olof Palme and his ideas’, International Journal of Cultural Policy 25:4 (2017) 471–485.
Mats Wickström “Comparative and transnational perspectives on the introduction of multiculturalism in post-war Sweden’, Scandinavian Journal of History 40:4 (2015) 512–534.
Mahama Tawat, “The divergent convergence of multiculturalism policy in the Nordic Countries (1964–2006): immigration size, policy diffusion and path dependency’, Malmö Institute for the Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare Working Paper Series 18:5 (2018).
Brochmann and Hagelund, ‘Comparison: a model with three exceptions?’, 163–164.
Hanne Sanders and Ole Vind, Grundtvig – nyckeln till det danska? (Göteborg and Stockholm 2005); Peter Duelund, ‘Cultural policy in Denmark’, in: Peter Duelund (ed.), The Nordic cultural model: Nordic cultural policy in transition (Copenhagen 2005) 31–77; Tawat ‘Danish and Swedish immigrants’.
We use, hereafter, immigration size interchangeably with the percentage of dissimilar immigration in the population.
Tawat, ‘The divergent convergence of multiculturalism policy’.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Proposition 1975: 26, Sveriges Riksdag Riktlinjer för invandrar- och minoritetspolitiken, 14. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/proposition/regeringens-proposition-om-riktlinjer-for_fy0326/ (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Linus Salö et al., ‘Mother tongue instruction in Sweden and Denmark’.
Tawat, ‘The birth of Sweden’s multicultural policy’.
Borevi, ‘Sweden: the flagship of multiculturalism’, 76.
Tawat, ‘Danish and Swedish immigrants’, 211.
See also Brochmann and Hagelund, Immigration policy and the Scandinavian welfare state 1945–2010, 164. [? This is an edited vol. so cite the article in question]
St.Meld. nr. 52 (1973/1974). Ny kultur politik. https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Stortingsforhandlinger/Lesevisning/?p=1973-74&paid=3&wid=d&psid=DIVL884&s=False (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Proposition 1974: 28, Ny Kulturpolitik.
Proposition 1975: 26, Riktlinjer för invandrar- och minoritetspolitiken, 15.
Peter Scholten and Andrew Geddes, The politics of migration and immigration in Europe (Los Angeles 2016).
Proposition 1985/86: 98 Sveriges Riksdag. Om invandrarpolitiken (on the integration policy) https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/proposition/om-invandrarpolitiken_g90398/, Proposition 1990/91: 195 Sveriges Riksdag Om aktiv flykting- och immigrationspolitik, https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/proposition/om-aktiv-flykting-och-immigrationspolitik-mm_GE03195/html/ 80–88 (last accessed 14 April 2024).
St. meld. no. 39, 1987–1988 Om innvandringspolitikken.
All translations by the author.
sou 1984:58.
St. meld. nr. 39 Om innvandringspolitikkeny, 49, available at: https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Stortingsforhandlinger/Lesevisning/?p=1987-88&paid=3&wid=c&psid=DIVL411&pgid=c_0387)
Marlou Schrover, ‘Pillarization, multiculturalism and cultural freezing. Dutch migration history and the enforcement of essentialist ideas’, bmgn-Low Countries Historical Review 125:2–3 (2010) 329–354 (last accessed 14 April 2024).
St. meld. nr. 17 (1996–1997). Om innvandring og det flerkulturelle Norge https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/stmeld-nr-17-1996-1997-/id191037/; Proposition. 1996/997: 3 Kulturpolitik: Proposition 1996/1997 (last accessed 14 April 2024): 3 Statliga Kulturpolitik (State Cultural Policy) https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/e1620c6c381145c5adf8a1dedf4cdfaa/kulturpolitik; sou 2005:91 Delbetänkandet Agenda för mångkultur. Programförklaring och kalendarium för Mångkulturåret 2006. https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2005/10/sou-200591/ (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Tawat, ‘Danish and Swedish immigrants’.
Wallace, Tolley and Vonk, ‘Multiculturalism Policy Index’.
Statistics Finland 2020, ‘Population development in independent Finland – greying baby boomers’, https://www.stat.fi/tup/suomi90/joulukuu_en.html (24 March 2024).
Wallace, Tolley, and Vonk. ‘Multiculturalism Policy Index’.
Saukkonen, ‘Multiculturalism and cultural policy in Northern Europe’, 191.
Wallace, Tolley, and Vonk. ‘Multiculturalism Policy Index’.
Saukkonen, ‘Multiculturalism and cultural policy in Northern Europe’, 192.
Tawat, ‘Danish and Swedish immigrants’.
Betænkning nr. 517 1969. En Kulturpolitisk Redegørelse]. https://www.xn--betnkninger-c9a.dk/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/517.pdf (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Betænkning nr. 589 om udenlandske arbejderes forhold i Danmark (62–63). https://www.xn--betnkninger-c9a.dk/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/589.pdf (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Betænkning nr. 589 om udenlandske arbejderes forhold i Danmark.
Tawat, ‘Danish and Swedish immigrants’.
Ibid.
Ibid., 208.
Lov nr. 474 af 1. juli 1998: Om integration af udlændinge i Danmark (Integrationslov) https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/1998/474 (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Queen’s University. Multiculturalism Policy Index 2011. https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant-minorities/annualdata-im (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Dorte Skot-Hansen, ‘Danish cultural policy – from monoculture towards cultural diversity’, International Journal of Cultural Policy 8:2 (2002) 197–210, 200.
Skot-Hansen, ‘Danish cultural policy’.
Tawat, ‘Danish and Swedish immigrants’.
Skaptadóttir and Loftsdóttir. ‘Becoming an immigration country’, 7–21.
Þorgerður Einarsdóttir, Thamar Heijstra and Guðbjörg Rafnsdóttir, ‘The politics of diversity: social and political integration of immigrants in Iceland’, Stjórnmál og stjórnsýsla 14:1 (2008) 131–148.
Statistics Iceland, https://px.hagstofa.is/pxen/pxweb/en/Ibuar/Ibuar__mannfjoldi__3_bakgrunnur__Uppruni/MAN43000.px/ (24 March 2024) (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Einarsdóttir, Heijstra and Rafnsdóttir, ‘The politics of diversity’.
Althingi 125th assembly 1999/2000, no. 220. https://www.althingi.is/english (last accessed 14 April 2024).
Elsa Jónsdóttir and Hanna Ragnarsdóttir, ‘Multicultural education in Iceland: vision or reality?’, Intercultural Education 21:2 (2010) 153–167, 158.
Borevi, ‘Sweden: the flagship of multiculturalism’.
Holzinger and Knill, ‘Causes and conditions’, 777.