Responsibility and the Demands of Morality
In: Journal of Moral PhilosophyIs it a good objection to a moral theory that it demands a great deal of individual agents? I argue that if we interpret the question to be about the potential welfare costs associated with our moral obligations, the answer must be “no.” However, the demands a moral theory makes can also be measured in terms of what it requires us to take responsibility for. I argue that this is distinct from what we may be required to do or give up, and that it provides a conception of demandingness that makes better sense of our intuitive reactions.
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| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 461 | 137 | 12 |
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Responsibility and the Demands of Morality
In: Journal of Moral PhilosophyIs it a good objection to a moral theory that it demands a great deal of individual agents? I argue that if we interpret the question to be about the potential welfare costs associated with our moral obligations, the answer must be “no.” However, the demands a moral theory makes can also be measured in terms of what it requires us to take responsibility for. I argue that this is distinct from what we may be required to do or give up, and that it provides a conception of demandingness that makes better sense of our intuitive reactions.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 461 | 137 | 12 |
| Full Text Views | 422 | 70 | 8 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 170 | 44 | 4 |