Non-Reductive Realism, Primitivism, and the Reduction Argument: Commentary on Bart Streumer, Unbelievable Errors

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
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  • Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University

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In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends the error theory by rejecting all competitors to it. My aim here is to defend one brand of realism from Streumer’s objections: primitivim. The primitivist holds that there exist sui generis normative properties that do not supervene on any descriptive properties. It is argued that Streumer’s objections to primitivism can be met.

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