Non-Reductive Realism, Primitivism, and the Reduction Argument: Commentary on Bart Streumer, Unbelievable Errors

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy

In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends the error theory by rejecting all competitors to it. My aim here is to defend one brand of realism from Streumer’s objections: primitivim. The primitivist holds that there exist sui generis normative properties that do not supervene on any descriptive properties. It is argued that Streumer’s objections to primitivism can be met.

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