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What’s Wrong with Relaxing?

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
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  • 1 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Germanyc.tiefensee@fs.de
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In his new book Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer argues that there is no way round the result that all metaethical views other than the error theory fail either for the same reasons as metaphysical normative realism or expressivism. In this contribution, I show that this is false: we can avoid this result by ‘relaxing’ about normative truths. Even if Streumer were right about the fate of other metaethical positions, then, relaxed realism remains immune to the problems he raises.

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