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Particularism and Default Valency

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Simon Kirchin1
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  • 1 Philosophy Department, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK, Email: s.t.kirchin@kent.ac.uk
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Abstract

In this paper, I concentrate on the notion of default valency, drawing on some of the distinctions made and thoughts given in my Introduction. I motivate why the notion is important for particularists to have up their sleeves by outlining a recent debate between particularists and generalists. I then move to the main aim of the piece which is to discuss how anyone, particularist and generalist alike, might seek to distinguish reason-generating features into different types. My main aim is not to argue for a specific way of dividing such features into types but to present various taxonomical options.

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