Abstract
Why did the Soviet Union and the United States refrain from using nuclear weapons during Cold War crises, and what can we learn from their restraint in navigating today’s confrontation fraught with nuclear threats? This paper examines the crucial lessons from Cold War nuclear standoffs to provide insight into the growing nuclear risks in today’s geopolitical landscape, particularly in the context of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. By analysing the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, the study explores how both sides pursued military-political confrontation under the threat of nuclear annihilation. Drawing parallels between these historical events and current tensions, the paper concludes with how Cold War nuclear strategies and crisis management could potentially guide present-day efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.
1 Introduction
The global nuclear order, established to mitigate the existential risks of nuclear weapons, is currently facing a profound crisis that echoes the darkest days of the Cold War.1 Treaties, deterrence frameworks, and diplomatic efforts once aimed at preventing nuclear catastrophe have been severely disrupted, particularly in light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This conflict has reignited fears of nuclear escalation unseen since the early 1960s, underscoring both the fragility of contemporary nuclear strategy and the urgent need for reassessment.
Russia’s actions have reignited fears of nuclear escalation unseen since the early 1960s and underscored the fragility of assumptions underlying nuclear strategy. While Putin’s nuclear threats, both explicit and implicit, have thus far not led to the nuclear exchange,2 they have set a dangerous precedent and raised urgent questions about the evolving role of nuclear weapons in crisis management. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies have responded with calibrated deterrence, testing Moscow’s red lines while attempting to avoid outright escalation. However, the diversity of perspectives within NATO and other allied nations complicates any uniform response, challenging the notion of a monolithic “Western”3 approach to nuclear crisis management.
This context prompts several critical questions: How can a crisis under the threat of nuclear escalation be managed? How can the active use of nuclear weapons be avoided? Which factors are important for the escalation and de-escalation of a conflict between nuclear powers?
To navigate these challenges, this paper distils three key lessons from Cold War nuclear crises that remain highly relevant today. First, effective crisis management requires a delicate balance between deterrence and restraint—demonstrating strength without provoking uncontrolled escalation. Second, diplomacy, particularly through backchannel negotiations, plays a crucial role in de-escalating nuclear standoffs by providing adversaries with viable off-ramps. Third, arms control agreements, while often fragile, have historically contributed to stabilizing great power competition and reducing the risks of miscalculation. These lessons underscore that nuclear conflicts are not solely decided by military capabilities but also by strategic signalling, leadership perceptions, and the availability of face-saving compromises. Understanding these dynamics is essential for policymakers seeking to mitigate nuclear risks in an increasingly volatile security environment.
The paper is structured as follows. It begins by outlining an applied historical approach to understanding nuclear crises. It then sketches out the current geopolitical stand-off, focusing on Russia’s nuclear threats, the war in Ukraine, and the breakdown of arms control agreements. The subsequent section draws lessons from Cold War crises, emphasizing strategies that prevented escalation. Finally, the paper concludes with summarizing main findings emphasizing principles from historic experiences that could be used by contemporary strategists to reduce nuclear risks.
2 Applied History as a Method and Theoretical Lens
Whether consciously or unconsciously, decision-makers and pundits refer to historical data when they navigate the present and develop strategies for the future. There is just no knowledge other than historical knowledge. Thus, the question is not whether we learn from history but how. Sure enough, history is not a straightforward guide. History is highly contingent, and “historical lessons” do not present themselves. The references to 1914 or to 1938 that many decision-makers made to justify their policies during the Cold War period are just one example. Indeed, as the historian John Tosh notes, an analogy tending in one direction can usually be countered by another one tending to the opposite direction.4
The applied history approach proposes a methodology that allows for more informed ways of drawing lessons from history. Central to this approach is the careful analysis of historical precedents and analogies. Applied history studies begin with a current policy choice or predicament and analyse the historical record to provide perspective and suggest likely consequences of different policy interventions.5 Central to the applied history approach is the identification of historical cases with similar properties (and controllable differences) to the current case in question. Theoretical considerations inform which similarities (and differences) are relevant.
We argue that we can indeed draw inferences from the Cold War period in general and the Berlin and Cuba crisis in particular for managing nuclear risks today. The talk about a second Cold War6 is not merely an eye-catcher. As we will show, the Cold War period and the current situation are indeed similar in many theoretically important respects. Indeed, the form of variables now and then which realist and liberal conflict theories have identified as important determinants of conflict behaviour seem to be rather similar.7
On the level of the international system, the most significant varying property is its polarity.8 At first glance, the Cold War period and the present situation seem to be rather different in this regard. The Cold War has often been described as bipolar while the post-cold war international system has been described as moving from unipolarity to multipolarity. At closer inspection, however, similarities prevail. To start with, the international system of the Cold war period was less bipolar than is sometimes assumed. Moreover, conflict dynamics, as Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver remind us, unfold within regional security complexes, and properties of these complexes are often more important than properties of the global system.9 If anything, the transatlantic or European regional security complex had been bipolar during the Cold War and is bipolar today. Russia might not be a superpower comparable to the Soviet Union and on par with the US. Yet, Russia is still a great power and able to pull the strings.10 In the crucial military realm, the balance of power is more difficult to estimate than a superficial look at raw data such as defence expenditures suggests. The possession of nuclear weapons as the big equalizer, the difference in the assessment of defence expenditures in nominal terms and in purchasing power parity as well as geographical factors all work in Russia’s favour.11 To summarize, we think it is fair to assume that the European security complex is still characterised by bipolarity.
Turning to the level of the state, many conflict-related properties are similar. The main acting states in the current and past conflict are similar. They are also similar with regard to regime type, the property that liberal democratic peace theory deems as being of utmost importance.12 Similarities between the USSR back then and Russia today are striking as well. It is true that the Soviet Union possessed a powerful ideology while Russia does not.13 Promoting ethnicity-based nationalism would be a rather double-edged sword in multi-ethnic Russia. Eurasian ideologies that propagate the concept of Russia as an idea resonate with the Kremlin’s repressive agenda at home and its anti-Western policies abroad but so far do not mobilize the Russian masses.14 More importantly, ideology is malleable, and communism in the hands of Soviet leaders as well as Eurasian ideas propagated by the Putin regime may become tools that can be used by the leadership to manipulate mass opinion. According to Sergey Radchenko, ambition may be more fundamental.15 With regard to ambition, that is the leadership’s or political elite’s vision of the country’s place in the world, the USSR, and Russia are rather similar. Its leaders then and now envision their country as a great power with special rights and on par with other great powers. Moreover, the former and present Soviet/Russian leadership perceive a vast difference between the place their country occupies and the place it deserves. The resulting hunger for expansion has shaped and continues to shape how the USSR/Russia strives for security and recognition.
Another similarity on this level results from the interaction of both parties. Their conflict had and still has a territorial dimension. Conflict studies suggest that territorial conflicts are more prone to escalation than conflicts over other issues such as economic gains.16 Territorial conflicts are also more long-lasting than conflicts over other issues. Thus, we should expect that high levels of tension in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine/the West will persist even beyond the end of the war as long as territorial issues have not been settled.
Regarding the level of individual decision-makers, we maintain that on the side of the United States and its allies the differences between the Cold-War generation of decision-makers which had been influenced by the Second World war and post-Cold war decision-makers are not as marked. When comparing Putin and his Soviet predecessors, we see similarities and differences. Similar traits are their mistrust and their suspicion of the West, their relative insularity and their quest for respect and recognition. We see differences in two regards. The defining experience of Soviet leaders including Mikhail Gorbachev has been the Great Patriotic War. Although their personalities differ—Stalin the cold master of power politics, Khrushchev the gambler, and Gorbachev the visionary—they share a lasting sense of insecurity of the country and a sense that the huge sacrifices justify special privileges.17 The defining experience of Putin has been the collapse of the USSR and the hardship that followed. Moreover, Putin seems to be imbued with deep-seated resentment and hostility towards the United States and its allies.18
A second difference results from a combination of the first and second level of analysis. The Soviet leaders were autonomous—Stalin more than Khrushchev and Gorbachev—but they were also restraint by the collective decision-making structure within the Politbureau. Putin seems to be less constraint by political institutions. One of the defining results of the first years of his presidency was the resurrection of state authority and the concentration of power in his hands.19 This centralization of power was epitomized in the infamous meeting of the national security council at the eve of the 2022 invasion where he publicly diminished state officials and treated them as lackeys. Hence, his decisions are more prone to be driven by emotions and miscalculations. If anything, Russia under Putin is less predictable and more dangerous than the Soviet Union under Stalin and Khrushchev.
To summarize, despite some differences, we do see important similarities between the East-West conflict during the Cold War and the current conflict between Russia and the countries of the political West. Thus, by analysing historical patterns from the Cold War, applied history provides essential insights into managing nuclear threats today. This approach will allow us to identify effective strategies of nuclear deterrence and risk management that can be applied to the current geopolitical landscape.
3 Present Challenges
As alluded to in the introduction, resurgence of nuclear threats during Russia’s war against Ukraine has shaken the global nuclear order, highlighting the multifaceted challenges that nuclear weapons pose in the 21st century.20 This conflict has brought nuclear brinkmanship back to the forefront of international relations, evoking comparisons to some of the darkest periods of the Cold War. The implications are profound: both Russia and the West are once again grappling with questions surrounding the credibility, utility, and risks of nuclear deterrence in an increasingly unstable geostrategic landscape. This section starts off by discussing how Russia’s war transformed the nuclear order in three key ways: i) the utility of nuclear weapons for exerting crisis leverage; ii) modernisation programs of nuclear doctrines and deterrence postures; and iii) the erosion of arms control agreements. It then turns to the dilemmas and uncertainties surrounding the West’s management of the evolving nuclear landscape amid Russia’s aggressive nuclear signalling and strategic recalibrations. Combined, this section sets up the stage for the historic part of the study that aims at illuminating how the United States and its allies navigated similar challenges of nuclear crisis-management in the past.
3.1 From Bad to Worse: The Transformation of the Nuclear Order
Since the onset of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has used its nuclear arsenal both as a tool of deterrence vis-à-vis the NATO bloc but also as a tool of coercion vis-à-vis Ukraine. Upon declaring the invasion, President Vladimir Putin issued a stark warning to Western nations, stating that any interference would result in “consequences never seen in history”.21 Three days later, he placed Russia’s nuclear forces on “high combat alert,” signalling his readiness to escalate if Western countries crossed perceived red lines.22 These threats—along with subsequent statements from high-ranking Russian officials—have become a key component of Moscow’s strategy to manage the crisis and maintain leverage over both Ukraine and the West.
Initially, these nuclear threats had the desired effect. Western nations, while committed to supporting Ukraine, were cautious about directly intervening in the conflict. Concerns about provoking a nuclear confrontation made NATO and its member states wary of direct involvement. As a result, the transfer of arms to Kyiv was limited, and Western leaders emphasised avoiding actions that could trigger nuclear escalation.23 However, as the war progressed, the Western response evolved. Incremental shifts in military support—what some have described as a “boiling the frog” strategy—gradually expanded the scope of Western involvement. As longer-range missile systems and advanced fighter jets were delivered to Ukraine, the once-clear red lines of nuclear escalation became increasingly blurred. This pattern highlights the central crisis-management challenge of balancing escalation and restraint, where deliberate, calibrated actions seek to reduce risks while maintaining effective support for Ukraine.
The approach of the United States and its allies has also exposed the limitations of Russia’s nuclear coercion as a tool for achieving broad political objectives and highlighted the risks inherent in relying on such threats to secure strategic gains. A growing number of Russian foreign policy experts have questioned the effectiveness of these threats in achieving Russia’s strategic objectives. Prominent figures such as Dmitri Trenin have argued that nuclear deterrence, once seen as a reliable tool for securing Russia’s vital interests, has revealed significant limitations during the Ukraine conflict. He notes that the West has “lost fear” of nuclear annihilation, reducing the effectiveness of Russia’s nuclear posture as a means of deterrence.24 Similarly, Nikolai Sokov, a former Russian diplomat, has asserted that while nuclear threats were sufficient to deter direct Western military involvement, they have failed to deliver any meaningful political gains for Russia beyond that.25
In light of these limitations, some Russian strategists have called for more drastic measures. Sergey Karaganov, a former presidential advisor, has suggested that Russia may need to consider moving further up the escalation ladder, by significantly lowering the threshold for nuclear use and potentially resorting to tactical nuclear strikes on European cities to force the United States and its allies into a strategic retreat. Karaganov argues that such radical steps might be necessary to break Western resolve, which he sees as the core issue preventing a decisive Russian victory in Ukraine.26 However, this position remains rather controversial within Russia. Other analysts, such as Alexey Arbatov, caution that the use of nuclear weapons, even at a tactical level, could irreversibly escalate the conflict and transform it into a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, with catastrophic consequences for all parties involved.27
In parallel, the war has significantly affected Western nuclear strategies. Western strategic community has increasingly grappled with a problem of how to avoid substrategic paralysis—fear-induced inaction at lower levels of conflict. The Western strategy is facing a dilemma of how to manage the risks of nuclear escalation is necessary without yielding to Moscow’s nuclear blackmail, which we elaborate upon in more in the following.28
The invasion has also forced a re-examination of the credibility of extended deterrence in the West, especially in Europe, where the threat of nuclear conflict has become more palpable. The United States and its allies have pursued a careful strategy, incrementally increasing support for Ukraine without crossing into direct confrontation. This “boiling the frog” approach has allowed the West to push back against Russia’s nuclear threats without immediately challenging its nuclear posture, yet Western policymakers remain divided on the sustainability of this gradual approach and the risks of escalation it could provoke.
Debates within Western strategic circles reflect two main schools of thought: the Nuclear Superiority School and the Limited Utility School. Proponents of nuclear superiority, like Matthew Kroenig,29 argue that nuclear advantage enhances coercive power and controls escalation, while the limited utility school, led by Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann,30 argues that nuclear threats carry significant reputational costs and limited utility, making them less effective in crises between nuclear-armed states. Both perspectives, however, agree that the United States and its allies can deter Russia’s nuclear threats without succumbing to paralysis. Supporters of the limited utility view, like Arndt and Horovitz,31 suggest that Russian nuclear use would provide limited military benefit while carrying reputational costs, while nuclear superiority advocates, like Alexander Vershbow, argue that the US retains credible damage-limitation capabilities.32
Compounding these challenges are the changes in the nuclear doctrines and modernization programs. They extend to the domain of arms control, where the erosion of long-standing agreements has compounded the challenges. Even before the invasion, key agreements such as the INF Treaty and New START were already under strain. Russia’s suspension of its participation in New START following the 2022 invasion has only exacerbated these issues, further narrowing the scope for negotiated arms control.33 For Russia, arms control discussions have been used as strategic tools, tied to broader demands concerning NATO’s presence in Europe and Western military support for Ukraine.34 Putin, for example, has made it clear that any future discussions on arms control must consider the entirety of Russia’s security concerns, including NATO’s presence in Europe and Western military support for Ukraine.35
For the NATO bloc, the erosion of arms control agreements equally presents a dilemma. There is little appetite in the West for arms control negotiations under the current circumstances as Russia continues its aggression under the shadow of nuclear threats. The political environment has become highly adversarial, and the prospects for meaningful arms control agreements are dim. The US and its allies, for their part, have focused on maintaining strategic stability through deterrence, rather than relying on arms control mechanisms, which many now view as politically unviable. This shift away from a reliance on formal agreements is evident in the deployment of new intermediate-range missiles and other deterrent measures designed to counterbalance Russia’s actions.36 The breakdown of traditional arms control frameworks, coupled with the emergence of a more confrontational nuclear posture on both sides, has thus heightened the risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation, creating a precarious strategic environment.37 These dilemmas and uncertainties surrounding them are put front and center of the subsection that follows.
3.2 Western Choices: Between Scilla and Charybdis?
The reactions of the United States and its allies to Russia’s nuclear sable-rattling have been marked by strategic uncertainty and ambivalence. Although there is broad consensus on the need to support Ukraine and counter Russia’s aggression, there is no clear strategy for addressing the nuclear risks associated with the conflict. This lack of clarity is reflected in several key dilemmas that continue to shape Western policy.
The first problem concerns the question of escalation versus restraint. As military aid to Ukraine increases, so does the risk of crossing Moscow’s continuously re-defined red lines that could provoke a more direct nuclear response from Russia. This highlights the critical need for effective crisis-management frameworks to calibrate support for Ukraine without triggering a nuclear crisis. The gradual expansion of military assistance indicates a willingness to accept some level of risk, but the boundaries of acceptable escalation remain uncertain.
The second issue revolves around the modernization of nuclear arsenals and the pursuit of more flexible deterrence capabilities. While modernization efforts could enhance the credibility of the West’s nuclear deterrence posture, they may also be perceived by Russia as a provocative escalation, potentially prompting countermeasures that could further destabilize the situation. The modernization debate thus reflects broader concerns about the balance between maintaining credible deterrence and avoiding actions that could increase the likelihood of nuclear confrontation.
The third concern is the role of arms control in this new environment. Given the current state of relations, some argue that arms control has lost its relevance as a tool for managing nuclear risks, while others believe it remains essential for preventing a slide into uncontrolled escalation. The decision to prioritize deterrence over arms control has strategic implications, as it shifts the focus away from diplomacy and towards a more confrontational approach. However, abandoning arms control entirely risks missing opportunities for dialogue that could help stabilize the nuclear order.
Compounding the situation are domestic political shifts within the countries of the political West, particularly the return of Donald Trump to the Oval Office. During his first term, Trump weakened traditional arms control mechanisms, notably withdrawing from the INF Treaty, and cast doubt on the reliability of US commitments to NATO. In Europe, the rise of nationalist movements on both sides of the political spectrum has further undermined strategic consistency in addressing nuclear risks. These movements, though politically diverse, contribute to polarized threat perceptions—while some factions, particularly on the left, tend to overstate the dangers of nuclear confrontation, others, particularly on the right, downplay them, sometimes advocating for rapprochement with Moscow at the expense of collective deterrence. This fragmentation complicates the development of a coherent and credible Western nuclear strategy, increasing the risk of miscalculation and weakening the ability to deter nuclear threats effectively.
These strategic problems, that resemble in principle the situation the great powers faced in the first decades of the Cold War, prompt a return to history for guidance. The experience of the Cold War can offer valuable lessons on managing nuclear risks, particularly during crises such as the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, where nuclear powers managed to avoid escalation and established frameworks for arms control. Despite the differences between the Cold War and today’s geopolitical landscape outlined above, the experiences of that era reveal that even in periods of heightened tension, there were opportunities for dialogue and de-escalation. Understanding how great powers navigated these crises can provide insights into how the West could reduce the risk of a direct confrontation with Russia while at the same time not giving in to Moscow’s nuclear sable rattling.
4 Past Lessons
Based on the existing literature, this chapter examines the history of nuclear threats and deterrence during the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis. For a better understanding of the discussed history, a brief overview of both crises is given first. The following analysis is shaped by the questions emerging from the examination of the current situation. What strategies did the superpowers use to manage the crises, particularly regarding the interplay between escalation and restraint? The overall leading question asked is, what were the reasons for the non-use of nuclear weapons?38 While the analysis includes both superpowers, the focus lies on the American side.
4.1 The Berlin Crisis
On November 27, 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev issued an ultimatum demanding that Western powers withdraw their forces from West Berlin within six months and turn Berlin into a demilitarized, free city.39 If the Western states did not comply, Khrushchev threatened to sign a peace treaty with the GDR, which would grant the GDR control over all routes to the western part of the city.
Before issuing his ultimatum, the Soviet leader had described the possible nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr as a major threat to the Soviet Union.40 Khrushchev’s ultimatum also implied the possibility of military escalation if the West refused to comply, as the Soviets had declared they would defend the GDR should the Western powers attempt to access the city by force.41 And any direct conflict between the superpowers carried the inherent risk of developing into nuclear war. Khrushchev, influenced by his experience in the Suez Crisis, believed that threatening nuclear attacks could be an effective way to achieve his aims.42 By 1958, he saw a nuclear standoff as primarily a test of nerves, hoping the US would back down. “Only madmen,” Khrushchev warned NATO, would risk starting a war to preserve the status quo in West Berlin. Yet the paradox was clear: initiating a war to alter the status quo was equally risky.43 The Berlin Crisis posed a serious threat to the US and NATO, as the Soviet Union had significantly more forces stationed around Berlin. Had they decided to march into West Berlin, Western forces would have been unable to stop them with conventional weapons. Notably, President Eisenhower believed that any armed conflict between the US and the Soviet Union would inevitably escalate into a full-scale nuclear war, with both sides using their whole nuclear arsenal. In his view, the best defense for such a war was strong nuclear deterrence.44 The United States and NATO rejected Khrushchev’s demands, emphasizing the importance of maintaining a presence in West Berlin as a symbol of resistance to Soviet aggression. When the six-month deadline passed without Western withdrawal, Khrushchev allowed the ultimatum to quietly expire, as he was not prepared to take the next escalatory step of actually signing a separate treaty with the GDR.45 Allied forces remained in West Berlin, and tensions with the Soviet Union persisted.
However, the Berlin Crisis was not over. At the Vienna Summit on June 4, 1961, Khrushchev issued another six-month ultimatum to the Western powers, repeating his initial demands. A key reason for this renewed threat was Khrushchev’s hope that the new President Kennedy, unlike Eisenhower, might not be able to withstand the pressure.46 Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy searched for a wider range of possible reactions to Soviet aggression.47 In a speech on July 25, Kennedy expressed openness to renewed negotiations with the Soviet Union but also announced massive investments in US military forces.48 This was based on the concept of a “flexible response,” which was later adopted by the US.
In short, Kennedy’s approach differed from Eisenhower’s, but he also remained firm in rejecting Khrushchev’s demands. As tensions over Berlin intensified, the GDR, with Soviet support, began closing the borders to West Berlin on the night of August 12–13, marking the start of the Berlin Wall’s construction. This led to the standoff between Soviet and US tanks at Checkpoint Charlie in October 1961. The confrontation was deescalated when both sides agreed to withdraw their tanks from the inner Berlin border and Kennedy proposed that the US would accept the Wall as a modus vivendi for Berlin.49
4.2 The Cuban Missile Crisis
The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 was arguably the most dangerous moment of the Cold War.50 The Soviet decision to send a force of 50,000 soldiers in disguise to Cuba was made in May 1962. While these troops were equipped with a range of conventional weapons, the critical factor for the conflict was the deployment of nuclear weapons. Scholars still argue whether Khrushchev’s primary motive for the operation called Anadyr was to defend socialist Cuba from a potential US attack or to gain a strategic advantage in the broader superpower rivalry by mirroring NATO’s deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. Also, the question of whether Cuba and the Soviet Union deployed missiles primarily as a defensive response to US escalations remains a relevant aspect of this debate.51
To prevent Kennedy from interfering, the Soviets attempted to carry out the deployment in secrecy, aiming to keep the US unaware until it was too late to respond. But on October 14, 1962, US U-2 flights over Cuba revealed Soviet ballistic missiles being installed. Kennedy was briefed on this discovery on October 16. Since most of the Soviet missiles in Cuba were not yet combat-ready, the US had time to consider various response options. Direct actions, such as airstrikes or even a full invasion, were debated but ultimately rejected.52
On October 22, 1962, Kennedy informed the American public about the Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons in Cuba. He also announced a naval blockade of the island, set to begin on October 24, to prevent further Soviet shipments and demanded the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons. Kennedy made it clear that if the US or any Western nation were attacked from Cuba, the US would respond with nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union.53 This approach was chosen to project strength while also allowing time for negotiations. US nuclear forces were placed on high alert and conventional troops were gathered in Florida. Likewise, Soviet forces, both conventional and nuclear, were prepared for action. The situation was highly tensioned, with both sides aware that any small accident or unauthorised action could trigger a series of events that would be nearly impossible to control.54
The discovery of Soviet weapons in Cuba and the US response presented a strategic dilemma for Khrushchev. He did not intend to provoke a nuclear war with the United States, but if the US were to attack Cuba in response to the missile deployment, a nuclear escalation appeared inevitable. In a meeting on October 22, he remarked: “What is tragic is that they might attack, and we will respond. This might lead to a major war.”55 On the other hand, a withdrawal from Cuba would have made the Soviet Union look weak. On October 26, Khrushchev wrote a letter to Kennedy, expressing his concerns about the escalating situation and comparing the conflict to a knot on which both sides were pulling. Still, he placed the blame for tying “the knot of war” on Kennedy. Nevertheless, Khrushchev offered to withdraw the Soviet missiles if the US guaranteed not to invade Cuba. In a second message, broadcasted by Radio Moscow on October 27, Khrushchev added, that the US must also withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. On the same day, a meeting was arranged between Kennedy’s brother and the Soviet ambassador to the US. The US agreed to Khrushchev’s demands, with the understanding that the withdrawal of the missiles would not be made public. With the Soviets’ acceptance of the deal, the Cuban Missile Crisis was finally resolved.56 Scholars have argued that it was not Kennedy’s promise to withdraw the American missiles from Turkey that caused Khrushchev to back down. More significant was Khrushchev’s perception that a US nuclear attack was imminent. Additionally, he feared that Fidel Castro, who advocated for a pre-emptive strike against the West, could drag the Soviet Union into an unwanted nuclear war.57 But to enable the Soviet Union to withdraw their forces, a face-saving solution had to be found.
Despite the Soviet Union’s improved strategic position following the withdrawal of the US missiles from Turkey, the end of the Crisis weakened Khrushchev’s standing in the Kremlin, and his leadership concluded in October 1964.58 Kennedy, on the other hand, was able to present himself a strong leader to the American public, since the missile withdrawal remained secret. In the crisis’s aftermath, a period of détente began: a direct “hotline” between Washington and Moscow was established in June 1963 to minimise misunderstandings and ensure rapid communication. Additionally, after years of intense crises and nuclear brinksmanship, the first arms control agreements were signed. However, despite these steps, both superpowers continued expanding their nuclear arsenals and defense systems, building large stockpiles. This paradox defined the remaining years of the Cold War.
As Burr and Rosenberg observed, political leaders in both the East and West “wanted to moderate Cold War rivalries and avoid confrontations, but those goals uneasily coexisted with commitments to preserving and developing strategic advantages”.59 Although both sides recognised the risks posed by nuclear weapons, they “wanted to keep them because of their fears and pursuit of national advantage”.60 But the nuclear threat was not eliminated with the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Only a few years after, nuclear posturing re-emerged. For example, US President Nixon, based on the Madman Theory, pursued a strategy of deterring his enemies by projecting an appearance of unpredictability, including the possibility of nuclear escalation.61
4.3 Escalation, Restraint and Crisis Management
Both Crises posed major challenges for superpower crisis management. How did they approach these situations and what strategies did they use?
During the Berlin Crisis, both US presidents refused to yield to Khrushchev’s ultimata. However, their approaches differed: Eisenhower relied solely on nuclear deterrence, while Kennedy sought a broader range of options, which were not fully developed at the time.62 Nevertheless, Kennedy’s strategy also incorporated the threat of massive retaliation.63 This shared reliance on the strategy of nuclear deterrence proved effective in two key ways. First, it prevented the Soviet Union from achieving its objectives through nuclear intimidation. Second, it successfully averted both nuclear and conventional escalation of the crisis.64
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy rejected the option of invading Cuba. At the same time, ignoring the Soviet missile deployment was also unacceptable. Therefore, the decision to impose a naval blockade served as a reasonable middle ground, that demonstrated resolve without incurring unnecessary risks. Still, if the Soviets had breached the blockade, the US would likely have escalated its response, potentially by attacking the missile sites in Cuba.65 Ultimately, the US opted for a limited, but not entirely risk-free, step of escalation. This forced the Soviet Union to choose between seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict or taking the final step of escalation: direct confrontation. Since Khrushchev was ultimately unwilling to take this step, the US strategy proved to be effective. In this situation, as well as in the Berlin-Crisis, it was crucial for US crisis management to strike a balance between escalation and restraint.
Some scholars argued that the series of unauthorised incidents during the Cuban Missile Crisis posed an even greater risk of nuclear escalation than the confrontation between Kennedy and Khrushchev, both of whom were unwilling to actually use nuclear weapons if it could be avoided.66 The unleashed war machinery of the superpowers brought with it an immense danger.67 As historian Serhii Plokhy notes, Kennedy “had little trust in the military carrying out orders as received”.68 It was therefore crucial to find a way out of the mounting tensions, as the risk of an unintended nuclear escalation remained a constant threat.
Diplomatic negotiations between the states would have been an evident solution to this issue, but in a nuclear conflict, they were subject to unique conditions. Historian Campbell Craig summarized this situation with respect to Eisenhower and Khrushchev as follows: “When statesmen on both sides of a crisis personally believe that the costs of war far outweigh the benefits of victory, then the important diplomacy becomes […] one of finding ways for both sides to save face.”69 Diplomacy, and especially backchannel diplomacy, was indeed important for the peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, as it allowed for a face-saving compromise to be communicated between the superpowers. Craig also described how, once the United States responded to the Soviet deployment in Cuba and both sides understood that any subsequent move could escalate to nuclear war, Khrushchev and Kennedy “shrank away from further confrontation and grasped at any diplomatic solution to the crisis that seemed feasible.”70
The Historian R. Gerald Hughes even argues that both the Berlin and the Cuban Missile Crisis had not escalated into nuclear war “was more down to good fortune rather than crisis management or skilled negotiation”.71 Following this thought, he continues that the most important lesson learned from the two Crises had been the hotline between Moscow and Washington, since “crisis management and détente require constant interaction and negotiation”.72 While luck may have played a role in the resolution of the crisis, Hughes is particularly correct in emphasizing that constant communication between the superpowers was, in fact, a central means of preventing future crises.
In summary, the US key crisis management strategies included maintaining a balance between escalation and restraint, engaging in backchannel diplomacy, and seeking face-saving compromises to ease tensions.73 Additionally, efforts to reduce the risk of unintended military actions proved essential in minimizing the chance of accidental escalation.
4.4 Nuclear Deterrence and the Credibility of the Threat
The historian David Holloway described nuclear weapons as “both a product of the Cold war and a factor contributing to the great tension of those years”.74 But as Holloway argues, these weapons also played a major role in preventing the Cold War from escalating further. The destructive potential both sides held created the perception that nuclear war was simply not an acceptable option.75 Nonetheless, nuclear threats and nuclear deterrence were crucial factors of both crises.
It is important to emphasise that a balance in the nuclear forces of the superpowers only developed after the crises. Until then, the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal was significantly inferior to that of the United States, and it did not achieve a second-strike capability until the early 1960s. This imbalance also influenced the respective strategies of the superpowers: In the 1950s, US nuclear plans were still based on the intention to use “nuclear threats to deter attacks on Europe, and to rely on nuclear war as the preferred means of fighting if major conflict erupted”.76 In the event of escalation, the strategy aimed to eliminate Soviet nuclear forces through a massive nuclear strike.77
Considering Khrushchev’s ultimatum, Eisenhower faced the challenge that Soviet conventional forces were far superior to those of the West. A massive nuclear threat against the Soviet Union was therefore necessary to deter them from taking further steps.78 He also accepted the remaining risk of a nuclear escalation, because of the loss of credibility a retreat from West-Berlin would cause for the US.79 So, in the Berlin Crisis, Eisenhower’s goal was to deter a large-scale conventional attack by threatening with the superior nuclear arsenal of the United States. On the other hand, Khrushchev was convinced, as Francis Gavin describes, that “he could get what he wanted in the crisis, despite possessing far smaller nuclear forces, because he could demonstrate greater resolve.”80 Behind this apparent resolve was not the willingness to actually risk a war with the United States under the given conditions: Khrushchev’s threat was ultimately a bluff. His brinkmanship was based on a strategy aimed at countering American superiority in nuclear strength through a stronger demonstration of resolve.81 The second attempt to succeed with this strategy also failed. Khrushchev had underestimated Kennedy, thinking he was easier to intimidate than Eisenhower.
An important lesson from the crisis, as argued by researcher Marc Trachtenberg, is that while “the threat of nuclear war was not so overwhelming that both sides were too frightened to push forward at all”, there were still “limits beyond which even a great power like the Soviet Union proved unwilling to go.”82 Historian Vladislav M. Zubok builds on this idea, noting that during the crisis, Khrushchev’s “perception of the forces at play in the United States” shifted. Moreover, “Kennedy’s show of force on July 25 persuaded him that the old stability of mutual nuclear bluff was gone and perhaps it was time to refrain from brinkmanship altogether.”83
Another key element through which the US sought to maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrence was the gradual shift toward a strategy of “flexible response” under Kennedy. In short, this involved strengthening the conventional forces of the West to respond to smaller conventional attacks from the Warsaw Pact and also developing limited options for the use of nuclear weapons. This was intended to both enhance the credibility of deterrence and provide more options for responding to either a nuclear or conventional threat.84 The shift to this concept emphasised the importance of having appropriate and credible options to respond to threats.
The Cuban Missile Crisis represented a new kind of confrontation between the superpowers. By that time, the Soviet Union had developed nuclear second-strike capabilities. This meant that even after a nuclear attack by the United States, the Soviet Union could still launch a retaliatory strike.85 Although the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal was still much smaller than that of the United States, the conditions for credible nuclear deterrence had changed. But a major problem for the Soviet Union remained: their arsenal lacked missiles that could reach the US and be useful for a second strike. Deterrence was mostly limited to the threat of attacks on Europe. The plan to deploy short- and medium-range missiles in Cuba, capable of striking the US, would have indeed shifted the strategic situation in favor of the Soviet Union. This enhancement of the Soviet Union’s deterrence options against the United States was a key reason why it secretly provided Castro with nuclear weapons.86 Kennedy even remarked after the crisis that the twenty-four missiles stationed in Cuba had already been “a substantial deterrent” for him, once he learned that a single Soviet missile could easily result in hundreds of thousands of American casualties.87
The US strategy during the crisis constantly navigated between the contradiction of expressing resolve while simultaneously avoiding a provocation that might lead to escalation. Kennedy expressed the determination of the United States in his speech on October 22, threatening massive retaliation against the Soviet Union.88 But instead of taking a more aggressive approach, Kennedy ultimately chose the option of a naval blockade to avoid further escalation. The increase of the US Strategic Aircraft Command’s Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) to DEFCON 2 on October 24, the last step before open war, exemplifies the delicate balance between demonstrating effective deterrence and risking an escalation of the conflict. This decision did indeed have a deterrent effect on Khrushchev and contributed directly to the peaceful resolution of the conflict.89 But it also could have easily led to further escalation on the Soviet side.
Nuclear stalemate only developed after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Following the end of the crisis, the Soviet Union focused its efforts on matching the US nuclear arsenal. In the emerging era of mutual assured destruction (MAD), nuclear threats lost part of their credibility, as the use of nuclear weapons against another nuclear power became suicidal due to the potential for retaliation.90 In summary, both the capacity for nuclear deterrence and its credibility for the superpowers initially depended heavily on the size and strength of their nuclear arsenals. To maintain an effective nuclear deterrence, a careful balance between assertiveness and restraint was required. This balance was crucial to preserve credibility while also avoiding any statements or actions that might escalate the conflict.
4.5 After the Crises: Prerequisites for Arms Control
It was only after the heightened tensions of the two crises that the superpowers intensified their efforts toward nuclear arms control. But what reasons have scholars identified as significant for this shift? Francis Gavin highlights four key factors: first, the increasing influence of a growing global grassroots antinuclear movement. Second, the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises made the superpowers recognise “the need to reduce tensions, halt the arms race, and limit the risk of an accidental nuclear war”. Third, the superpowers feared that without halting nuclear proliferation, the number of nuclear-armed states would increase, leading to new dangers. Fourth, and most importantly, according to Gavin, the four existing nuclear powers were “status quo powers, unlikely to change postwar borders through force”. They feared that nuclear proliferation to other states could threaten the stability of the status quo in Europe.91 So, besides the influence of the antinuclear movement, the reasons Gavin outlines for the intensified arms control efforts beginning in the early 1960s can be distilled down to the superpowers’ fear of the nuclear threat. A threat recently underscored by their confrontation over the missiles in Cuba.
Fursenko and Naftali also pointed out that “the Cuban missile crisis may well have opened Khrushchev’s eyes to the dangers of an uncontrolled arms race”.92 They further noted that it was only after Kennedy’s speech at the American University on June 10, 1963, in which he emphasized the need to ease tensions between the superpowers, that Khrushchev finally agreed to a test ban treaty.93 In his book about the Jupiter missiles deployed in Turkey, historian Philip Nash explains that many scholars view the Cuban Missile Crisis as a “catalyst” for the beginning of arms control. However, Nash disagrees with this perspective, describing the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis itself as “the first arms control agreement, indeed, first arms reduction agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States”.94 In fact, as part of the deal, both sides agreed to withdraw some of their nuclear weapons.
However, the looming threat of nuclear escalation during the Cuban Missile Crisis seems to be the main reason the first arms control agreements emerged only after the crisis. But is the threat of a catastrophic nuclear war necessary to bring two nuclear powers back to the negotiating table? Some might argue that such a shock could play an important role in easing tensions.95 But the risks of nuclear brinksmanship are too high to rely on a cathartic moment to bring some change. As historian Serhii Plokhy points out, “we can’t wait for another crisis of such proportions to bring leaders back to their senses, as the next crisis may prove much worse than the previous one.”96
5 Conclusion: Lessons Learned?
One should not misread history to assume that, because nuclear weapons were not used during the Cold War, they will not be used today. Such complacency risks emboldening nuclear brinkmanship under the dangerous assumption that a nuclear scenario is out of the question. The re-emergence of nuclear threats in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine marks a dramatic shift. After decades of focusing on disarmament, arsenal security, and non-proliferation, nuclear weapons have returned to the forefront of international politics, not just as tools of deterrence but also as instruments of political coercion. This dangerous trend is most likely to persist even when the war in Ukraine is over.
The history of the Berlin- and Cuban Missile Crises highlights the inherent ambivalence of nuclear deterrence. Both sides understood that nuclear weapons had transformed warfare by making outright military victories impossible in the face of nuclear retaliation. As Bernard Brodie noted, the function of nuclear weapons shifted fundamentally, from tools of war to instruments for preventing it.97 Still, this did not eliminate conflict. Instead, it reframed it within a high-stakes environment where miscalculation could lead to devastating consequences. Khrushchev’s nuclear threats during the Berlin Crisis failed to compel US withdrawal, as America’s superior nuclear capabilities and steadfast resolve preserved the territorial status quo. Similarly, his plan to reach nuclear balance with the United States by deploying nuclear Missiles in Cuba backfired, forcing him into a face-saving retreat. These crises demonstrated that while nuclear weapons can help stabilize the status quo by deterring direct conflict, they also amplify the risks of escalation and unintended consequences.
However, these lessons from the Cold War are complicated by the far more volatile nuclear landscape of today. The world now faces multipolar dynamics, with rising nuclear powers like China complicating traditional bilateral risk management frameworks. Technological advancements, such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles, and the blending of nuclear and conventional systems, create additional uncertainties that increase the likelihood of miscalculation. The war in Ukraine also involves direct military confrontations that heighten the stakes further. Moreover, political unpredictability in some nuclear states, like Russia, where decision-making is increasingly centralised and less constrained, amplifies the danger of rash or impulsive decisions.
Addressing these challenges requires the international community to internalize the lessons of the past while adapting them to present realities. Delegitimizing nuclear weapons as acceptable instruments of policy is critical, as is increasing transparency to prevent unauthorised use and reduce the risks of miscalculation. Against this backdrop, policymakers are also well-advised to think more thoroughly about defensive measures like missile defence systems, which, while controversial, remain one of the central pillars of credible deterrence. Perhaps most importantly, the erosion of arms control agreements must be reversed. Despite the adversarial climate, arms control frameworks remain essential for managing risks and building mutual trust among nuclear powers.
The lessons of the Cold War illustrate that nuclear deterrence can stabilize crises but only within narrow margins. While credible deterrence, restraint, and diplomacy were sufficient to avoid catastrophe in the past, today’s heightened complexity and unpredictability demand more proactive measures. History warns us that assuming nuclear weapons will never be used is a dangerous fallacy. Leaders must act urgently to strengthen international norms, build safeguards against escalation, and create mechanisms for dialogue. Failure to do so risks repeating dangerous moments of the past on an even more catastrophic scale, as the fragile peace of the nuclear age grows ever more precarious.
Acknowledgments
Research for this article was conducted as part of the research project “PATTERN: How Does the Past Matter? The Russian War of Aggression Against Ukraine and the Cold War” (
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For the purposes of this paper, the term “West” is defined as the historically established security community encompassing NATO (excluding Turkey) and the EU member states. Although this interpretation might be seen as outdated and overly narrow—especially in contemporary context—it corresponds to the prevailing understanding of this term in the academic and security literature (see G. Hellmann and B. Herborth, Uses of ‘the West’: Security and the Politics of Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017)). Throughout the text, “West” is used interchangeably with phrases such as “the United States and its allies”, “countries of the political West” as well as “NATO block”.
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This study does not examine the roles of West and East Germany or Cuba in detail. The exclusion of these key players from the respective crises is partly due to the study’s limited scope, but primarily because these states do not offer a strong basis for comparison with Ukraine’s role today. One might argue that a key similarity between the situation then and now is that in both cases, territorial dimensions and claims over spheres of influence are central concerns. While this is true, it applies to most conflicts between the superpowers during the Cold War. Therefore, this aspect is not considered a significant similarity in this analysis.
For a more detailed look on the Berlin Crisis see: V.M. Zubok, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958–1962) (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1993); J. Schick, The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971); M. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 169–234.
In the literature, opinions differ about how concerned Khrushchev really had been about a possible nuclear armament of West-Germany. For this discussion see: V. Mastny, “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953–1962.” In The Cambridge History of the Cold War, eds. M.P. Leffler, O.A. Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 1, 323; Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 180–191; Zubok, The Berlin Crisis, 6–13.
G. Wettig, Chruschtschows Berlin-Krise 1958 bis 1963 (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006), 31–32.
For Khrushchev’s reasons to start the crisis see: Zubok, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 5–13.
D. Holloway, “Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962.” In The Cambridge History of the Cold War, eds. M.P. Leffler, O.A. Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1, 391–392.
R. Mcmahon, “US national security policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy.” In The Cambridge History of the Cold War, eds. M.P. Leffler, O.A. Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1, 293–297.
Wettig, Chruschtschows Berlin-Krise, 37–39.
Holloway, Nuclear weapons, 393; Mastny, Soviet Foreign Policy, 327–328.
Mcmahon, From Eisenhower to Kennedy, 303–305.
“Speech by John F. Kennedy, Washington, 25 July, 1961.”
For more details see: Wettig, Chruschtschows Berlin-Krise, 185–212.
For a more detailed look at this topic see: A. Fursenko and T. Naftali, One hell of a gamble. Khrushchev, Castro & Kennedy 1958–1964 (New York/London: W.W. Norton, 1997); M. Dobbs, One minute to midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the brink of nuclear war (New York: Random House, 2008); S. Plokhy, Nuclear Folly. A new history of the Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Penguin Books, 2022).
J. Hershberg, “The Cuban missile crisis.” In The Cambridge History of the Cold War, eds. M.P. Leffler, O.A. Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 1, 67–70; Holloway, Nuclear weapons, 394; Mastny, Soviet Foreign Policy, 331–332.
Hershberg, Cuban missile crisis, 71–74.
Ibid., 75.
Holloway, Nuclear weapons, 394–395.
Mastny, Soviet Foreign Policy, 333.
Hershberg, Cuban missile crisis, 78–82. For Kennedy’s offer to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey see also: D. Munton, “The fourth question: Why did John F. Kennedy offer up the Jupiters in Turkey?” In An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 50-year retrospective, eds. D. Gioe, L. Scott, C. Andrew (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).
Hershberg, Cuban missile crisis, 82–83.
Holloway, Nuclear weapons, 395.
W. Burr, D. Rosenberg, “Nuclear competition in an era of stalemate, 1963–1975.” In The Cambridge History of the Cold War, eds. M.P. Leffler, O.A. Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2, 88–89.
Ibid., 111.
See for example: F.J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft. History and strategy in America’s atomic age (Ithaca/New York: Cornell University Press, 2012), 104–119.
Holloway, Nuclear weapons, 393.
Mcmahon, From Eisenhower to Kennedy, 309.
Holloway, Nuclear weapons, 393.
Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 252–253.
Hershberg, Cuban missile crisis, 83–84.
Dobbs, One minute to midnight, 345. For example, the standoff between a Soviet Submarine and US destroyers and fighter jets nearly led to the use of a nuclear-tipped torpedo. See: Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 257–272.
Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 225.
C. Craig, Destroying the village. Eisenhower and the thermonuclear war (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 105.
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G.R. Hughes, “The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: Overt Confrontation, Covert Diplomacy and Downright Luck.” In Landmark Negotiations from Around the World: Lessons for Modern Diplomacy, eds E. Vivet (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2019), 267.
Ibid.
Ironically, the key lesson the Kennedy administration took from the crisis was that the West needed to remain firm in the face of Soviet aggression. See, for example: Dobbs, One minute to midnight, 343–349.
Holloway, Nuclear weapons, 396.
Ibid., 397.
K.A. Lieber and D.G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution. Power politics in the atomic age (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2020), 56.
Ibid., 58.
Craig, Destroying the village, 90–97.
Mcmahon, From Eisenhower to Kennedy, 309.
Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft, 71–72.
Ibid., 68–69.
Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 233.
Zubok, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 31.
See for example: Lieber/Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution, 59–60.
Ibid., 45–48.
Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 48–57.
Dobbs, One minute to midnight, 229.
Ibid., 49–50.
Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 192–197.
See: Burr/ Rosenberg, Nuclear competition in an era of stalemate.
Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft, 6–8.
Fursenko/Naftali, One hell of a gamble, 338.
Ibid., 337–338.
P. Nash, The other missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957–1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 148–149.
See for example: C. Lalengkima, “The role of crises in the arms control process: A lesson for India and Pakistan.” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 17 (1) (2013), 108–123.
Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 363.
B. Brodie and F.S. Dunn, The absolute weapon: Atomic power and world order (Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946).
