Abstract
Following the Opium Wars, traditional notions of China as encompassing “all under heaven” (tianxia
Arnold J. Toynbee counts thirty-four civilizations among the many rich, resplendent, and long-standing civilizations that have existed from ancient times to the present.1 Those which have made it into popular discourse include the ancient civilizations of Babylon, Egypt, Greece, and Rome; Christian civilization, Arab civilization, Indian/Hindu civilization, the Sinitic civilization of the East Asian mainland, and so forth. Some of these ancient civilizations perished amidst competition and confrontation and others were fortunate enough to survive. In any case, the survivors underwent massive transformations in both form and content, adapting to the ever-changing world order and developments abetted by inter-cultural exchanges. The organizing principles of political power and society within them were also reformed, sometimes even to the point of becoming unrecognizable to their forbears.
Spurred on by the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment, the Christian states of Western Europe were the first to undergo the transition from feudal societies to modern nation-states. Anthony Smith’s idea of a “civic model of the nation” came, in fact, from the 17th- to 18th-century Western European notion of a “national polity” characterized by a political identity founded on civil liberties and a representative government, and boundaries defined by shared culture and land.2 The nationalist movements which subscribed to this pushed to establish new identity formations and bodies of national governance. Taking the Peace of Westphalia (1648) as a signal, they reshaped the nature of the European nation, rewriting the international order. The political transformation undergone by each spurred on transformation of their economy. New manufacturing processes were established and production limits removed, leading to rapid developments in Western European industry and technology. In the meantime, the social structures, ideology, and cultural discourse in European countries were reshaped and updated. Thus, one after another, they entered the new age of industrial civilization.
As European powers strengthened and prospered, they began to set their sights on the rest of the world. Faced with their aggression, the fate of native sovereignty in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America took each down different historical paths. The Ottoman Empire was dissolved. The Mayan and Incan civilizations met with destruction and annihilation.3 European colonies spread across the globe, bringing about irrevocable changes to the political and cultural map of the world. In East Asia, neither the Qing government nor Japan could avoid the impact of the powerful, expanding colonial domain of the west.
1 Modern China Forced to Adopt Western Conceptual Reasoning, Discursive Language, and Rules of Conduct
Out of lands and environments vastly different from those of distant China, the European countries developed distinct cultural traditions and political systems. From this, arose two contrasting centers of civilization: the Mediterranean and East Asia.4 Cultural exchange between China and Europe can be traced back to Catholic missionary activities. In 1583, Jesuit missionaries from the Vatican such as Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) entered China via Macau. Ricci collaborated with Xu Guangqi
Beginning with the first Opium War (1839–1842), the Qing government suffered defeat after defeat in wars against foreign nations, ceding territory and paying indemnities. In its dealings with Western countries, China steadily lost the power to self-determine and was forced, instead, to accept Western conceptual reasoning, discursive language, and rules of conduct. Facing the imminent threat of annihilation, the Chinese people had no choice but to abandon traditional notions of China as “all under heaven” (tianxia
On the surface, the Great Powers extolled notions of “equality” and “international law;” however, following the First Opium War and Second Opium War (1856–1860), the conditions under which the Qing government signed the peace treaty were completely devoid of “equality” or “parity.” When it came to foreign relations with China, the Great Powers consistently interfered in affairs concerning China’s frontier regions and affairs between local groups. Examples of this include Tsarist Russia recognizing the legitimacy of Yaqub Beg’s (1820–1877) rule in Kashgar, Xinjiang in 1872, and Britain forcibly opening the commercial port of Yadong
At the same time, diplomatic envoys, merchants, missionaries, and geographers from the Great Powers paid visits to every part of the Chinese frontier regions, building churches, organizing socials, opening schools, starting newspapers, and even developing writing systems for the oral languages of certain ethnic groups.8 These visitors worked to infiltrate every level of frontier society, meddling in local affairs and inciting inter-ethnic conflict. Western powers sought to promote an image of the Qing dynasty as a country of multiple nations existing side-by-side. Starting with such labels as “Tibetan nation” and “Mongol nation,” Western languages introduced discourses of “nation,” “national self-determination,” and “national identification” to the elites of the many peoples – namely, the Manchu, Han, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan – in China.9 Slowly but surely, from the concepts and meanings behind these new Western-derived labels, would emerge new forms of political and cultural identity.
The actions of Western imperialist powers inevitably impacted inter-group relations and affected discursive shifts in the various jurisdictions of the Qing government. The elites of the various Chinese ethnic groups began to use Western discourse to describe not only the world outside of China, but also recent Chinese political history as well as shifts within and between Chinese ethnic groups across the dynasties. This was the start of a comprehensive discursive shift within Chinese society.
As China endured its passive and humiliating role in foreign diplomatic negotiations, its political system based on traditional notions of ruling “all under heaven” and identifying according to the so-called “Sino-barbarian distinction” (yixia zhibian
To begin with, the Qing government officials used terms associated with frontier peoples, such as manyi
At the time, Chinese people who remained clear-headed observed that the Qing government was losing its authority over frontier lands and peoples to Western colonization. They saw how the existing social order and cultural logic was being thoroughly overturned, and how the Great Powers would cause rifts between different groups within a nation in order to conquer and enslave them.13 Those in the know considered how to “defend the race and nation,” how, against the tides of discursive shifts, to form their own interpretations of the new lexicon.14 Only by doing so could they reestablish a coherent identity among China’s people and keep the fragmentation and violence of in-fighting from breaking out across China’s vast territory.
2 Translating Terms between Western Languages and Chinese during the 19th Century
Western discourses and concepts that were brought into China by the Great Powers in the mid-nineteenth century had only recently emerged and become popular in Europe. The seventeenth century Enlightenment advanced innovation in philosophy, ethics, political science, economics, history, literature, and the natural sciences. The subsequent wave of new concepts and related terms that were born from new political beliefs, social movements, and developments in technology transformed existing words and phrases in the languages of European countries.
The word “nation” serves as an apt example. It stems from the Latin word “natio,” which has multiple meanings. According to the earliest and most widespread understanding, it “referred to a group of people who share a place of birth and are placed in the same category that is larger than a family but smaller than a clan; also, a people.”15 French encyclopedists Denis Diderot (1713–1784) and Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1717–1783) reframed “nation” as “a collective word used to denote a considerable quantity of those people who inhabit a certain extend of country defined within certain limits, and obeying the same government.”16 The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens of the French Revolution elevated the idea of “nation” to include ideas of sovereignty, stating that “the principle of sovereignty resides essentially in the nation.” The British historian Eric Hobsbawm (d. 2012) writes that “the modern sense of the word is no older than the eighteenth century (…).”17 Elie Kedourie (d. 1992) writes on the “doctrine” of European nationalism at that time: “(…) that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.”18 Thus, the central position of modern European nationalism is that every nation has the right to establish its own government.
The process by which Western concepts were transmitted to China was anything but direct. At first, Chinese people attempted to use existing Chinese words and phrases to translate Western words. Such words and phrases were inevitably informed by traditional Chinese worldviews and rational concepts that differed greatly from that of the Western concepts they were meant to represent. Therefore, Chinese scholars who first attempted to translate Western texts into Chinese could only do so by either using barely passable Chinese terms or coining new terms. In Lin Zexu’s
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, it was very difficult to translate Western concepts and discourses using the Chinese that was available. When translating Thomas Henry Huxley’s (1825–1895) Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays, Yan Fu once mentioned the difficulty of adhering to the three principles of translation: reliability (xin
It is already difficult to remain true to the ideological content of the source text; however, if one were to produce an indecipherable text based on a correct understanding of the source text, there would be no point in the translation. Thus, it is very important to take care with expression…. (The translator must) gain masterful understanding of the substance of the entire text; only then can the translation gain a natural smoothness. If the writing and content of the source text is abstract and difficult to understand, then one must do the work of laying the foundation and finding the correct resonances in the sections of the translated text that both precede and follow. In this way, one can better express its intended meaning. These methods are all meant to enhance the expressive power of the translated text. Only by achieving a smooth translation can one remain true to the source text.22
This passage highlights the difference between Chinese and Christian cultures while also reflecting how difficult it was for Chinese people to understand Western texts and to select the right words and phrases to convey them. Yan Fu, the pioneer of translating Western texts into Chinese, met with multiple hardships when using old Chinese words to translate the new foreign phrases.
One can see many examples in works of translation by Chinese translators that illustrate Yan’s emphasis on “choosing the word that best fits the meaning” (ji yi ding ming
3 Japanese Terms as a Key Medium through Which Western Discourse Was Introduced into China
Japan’s translations played a unique role in facilitating the translation and acceptance of Western knowledge in China. During the Meiji Reformation, Japanese scholars systematically translated Western knowledge into Japanese, which effectively pushed forward modern developments in Japan’s educational and industrial sectors. After the Qing government’s loss in the First Sino-Japanese War, many members of the Chinese elite sought to learn from Japan’s experience of “reformation” and “leaving Asia to join Europe” as a way to save China. Those studying abroad in Japan eagerly studied and consumed Western ideas through Japanese publications. Thus, Japanese became an established means for introducing Western knowledge into China. From the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, China set off on a course of book translation. Liang Qichao
In “Gezai Zhong-Xi zhijian de Riben – xiandai hanyu zhong de riyu ‘wai lai yu’ wenti”
Indeed, Japanese texts and terminology played an influential role in the establishment of modern thought in Chinese society. Following the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), Chinese scholars were in agreement about looking to Japanese texts to learn about Western civilization. In 1897, Liang Qichao and others pooled the capital to start the Datong Translation Bureau (Datong yishu ju
At the time Western knowledge and discourse was being translated into Chinese via their Japanese versions, educational reform and the vernacular movement in China were also underway. In the case of educational reform, China was “retiring the imperial examination system to uplift new learning.” The change brought about by Western political, social, and cultural ideas completely shook the foundations of traditional Chinese epistemology and political discourse. The resulting impact this had on Chinese writing style, grammar, punctuation, and conceptual language was historically monumental.
4 Confrontation and War Due to Differing Interpretations of the Character Yi 夷
Within the traditional worldview of China as the center of “all under heaven,” the yi-xia
It is precisely because of the gulf between cultural norms and language usage, as well as the resulting mistranslations of words and concepts, that serious diplomatic conflicts, even some leading directly to war, have arisen between China and the West. In August 1834, the English-language newspaper Chinese Repository published a translated order from Lu Kun
As the use of yi was so central to Sino-British conflict, the Treaty of Tianjin signed in 1858 included an Article 51 in Chinese which read, “It is agreed that, henceforward, the character ‘I’
As Lydia Liu has pointed out, the legal banning of yi by the Treaty of Tianjin was responsible for “forcing the Chinese word to refer its signified … onto the English word ‘barbarian.’”36 Additionally, “… yi/barbarian articulates a particular vision of sovereignty at the meeting ground of the British and Qing empires.”37 In discussions on the matter, Chinese officials continually emphasized that yi did not have negative connotations, that “Mencius himself said, ‘King Shun was an eastern yi and King Wen was a western yi.”38 Yet, when it came to this word, which has been in use throughout China’s thousands of years of history, it was not the Chinese understanding that mattered for how it was interpreted, but the British understanding. The nineteenth century Sino-British debate over yi was an interesting case of how Westerners firmly took hold of power over Chinese language, including the unilateral power to arbitrate on its interpretation.
5 Adoption of Terms Such as Zhongzu and Minzu
In today’s China, minzu
5.1 “Minzu” in Traditional Chinese Texts
Notable scholar Ya Hanzhang
The term minzu in Chinese appears rather late period-wise. In ancient texts of China, the word zu is often used as is min
民 , ren人 , zhong種 , bu部 , lei類 as well as minren民人 , minzhong民種 , minqun民群 , zhongren種人 , buren部人 , zulei族類 and so forth. However, the combination of min with zu as a single word occurred later. Although there are some scholars who believe that minzu was already in use in premodern Chinese society, it is difficult to confirm that it maintained a distinct orientation and stable meaning as a concept from premodern times to the present.39 It is even harder to connect its meanings to that of our current usage as they originate in different epistemologies. In 1903, Liang Qichao introduced to China the German-Swiss political theorist and law scholar J.K. Bluntschli’s ideas about ethnicity and nation. Thus, use of the word spread, and its meanings are often confused with the concept of race or nation. This confusion is inseparable from the influence of the Western European ideas.40
5.2 Minzu and Zhongzu in 19th Century Chinese Sources
As the Western ideological system gradually made its way across China in the mid-19th century via translated texts, Chinese scholars from the late Qing onward inevitably adopted newly imported terms such as race, nation, religion, sovereignty, and citizen when discussing Chinese history, society, and culture.41 Minzu and its associated concepts was used not only to describe different groups of people residing in China from the late Qing to Republican (1912–1949) period; it, along with the other new terms, was also used to interpret and describe Chinese society of earlier periods.
According to scholarly research, the first use in Chinese of minzu in its modern sense appeared in Prussian missionary Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff’s (1803–1851) Jiushizhu Yesu Jidu xinglun zhi yaolue zhuan
The shifts in framework occurring within the Chinese academic world can further be observed through shifts in Liang Qichao’s language usage as one of the most influential thinkers of the Late Qing to Republican periods. From 1896 to 1901, undoubtedly influenced by Yan Fu, Liang used zhongzu in reference to groups of people. In 1896, he discussed “racial conflict” (zhongzu zhi zheng
5.3 Minzu as Race and also as Nation
Wang Ke argues that “of essays about nationalism written by Chinese thinkers at the start of the twentieth century, nearly all were without exception derived from Japan.” He believes that the idea of minzu received by late Qing Chinese was “a misunderstanding that came from Japan.”48 In Japan, Wang says, the English word “nation” was first translated into Japanese with the Chinese characters
In 1898, Liang Qichao traveled to Japan and began engaging with Japanese texts. That year, he wrote, “It is my hope that, from now on, the Chinese nation (minzu) may once again come into the light and exist in the world freely and independently.”51 At the time, he used minzu to refer to the many different groups residing within China. In 1901, Liang discussed in his work Zhongguo shi xulun
5.4 Constructing “China”: Does Guozu Include All Chinese People or Refer Only to the Ethnic Han?
Under the influence of foreign discourse, ethnic groups such as the Manchus, Han, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans came to be known as minzu. As this was the case, Liang Qichao attempted to put forth two frameworks for group identification in order to better distinguish minzu from guozu. In his 1903 essay, “Zhengzhixue dajia Bolun zhili zhi xueshuo”
In his 1903 personal account Geming jun
In 1905, Sun Yat-sen
5.5 Applications of Concepts of Minzu to the Studies of Chinese History
As minzu had by the late Qing entered discourses on relationships between different groups in China as well as been used to refer to those different groups, it was inevitable that the modern term would make it into the vocabulary of scholars who were, at the time, researching inter-ethnic relationships in Chinese history. Here, also, it is possible to observe in the diction of such scholars the indelible mark of Japanese influence.
In his 1928 publication, Zhongguo minzu shi
Many subsequent works sharing the title of Wang’s books followed in his application of minzu. One example is Lü Simian’s
6 Concluding Remarks
Looking back at China’s interactions with Western powers around the time of the Opium Wars, it is evident that Western colonizers employed a double standard in their dealings with China. In the eyes of Europeans, the difference between “civilized” and “barbaric” people was a matter of racial essentialism. This is why the Great Powers of Europe applied a different moral and legal standard in diplomacy with one another versus when engaging the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Without understanding this point, it is very possible to accept the universal value of Western concepts and discourse.
The Opium Wars represented a turning point in Chinese history. The arrival of Western political concepts and language overturned the Chinese cultural order and group dynamics that had traditionally been based on the ideas of a Chinese empire encompassing “all under heaven” and the “Sino-Barbarian dichotomy.” In the new context of Western dominance, the Chinese people had little choice but to try to learn, understand, and adopt the foreign lexicon while also struggling to find ways to preserve the nation and its people despite the humiliating conditions.
Having now arrived at the international stage of the twenty-first century, broadly maintaining relations with many other nations is of utmost importance. While doing so, it is also important to communicate using language and concepts that are understandable and acceptable to others. The Western concepts and discourses that entered China during the modern period and which have since been adopted as part of the Chinese lexicon are now a necessary tool for building such relationships. However, it is precisely for this reason that researchers must remain cautious on two counts.
Firstly, many foreign concepts contain meanings which are incompatible with traditional Chinese worldviews; thus, we cannot unilaterally apply Western concepts to the understanding of ancient China, even less so to reductive interpretations of China today. To do so would be to risk the procrustean error of “maiming one’s feet to fit too-small shoes.” Thus, when discussing group dynamics in ancient China, we would do well to avoid using such modern Western conceptual terms as “nation” and “ethnic group.” Terms such as chao
Secondly, we must carefully untangle the exact route by which these core concepts came into China and analyze the cultural background informing the different ways Chinese people understood these concepts in different time periods. After building concrete scenarios of how these foreign concepts were used in Chinese society during and after the Opium Wars, we must give them clear definitions. Since it is possible that Chinese people’s understandings of these concepts were partially different from their original definitions, it is necessary to add attributive or conditional words and explanations. Research in the fields of conceptual history and sociology of knowledge are essential to Chinese-foreign intellectual and cultural exchange. What we are facing are two completely different paths of historical development, two sets of fundamental concepts and language systems that arose from different political, economic, and cultural environments. Only with a strong foundation in conceptual historical studies can one open up mutual dialogue rooted in the essence of things and, gradually, actualize deep understanding between the two sides.
We must systematically work through all the Western political and cultural ideas accepted into China over the past two hundred years, acknowledge the gap between the two sides when engaged in comparative analysis of traditional China, seek out possible points of similarity, and analyze the reasons for the differences. Only by doing so can we truly recognize, through comparison, the Western world and, in turn, gain a deeper understanding of China and Chinese society. In terms of participating in international politics and cultural exchanges, Chinese people strive towards deep awareness of world civilizations, including those of the West. We should also try to understand more deeply the political and cultural traditions of the many peoples in China. From there, it may be possible to gain political and cultural self-awareness.
When the alternative to learning from Western countries is to perish as a nation, there is no choice but to do so. Only after grasping the rules of the West’s games – even drawing on knowledge passed down from Chinese ancestors to exhibit skill on an international stage – can the Chinese people start to take the initiative and begin to restore China’s cultural confidence. In order to do so, they must position themselves firmly in the present world stage and, from its highest institutions of knowledge, learn to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of all the civilizations of humanity, including Western, Islamic, Indian civilizations as well as the Sinitic civilization. At the same time, they must master the ability to communicate cross-culturally and develop skills to facilitate harmonious interaction between different cultural groups, perhaps even merging them. To this end, the wisdom their ancestors maintained across thousands of years of Chinese civilization is an incomparable resource.
Translated by Casey Lee
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Lu Fanzhi
The four signs of a “Civil ethnic polity” include: 1. territory forged by historical circumstance; 2. a unified legal and governmental body; 3. legal and political legal rights; 4. shared culture and awareness. See Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 11.
“… twelve major civilizations, seven of which no longer exist (Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Cretan, Classical, Byzantine, Middle American, Andean) and five which do (Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Islamic, and Western).” See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 45.
Zhan Zhonghe
Xiao Zhiqin
It would seem that, after unsuccessful attempts at opening trade routes with Tibet, British troops – invaded Tibet in 1903, occupying Lhasa and finally, in 1906, forcing the Qing government to sign the “Sino-British Convention on British and Tibetan Relations.” See Zhang Zhirong
Western ideas of “sovereignty (zhuquan
From the end of the 19th century to the 1930s, missionaries active in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan provinces preached to ethnic minorities. Around that time, they devised and published on several ethnic minority orthographies. The British Methodist missionary Sam Pollard devised Old Miao script. The British James O. Fraser of the Inner China Mission developed Old Lisu script with Sara Ba Thaw, a preacher of the Karen peoples of Myanmar. Missionaries of the American Baptist Mission Society such as Josiah Nelson Cushing and O. Hanson devised Singpho writing. Vincent M. Young of the American Baptist Convention developed both the Lahu and Wa scripts. Australian missionary Gladstone Porteous devised Yi script. See Chen Jianming
“Even the terms ‘Manchu’ and ‘Han’ referring to ethnicities is very modern …… it wasn’t until the post–1900 hostility broke out between loyalists and revolutionaries that the Manchu-Han conflict came to a head. However, the concept of ‘Han ethnicity’ was also being re-invented.” See Sun Longji
“Imperial China … at the end of the Qing dynasty was forced into the straightjacket of a ‘nation-state.’” Sun Longji, Lishixue jia de jingxian, 21.
The Qing government pursued a “diverse empire” where each district administered itself via the principle of “governing according to customary practice” (yin su er zhi
Mao Haijian
“The British conquest of India was an act of urging Indian people to kill Indian people.” See Yang Du
Datongbao
Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1960.), 12–13. For further discussion on the evolution of the term “nation,” see Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 4–8.
Kedourie, Nationalism, 14.
Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3.
Kedourie, Nationalism, 9.
The original text renders Yinjili guo with the characters
Lin Zexu
Lydia H. Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity – China, 1900–1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 360.
Yan Fu
In 1884, Japan put into practice a new peerage system and granted old high-ranking imperial officials, those with an established reputation, and those who had contributed notably to the Meiji reformation the rankings of gong, hou, bo, zi, and nan. It is unclear whether European aristocrats were first referred to using the same ranks in Chinese translated texts or if this translation practice was borrowed from Japanese translators who had borrowed the ancient Chinese feudal ranks for both European and Japanese nobles.
Lin Zexu, Sizhou zhi, 114–17.
Liang Qichao
Gu Jiegang
At the end of 1919, Chen Wangdao
Wang Binbin
Pei Yu
Liang Qichao, “Lun xue Ribenwen zhi yi”
Liang Qichao, “Chunqiu Zhongguo yidi bian xu,” 2: 58.
Ge Zhaoguang
Lin Zexu, Sizhou zhi, 114.
Lydia H. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 63–65.
Ibid., 70–71.
Ibid., 35.
Ibid., 34.
Ibid., 43. This passage appears in the following passage from The Mencius: “Shun was born in Zhu Ping, moved to Fu Xia, and died in Ming Tiao. He was a man of the Eastern yi lands. King Wen was born in Qi Zhou and died in Bi Ying. He was a man of the Western yi lands. The distance between the two lands was over a thousand li. The two men lived over a thousand years apart. But when it came to realizing their wishes in the central plains, the two were as one. Both the former and the latter are sages; both stood by the same principles.” See Jiao Xun
“With careful research into various examples of minzu’s usage in premodern China, it is not hard to realize that its meaning is not clear, seeming to encompass many definitions, and is largely used to express ‘minzhi zushu
Ya Hanzhang
Liang Qichao emphasized in particular the difference between traditional and modern notions of state (guojia
Huang Xingtao, Chongsu Zhonghua: jindai Zhongguo “Zhonghua minzu” guannian yanjiu, 72.
See “Ren wu fen lei shuo”
Dikötter, Jindai Zhongguo zhi zhongzu guannian, 63.
Liang Qichao, “Bianfa tongyi, lunyi shu”
Liang Qichao, “Chunqiu Zhongguo yidi bian xu,” 2: 48.
Liang Qichao, “Lun Zhongguo yu Ouzhou guoti yitong”
Wang Ke
Ibid., 54.
Ibid., 60–61.
Jin Guantao
Liang Qichao, “Zhongguo shi xulun”
“
Liang Qichao, “Xin shi xue”
Liang Qichao, “Zhengzhixue dajia Bolunzhili zhi xueshuo”
Zou Rong
Ibid., 1–4.
Chen Tianhua
Sun Zhongshan
Sun Zhongshan, “Zhongguo tongmenghui geming fanglüe”
Sun Zhongshan, “Zai Nanjing Tongmenghui huiyuan jianbiehui de yanjiang”
Sun Zhongshan, “Zhongguo guomindang xuanyan”
Sun Zhongshan, “Sanmin zhuyi”
Ibid., 242.
Wang Tonglin
Lü Simian
Lin Huixiang