Abstract
Religious majoritarianism was established in Turkey with the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The Diyanet became the new home for the Ottoman Sunni ulema and supported the implementation of Sunni majoritarianism by assimilating minorities, e.g. Alevis. With the AKP government in power in the last decades in Turkey, Turkish majoritarianism has come to the fore. Turkish majoritarianism consists of Sunni Islam along with Turkish cultural and political dimensions. Diyanet imams function as important transmitters of Turkish majoritarianism to the Muslim community. At the same time, imams in Germany are seen as mediators for German integration policies. German politicians set the framework for integration with the expression ‘majority society’ (Mehrheitsgesellschaft) in policies regarding Islam, although a concrete definition of this seems to be problematic. Elements of Christian religion and German culture are used as elements in the construction of a ‘majority society’.
1 Introduction: Religious Majoritarianism in Turkey
Majoritarianism is defined as ‘the idea that the numerical majority of a population should have the final say in determining the outcome of a decision’. The cautionary phrase ‘tyranny of the majority’ originated with the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville.1 Majoritarianism is not concerned with the content of a decision but rather with how a decision was made. Thus an evaluation of the content seems difficult, as even the best judges, for example, differ in their opinions about what is the best (moral) decision but all votes are counted equally and the quality of arguments or intentions is not relevant.2 James Allan underlines in his comment that majoritarianism may have negative impacts on the population concerned, but it is still better than other political systems worldwide.3
Ceren Lord has analysed religious majoritarianism with regard to to Turkey. By religious majoritarianism, she means ‘the extent to which a religiously demarcated group dominates and has a monopoly over political and economic resources, legitimating its power based on its numeric majority within the nation’.4 Lord underlines, that ‘the prism of “religious majoritarianism” is developed to describe a more complex and intertwined relationship between state, religion and society’ and is better than ‘the concept of secularism, which has resulted in a binary frame of reference’.5 Nation-state projects need majorities which they construct by elevating an ‘ethnic group(s), which may be demarcated by religion, as the owners of the state’. The level of religious majoritarianism is determined in the founding years of a nation-state, when boundaries between the religious majority and the minorities are defined and institutional changes are made.6
In the case of the Turkish state, the ideas of the nation state and religious majoritarianism were established with the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Maurus Reinkowski states in his monograph, Geschichte der Türkei: Von Atatürk bis zur Gegenwart, that the roots of Turkish self-understanding go back to the period of change period from the Ottoman Empire as a ‘multi-ethnic empire (Vielvölkerreich)’ to a Turkish nation state, which was an answer to the challenges of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.7 Turkish national sovereignty was internationally accepted with the treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Although European treaty partners saw religious and linguistic identities as both decisive criteria for applying the status of ‘minority’, Turkish representatives used only religious criteria to defined ‘minority’. According to the treaty of Lausanne, non-Muslims should be treated equally before the law, and this was adopted into the Turkish constitution of 1924. Alevi and Kurdish parts of the population were not specifically referred to.8
The Sunni Islamic position of the majority of the population was enforced with the founding of the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) on 3 March 1924.9 It is responsible for ‘organising affairs having to do with the Islamic religious belief and places of worship and administering religious institutions’.10 The Diyanet became the new home from which the Ottoman Sunni ulema controlled religion. In line with Ottoman religious traditions, the Diyanet included only Sunni Turkish Muslims and excluded members of all other religions.11 The Sunni ulema worked together with Sufi shaykhs in the propagation of Sunni othodoxy.12 A Sunni religious majority was constructed and as ‘a result, Alevis, like Kurds, are both necessary constituents that enable (through assimilation) the construction of the Muslim Turkish majority bloc embodied in the prevalent discourse of the 99 per cent Muslim Turkish majority’.13
With the AKP (Justice and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) government in power in the last decades in Turkey, Sunni religious majoritarianism became a ‘fundamental element of the constitutional identity’. The ascendance of the AKP led to the centralisation of power and an authoritarian system,14 and state power was transferred from the secularists to an explicitly religious-conservative party.15 Turkey’s government changed its identity from that of a secular republic to a majoritarian democracy,16 in which all decisions were legitimised by majoritarianism.
Imams function as important transmitters of the Islamic religion to the Muslim community.17 This article first analyses the state of research about the role of (Diyanet) imams. Second, it illustrates the religious, cultural and political dimensions of Turkish majoritarianism in relation to the Diyanet and the diverse expectations of Diyanet imams. Third, the German ‘majority society’ and its expectations concerning Diyanet imams are discussed, and, finally, it concludes that the imams are caught between the expectations of Turkish majoritarianism and the German ‘majority society’, which leads to challenges.
2 State of Research: The Role of (Diyanet) Imams
Thijl Sunierhas explored the shift from a policy of integration of Muslims into European societies to one of control of Islamic practices and institutions.18 ‘Immigrants have to show that they are willing to comply with the dominant national culture.’19 Policies are being introduced with the aim of strengthening national states, which Sunier refers to as ‘domesticating Islam’.20 He looks for the origins of the ‘domestication’ of Islam after the 1970s, when there was ‘an emphasis on the economic absorbing mechanisms of host societies to the cultural characteristics of the migrant populations’.21
Some countries in Europe, including France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, offer training programmes for imams. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Michael J. Balz have underlined that European countries try to prevent radicalisation in Muslim communities by training ‘Euro-friendly’ imams.22 They conclude that ‘European governments have shifted from a relatively laissez-faire policy on Islam to one that actively seeks to shape religious institutions on European soil’.23 One of the shaping tools are the imams, on condition that they do not support terrorism. Some European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands have an agreement with the Turkey, trusting that ‘moderate imams’ will come from the Turkish secular education system and, in addition, they are building up their home-made imam training programmes.24 This development serves European states in creating imams who should fulfil their expectations.25
Transnational ties support change and can be controlled by the recipient country. Sunier, Heleen van der Linden and Ellen van de Bovenkamp have shown that transnational networks constitute a controllable challenge.26 They describe Islam as a ‘multi-dimensional binding mechanism’, which, in combination with nationalism, binds migrants to their countries of origin,27 and suggest two reasons for the expansion of the Diyanet in European countries: first, the need of the Turkish migrants for religious services, and, second, to prevent the spread of ‘non-official Turkish Islamic movements’.28 The Turkish state ‘domesticates’ Islam via the Diyanet in line with Kemalist principles.29
Knowing the history of the Turkish Republic helps towards an understanding of its religio-political development. Sunier and Nico Landmann classify the history of the secular Turkish Republic into four stages, the final one being determined by the AKP, which has integrated Islamic elements into the secular state. President Erdoğan wants to form a political system in line with Western democracy30 but at the same time imposes an Islamic/Turkocentric world view, as can be seen, for example, in Turkish education policies.31
Imams can be seen to reflect the tension between politics and religion. Benjamin Bruce analyses the point of view of the Turkish state and of respective students. The Turkish state offers students with Turkish roots and citizens of other countries opportunities to study Islamic theology in Turkey, with the possibility of then being employed by the Diyanet, the aim being to overcome the language deficiencies of imams abroad.32 Bruce illustrates the ‘ambiguous political status’ of DİTİB imams who supported the election of the AKP in Turkey.33 After 2016, the failed military coup for which the Turkish government held the Gülen Movement responsible, candidates for the International Theology Programme who seemed close to Gülen were filtered out by the Diyanet.34
The use of religious institutions to suit the purposes of the AKP government are visible in the development of the Diyanet. Ahmet T. Kuru asserts that Islamic political actors were important in modernising the political system in Turkey. Kuru underlines that secularist leaders such as Atatürk weakened the ‘ulema-state alliance’ but the mass of the population stayed loyal to conservative ideas and ‘Islamic actors’.35 The AKP government uses the Diyanet to legitimise its policies,36 as can be observed, for example, in the government’s and the Diyanet’s battle against terrorism; they both call the Gülen movement a terrorist group FETÖ (Fethullah Gülen Terör Örgütü) and fight against it.37
A political approach to the historical development of the Turkish Republic shows that religion and politics were intertwined to suit state requirements. Maurus Reinkowski underlines the creation after World War II of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, in which nation and religion were melded together.38 Kurds part and Alevis, each constituting around one fifth of the Turkish population, have been subjects of an assimilation policy.39 The AKP sees itself as representing the broad right-conservative wing,40 taking its right to rule from the majority of the Turkish population.
Religious state authorities exert political influence on imams abroad, who, according to Mohammed Hashas, are dependent on and influenced by ‘religious-political powers’.41 He also maintains that the influence of national authorities, especially European state authorities, on imams as transmitters of Islamic religion to the Muslim community needs further analysis.42 Discussions about the role of imams within the integration debate leads to a search for new definitions of ‘being European’.43 Nurettin Gemici identifies various difficulties that the Diyanet faces in training suitable imams for Europe.44 For example, they have language problems and are called upon to meet too many expectations.45 Ednan Aslan, Evrim Ersan-Akkilic and Jonas Kolb conclude that imams are unable to cope with the numerous expectations they face from different actors and are dependent on the associations for which they work.46
Transnational ties seem to be important for imams and Muslims in their local situations. Theresa Beilschmidt examines DİTİB mosques and the Islam practices of DİTİB members and states that there are too many discussions about a conflict of loyalities between Turkey and Germany: it is possible for people to have a relationship with the Turkish homeland as well as identifying with Germany.47 She underlines that the loyality question is mostly present on the state level and that transnational relationships are important at the local level.48
The various expectations faced by imams are analysed by Hansjörg Schmid, who uses the stakeholder theory to show that imams have a conflict of roles between claims made upon them by the various stakeholder and their self-image.49 Schmid takes the definition of R. Edward Freeman, a philosopher and professor of business administration, and works on the assumption that stakeholders are ‘individuals, groups or institutions with a special interest in an organisation or a function thereof’.50 He illustrates the multiple expectations that internal and external stakeholders have of imams, as well as the imams’s expectations of themselves.51 The German state and the churches try to find in imams an equivalent to priests and ministers.52
The expectations of imams range from acting as experts in Islamic religion and dialogue partners to being, in the case of DİTİB imams, representatives of Turkey.53 Turkish state policies lead to conflicts between DİTİB imams and the executive committees of DİTİB associations.54
German policies vis à vis Islam have been analysed by Hanna Fülling, who states that German Islam Conference II decided that training programmes for imams should be run under the control of the German state.55 Imams would be expected to prevent radicalisation in the Muslim community and support the integration of Muslims into German culture. Imam training should include an advanced course about Germany so that they could make the Muslims familiar with the host country.56 Fülling notes that the German authorities insist on the cultural integration of immigrants but there is no mention of this in the publications of Muslim delegates at the German Islam Conference. She says that the definitions of ‘integration’ and ‘values’ are not clear and should be made transparent57 and suggests security policies and integration policies should be separated from policies regarding Islam, which should come under the umbrella of religious policies (Religionspolitik).58 Fülling recommends that religion should be referred to in general terms in the German Islam Conference without assuming that ‘religion’ means Christanity, as some German state representatives do, which contradicts the ‘weltanschauliche’ neutrality of the state.59
The above mentioned works indicate that the goals of various states are ‘domesticate’ Islam,60 to train ‘Euro-friendly’ imams,61 and to make imams respond to the expectations of the nation states in question.62 In the German case, the reference made by politicians to Christian ideas and German culture, using the ‘majority society’ argument,63 show that (religious and cultural) majoritarianism is present in proposing the integration of imams and Muslims. In the case of Turkey, we find, for example, the prohibition of ‘non-official Turkish Islamic movements’64 and the AKP’s battle against terrorism, especially the FETÖ,65 and the Diyanet’s support for this battle.66
There is so far no study of the situation of imams between the expectations of Turkish majoritarianism and the German ‘majority society’. The present analysis argues that majoritarianism plays an important role in defining the (differing) expectations of Diyanet imams and the following section discusses the role of the Diyanet and its imams.
3 Diyanet Imams and Majoritarianism
The Directorate General of Foreign Affairs (Dış ilişkiler Genel Müdürlüğü) of the Diyanet was established on 13 August 1984 to enforce Turkish religious and national values, to prevent the exploitation of Islam through religious groups and to lead religious activities.67 Diyanet is a state body and Diyanet imams, including in Germany, are Turkish state officials and are under pressure to support the politics of the AKP government.68
The Religious Affairs High Council (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu, DİYK) of the Diyanet declares that it works (inter)nationally to ‘share the correct knowledge about Islam with the whole world’69 and sees itself as the mediator of ‘correct’ Islam, ignoring Islamic plurality. The Diyanet refers to the traditions of the Ottoman Empire and the DİYK is traced back to the position of the Shaykh al-Islam (Şeyhülislamlık makamı).70 When the reopening of the Hagia Sophia museum as a mosque was declared by Erdoğan, it was the subject of the Friday sermons in all mosques on 24 July 2020.71 The Diyanet president, Prof. Dr. Ali Erbaş, entered the pulpit for the Friday sermon with a sword and declared that Ottoman rulers used to do so.72 Erbaş received a lot of criticism for implementing this Ottoman tradition, but he was defended by Erdoğan.73 This sermon recalled the conquest of Istanbul and underlined the importance of love for the Islamic religion and the Turkish fatherland.74 In Diyanet sermons, there is no mention of Islamic plurality75 and no reference, for example to Alevi traditions among the Turkish population; the sermons are prepared centrally, consistent with Turkey’s religious majoritarianism policy.
The Diyanet has overseas representation in 106 countries, with religious services consultants (din hizmetleri müşavirlikleri) who have diplomatic status in 52 Turkish embassies, in addition to 38 religious services attachés (din hizmetleri ataşelikleri) in 16 countires and coordinators of religious services (din hizmetleri koordinatörlükleri) in 12 Turkish consulates.76 The distribution of religious services attachés is as follows: 13 in Germany, 4 in France, 3 in Austria, 3 in the USA, 2 in Australia, 2 in Holland, 2 in Italy, and one in each of the following: Afghanistan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Nakhchivan, Romania, and Saudi Arabia.77
One third of the Diyanet religious services attachés are in Germany, which shows the importance of Germany for the Diyanet abroad. They are located in the following 13 cities, corresponding to the 13 consular districts: Berlin, Düsseldorf, Essen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hannover, Karlsruhe, Cologne, Mainz, Munich, Münster, Nuremberg and Stuttgart, and they all come under the Turkish embassy in Berlin.78 Statistics for 2020 show that there were 1,461,910 Turkish nationals living in Germany,79 plus around 1 million German passport holders of Turkish origin.
DİTİB, the German division of Diyanet, was established on 12 January 1982 in Berlin. DİTİB Cologne was established on 5 July 1984 and was registered as an umbrella organisation for all DİTİB associations in Germany in 1987.80 The establishment of DİTİB after the 1980s is regarded as a late step. The first labour migration agreement between Turkey and Germany was signed on 30 November 1961 and the Süleyman Tunahan Efendi movement established its ‘Turkish Union’ as soon as 1967.81
The first imam was sent abroad in 1971 and was paid by the Fund for the Protection and Proclamation of the Turkish Cultural Heritage (Türk Kültür Varlığını Koruma ve Tanıtma Fonu).82 The Ministry of National Education (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı; MEB) described the goal for personnel abroad as follows: ‘to communicate the Turkish culture abroad, to spread and protect it, to strengthen the cultural connection with our citizens and cognates abroad, to shed light in religious affairs and to teach the Turkish language’.83 The obligations of imams abroad are to provide information about the Islamic tradition and to spread ‘correct’ knowledge of Islam. Imams are responsible for protecting the ‘original identities’ of Turkish citizens in Western countries and to support ‘correct’ integration, that is, equal integration into the society in which they live. Imams must support the Turkish cultural heritage and values.84 Vice President Fuat Oktay emphasises that the Diyanet serves the third generation of Turks abroad and that the Turkish diaspora is still bound to its religious and cultural values.85
The Diyanet does not give an explicit definition of its understanding of ‘correct’ Islam and integration but the contents of the Friday sermons, for example, indicate that the teachings of the Diyanet are a continuation of Ottoman Sunni orthodoxy,86 which serves the Sunni majoritarianism of the Turkish state.
On 24 April 2020, in the first Friday sermon in the fasting month of Ramadan, the Diyanet’s President Erbaş emphasised that homosexuality is condemned in Islam because it brings sickness into society and he made an appeal to fight against it.87 He received a lot of criticism from the political opposition for his statement but, a few days later, Erdoğan expressed his support for Erbaş and underlined the authority of the Diyanet as a state institution in religious affairs.88 The DİYK published a religious expert opinion (fatwa) on 28 April 2020, stressing that homosexuality is forbidden in Islam and substantiated its decisison with verses from the Qur’an and relevant sources.89
Criticism of the government or the Diyanet in social media, for example, by an imam, who is a Turkish state official, can lead to an interrogation and the loss of his employment.90 Diyanet personnel, as a state official, have to dress, talk and behave appropriately.91 Imams are transmitters of the Sunni religious majoritarianism of the Turkish state and its religious state bureaucracy.
According to the Diyanet’s contract of employment for imams abroad, their duties are various, reaching from answering religious questions and to organising proselytisation (ihtida’) to organising funerals and weddings. The imam abroad should observe the religious, national, moral, social and cultural structure and its effects on individual and society in his host country, and then write an analysis with ideas for solutions to any problems and send it to the attaché. Further duties may be given by the imam’s superior.92
Vice President Fuat Oktay stressed in a congress for muftis on 3 March 2019 that imams must be close to Turkish citizens, take care of their problems and ‘touch their hearts’, and be in social contact with young and old. The Diyanet underlines the goal that ‘our citizens abroad don’t become assimilated but stay connected to their original identity (öz kimlik)’.93 DİTİB associations are places where the connection with Turkey can be kept alive.94 The national and Islamic sensibilities of people of Turkish origin are strengthened though programmes recalling important historical events, such as Çanakkale, and special religious festivals, such as the birthday of the Prophet.95 It is noteworthy, that in 2021, declared by UNESCO96 to be a “Year of Yunus Emre and Turkish Language”.97 President Erdoğan announced a commemoration and celebration of the anniversary of Yunus Emre, full of activities prepared by the State Presidency Commission for Culture and Arts Politics (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kültür Sanat Politikaları Kurulu).98 The focus would be exclusively on Turkish language, culture and values and seems to leave little room for the language, culture and values of the, for example, German, host country.
Diyanet President Ali Erbaş defends the unity of Muslims and emphasises that the worship places of all Muslims are mosques, saying, ‘Mosques are places of worship for Sunnis and Alevis.’99 However, Alevis do not pray in mosques; their praying and congregation places are called ‘cemevis’, and observe different religious rituals from Sunnis.100 The Diyanet does not support Alevis in acquiring their own places of worship and exerts pressure on them – for example, to follow Sunni rituals.
The Islamist movement became stable in Turkey in the 1970s. After the military coup in 1980, the Islam and Turkish nationalism were increasingly intertwined and a Turkish-Islamic synthesis developed.101 Imams abroad are communicators of majoritarianism, through which not only Sunni Islamic values but also Turkish national values are inculcated.
The Turkish security policies against the Gülen movement are also supported by the Diyanet, as is clear in Friday sermons. On the day commemorating the failed military coup of 15 July 2016, the Friday sermons dealt with the military coup trial of 2016, its martyrs and the unity of the Turkish people. The Diyanet appealed for a united stand with ‘hearts full of love for God and the fatherland’.102 The people were reminded of the alleged treason of the Gülen movement and warned that they are dangerous.103 When it was discovered that Diyanet imams in Germany had spied on members of the Gülen movement, German indignation was widespread.104
The AKP’s majoritarian policies against the Gülen movement are required to be supported by Diyanet imams in Turkey and abroad. The AKP government defines the Gülen movement as both a political and a religious enemy; political majoritarianism goes hand in hand with religious majoritarianism.105
In Diyanet sermons, political messages against the Gülen movement are combined with religious elements from the Qur’an and the Islamic tradition. In short, we may say that Diyanets imams are transmitters of Sunni religious and Turkish cultural and political majoritarianism. In the next section will discuss the expectations that the German ‘majority society’ has of Diyanet imams will be discussed.
4 Diyanet Imams and the German ‘Majority Society’
Diyanet imams, who constitute 40% of all active imams in Germany, work with 694 DİTİB associations.106 They are mostly in the federal states of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia, where the majority of Turks and people with Turkish roots live. The members of DİTİB associations are 95% Turks and people of Turkish origin, but the mosques are also attended by non-Turkish Muslims.107
Their work permits are limited to three–five years108 and 70% of the imams have a five-year employment contract. Their working hours vary between 32 and 60 hours per week, and some of them work more than 61 hours.109
Imams have to meet numerous expectations110 and are under pressure.111 Their main responsibilities are to lead the daily prayers, read the Friday sermon, teach the Qur’an and look after the mosque.112 Mosques abroad are not only places for worship: they also run social and cultural activities, cafés, education courses, supermarkets, tourist agencies, and conference and wedding venues.113 Imams also have social responsibilities and participate in intercultural dialogue meetings.114 This is in line with the Diyanet view that the Islamic religion goes hand in hand with Turkish culture – the Turkish-Islamic synthesis.115
According to Fülling, the German policy regarding Islam involves ‘measures, formats, structures, goals as well as lines of arguments, which are developed by the policies of the Federal Republic and Länder concerning the Islamic religion’.116 Policies regarding Islam are intertwined with integration policies, which leads German government officials to have various expectations of imams.117 Imams are classed as an intersection between the German state and society,118 they are expected support the integration of Muslims into German society.
There is no clear and fitting definition of integration.119 For the German Ministry of the Interior, integration is a long process and includes those who live permanently in Germany. German integration policy aims to provide migrants with opportunities in economic and social matters equal to those of the German population. Migrants are expected know German and to respect and conform to the German constitution.120
The major problem of imams is their lack of knowledge of the German language and culture,121 which prevents them from adequately meeting the expectations made of them. Diyanet imams do not speak German well enough and children and young people of Turkish origin do not speak Turkish well enough for quality dialogue to take place. To break this barrier imams are expected to have a good knowledge of German.122 In the Netherlands, for example, preaching in Dutch is encouraged in order to create an Islam ‘rooted in the Netherlands’.123
Imams in Turkey who wish to go abroad have to finish courses in the language and culture of their future host country. Since 2002, the Diyanet has had a cooperation agreement with the Goethe Institute, a German government institution that is active worldwide in teaching German language and culture.124 It is noteworthy that Turkey founded a similar institute in 2007, the Yunus Emre Institute,125 which is active worldwide in teaching Turkish language and culture. The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung – a political foundation associated with the Christian Democratic Union party (CDU), which is internationally active in spreading the principles of ‘freedom, justice and solidarity’,126 and the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs support courses for Diyanet imams that provide information about the German political system. There have been further courses for imams, such as a course on ‘Imams for Integration’ organized by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and the Goethe Institute.127 Some universities in Germany, such as the University of Osnabrück organise additional training courses for imams on politics and society, pedagogy and language. Osnabrück training aims to increase imams’ interfaith dialogue abilities and improve their communication skills with young people in DİTİB communities.128 In 2019, the Islamkolleg Deutschland was founded to provide theological and practical training for religious personnel and, in 2020, DİTİB opened an education centre for its religious staff.129 However, the extent to which Diyanet imams abroad can support Muslim integration, since they change every five years and hardly know the German language and constitution, so that they themselves are not ‘integrated’ in the sense in which the German government understands it.
The former vice president for integration at the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Dr. Michael Griesbeck, emphasises that imams should inform community members about the German education system, for example, and how families can motivate their children to take up a university education, as well as providing them with useful contacts to help with family problems. Community members may ask imams how to find a job, or what to do about drug problems130 and imams are also expected to provide pastoral care for prisoners and hospital patients.131 Michael Kiefer points out that the expectations of imams are too high and impossible to fulfil.132 He uses the expression ‘multifunctional imam’.133
A solution might be to engage volunteers or professionals in the mosque to support the imam or to change the imam’s role to that of a social worker ‘strongly shaped by religion’.134 In the Islam politics of the German state, imams shall support preventing Islamic terrorism,135 which may be defined as political majoritarianism – see the battle against terrorism by the Diyanet and the Turkish government.
Imams abroad have a university degree and their standard of education is higher than that of the majority of the DİTİB members.136 Imams try to establish religious authority within the DİTİB community.137 However, the additional training referred to above seems not to solve the problem of their lack of knowledge of the language and culture knowledge.138 They need translation to be provided in order to understand German documents139 and the content of meetings. Imams who are going to Germany should take regular courses in German language and culture, and have social skills beyond basic mosque responsibilities.140 Andreas Gorzewski gives an example of the inadequacy of the imams’ knowledge of language and culture. A German visitor went to a DİTİB mosque and asked the imam’s opinion about Salafis. The imam referred to al-salaf al-salihin, the Companions of the Prophet and their successors, and talked about their positive aspects. He did not know about the discussion about Salafis that is current in Germany – that they are a radical movement being under observation from the German Domestic Intelligence Services (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz). His ignorance of current debates meant that the imam gave the impression that DİTİB supports the Salafi movement, although this is not true.141
Imams are obliged by the Diyanet to teach Sunni Islam and Turkish values. Gemici underlines that imams consider their values superior to those of Turks abroad, which leads to problems in their relationships with community members.142 The DİTİB community and executive committee members know the German language and culture better than the imams, having been born in Germany or having lived there for a long time.143 If integration means education, the imams on average are better educated than DİTİB community members and should thus be better integrated, but if integration means knowledge of German, the community members are more integrated into the ‘majority society’ than the imams. The extent to which imams can contribute to the integration of Muslims in Germany is highly questionable.
The DİTİB umbrella organisation supports imam training to meet German government expectations.144 In 2006, the Diyanet started an International Theology Programme to strengthen the knowledge of DİTİB imams abroad about the language and culture of their host country. High school graduates from European countries can apply for a Diyanet scholarship and study Islamic theology in Turkey. The first graduates returned to Germany in 2010 intending to work as DİTİB imams or teacher off Islam.145 In 2019, there were 555 scholarship holders from various countries, the highest number, 292, being from Germany. Up to 2019, 595 had graduated and again the highest number of them, 312, came from Germany.146 The Islamic Theology graduates in Germany must finish imam training before they can be employed by DİTİB.
Students on the International Theology Programme complain that they are given insufficient information about Islam in Western countries and the particular situation of Muslim minorities there.147 It is very important that imams should learn about the plurality in Islam,148 as Muslims in Germany come from different Islamic traditions.149 Beilschmidt refers to a balancing act for DİTİB communties between openness to the ‘majority society’ and concern about the unity of Islam and Muslims.150 As they are Turkish government officials, they are obliged to focus on the Sunni religious, Turkish cultural and political majoritarianism of the Diyanet.
Only the Sunni understanding of Islam is taught at Islamic theology faculties in Turkey; imams do not learn about alternative views within the Islamic spectrum and so they are not able to respond to challenges coming from pluralistic religious views, as is the case in Germany. A major problem for the graduates is unemployment. Vice President Oktay praises the International Theology Programme and concludes that there is need for the Diyanet to provide a concrete programme that will result in employment for its graduates. Graduates have a duty ‘to contribute to the correct understanding of Islam abroad’,151 by which he means the Sunni, Turkish cultural and political majoritarianism of the Diyanet.
It is conspicuous that 70% of the graduates of the International Theology Programme are female. The Diyanet is trying to expand the number of its female staff, but women have fewer employment opportunities.152 It is notable that the Diyanet employs women as religious officials only if they wear a headscarf. Sedide Akbulut, the former Head of the Directorate for Family and Religious Guidance in the Diyanet, said in email correspondence, that ‘it is natural that the women going to serve as personnel in religious matters wear a headscarf’.153 A pluralistic approach to the headscarf, embracing women who wear it and those who do not, is missing. This is in line with the Diyanet’s Sunni majoritarianism paradigm and supports the conservative view of the AKP government about women, which is not compatible with the integration expectations of German government representatives or the German ‘majority society’.
Fülling highlights that the theoretical and political concept of integration measures immigrants by the extent to which they adapt to the ‘majority society’. Tools for measuring this may be economic or social participation in the ‘majority society’.154 There are various expectations of imams concerning integration into the economic and cultural context of the ‘majority society’, while neither ‘integration’ nor ‘majority society’ can be sufficiently clearly defined. The German government implements its Islam policy through imams, and keywords in it are ‘majority’ or ‘majority society’, so we may speak of German majoritarianism, which includes the dimensions religion, culture and politics.
Fülling warns that, in recent years, majority decisions in German Islam- related policies are directed against religious minorities, calling for them to be watched critically.155 The ‘weltanschaulich’ neutral state uses the ‘majority society’ argument to enforce the will of the majority and is not able adequately to protect its minorities.156 The statements and behaviours of political actors should be transparent. Wolfgang Schäuble, for example, used Christian values as a general framework during the German Islam Conference.157 Further studies should analyse the extent to which the German idea of a ‘majority society’ coincides with majoritarianism.
Jonathan Laurence illustrates that a ‘bottom-up’ process, such as educating imams in Europe and the establishment of a ‘European Islam’ is important for the integration of Islam,158 but even then it will be problematic to speak of the integration of Islam, as long as the will and identity of the ‘majority society’ and the concrete expectations of ‘integration’ are not made transparent and discussed critically.
5 Conclusion: Imams between Turkish Majoritarianism and the German ‘Majority Society’
The Diyanet was founded as a state institution to organise religious affairs and is rooted in the Ottoman Sunni Islamic tradition. DİTİB was founded by the Turkish state mainly to protect the national and religious values of the Turks abroad, and Germany plays an important role in the organisation of religious activities of the Diyanet abroad via its imams.
Diyanet imams in Turkey and abroad are expected to preserve Sunni values and the Turkish language and culture, as well as supporting relevant policies. Imams are government officials and cannot defy the instructions of their employer the Diyanet, which can terminate their employment if they do not behave in a manner consistent with the expectations of the Diyanet and the Turkish government. Imams function as communicators of Turkish majoritarianism, including the Sunni religious, Turkish cultural and political dimensions.
Germany has an Islam-related policy in which imams are seen as mediators of integration policies, although ‘integration’ is not clearly defined. The terms ‘majority’ and ‘majority society’ are setting the framework for policies on Islam and integration, although they are not given a precise definition either. Elements of Christian religion and culture are part of the German ‘majority society’. Political expectations in matters such as combating Islamic terrorism (as in Turkey) are also laid upon Diyanet imams.
Diyanet imams are (although not always) caught between the expectations of Turkish majoritarianism and German majoritarianism, as can be seen, for example, in policies regarding the headscarf or the institutionalisation of religion, which have the potential to create conflict. It should be clear that the loyalty of the imams is to the Turkish majoritarianism of their employer, the Diyanet.
The warnings of the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville expressed in his phrase the ‘tyranny of the majority’ are being realised and should be discussed again. Turkish majoritarianism makes hardly any room for minorities such as Kurds and Alevis, while the German concept of a ‘majority society’ seems not to protect minorities such as Muslims sufficiently either. These could be important arguments for rethinking majoritarian national concepts.
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Ibid., 13.
Ibid., 23.
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Ibid.
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Diyanet, “Kuruluş ve tarihi gelişim [Formation and Historical Development]”, 16 March 2016.
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Ibid., 132–3.
Ibid., 128.
Ibid., 77.
Tetik, Mustafa Onur, “The pendulum of majoritarianism: Turkey’s governmental self-identity and Turkish–Egyptian relations”, Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 8/2 (2021), 210–35, pp. 228–9.
Ibid., 213.
Hashas, Mohammed, “The European imam: A nationalized religious authority”, in Imams in Western Europe: Developments, Transformations, and Institutional Challenges, Hashas, Mohammed, Jaap de Ruiter, Jan, and Vinding, Niels Valdemar (eds.) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press: 2018), pp. 79–100, esp. 96.
Sunier, Thijl, “Domesticating Islam: Exploring academic knowledge production on Islam and Muslims in European societies”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 37/6 (2014), 1138–55, p. 1140.
Ibid., 1141.
Ibid., 1139.
Ibid., 1143.
Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and Balz, Michael J., “Taming the imams: European governments and Islamic preachers since 9/11”, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 19/2 (2008), 215–35, p. 216.
Ibid., 220.
Ibid., 224.
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Ibid., 404.
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Ibid., 9–28.
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Ibid., 1176.
Ibid., p. 1175.
Kuru, Ahmet T., Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment: A Global and Historical Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 229.
Ibid., 230.
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Ibid., 25–7.
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Hashas, “European imam”, 96.
Ibid.
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Beilschmidt, Theresa, Gelebter Islam: Eine empirische Studie zu DİTİB-Moscheegemeinden in Deutschland (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2015), pp. 148–9.
Ibid.
Schmid, Hansjörg, “‘I’m just an imam, not Superman’: Imams in Switzerland, between stakeholder objects and self-interpretation”, Journal of Muslims in Europe, 9 (2020), 64–95, p. 65.
Ibid., 78.
Ibid., 68.
Ibid., 82.
Ibid., 85.
Ibid., 84.
Fülling, Hannah, Religion und Integration in der deutschen Islampolitik, Entwicklungen, Analysen und Ausblicke (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2019), p. 361.
Ibid., 408.
Ibid., 442, 459.
Ibid., 448, 459.
Ibid., 437.
Sunier, “Domesticating Islam”, 1143.
Savage, “Europe and Islam”, 42, cited in Haddad and Balz, “Taming the imams”, 229.
E.g. Gemici, “Uluslararası İlahiyat Projesi”; Aslan, Ersan-Akkilic, and Kolb, Imame und Integration.
Fülling, Religion und Integration, 437.
Sunier et al., Diyanet, 55, cited in Sunier, van der Linden, and van de Bovenkamp, “Long arm of the state?”, 407.
Diyanet, “Diyanet, FETÖ elebaşının”.
Bruce, “Imams for the diaspora”, 9.
Diyanet, Kuruluşundan günümüze Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı: Tarihçe-teşkilat-hizmet ve faaliyetler (1924–1997) (Ankara: Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1999), p. 760.
Lord, Religious Politics, 113; Yaşar, Aysun, “Die DİTİB im Spannungsfeld politischer, religiöser und gesellschaftlicher Erwartungen [DİTİB in the area of conflict between political, religious and social expectations]”, in Handbuch der Religionen (Kirchen und andere Glaubensgemeinschaften in Deutschland und im deutschsprachigen Raum), Klöcker, Michael, and Tworuschka, Udo (eds.) (Hohenwarsleben: Westarp, 2020), 1–23, p. 15.
Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu [Religious Affairs High Council], “Hakkımızda [About us]”, accessed 15 December 2021,
Ibid.
Diyanet, “Ayasofya (Hagia Sophia)”, General Directory for Religious Affairs of Diyanet, accessed 28 December 2021,
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Diyanet, “Temsilcilikler (Representations)”, Dış İlişkiler Genel Müdürlüğü [Directorate General of Foreign Affairs], accessed 15 December 2021,
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Şen, Faruk, Saur, Martina, and Halm, Dirk, Euro Islam: Eine Religion etabliert sich in Europa. Stand, Perspektiven, Herausforderungen (Essen: Zentrum für Türkeistudien 2004), p. 18.
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Lord, Religious Politics, 132–3.
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Coştu and Ceyhan, “DİTİB’in din eğitimi faaliyetleri”, 48.
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Reinkowski, Geschichte der Türkei, 173, 178.
Diyanet, “Gün, milletçe kenetlenme ve geleceğimizi inşa etme günüdür [Today is the day of national engagement and building our future]”, Gölmarmara Müftülüğü, 22 July 2016, accessed 23 March 2022,
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Halm, Dirk, et al., Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland. Forschungsbericht 13: Im Auftrag der Deutschen Islam Konferenz (Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2012), p. 430.
Ibid., 431.
Contracts for imams abroad are extended annually, in total for 5 year, and can be cancelled if a problem arises. See Diyanet, “Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı yurt dışı teşkilatında sözleşmeli personel”, 3–6.
Latifoğlu, “Yurt dışında görev yapan din görevlilerinin problemleri”, 8; Halm et al., Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland, 11.
Gemici, “Uluslararası İlahiyat Projesi”, 188.
Latifoğlu, “Yurt dışında görev yapan din görevlilerinin problemleri”, 8; Halm et al., Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland, 11.
Ceylan, Rauf, “Religiöse Orientierungen und Einstellungen türkischer Imame am Beispiel neo-salafitischer, traditionell-konservativer und intellektuell-offensiver Imame”, Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft, 16/2 (2008), 203–23, pp. 207–8; Halm et al., Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland, 433.
Coştu and Ceyhan, “DİTİB’in din eğitimi faaliyetleri”, 46.
Halm et al., Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland, 432–3.
Reinkowski, Geschichte der Türkei, 178.
Fülling, Religion und Integration, 3 (my translation).
Ibid., 30.
Beilschmidt, Gelebter Islam, 181.
Fülling, Religion und Integration, 442, 459.
Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat, “Heimat & Integration”, accessed 23 March 2022,
Halm et al., Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland, 10; Güzel. Din Görevlilerinin Yeterlikleri, s.222; Aslan, Ersan-Akkilic, and Kolb, Imame und Integration, 44; Latifoğlu, “Yurt dışında görev yapan din görevlilerinin problemleri”, 7.
Beilschmidt, Gelebter Islam, 149.
Sunier, van der Linden, and van de Bovenkamp, “Long arm of the state?”, 415.
Goethe Institut, “Hakkımızda [About us]”, Goethe Institut, accessed 28 December 2021,
Yunus Emre Enstitütsü,
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See Tezcan, Levent, “Governmentality, pastoral care and integration”, in Islam and Muslims in Germany, Ala Al-Hamarneh and Jörn Thijlmann (eds.) (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 117–32; Kamp, Melanie, “Prayer leader, counselor, teacher, social worker, and public relations officer: On the roles and functions of imams in Germany”, in Islam and Muslims in Germany, Ala Al-Hamarneh and Jörn Thijlmann (eds.) (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 133–60.
Kiefer, Michael, “Zielsetzung einer Imamausbildung in Deutschland: Vom einfachen Vorbeter zum multifunktionalen Akteur?”, in Imamausbildung in Deutschland: Islamische Theologie im europäischen Kontext, Bülent Ucar (ed.) (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2010), pp. 185–93, esp. 187–8.
Schmid, “‘I’m just an imam’”, 87.
Fülling, Religion und Integration, 448, 459.
Halm et al., Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland, 432.
Ceylan, “Religiöse Orientierungen”, 223; Güzel, Din Görevlilerinin Yeterlikleri, 222.
Yaşar, “Die DİTİB im Spannungsfeld politischer, religiöser und gesellschaftlicher Erwartungen”, 15. Ceylan, Rauf, Cultural Time Lag: Moscheekatechese und islamischer Religionsunterricht im Kontext von Säkularisierung (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2014), p. 434; Latifoğlu, “Yurt dışında görev yapan din görevlilerinin problemleri”, 8.
Ibid., 14.
Gemici, “Uluslararası İlahiyat Projesi”, 195.
Gorzewski, Andreas, Die Türkisch-Islamische Union im Wandel (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015), p. 83.
Gemici, “Uluslararası İlahiyat Projesi”, 195.
Aslan, Ersan-Akkilic, and Kolb, Imame und Integration, 310.
Beilschmidt, Gelebter Islam, 153–4.
Yaşar, Die DİTİB zwischen der Türkei und Deutschland, 131.
Diyanet, Uluslararası İlahiyat Programı: Tanıtım ve Başvuru Kılavuzu [International Theology Program: Introduction and application] (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2019), p. 7.
Bruce, “Imams for the diaspora”, 13.
Ibid., 14.
Halm et al., Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland, 10.
Beilschmidt, Theresa, “Transnationale Bindungen im Wandel”, in Staat und Islam: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven, Uwe Hunger and Nils Johann Schröder (eds.) (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2016), pp. 223–44, esp. 236–37.
Diyanet, “Cumhurbaşkanı Yardımcısı Oktay, 3. İlçe Müftüleri Kongresi’nde konuştu”.
Gemici, “Uluslararası İlahiyat Projesi”, 190.
E-mail correspondence with Sedide Akbulut, Head of the Directorate for Family and Religious Guidance in Diyanet, 18 April 2019.
Yurdakul, Gökce, “Juden und Türken in Deutschland: Integration von Immigranten, politische Repräsentation und Minderheitenrechte”, in Staat und Islam: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven, Uwe Hunger and Nils Johann Schröder (ed.) (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2016), 245–82, p. 252.
Fülling, Religion und Integration, 28.
Ibid., 429.
Ibid., 436.
Laurence, Jonathan, “Die Integration der Muslime und die Entstehung eines europäischen Islam”, in Staat und Islam: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven, Uwe Hunger and Nils Johann Schröder (eds.) (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2016), 313–48, p. 344.