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The Post-Cold War Promises of Third Party Military Interventions: Implications for Core Human and Political Rights

In: Journal of International Peacekeeping
Authors:
Tessa Postmus Student, Faculty of Behavioural Sciences, Political Science Institute, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands

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Arlinda Rrustemi Lecturer/Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, Leiden University, The Hague, Netherlands
Director, Peace Analytics, The Hague, Netherlands

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, third party military interventions are only justified in cases of large-scale human rights violations. However, the number of military interventions did not decrease since 1989. A large-N study is done to measure the effect of third party military interventions since 1989 on core human right practices. It is argued that five years after an intervention takes place, there will be less physical harm to citizens. However, the effect on political rights appears to be diminishing. In addition, to contribute to the discussion as to who should intervene, an analysis about the intervener’s political system is included in this article. The results impose important questions and debates, both about the intentions and effects of foreign troops intervening in a conflict, as the conceptualization and cultural debate with regard to human rights violations.

1 Introduction

“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”1

This quote from the seventh Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Atta Annan, reflects the main issue the international community was facing regarding human rights protection, at the beginning of the 21st century. This challenge represents the norm gap between Article 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. In the first place, the international community should strive towards peace and security, and effective measures should be taken to prevent or remove threats to international peace. Yet, as Article 2 denotes, territorial and equal sovereignty is the basic principle of the Charter. In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (iciss) tried to narrow this norm gap by introducing the idea of state sovereignty as a responsibility. In this sense, sovereignty is seen as a responsibility to protect both outside interferences, and inside population welfare. Importantly, if a state is either unwilling or unable to fulfil these responsibilities, the responsibility shifts from the state to the international community.2 This new rationale was the beginning of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine where outside military interventions are justified in relation to prevention and responsibility to serious violations of humanitarian law and international human rights.

The adoption of the R2P in 2005 was in line with a wider emphasis on human rights protection and human rights purposes within the use of force, since the end of the Cold War.3 However, there is no downward trend in the number of conflicts, civil wars, and military interventions.4 More importantly, military interventions are still one the most frequently used military force types.5 It is important to study the relation between military interventions and human rights practices because it shows whether military interventions improve human rights, being the only legal justification of military intervention, or, as Orford argues, whether the international community has introduced a humanitarianism narrative justifying interventions, but still serve the existing international power and exploitation relations.6 Moreover, current intervention literature is highly focused on single-case studies and the legal permissibility of single interventions, resulting in the lack of empirical research reflecting and linking the basis of intervention justifications and its actual effect.7 In this article, a large-N study will be done to analyze whether military interventions influence human rights practices in the intervened state. The question that will be answered is what is the effect of military interventions on human rights practices in the intervened state since the Cold War?

2 Literature Review

2.1 Importance of Interventions

External intervention in conflicts, although related to as ‘civil’ wars, is a very common type of military involvement and an important study area due to the variety of intensions, roles, incentives, and outcomes.8 There is no consensus on the reasons why states intervene in foreign conflicts. It could be for example because of regime change,9 ethnic ties,10 regional power,11 or material gains. Cunningham argues that states do often have other goals than purely ending the conflict.12 He explains that interveners often seek specific goals in addition to internal fighters, which is making the conflict way more complex. Lounsbery and Pearson add other possible interests of states and other political actors to intervene.13 It could be because of the intervener’s national interests, to protect economic or geopolitical interests or because they want to protect specific trade partners. Furthermore, colonial histories appear to be an important factor in foreign intervention. Former colonizers tend to protect favored parties in former colonies when they are becoming unstable.14 Kathman creates two dimensions in intervener’s interests. He argues that states care about the risk of contamination in the region on the one hand, and the value of the region at risk on the other hand.15 This argument indicates that third party interveners value geopolitical and regional interests the most.

2.2 Humanitarian Intervention and R2P

Despite the varying and largely unknown incentives of states to intervene in civil conflicts, many scholars denote the shift from material and economic motives of intervention towards interventions based on human right violations.16 Since the end of the Cold War, international norms shifted towards securing human rights, which paved the way for the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine. This doctrine sets the norm for the international community to take decisive action in the face of ethnic cleansing, genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.17 Since the adoption of the R2P in 2005, it has been invoked in many UN Security Council resolutions, Human Rights Council Resolutions and General Assembly Resolutions. However, recent literature is far from uncritical towards the practices of R2P. First, there are critical notions from Chinese and East-Asian scholars as they argue that R2P is often used for regime change purposes. For example, the intervention in Libya, which led to the government being overthrown, would be purely based on elevating liberal democracies rather than human rights abuses.18 Moreover, R2P is often purely interpreted as military action, although wider measures of action could protect populations from severe human rights abuses as well.19 Bellamy describes the R2P doctrine as a ‘Trojan horse’ legitimizing unilateral coercive intervention without exact guidelines for intervention.20

2.3 Human Rights

The link between human rights practices and foreign military intervention is important because of the, in theory, humanitarian nature of interventions since the end of the Cold War, as a consequence of the so-called international human rights regime that emerged after 1945. However, this regime simultaneously causes divisions between the perceptions of political figures, governmental bodies, judges, the public, the military, and scholars.21 Technically, the state that has authority over a territory is responsible for the protection of all human rights for its citizens. However, in conflict situations, human rights are subordinate to International Humanitarian Law (ihl). This implicates a shift from the apparent inviolability of the right to life to the right to kill as presumed under ihl.22 The disagreements in courtrooms, political apparatuses and lecture halls emerge exactly because of this ambiguous consequence of applying human rights rules to conflict. Some argue that because of its universality, human rights should unlimitedly apply to every human activity, including conflict. Others argue that the battlefield is an area where human rights are denied in their core nature and should therefore not have a place in conflict rights.23 Whereas the implication of human rights in conflict situations remains debatable, the justification or even obligation of military interventions in conflict are based on violations of international norms, which, since the Cold War, means large-scale violations of human rights.24 The R2P doctrine clearly states that collective action is justified based on preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Regardless of various critiques of R2P, it is argued that nonintervention cannot be a solution because this would mean a shift away from international humanitarian norms.25

2.4 Intervention Effects

As explained, there is no consensus on the incentives of states or political actors to intervene in foreign conflicts. However, the most important question is what the effects of the interventions are, and whether international interventions improve human rights conditions and practices in the intervened state. DeMeritt argues that in delegating death tolls, supportive intervention would be a useful means to prevent the government from killing civilians.26 His conclusion is that international actors are important in limiting civilian slaughter. On the other hand, Peksen argues that both neutral and hostile interventions worsen human rights conditions by an increase in imprisonment, killing and torture.27 However, intervention by an intergovernmental organization does not change human rights conditions. Peksen also focuses on the specific impact on women’s rights and concludes that effects are also dependent on the type of intervention.28 Moreover, the inclusion of foreign actors in civil conflicts makes the conflict complex due to different interests, which tends to lengthen the conflict instead of ending it.29

3 Theoretical Framework

3.1 Definitions

Elbadawi and Sambanis define foreign intervention as a military, economic or mixed form of third-party assistance to either the rebel group or the government in a civil war.30 They view interventions as a strategy in favor of one of the parties involved in conflict. Humanitarian intervention is a form of foreign intervention which can be either military or non-military (e.g. mediation, peacekeeping). Roberts defines this form of intervention as “coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants”.31 Moreover, Holzgrefe defines humanitarian intervention as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied”.32 In this article, military interventions will be the central subjects from which humanitarian interventions are part of. However, recent literature often uses humanitarian interventions, military interventions, and military humanitarian interventions interchangeably, because the legal nature of interventions can only be on humanitarian grounds.33 However, it is not inherently excluded that military interventions may have other intensions than purely human rights violations. The definitions added together highlight the important features of military interventions which are the use or threat of use of force across state borders, initiated by a foreign state or group of states.

Human rights are harder to define since it evolved into a complex and broadly defined concept.34 The UN defines it as “inherent rights to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status”. More specifically, human rights are “universal legal guarantees protecting individuals and groups against actions and omissions that interfere with fundamental freedoms, entitlements and human dignity”.35 The question however is which fundamental freedoms and entitlements are of importance, and which are measurable.

3.2 Framework

To frame the fundamental freedoms and entitlements making human rights measurable, a framework is developed deriving from Risse and Sikkink’s ‘core rights’ concept,36 and the political rights and civil liberties from Richards et al.37 Risse and Sikkink argue that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains too much variety in the type of rights to evaluate progress. Therefore, they formulate central core rights, being the right to life, defined as the right to be free from extrajudicial execution and disappearance, and the freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. Risse and Sikkink do not argue that other rights are not of importance, however, the rights as formulated are mostly seen as universal and institutionalized, without political, ideological, or systematic biases. In this article, these core rights will be used interchangeably with physical integrity rights. Next to the central core rights of Risse and Sikkink, political rights and civil liberties will be incorporated. Herein, rights to travel, freedom of religion, rights to join unions and political participation are included.38 These two dimensions of human rights include the most institutionalized rights, but also show a contradiction in providing basic needs to live according to your own perception and ideology and preventing people from physical harm like the ‘core rights’.

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3.3 Theories

The first important theory in terms of foreign interventions in civil conflicts is Regan’s conflict management theory.39 He argues that outside interventions can be seen as ways to manage the conflict, and should therefore inherently aim to diminish hostilities instead of exacerbating them. In this sense, any form of outside intervention should aim to decrease violence and human rights abuses. Alotabai adds the framework of international law to military interventions by arguing that all interventions need to follow international humanitarian and international human rights law. Therefore, military interventions should aim to promote human rights.40 Seybolt looks at empirical evidence, which is the missing link between the normative debate and real-world outcomes.41 He analyzes 17 different military interventions, which should have the effect of saving lives. He concludes that 9 of them did safe lives and the other 8 had mixed results. Although it may not be a long-term solution to political instability and conflict, military interventions could have a positive impact on human rights conditions by preventing people from death. This narrow conception of the effect of military interventions leads to the first part of the framework focusing on physical integrity like preventing death and torture.

H1.1: Military interventions affect central core human rights practices in the intervened state positively H1.0: Military interventions do not affect central core human rights practices in the intervened state positively

Focusing on political rights and civil liberties, it is highly debated whether military interventions improve human rights in this perspective. Peksen argues that an intervention in favor of the government bolsters its military capacity, however, associated with poor consequences for human right conditions.42 He explains that prior to the intervention, the state in conflict experiences various socioeconomic and political instabilities. Moreover, domestic conflict undermines states authority and, together with an increased military capacity, there is a greater incentive to use repressive tools against civilians. Interventions also undermine pressure impacts from the international community and human rights organizations on states’ human rights conditions. Furthermore, the international community often emphasizes individual rights over collective rights, pushing civil liberty rights to the background.43

H2.1: Military interventions affect political rights and civil liberties in the intervened state negatively H2.0: Military interventions do not affect political rights and civil liberties in the intervened state negatively

Next to the normative and legal debate, it is argued in the literature review that many military interventions have multiple intensions, and therefore may have different intended outcomes.44 Nuruzzaman argues that, although it may be a big concern, human rights violations were not the decisive factors in external engagement in civil conflicts.45 However, Vllasi adds a nuance based on the type of intervener. He argues that military interventions since the Cold War were often done by democratic states, which inherently intended to promote democracy in the country of intervention. Whereas both core human rights and political rights and civil liberties fundamentally belong to the functioning of democracies, these should have been developed during or after the intervention.46 Gleditsch et al. argue that this link between increased democratization and international intervention is analyzed the first years after intervention.47

H3.1: Military interventions by democratic states affect human rights in the intervened state positively H3.0: Military interventions by democratic states do not affect human rights practices in the intervened state positively

4 Methodology

In this article, the aim is to analyze the effect of military interventions on human rights practices in the intervened state. A large-N quantitative method will be used to examine whether, in general, military interventions contribute to better human rights practices. The main datasets used derive from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (ucdp) and the ciri Human Rights Data Project, which will be explained further in the next section. A complex samples general linear model (csglm) procedure will be used to examine whether there is a relationship between the occurrence of interventions and human rights practices, both positively and negatively. A complex sample is used because the regression results are not independent from each other, which demands clustering. The cluster variable in this analysis is country id as the results highly depend on the country in which an intervention is measured. Because clustering reduces precision, a confidence interval of 90% will be adopted.

The dependent variables are core human rights practices and political rights and civil liberties. Both variables need to be continuous. The independent variable is all military interventions in conflicts since the Cold War, which represents a binary variable whether there was military intervention in a certain conflict. For the third hypothesis, an interaction effect will be included in the analysis to measure whether the effect of military interventions on human rights practices depends on the intervener being a democratic or non-democratic state.

4.1 Case Selection

For the analysis, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (ucdp) External Support dataset, specifically the Primary Warring Party Dataset, will be used. This dataset includes all state and non-state actors who gave support to primary warring parties (receivers of support) in conflict from 1945 to 2006. The unit of analysis is whether there was military support, being foreign troops on the ground, in the state in conflict.48 This dataset allows to differentiate between the type of intervention and the different interveners. This information is combined with data from Our World in Data to be able to analyze whether a democratic or non-democratic state intervened.49

Human rights scores derive from the ciri Human Rights Dataset from Cingranelli et al.50 This dataset includes all indicators for both core rights and political rights as explained in the theory section. The first main variable of analysis is the Physical Integrity Rights Index, which is an aggregate score from the torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance indicators. The second main variable is the so-called Empowerment Rights Index, constructed from freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, political participation, and worker’s rights indicators.51 The human rights scores included in the dataset date from five years after the intervention took place, since the effects of rights-related government actions, referred to as human rights practices, pays off over time. The coding of the variables, from which the main variables are constructed, is as follows: (0) Frequent violations, (1) Some violations, (2) No violations. A state needs to have 50 or more violations to be coded as zero, between 0 and 50 to be coded as 1 and no confirmed violations to be coded as 2. Hence, in this case, a higher score implies more government respect for this specific human right.

Since the time-frame focus is from the end of the Cold War onwards, the cases included in the dataset before 1989 will be excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, as will be explained in the operationalization section, multiple cases will be excluded because only specific forms of external support can be seen as foreign military intervention. After this, the total number of cases included is 852.

4.2 Operationalization

The main topics in this research that need to be operationalized are military interventions and human rights.

Military intervention is defined as “the movement of troops or forces of one country into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute”.52 The dataset includes all kinds of external support in conflict, ranging from military troops on the ground to providing intelligence material.53 External interventions will be operationalized as external military troops on the ground provided by the secondary warring party to the primary warring party. It is important to notice that this type of intervention does not need to have a humanitarian motive in the first place, however since the Cold War intervention rationale there is no legal basis to intervene based on other motives. Whether this would be of influence on human rights conditions will be examined in the analysis. If there is external support based on these grounds, the variable is coded as 1, otherwise the value will be 0.

As explained in the theoretical framework, the second construct, human rights, is divided by core rights and political rights. The variable for core rights is the Physical Integrity Rights Index ranging from 0 (no respect for core rights) to 8 (perfect respect for core rights). The indicators measuring this index are disappearance, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture, corresponding with the ‘core rights’ of Risse and Sikkink.54 Political rights and civil liberties are operationalized as empowerment rights and constructed by the indicators freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement, freedom of speech, political participation and freedom of religion. The variable ranges from 0 (no government respect for these rights) to 14 (perfect government respect for political rights). It is important to note that the variables are measured from a human rights practice perspective, meaning that is measures human rights-related actions of a government and all of its agents, such as police or paramilitary forces, and not the general conditions or policies that are adopted concerning human rights.

To analyze whether the intervener is a democratic state, a dummy variable is included. This variable is coded as a dummy variable where a value of 0 means the intervening state is not a democracy and a value of 1 means the intervening state is a democracy during the years of intervention. The data is collected from Our World in Data and recoded from a -10 to 10 scale to a dummy variable.55 There are many interventions done by single states. However, when there are multiple intervening entities, the variable is only coded as a democracy if all intervening states are democracies. For example, in 2006 the United States intervened in a conflict in Uganda together with Sudan. Except the United States being a democracy, the variable is coded as 0 because Sudan did not have a democratic polity. Moreover, intervening entities that cannot be categorized as being democratic or non-democratic like diaspora groups are coded as missing values.

4.3 Control Variables

To ensure that a possible relationship between military interventions and human rights practices are not caused by other constructs, there are several control variables included in the regression analysis. First, a dummy is included whether the intervened state is a democracy. The right to vote and having free and fair elections are fundamental rights and by definition protected by democracies. Furthermore, scholars found a positive correlation between human rights protection and liberal democracy index scores, and a significant effect between democracy scores and the prevention of citizen killings, religion regulation and press censoring.56 Second, it is argued that economic development facilitates democratization, hence, a state’s ability to protect human rights. Gross Domestic Product (gdp) per capita is used as an indicator for economic development, and therefore included as control variable.57 Marson et al.58 argue that ethnic fragmentation leads to social tensions and a harder time for governments to promote economic growth. Moreover, ethnic fragmentation is linked to a higher degree of riots and civil wars, and will therefore be included as control variable. This variable is the ethnic fractionalization index, following the definition of the probability that in a certain country, two randomly drawn individuals are not from the same ethnic group. The index ranges from 0, meaning no ethnic fractionalization, to 1, where each individual belongs to its own ethnic group.59 The fourth control variable that will be included is conflict intensity. This variable can be measured in multiple ways, and can be linked to government functioning and conflict duration. It is expected that high conflict intensity has a negative impact on government functioning and conflict duration, and therefore the ability to protect human rights.60 Conflict intensity is coded as a dummy variable where a value of 0 means a minor conflict, and a value of 1 represents a war.

5 Results

In this article, the effect of military interventions in conflict on human rights practices is tested. The effect on two types of human rights practices is tested, physical integrity (core rights) and political rights and civil liberties. An overview of the variables included in the analysis is shown in table 2. As can be seen, the mean of core human rights practices is 2,02, which is quite low on a scale from 0 to 8. Contrarily, the mean of political rights and civil liberties is 6,57, which is almost the middle score on a scale from 0 to 14.

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Table 3 demonstrates the complex samples general linear regression results for the effect of military interventions on core human rights, respectively excluding and including control variables. Table 4 demonstrates the regression results for the effect of military interventions on political rights and civil liberties. The last section is about the effect of military interventions done by democratic states.

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5.1 Core Human Rights

5.1.1 Assumption Checks

First, the effect of military interventions on core human rights practices will be analyzed, which corresponds to the first expectation that military interventions affect core human rights in the state in conflict positively, meaning that the presence of military troops on the ground are expected to have a positive relationship with the dependent variable, core human rights.

Assumption checks have shown that there is no multicollinearity, the relationship between the dependent and independent variable is linear and the errors are normally distributed. To prevent heteroskedasticity, the log of gdp per capita will be included. In the dataset, 3 outliers are detected. Most outliers are cases where there is a military intervention during an intense conflict (war), while their core human rights score is high. These cases will not be excluded from the analysis because they do not affect the results nor the assumptions. Moreover, removing them decreases the explanatory power of the model.

5.1.2 Results

As can be seen in table 3, model 1, the presence of military troops on the ground in the state in conflict has a positive effect on core human rights. This effect however is not statistically significant with a p value of 0,121. Model 2 shows the regression results with only log gdp per capita included, being a standard variable controlled for. This model shows a significant positive effect of external intervention on core human rights. If there is a third-party military intervention in conflict, core human rights practices will increase with 0,875 on a scale from 0 to 8 over five years. In addition, an increase in the log of gdp per capita means an increase in core human rights practices as well. In this model, however, this effect is statistically insignificant. Model 3 includes all control variables and can give more information about the effect being sure it is not caused by other variables. In this model, the presence of military troops on the ground significantly affects core human rights practice scores positively with 0,725 on a scale from 0 to 8. This means that if there is an intervention in conflict, there will be more government respect for core human rights five years later. The first control variable, gdp per capita shows a negative effect on core human rights practices but is not statistically significant. The effect of conflict intensity on core human rights practices is negative and demonstrates that when a conflict is a war instead of a minor conflict, core human rights practices decrease by 0,437 on a scale from 0 to 8. This effect is significant at the 90% level. Third, when the country in conflict is a democracy, core human rights practices increase by 0,407 compared to non-democracies. However, this effect is not statistically significant. Lastly, there is an insignificant negative effect of more ethnically fractionalized states on core human rights practices.

From these results, the first hypothesis can be confirmed, meaning that there is a significant effect between military interventions and core human rights in the country in conflict, five years after the intervention took place. This means that when states, alliances or organizations decide to intervene military in a conflict, this could, after five years, have a positive effect on the prevention of disappearance, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture by the government.

5.2 Political Rights and Civil Liberties

The effect of military interventions on political rights and civil liberties is tested in the next three models. It is expected that when there is military intervention in a conflict, this will have a negative effect on political rights and civil liberties. This means that when foreign troops are intervening in conflict, government practices on the freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement, freedom of speech, political participation and freedom of religion will be worse after five years, than when there was no military intervention.

5.2.1 Assumption Checks

Assumption checks indicate that there is no multicollinearity because all vif scores are lower than 2. The normal distribution and partial plots show that the association between the dependent and independent variable is linear, and the errors are normally distributed. As with the previous regression, the log of gdp per capita will be included to prevent heteroskedasticity. In the model, 3 outliers are detected. The exclusion of these outliers does not affect the results, however, the scatterplot does show some heteroskedasticity when doing so. Therefore, the outliers will not be excluded from the data.

5.2.2 Results

As can be seen in table 4, model 1, the presence of military troops on the ground in the state in conflict has a negative effect on political rights and civil liberties. This effect indicates a decrease of 1,467 on the 0 to 14 scale of political rights and civil liberties, but is statistically insignificant. When including the log of gdp per capita as first control variable, it can be analyzed that military intervention affects core political rights and civil liberties scores negatively with 1,609 on a 0 to 14 scale. This effect is statistically significant. The first control variable, log gdp per capita shows an insignificant negative effect on political rights and civil liberties. Model 3 includes all control variables and shows a negative effect of military interventions on political rights and civil liberties as well, however, not statistically significant. This means that for model 3, it cannot be said with certainty that there is an effect between these two variables. More upon, this model shows that log gdp per capita and conflict intensity have a significant negative effect on political human rights practices. The dummy for democracy has a coefficient of 5,531, meaning that if the country in conflict is a democracy, the political rights and civil liberties increase by 5,531 on a scale from 0 to 14. This effect is statistically significant as well. The last control variable, ethnic fractionalization is not statistically significant. As can be seen in table 4, the intervened country’s political system has a large influence on the regression results. A fourth model is added to look at the findings without this large impact. In this model, the effect of military interventions on political rights and civil liberties is negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, the effect of log gdp per capita and ethnic fractionalization changes in direction, meaning that these variables have a positive effect on government respect for political rights and civil liberties, unlike model 3. Conflict intensity is still affecting political rights and civil liberties negatively, but becomes insignificant.

From these regression results, it can be said that external intervention in a conflict has, in general, a negative effect on political rights and civil liberties in the state in conflict. However, if all control variables are included, this conclusion cannot be drawn. Yet, the intervened state’s political system has a large impact on the regression outcomes.

5.3 Democracy as Intervener

The third expectation in this article is that military interventions by democracies have a positive effect on both core human rights and political rights and civil liberties. In table 5 the descriptive statistics of the two dependent variables are shown together with the democracy dummy. This expectation is tested by adding an interaction effect to the analysis. In this case, it is tested whether the effect of military interventions on human rights practices is affected by the intervener being a democratic or non-democratic state.

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5.3.1 Assumption Checks

While testing the effect of military interventions on core human rights and political rights and civil liberties including the intervener’s political system variable and the interaction effect, the assumption checks demonstrate that there is no multicollinearity nor heteroskedasticity. Moreover, the association between the dependent and independent variable is linear and the errors are normally distributed. The log of gdp per capita will be included to prevent heteroskedasticity. In the regression analyses testing the effect on core human rights and political rights and civil liberties, respectively there are 1 and 3 outliers detected. One of them will be deleted, an intervention by Senegal in Guinea Bissau in 1999, because it changes the regression results.

5.3.2 Results

As can be seen in table 6, the expected growth of government respect for core human rights increases by 0,498 when a non-democratic country intervenes in conflict. However, this effect is not statistically significant which results in no possible conclusion to draw. Moreover, the effect on core human rights in the intervened country is positive when there is an intervention done by a democracy. This effect has a p-value of 0,390 which makes it insignificant as well. The control variables are all insignificant except the conflict intensity dummy. This effect shows that when a conflict is a war instead of a minor conflict, the government respect for core human rights decreases by 0,524 on a scale from 0 to 8.

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The next findings that will be discussed are the results from the complex sample regression analysis testing the effect of the intervener’s political system on political rights and civil liberties. Table 7, model 1 demonstrates the regression results with the interaction effect included. First, when a non-democratic country intervenes, the effect on government respect for political rights and civil liberties will decrease with 1,083. However, this effect is statistically insignificant with a p-value of 0,275. The effect of a democracy as intervener, on government respect for political rights and civil liberties when there is no intervention, is positive and statistically significant. However, this effect will not theoretically contribute to the discussion since this finding means the effect of interventions when there is no intervention taken place. The effect of a military intervention taking place compared to no intervention taking place by a democracy is -1,55 and the effect when an intervener is a democracy instead of a non-democratic country if an intervention takes place is 1,607. However, both effects are not statistically significant. Model 2 includes log gdp per capita, being a standard variable controlled for. As can be seen, the regression results do not change in direction nor significance compared to model 1. Model 3 includes all variables that need to be controlled for. First, the effect of a military intervention on political rights and civil liberties is negative in this analysis, but not significant. Second, the effect of a democracy as intervener is positive and significant but has no logical theoretical basis as explained. The interaction effect shows that when there is an intervention, and the intervener is a democracy, government respect for political rights and civil liberties decreases by 1,392. If there is an intervention, the effect of a democracy as intervener compared to a non-democratic state is -0,584. However, the interaction effect in this model is insignificant as well. The log gdp per capita and ethnic fractionalization index show an insignificant negative effect. The effect of conflict intensity is negative and significant. This means that when a conflict is a war instead of a minor conflict, government respect for political rights and civil liberties decreases by 0,992. Moreover, if the conflict is taken place in a democratic country, government respect for these rights increases with 5,835 on a scale from 0 to 14.

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6 Discussion

As stated in the introduction, the question that will be answered is what is the effect of military interventions on human rights practices in the intervened state since the Cold War? In the analysis, support is found for the first and partly for the second hypothesis. This means that military interventions have a positive effect on core human rights practices and a negative effect on political rights and civil liberties. In other words, foreign troops intervening in a conflict result five years later in less physical human rights violations. However, under certain circumstances government respect for political rights and civil liberties decreased. The third hypothesis cannot be confirmed based on the analysis results due to lacking significance.

6.1 Core Human Rights

To start with the first hypothesis, the regression analysis shows that practically there is less torture, killing, imprisonment and disappearance by governments observed. As Regan (2002) argues, this is partly the case because military interventions should inherently aim to diminish hostilities. Moreover, as Alotabai and DeMerritt argue, interventions take place within the framework of international humanitarian and international human rights law, which inherently should promote human rights.61 By confirming the first hypothesis, the argument about a shift towards humanitarian incentives of interventions can be reinforced. In this case, the responsibility to protect humans from war crimes is successfully met. However, it is essential to remain critical towards military interventions, being it a violation of the UN Charter Article 2. First, it is important to note that while there is a positive effect on core human rights five years after an intervention took place, this does not mean that intervening parties did not have other interests. Second, the length of conflicts is not included in the analysis. So, while a decline in physical human rights violations can be observed, it could still be the case that the conflict lasts longer due to the increased complexity, as a result of the intervention.62 Lastly, the aggregated physical human rights index does not include specific rights for women. This could be interesting to investigate because, as Peksen argues, military interventions have specific effects on women’s rights depending on the type of intervention, the type of conflicts and the type of rights.63

Cingranelli et al. found that within human rights violations, governments use repressive tools like torture and political imprisonment more often than extrajudicial killing and disappearance.64 Whereas DeMerrit argues that military interventions are important means to prevent government killings, Cingranelli et al. argue that these human rights violations are not inflicted that often because it is not accepted by the general public.65 If public civilians would play this important role, it could be speculated that when a military intervention takes place, these opinions by the ‘general public’ are strengthened which increases pressure on governments to diminish these human rights violations. Moreover, during military interventions the international community also increases its pressure on governments which mostly results in pressure to diminish individual human rights violations.66

6.2 Political Rights and Civil Liberties

The second hypothesis, military interventions affect political rights and civil liberties negatively in the intervened state, cannot completely be confirmed nor rejected. The negative effect military interventions have on political rights and civil liberties could arise because on the one hand interventions supporting the government result in governments having greater military capacities and thus more tools to oppress civilians. On the other hand, when these interventions are not in support of the government, it can have undermining effects on the current regime, which increases the government’s incentive to use repressive instruments.67 Moreover, whereas military interventions increase pressure from the international community on governments to improve human rights conditions, improvements can only be observed with physical human rights. It can be speculated that this argument works opposite of political rights. Governments can more easily curb political rights and freedoms unseen, while the jailing and killing of civilians will not go unnoticed. It would be important to know which intervention tactics enable or force governments to limit political rights and civil liberties and adapt intervention programs according to this information. In case intervention strategies can be linked to certain human rights outcomes, this would help to solve the accountability problem which arises after the effects of military interventions loom.

The negative effect on political rights and civil liberties could also have other causes. From table 4, model 3 and 4, it can be said that the effect on political rights and civil liberties highly depends on the domestic political system. In this case, it would be interesting to differentiate more political systems than only democratic and non-democratic to get insights in specific effects depending on the domestic polity. Furthermore, this finding can be linked to the human rights debate between the East and the West. There are many critiques on human rights conceptualizations by Western democracies, since they ignore many East Asian and African traditions.68 Like Bell69 argues, rights to political liberty conflict with East Asian cultural factors and especially the Confucian tradition. From this point of view, it is not surprising that the intervened state’s political system has such an important influence on political rights and civil liberties, because they are simply not applicable to many non-democratic states.

6.3 The Intervener’s Political System

The third and last hypothesis cannot be confirmed in this analysis. Therefore, it cannot be concluded whether interventions by democratic states improve or worsen both core political rights and political rights and civil liberties. There are different methodological reasons why there is no effect found. First, the total number of cases that are counted as interventions by a democracy is very low. Furthermore, in various cases there are multiple countries involved in which one of them is not a democracy. Also, there are more cases where there was no intervention and more non-democratic countries present in the dataset. The number of interventions done by non-democracies is therefore over representative. The effect of the intervener being a democracy on political rights and civil liberties is statistically significant. However, this effect does not contribute theoretically to the research since this means that there is an effect when the intervener is a democracy when there is no intervention.

Despite these results, it is important to understand the effect of the intervener’s political system. The importance lies within the benefits and simultaneously the critiques on intervening democratic states. On the one hand, democratic states will promote human rights because it inherently belongs to their political system.70 On the other hand, this could be intended and understood as regime change, which should not be an incentive of military interventions.71 Especially the interventions in Libya in 2011 and Côte d’Ivoire in 2004 are criticized due to its debatable intentions. However, as Bellamy and McLoughlin72 argue, it would be naïve to completely reject the association between humanitarian protection and regime change. Protecting human rights should of course never be used to achieve regime change, however, regime change may be necessary to protect civilians from their own government.

6.4 Concluding Remarks and Implications

Altogether, military interventions do have a positive effect on core human rights practices and could pressure governments to diminish torture, killing, imprisonment and disappearance. However, it would be important to examine more in depth the effect on women’s rights since they are not included in this analysis. In addition, different intervention strategies could have different effects on protecting human rights, which should be researched to enable intervening entities, and especially the UN Security Council, to construct and legitimize certain intervention strategies based on a high chance of its positive effects on human rights. The effect of military interventions on political rights and civil liberties should be examined more extensively, considering different political systems, possible oppression tools, and its effect on state authority. Lastly, the political system of the intervener could affect human rights practices positively and negatively. It is important to research this effect more in depth and prevent the use of humanitarian protection to impose regime change. Overall, the conceptualization of human rights remains debatable and not always applicable to non-democratic regimes. Even though there are multiple conceptualizations and human rights are an intensively discussed topic, it is important to incorporate more research from wider, non-Western perspectives to limit conflicting cultural debates.

7 Conclusion

The number of military interventions in conflicts has not decreased in recent decades. However, whether these interventions have a positive effect on human rights, as insinuated by the shift to a humanitarian discourse of military interventions and the adoption of the R2P, remains debatable. This article shows that in general, five years after an intervention took place, government respect for core human rights improved. This means that there are less government killings, torture, prison sentences, and disappearances. From this perspective, one could argue that the post-Cold War promises are fulfilled. However, the effect on empowerment rights like freedom of speech, religion, movement, and the ability to vote in free and fair elections cannot be confirmed as positive. These specific human rights are even less respected than before the military intervention, if the intervened state’s political system is not taken into account. The importance of the political system lies within the democratic nature of respecting both physical and political human rights. Nevertheless, the conceptualization and measuring of human rights perspectives needs a more culturally sensitive debate to not automatically disregard non-Western regimes.

Based on this research, one could argue in favor of foreign intervention in conflict when the intervention could save numbers of lives. However, more examination is needed to understand which tactics do not pressure governments to increase their oppression strategies. Additionally, it should be taken into account that political rights and civil liberties have a chance of receiving less respect from the domestic regime. This challenge incorporates important discussions about the accountability of a possible decline in human rights practices, in the face of preventing large scale human rights violations.

Biographical Notes

Tessa Postmus is a student in the Msc programme International Politics at Leiden University. She holds a bachelor’s degree in international Relations and Organisations and finished the Masters International Politics, both at Leiden University. During the bachelor she conducted research in Indonesia with respect to sustainability issues. The masters will be finished with specialization in the fields of geopolitics, human rights and international conflict. After this masters she worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an intern at the Advisory Council on International Affairs, the advisory body for government and parliament. She has worked on advisory reports in the fields of international peace and security, European cooperation, and human rights. Her research interests are international conflict and violence, geopolitics, human rights practices and issues, and international peace and security.

Arlinda Rrustemi is a Lecturer/Assistant Professor at Leiden University for ma and ba programmes on Politics and International Organizations and a Director of Peace Analytics. She holds a ba (cum laude) in Liberal Arts and an ll.m. degree in Public International Law from Utrecht University. Arlinda finalised a doctoral degree in the interdisciplinary research of history, law and politics called ‘State-Building through Life Stories: Incorporating Local Perspectives’, supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (nwo). She has been on exchanges at FreeUniversity of Brussels, New York University, and Central European University. She has previously worked as a Strategic Analyst and a Senior sa at the Hague Center for Strategic Studies, and as a Special Advisor to Columbia University. She has been active in several ngo s and io s: the Youth Initiative for Human Rights (yihr) in Kosovo, the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (icty), the International Criminal Court (icc) and at various Ministries in the Republic of Kosovo. Her comparative work focuses geographically on Europe, the Sahel region and the Middle East. Her research interests are in international security (geopolitics, conflict/violence, polarization and resilience, artificial intelligence), ii) state/peace building (transitional justice, and diplomacy), and iii) international law (humanitarian intervention, human rights, accountability of international organisations). The lifestories approach, uncovering the subaltern/citizens perspectives, is used in her work for both research and societal impact. The latter is implemented through strategic communications with lifestories. Her research employs mixed methods, quantitative data for understanding trends and qualitative data for understanding in depth new phenomena.

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