Temporal Externalism: A Taxonomy, an Articulation, and a Defence
In: Journal of the Philosophy of HistoryAbstract
I argue that the semantic content of thoughts and the linguistic meaning of expressions are things with a history in the sense that they can be made fully intelligible only from the point of view of the future. I defend this position by articulating a version of a view known in the philosophy of language as temporal externalism. Temporal externalism about content is the view that the content of a subject’s thoughts and utterances at a time t depends on features of the linguistic practices of her community after t. There are two different ways in which temporal externalism can be developed. First, one can take it to be the view according to which the meaning of an expression is given by the whole pattern of use, including future ones, of that expression. Alternatively, one can interpret temporal externalism as the view that the meaning of a speaker’s utterance is determined by the norms that govern or constrain her linguistic behaviour. These norms, which may be instituted at a later date, place their authoritative stamp upon prior conduct. I show that the first version of temporal externalism faces severe objections from which the second version is immune. I also provide a defence of this second position through an extensive discussion of some thought experiments.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
Brandom Robert B. Making it explicit. Reasoning, representing & discursive commitment 1994 Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press
-
Brown Jessica ‘Against temporal externalism’ Analysis 2000 60 178 188
-
Burge Tyler ‘Individualism and the Mental’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1979 4 1 73 121
-
Burge Tyler ‘Individualism and Psychology’ The Philosophical Review 1986 95 1 3 45
-
Donnellan Keith Ginet C. & Shoemaker S. ‘Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind Terms’ Knowledge and Mind 1983 New York, NY Oxford University Press 84 104
-
Ebbs Gary ‘The very idea of sameness of extension across time’ American Philosophical Quarterly 2000 37 245 268
-
Jackman Henry ‘We live forwards but understand backwards: Linguistic practices and future behaviour’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 1999 80 157 177
-
Jackman Henry ‘Temporal Externalism, Use and Meaning’ 2006 1 14 draft [available at http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/TE_and_Use.pdf].
-
Kripke Saul A. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition 1982 Oxford Blackwell
-
Lance Mark Norris ‘The world Made Flesh: Towards a neo-Sellarsian View of Concepts, Analysis, and Understanding’ Acta Analytica 2000 15 117 135
-
Lance Mark Norris & Hawthorne John ‘From a Normative Point of View’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 1990 71 28 46
-
Lance Mark Norris & O’Leary Hawthorne John The Grammar of Meaning 1997 Cambridge Cambridge University Press
-
Putnam Hilary Mind, Language, and Reality. Philosophical Papers 1979 Vol. 2 Cambridge Cambridge University Press
-
Rouse Joseph ‘Social Practices and Normativity’ Philosophy of the Social Sciences 2007a 37 1 46 56
-
Rouse Joseph Turner S. P. & Risjord M. W. ‘Practice Theory’ Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology 2007b Amsterdam and London North Holland 499 540
-
Rouse Joseph ‘Temporal Externalism and the Normativity of Linguistic Practice’ Journal of the Philosophy of History 2014 8 1 20 38
-
Stoneham Tom ‘Temporal Externalism’ Philosophical Papers 2003 32 97 107
-
Tanesini Alessandra ‘Bringing about the Normative Past’ American Philosophical Quarterly 2006 43 191 206
-
Waismann Friedrich Flew A. ‘Verifiability’ Essays on Logic and Language 1968 Oxford Blackwell 117 144
-
Wilson Mark ‘Predicate Meets Property’ The Philosophical Review 1982 91 549 589
-
9
I owe the point to Ebbs (2000) who uses it to make a different but related argument.
-
11
Jackman (1999) appears to vacillate between the two versions. In his (2006), however, he develops a non-reductive naturalist account of meaning akin to sophisticated dispositionalist approaches to rule-following.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 301 | 59 | 3 |
| Full Text Views | 210 | 8 | 2 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 75 | 20 | 6 |
Temporal Externalism: A Taxonomy, an Articulation, and a Defence
In: Journal of the Philosophy of HistoryAbstract
I argue that the semantic content of thoughts and the linguistic meaning of expressions are things with a history in the sense that they can be made fully intelligible only from the point of view of the future. I defend this position by articulating a version of a view known in the philosophy of language as temporal externalism. Temporal externalism about content is the view that the content of a subject’s thoughts and utterances at a time t depends on features of the linguistic practices of her community after t. There are two different ways in which temporal externalism can be developed. First, one can take it to be the view according to which the meaning of an expression is given by the whole pattern of use, including future ones, of that expression. Alternatively, one can interpret temporal externalism as the view that the meaning of a speaker’s utterance is determined by the norms that govern or constrain her linguistic behaviour. These norms, which may be instituted at a later date, place their authoritative stamp upon prior conduct. I show that the first version of temporal externalism faces severe objections from which the second version is immune. I also provide a defence of this second position through an extensive discussion of some thought experiments.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 301 | 59 | 3 |
| Full Text Views | 210 | 8 | 2 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 75 | 20 | 6 |