1.1 Determinism

Let us first see how Muller understands the term ‘determinism.’ It seems clear that he is using the word to mean absolute necessity. For example:

If determinism is taken to mean that there is no contingency in the world order such that human acts and effects, as willed by individual human beings, could not have been otherwise (or in view of resident potencies could not have been otherwise), then Reformed thought is not determinist.⁸

Absolute necessity would amount to what Muller describes here as determinist. There is no contingency. Human actions could in no sense be otherwise. Elsewhere, Muller more clearly identifies determinism with absolute necessity:

There is a long line of argumentation that has identified Calvin as a strict determinist, usually with reference to human willing, on the assumption that the divine decree imposes absolute necessity on all events and actions in the world order.⁹

We see here the linkage between the word ‘determinist’ and the words ‘absolute necessity.’ I think it is clear that by determinism Muller means absolute necessity.

Instead of affirming absolute necessity or determinism Muller concludes that the Reformed Orthodox affirmed hypothetical necessity:

This necessity, however, is consistently identified as a “necessity of infallibility” or a “necessity of certainty” in relation to the contingent order and the actuality of the order defined typically as a necessity of the consequence rather than as a necessity of the consequent thing. As Bucanus indicated, a distinction must be made between “absolute necessity” and “necessity of the consequence” or “by hypothesis [ex hypothesi],” the former identifying “those things the opposites of which are simply impossible according to the nature of the cause or subject” and the latter identifying instances when, an antecedent cause being granted, the effect must follow, but in such a way that “their causes either might not have been, or might be altered.” Bucanus goes on to apply this logical understanding to the divine decree: “Those things are necessary that God has decreed or brought about by reason of the immutability of the divine decree: nonetheless what God has most freely done, that is [done] from eternity, he could either have refrained from decreeing or decreed otherwise.”¹⁰

The Reformed Orthodox distinguished between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity. An absolute necessity makes opposites “simply impossible.”¹¹ Hypothetical necessity is not like this because it could have been otherwise. When applied to the decree, there is a necessity, but given God’s freedom, it could have been otherwise. Passages like this make it clear why Muller does not want to label the Reformed Orthodox determinists.

He is certainly correct that they were not determinists in the sense of affirming absolute necessity. However, the contemporary sense of this term need not have this meaning. Contemporary philosophers use the word ‘determinism’ to mean conditional or hypothetical necessity. For example, Robert Kane’s introduction to the topic of free will defines ‘determinism’ as follows,

Determinism is thus a kind of necessity, but it is a conditional necessity. A determined event does not have to occur, no matter what else happens (it need not be absolutely necessary). But it must occur when the determining conditions have occurred.¹²

This definition is borne out by two recent scholarly books on theological determinism: Heath White’s book Fate and Free Will: A Defense of Theological Determinism and Peter Furlong’s book The Challenges of Divine Determinism: A Philosophical Analysis.¹³ These works understand determinism along the lines of conditional necessity. White writes:

Determinism is a form of conditional necessity; given these facts or events over here, some other fact or event over there must be the case or must occur. The “must” can come in different flavors, depending on the type of determinism in view, but for our purposes, it is a “must” of metaphysical necessity.¹⁴

White clearly understands determinism as conditional necessity, not absolute necessity.

Furlong follows White in his understanding of determinism.¹⁵ Furlong and White follow Kane in their understanding of ‘determinism’ as hypothetical necessity. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says that this is the dominant sense for compatibilists:

Spinoza’s Ethics (1677[1992]) is an important departure from the above dialectic. He endorses a strong form of necessitarianism in which everything is categorically necessary as opposed to the conditional necessity embraced by most compatibilists, and he contends that there is no room in such a world for divine or creaturely free will.¹⁶

Historically, compatibilists embraced conditional necessity as opposed to absolute necessity. This means that they did not understand ‘determinism’ to mean absolute necessity as Muller does.

In light of what we have seen, it is clear that ‘determinism’ need not mean absolute necessity. This means that Muller’s claim that the Reformed Orthodox were not determinists is correct in the sense of absolute necessity. However, he is incorrect in the sense of determinism as hypothetical necessity. As we saw, the Reformed orthodox clearly affirm hypothetical necessity. For example, Turretin writes:

The providence of God neither takes away the contingency of things (because it always remains indifferent with respect to the second cause, what becomes necessary by providence with respect to the first cause); nor overthrows the liberty of the will (because the hypothetical necessity of the decree brings no coaction to the will, but permits it to exercise its own movements most freely, although inevitably); nor does away with the use of means (because the certainty of the end does not take away, but supposes the necessity of the means) … nor does it abolish the relation of punishment and rewards because the necessity which providence brings is not absolute, physical and compulsory (which does not destroy liberty), but relative (from hypothesis of the decree of immutability, which indeed renders man dependent and accountable (hypeuthynon), but always leaves him rational and free, and so worthy of reward or punishment in good and evil deeds).¹⁷

In the italicized portions of this quote, we see that Turretin affirms the hypothetical necessity of the decree and providence. Thus, he is a determinist in that sense. This is also the case with the rest of the Reformed Orthodox. There is no anachronism in calling them determinists. This is because the Reformed Orthodox and contemporary determinists share the concept of hypothetical necessity.

At this point it may be helpful to follow up on a point that White made concerning different types of determinism. These different types of determinism will give rise to different types of compatibilism. Since determinism is understood as hypothetical necessity, various types of views can fall under the category of determinism. I want to give two brief examples as illustrations. First, consider naturalistic determinism. This is the view that the laws of physics and the state of the universe at any given time determines or hypothetically necessitates everything that follows. Clearly the Reformed Orthodox were not determinists in this sense. The Reformed Orthodox were trinitarian theists, not metaphysical naturalists. Second, consider theological determinism. This is the view that God’s decree, determines or hypothetically necessitates whatsoever comes to pass. Clearly the Reformed Orthodox were determinists in this sense.

Thus, we see that two metaphysically different types of determinism can be fairly called ‘determinism’ because they share the concept of hypothetical necessity. All events are determined or hypothetically necessitated either by the laws of physics and the state of the universe at a given time or by God. This means that the Reformed Orthodox were determinists because they affirmed that God hypothetically necessitates all events including human free actions. Some historians have reached the same conclusion. Aza Goudriaan writes,

Voetius thus clearly endorses what could be called the theological determinism of Reformed theology or, in the formulation of Norman S. Fiering, ‘the divine determinism of the Protestants’: everything is ultimately determined by God and thus necessary with a ‘not absolute, intrinsic, but only hypothetical, extrinsic, and respective necessity.’¹⁸

Therefore, it is not anachronistic to apply the term ‘determinist,’ understood as hypothetical necessity, to the Reformed Orthodox. It describes their position accurately.

1.2 Compatibilism

In addition to rejecting the label ‘determinist’ Muller also rejects the label ‘compatibilist’ as an accurate description of the Reformed Orthodox:

In rejecting both a determinist or compatibilist and a libertarian reading of Reformed orthodox thought, the authors of Reformed Thought on Freedom and I have consistently indicated that the early modern Reformed understood divine determination to be compatible with human freedom and accordingly stand in a long line of thinkers reaching back to Augustine.¹⁹

Muller rejects that the word ‘determinist’ applies to the Reformed Orthodox because he uses the word differently than contemporary philosophers. We will see that this is also the case with his use of the word ‘compatibilism.’ In order to see this, I need to examine the way this term is used by those working in the field of free will and moral responsibility.

One standard reference work defines compatibilism as “the thesis that it is metaphysically possible that determinism is true and some person has free will.”²⁰ Compatibilism merely affirms that it is possible for determinism to be true and for humans to have free will. Recall that by determinism philosophers just mean conditional or hypothetical necessity. On this definition of compatibilism, to be a compatibilist is merely to affirm that hypothetical necessity is compatible with free will. We have already shown that the Reformed Orthodox affirm this. Therefore, they are compatibilists in this sense.

One example of Muller’s use of ‘compatibilism’ comes from the end of his book Divine Will and Human Choice. There he provides some rather vague conceptions of compatibilism and then uses these conceptions to reject the idea that the Reformed Orthodox were compatibilists:

If compatibilism is taken to mean not only that the determination of all human acts and human freedom are epistemically compatible but also that this compatibility rules out genuine liberty of contradiction and liberty of contrariety in human choosing such that a choice at any given moment (given both divine and human freedom) could be otherwise, then Reformed orthodoxy were not compatibilist.²¹

This is a very ill-defined understanding of compatibilism. It contrasts with the clear manner in which contemporary philosophers use the term. It also shows that Muller’s understanding of compatibilism differs from philosophers working in the field of free will and moral responsibility. Contemporary philosophers understand compatibilism as the thesis that determinism (understood as hypothetical necessity) is compatible with free will and moral responsibility.²²

We could try to rehabilitate Muller’s objection. Perhaps he could be understood not as giving a definition of compatibilism, but as describing an implication of compatibilism. The implication would be that compatibilism implies that human choices could not be otherwise. This, however, would be a mistake. There are various senses in which an agent’s choice could be otherwise.²³ One such sense is exactly the sense Muller attributes to the Reformed Orthodox. Given hypothetical necessity, human choices could have been otherwise. But Muller continues with a another understanding of compatibilism:

If, further, compatibilism is taken to mean the ontic (as well as epistemic) compatibility of the divine determination of all things with the freedom of the will, but not with freedom of choice understood as freedom of contradiction and contrariety, the Reformed orthodox were not compatibilist.²⁴

Notice again how this understanding of compatibilism differs from how philosophers define it. There is nothing in the definition of compatibilism that rules out what Muller calls freedom of contradiction and freedom of contrariety. If determinism is understood as hypothetical necessity, then compatibilism does not rule this out. He continues:

If however, compatibilism were taken to mean that the divine determination of all things is ontically as well as epistemically compatible with freedom of contradiction and contrariety, with the intellect understood as self-determining in its identification of objects, then the Reformed orthodox can be identified as compatibilist—but this would set an older Reformed compatibilism quite apart from classical and modern philosophical understandings of the compatibilist position where something, whether in the past or the present context, in addition to the intellect’s judgement must (sic) be different and serve as a prior cause of that judgement.²⁵

This is another ill-defined conception of compatibilism. We will see later in this essay that compatibilism need not rule these things out.

My purpose for taking us through these passages is to show that Muller does not use the word ‘compatibilism’ as commonly defined by philosophers. His understanding is vague and does not reference standard dictionaries, encyclopedias, introductions, or other literature by those working in the field. I think that this lack of clarity and lack of reference to the literature of those working in the field is a weakness in his work. It causes him to reject the label ‘compatibilism’ based on a misunderstanding of compatibilism.

That the Reformed Orthodox were clearly compatibilists is illustrated by Voetius:

Now these authors claim indifference of the free potency to both components not only in the divided sense, but also in the compound sense, which implies a contradiction in terms. Likewise, they ask regarding the essence (quidditas) and integrity of a free nature for a twofold immunity, that is from coaction and from necessity, and indeed not only from intrinsic, absolute and natural necessity (to which we agree), but also from extrinsic, hypothetical necessity, which we deny. Thus, we need to deal with two issues: We have to investigate the concept of the essence (quidditas) of freedom, and we have to demonstrate its compatibility with necessity.²⁶

The last line makes Voetius’s compatibilism explicit. He is demonstrating that freedom is compatible with hypothetical necessity. This is exactly the compatibilist thesis.

Some historians have argued the same. Aza Goudriaan, for example, observes that “Voetius, Van Mastricht, and Driessen all represent what in modern terminology has been termed ‘soft determinism’ or ‘compatibilism,’ by claiming ‘that freedom and determinism are compatible with each other, and thus the truth of determinism does not eliminate freedom.’ ”²⁷ Therefore, it is not anachronistic to label the Reformed Orthodox as compatibilists. It describes their position accurately.

2.1 Genuine Alternativity and Multiple Potencies

Muller states that if compatibilism denies genuine or true alternativity (or genuine liberty of contradiction and contrariety), understood as a simultaneity of potencies (or multiple potencies) in the divided sense, then the Reformed Orthodox were not compatibilists. In order to see this more clearly, we need to piece together a few passages from his works. For example:

If compatibilism is taken to mean not only that the determination of all human acts and human freedom are epistemically compatible but also that this compatibility rules out genuine liberty of contradiction and liberty of contrariety in human choosing such that a choice at any given moment (given both divine and human freedom) could be otherwise, then Reformed orthodoxy were not compatibilist.²⁸

Muller states that if compatibilism rules out genuine liberty of contradiction and contrariety so that a human action could not be otherwise at any given moment, then the Reformed Orthodox were not compatibilists.

The liberty of contradiction is the liberty to do A or not-A.²⁹ The liberty of contrariety is the liberty to do A or B or C, etc.³⁰ These types of liberty are genuine if given any moment, the human choice could have been otherwise. As we will see, these genuine liberties are understood as a simultaneity of potencies (or multiple potencies) in the divided sense. It is the presence of these in the agent that give the agent true or genuine alternativity.

In another place he understands this genuine liberty of contradiction and contrariety as synchronic contingency or simultaneity of potencies (or multiple potencies). He also refers to this as true or genuine alternativity.

Clearly, Twisse argues a case for synchronic or simultaneous contingency (understood as a simultaneity of potencies)—but it bears examination as to how his argument reflects precisely what is claimed for synchronic contingency, namely, “that for one moment of time, there is a true alternative for the state of affairs that actually occurs”?³¹

Here Muller equates synchronic or simultaneous contingency with simultaneity of potencies. He further understands this simultaneity of potencies as their being a true alternative for the state of affairs that actually occurs. True alternativity is understood as simultaneity of potencies. As he explains it:

The answer to the question rests on the definition of a “true alternative.” Elsewhere, in defense of Perkins against Arminius, Twisse notes the accusation that Reformed theology held the removal of freedom when God moves the will—as if the Reformed held that the will is incapable of not moving or acting when it is moved by God. He responds on the contrary, “that the human will in the very moment that it is moved by God, is able to move otherwise,” when the statement is understood in sensu diviso. Twisse, then, does hold that in the very particular sense identified as “divided,” there is a genuine alternative to the actualized possibility in the very moment of actualization. The issue that he is addressing, however, is that although the will as such is sufficient to act apart from the divine concurrence, it requires the divine concurrence as the ultimate source of motion in the very same moment that it is able to move or not move.³²

A true or genuine alternative is understood in the divided sense. In this divided sense, there is a “genuine alternative to the actualized possibility in the very moment of actualization.”³³ And he continues to explain how,

There is, therefore also a sense—namely, the composite sense—in which there can be no alternative in the moment of actualization to the effect or state of affairs that actually occurs. There is no denial here of the law of non-contradiction.³⁴

Muller also identifies a sense in which there is not a true alternative. It is in the composite sense.

A genuine alternative is understood as a simultaneity of potencies (multiple potencies) in the divided sense, not in the composite sense. We need to unpack these terms to see more clearly what Muller is saying.

Muller understands simultaneity of potencies (or multiple potencies) as follows:

Simultaneity of power or potency; as distinguished from a potentia simultatis, a power or potency of simultaneity. In scholastic analyses of free choice, the rational agent is understood to have a simultas potentiae, a simultaneity of potency to more than one effect, in contrast to purely physical or brute agents, which have potency to one effect only. Thus a rational agent, simultaneously, has the potency of choosing either A or not-A … The rational agent, then, is able in the divided sense (sensus divisus) to choose either A or not-A but incapable of doing so in the composite sense (sensus compositus, q.v.).³⁵

There are a few things to see from this definition. First, a simultaneity of potency is a power. A potency is just another word for what we call powers or abilities. Second, it is a power of a rational agent. A rational agent has the power to do more than one thing. In contrast, those without a simultaneity of potency are “purely physical or brute agents.”³⁶ These agents have the power to do only one thing. Third, this simultaneity of potency is in the divided sense, not the composite sense. Thus, we should turn to defining those terms.

Muller understands the composite sense in contrast to the divided sense as follows:

Sensus compositus: composite or compound sense. The term has two applications. (1) A logical application, as distinguished from the divided or isolated sense (sensus divisus). In the composite sense (in sensu composito), a subject is understood in necessary connection with or as conditioned by its predicates or attributes; in the divided sense (in sensu diviso), the subject is understood in a hypothetical or contingent relationship to its predicates or attributes.³⁷

The Reformed Orthodox apply this to the agent without the requisites for action in place (the divided sense) and the agent with the requisites for action in place (the composite sense). Turretin states:

Hence it is evident that it is not here concerning indifference in the first act or in the divided sense, as to a simultaneity of power, which is called passive and objective (to wit, whether the will considered absolutely from its natural constitution, the requisites for action being withdrawn, is determinable to various objects and holds itself indifferently towards them).³⁸

Here we see that the divided sense considers the will absolutely, with the requisites for action being withdrawn. The composite sense is different:

But concerning indifference in the second act and in the compound sense (as to simultaneity of power called active and subjective)—whether the will (all requisites for action being posited, for example, the decree of God and his concourse; the judgement of the practical intellect, etc.) is always so indifferent and undetermined that it can act or not act. This our opponents pretend in order that its own liberty may be left to the will. We deny it.³⁹

The compound or composite sense is considering the will with the requisites for action in place. Those requisites are such things as God’s decree, God’s concursus, the last judgement of the intellect, etc.

This would mean that a true or genuine alternative would be a simultaneity of potencies (or multiple potencies) in the divided sense (without the requisites for action in place). It would be to consider the agent in himself, apart from the requisites for action. In order for compatibilism to deny genuine alternativity, it would have to deny all this conceptually, not linguistically. It would have to deny that the agent, in the abstract, did not have more than one power or ability to do things. Muller asserts that if compatibilism denies this, then the Reformed Orthodox were not compatibilists.

Does contemporary compatibilism deny this? The way to answer this question is not by looking to see if modern compatibilists use the same terms as the Reformed Orthodox. In this sense, clearly, compatibilists do not speak in terms of “the divided sense” or “simultaneity of potencies.” The way to do this is by examining the underlying concepts to see if there is conceptual identity or compatibility. Applied to the contemporary compatibilist we would ask, “Do they affirm a power or ability to do various things (simultaneity of potencies) in the agent himself (divided sense)?” I think the answer is clearly yes.

Earlier I mentioned that different types of determinism give rise to different types of compatibilism. Naturalistic determinism gives rise to naturalistic compatibilism. Theological determinism gives rise to theological compatibilism. When we look at naturalistic compatibilism, we can see parallels. On this view, freedom is compatible with physical determinism. Physical determinism is understood as the laws of physics combined with the state of the universe at time t₁ causally determine everything in the future. As we have seen, determinism is understood as hypothetical necessity. On this view, the laws of physics and the state of the universe at t₁ hypothetically necessitate an agent’s action at t₂.

Given this, let us look to parallels with the divided and composite sense distinction. The divided sense is viewing the agent in himself without the requisites for action being in place. Those requisites are things like the decree and providence. The composite sense is the agent viewed with the requisites for action in place. This is to view the agent in relation to the decree and providence. The naturalistic compatibilist does the same thing. He can view the agent in himself, apart from the laws of physics and the state of the universe at t₁ (divided sense). He can also view the agent in relation to the laws of physics and the state of the universe at t₁ (composite sense). Contemporary philosophers would view the former as the agent in all possible worlds in which he exists. Contemporary philosophers would view the latter as the agent in the actual world or actual sequence. I think this parallel is clear.

The question now becomes, “Do contemporary compatibilists affirm a power or ability to do otherwise in the divided sense or in all the possible worlds in which the agent exists?” The answer is clearly yes. The exact analysis of what a power or ability is remains in debate. However, no compatibilist denies that the agent could have done other than what he did in the actual world in some other possible world. For example, if an agent A did x in W₁, the actual world, it is affirmed that he could have done not-x in W₂ (liberty of contradiction) or A in W₃, B in W₄, C in W₅ (liberty of contrariety). In other words, the agent possesses the ability to do multiple other things in the divided sense or in all the other possible worlds in which he exists.

This kind of power or ability is often referred to as a general power or ability to do otherwise. The exact analysis of this ability is debated. It could be a conditional analysis or a dispositional analysis, etc. Nonetheless, these are all analyses of a general ability to do otherwise in the other possible worlds in which the agent exists (divided sense).⁴⁰

When we compare the underlying concepts between the Reformed Orthodox and contemporary compatibilists, we see that there is conceptual identity on this question of genuine alternativity in terms of multiple potencies in the divided sense. We saw this with naturalistic compatibilism, but the same is true of theological compatibilism. Therefore, many contemporary compatibilists affirm the underlying concepts in what Muller calls genuine alternativity or multiple potencies. A simultaneity of potencies or multiple potencies is what contemporary compatibilists call a general ability or power.

2.2 The Will Can Reject the Judgement of the Intellect

In a more recent work, Muller states that the Reformed orthodox were not compatibilists because they taught that the will could reject the judgment of the intellect:

What Perkins and Reformed writers like Ursinus, Pareus, Trelcatius Sr., and Bucanus do not hold is that the necessity of the will following the intellective operation involves a determination of the will to accept the object presented by the intellect. Once the intellect has determined the object of willing, there remains the ability of the will to choose or refuse the object or even to will an alternative: as distinct from the somewhat later definitions we have seen in Weemes and Reynolds, Perkins and this group of relative contemporaries take a clearly voluntaristic path. The recent identifications of the Reformed position as compatibilist so focus on the necessary determination by the intellect, without carefully inquiring into the nature of that necessity or the sense of “follow,” that they fail to account for multiple potencies of the will clearly indicated by the reference to liberty of contradiction, liberty of contrariety. In other words, in the voluntaristic form of the theory held by many of the early orthodox writers, the necessity of following the deliberative act is not such that it impedes or radically determines the will—it is the necessity that the will be provided with an object or objects in order for it to engage in the exercise of electing, rejecting. Or suspending its act. The will may either choose or reject the object or objects, having both a liberty of contradiction (simply nilling) and of contrariety (willing “another thing of the contrarie”). The final determination to one effect is the free act of will, free even from a determination by the intellect.⁴¹

In this passage, Muller identifies compatibilism as the idea that the intellect determines the will. He argues that the Reformed Orthodox did not hold this position. Rather, they held that, the will has multiple potencies indicated by the liberty of contradiction and the liberty of contrariety. In this way, the Reformed Orthodox were more voluntaristic in their view. Muller’s exegetical conclusion is that “[t]he final determination to one effect is the free act of will, free even from a determination by the intellect.”⁴² It is alleged that the Reformed Orthodox were not compatibilists because they taught that the will can reject the judgement of the intellect. Allegedly, compatibilism does not teach this.

In response, recall that I do not wish to dispute Muller’s exegetical conclusions. This is not to suggest that they cannot be disputed. However, I wish to grant him this conclusion and evaluate it through the lens of compatibilism. I want to show how this exegetical conclusion is still consistent with compatibilism. Recall that compatibilism is the thesis that determinism (understood as hypothetical necessity) is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. Recall also that the Reformed Orthodox affirmed that God’s decree and providence hypothetically necessitate whatsoever comes to pass, including the will. This means that the will is free and hypothetically necessitated by the decree and providence. This is compatibilism regardless of whether or not the will can reject the judgement of the intellect.

2.3 Primary/Secondary Causality and Two Tier Universe

Another exegetical conclusion Muller reaches is that the Reformed Orthodox held to a primary/secondary causality distinction and a two-tiered universe:

Arguably, the modern understandings of both compatibilism and libertarianism operate without a significant distinction of primary and secondary causality, without a clear understanding of divine concurrence and without the assumption, intrinsic to the notion of an ontologically and causally two-tiered universe, that divine and human causality are, taken together, the necessary and sufficient conditions for free acts of the human will.⁴³

Muller thinks that the Reformed Orthodox were not compatibilists because modern compatibilists do not affirm a primary/secondary causality distinction. In response, this again shows a different understanding of compatibilism. Compatibilism is merely the thesis that determinism (understood as hypothetical necessity) is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. Compatibilists affirm various metaphysical commitments depending on the type of compatibilism. For example, the primary/secondary causality distinction may be denied by compatibilists who are naturalists, but it need not be denied by compatibilists who are theists. This shows that as a thesis compatibilism is neutral towards this distinction. Whether it is affirmed or denied is the result of our metaphysical commitments, not compatibilism per se.

Theistic compatibilism, especially in the Reformed variety, affirms this distinction. It is the result of their metaphysical commitment to the creator/creature distinction. God is the primary cause and man is the secondary cause. The compatibilist thesis comes in when it is affirmed that primary causality is compatible with secondary causality.

Muller also objects that compatibilism does not affirm a two-tiered universe. I think my comments above substantially address this issue. In short, compatibilism is a thesis that determinism (understood as hypothetical necessity) is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. A compatibilist who is a naturalist would deny the two-tiered universe. A compatibilist who was a theist would affirm the two-tiered universe. The compatibilist thesis would be evident in the affirmation that the first tier is compatible with the second tier. Muller has confused particular metaphysical issues (primary/secondary causation and two-tiered universe) with compatibilism. Compatibilism is not a thesis about those issues.

2.4 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

Finally, Muller objects that the Reformed Orthodox are not compatibilists because compatibilists do not affirm “that divine and human causality are, taken together, the necessary and sufficient conditions for free acts of the human will.”⁴⁴ In another place he writes:

The divine willing is necessary but in itself insufficient to explain events in the temporal order—and even so, finite efficiencies are necessary but in themselves insufficient to explain the same events; taken together the divine willing and the finite causality are necessary and sufficient. Helm, by the way, expresses difficulty with such a construction.⁴⁵

In response, first, we need to remind ourselves of the compatibilist thesis. It is merely the thesis that determinism (understood as hypothetical necessity) is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. It says nothing about whether or not divine willing and the finite causality are necessary and sufficient. Muller is again confusing the compatibilist thesis with specific metaphysical commitments.

Second, a compatibilist who was a naturalist would obviously reject this, but why would a compatibilist who is a theist reject this? Muller does not say. Many would agree with this, especially those working in the Reformed tradition. This would be one formulation of it: let W stand for God’s willing, let H stand for human causality and let X stand for a particular human action. A compatibilist would affirm that “[i]n some world where God decreed X, X obtains by means of W and H.”

The first thing to see is that this is a statement of theological determinism. The decree is the sufficient condition for X. If this were to be denied, then a possible result would be that “[i]n some world where God decreed X, not-X obtained.” The Reformed Orthodox would not affirm that it is possible for God to decree X and not-X obtain.

Second, in Reformed theology, the decree is actualized by means of God’s providence. Third, God providentially brings about human actions by means of concurrence. Concurrence is the joint working of God’s causality and man’s causality to produce a human action. Thus, we see that X is providentially brought about by means of concurrence or W and H. This analysis is clearly compatibilist.