"No Equals in Wrong?" The Issue of Equality in a State of Illegality

Some Thoughts to Encourage Discussion

In: The Journal of World Investment & Trade
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  • 1 1Ref. jur. (Marburg); LL.M. (Sheffield); Research Fellow, Lecturer and Doctoral Candidate, Eberhard-Karls-University, Tübingen, Germany, Faculty of Law. His research is mainly directed towards the European and International Legal Framework on Foreign Investment. Thc author thanks Professor Nettesheim and Professor Wälde, Dr Gutbrod, Mr Kurtz, Mr Sliwiok, and the Working Committee of the Research Assistants in Public Law at the University of Tübingen, School of Law, for helpful comments on earlier drafts, as well as Ms Lawler and Ms Oberer for their technical support. The article was partially presented as a paper at the European Public Law Summer School 2006 at "Villa Vigoni-Centro Italo-Tedesco", Italy. The usual disclaimers apply. The author may be contacted at: ‹st.hi@gmx.de›.

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  • 1 Cj for some examplcs taken from the realities of developing countries: Max Gutbrod and Steffen Hindelang, Extemalization of Eljective Legal Protection against lndirect Expropriation-Call the Legal Order of Developillg Countries Live up to the Standards Reguired by International Investment Agreements? A DisenchantinA Comparative Analysis, 7 ].W.I.T. 1 (Fcbruary 2006), 59 et seq. 2 NAFTA Arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules (2006), International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexiran States, Final Award; available at: International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States, Separate Opinion of T.W. Wälde; available at: Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa (CemsA) (U.S. A.) v. United Mexican States, Award, Case No. ARi3(AF)/99/1; available at: , last visited 10 May 2006, paras. 173 et seq. In Feldman, the issue of equality in a statc of illegality was also present but unfortunately not discussed. The circumstances which are ofinterest for our topic can be summarised as follows: "No cigarette reseller-exporter (the Claimant [Feldman], Poblano Group member or otherwise) could legally have qualified for thc IEP, [taxl rebates, since none under the facts established in this case would have been able to obtain thc nccessary invoices stating the tax amounts scparately." [Feldman, Award, para. 176]. Thus, both, the foreign as well as the domestic investor were in brcach of (national) law. Given that only Feldman's Company was asked to pay back the already granted tax rebatc, although also domestic investors had received those [Feldman, Award, para. 173], it becomes reasonably clear that enforcement actions were not conducted free of prejudice. Note also NAFTA Arbitration under Uncitral Rules (2000), United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Canada, Statement of Claims; available at: , last visited: 31 July 2006. 3 Thunderbird v. Mexico (Final Award), para. 73.

  • 47hunderbirdv.Mexico (Separate Opinion), paras. 107 et seq. A question different from the one considered here is the issue of whether a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) is meant to help parties which arc legally unskilful in local court proceedings to receive an additional chance in an international investment arbitration just because they are foreign. 5 See, for the ongoing debate in international investment law on how to determine "likeness", e.g. Thornas Walde, Comments ort the Discipline of "National Treatment" in International Investment Law: Boosting Good Governance versus Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space? (unpublished manuscript, envisaged for publication in TDM); Jürgen Kurtz, National! Treatment, Foreign Investment and Regulatory Autotiomy: The Search jor Protectionism or Snmething More? in: Hague Academy of International Law (ed.), Report o(the 2004 Research Seminar on International Investment Law, (The Hague: forthcoming 2006). For an account of "likeness" in the WTO legal order, see, c.g. Jonell B. Goco, Non-Discrirninatiort, "Ir'keness", and Market Definition in World Trade Organisation jurisprudence, 40 Journal of World Trade (2006), 315 et seq.; Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring, WTO Dispute Settlement arid Competition Law: Viewsfrom the Perspective of the Appellate Body :c Experience, 26 Fordham Int'l L. J. (2002-2003), 1505 et seq. 6 This article, due to its scope, considers only those mles which entitle the adtninistration of the host State to interfere with existing rights of an investor but not those rules which entitle it to distribute additional rights or benefits. For an account of how national legal orders of transition countries, the Russian legal order serves as a point of reference, deahng-or better, failing to deal-with the issue of discrimination; see Max Gutbrod and Steffen Hindelang, The Missing Bits-To Be Substituted by Biis? The Inadequacy of Russian Law in regard to the Effective Protection oJForeign Investors, 77ie Role ofBiTs and the Need for Reform Comingfrom within the State, 1 SIAR (2006:2), forthcoming. 8 CJ-e.g. M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 233 et seq.; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), National Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreemcnts (New York and Geneva: Ut�lc'rnt�, 1999).

  • 'Cfe.g. Organisation for Economic Co-opcration and Developntent (OECD), Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in Intemational Investment Law, Working Papers on International Investment (No. 2004/2) (Paris: OECD, 2004). 10 "At most, it can be that the concept connotes the principle of non-discrimination and proponionality in the treatment of foreign investors." Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Laib, Ist ed. (Oxford [et al.]: Blackwell, 1995), 625; see also, e.g. Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment. Treaties, 39 International Lawyer (2005), 87 et seq.; Ad Hoc Arbitration (The Netherlands-Republic of Poland BIT) (2005), Ellreko B. V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award and Separate Opinion of J. Rajski, available at: ,http://ita.Iaw.uvic.ca/docuinents/Fureko-PartiaL�\wardandDissentingOpinion.pdf�, last visited 12 March 2006, paras. 233 et see.; OECD, Fair and Equitable Trealment Standard in International Investment Lauf, Working Papers on International Investment (No. 2004/3) (Paris: OECD, 2004), 25 et seq.; UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNf:TAn Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements (New York and Geneva: Unctad, 1999); WTO Secretariat, Note: Non-Discrimination, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and National Treatment, WT/Wgti/W/118 (4 June 2002), 10. Suggesting otherwise: NAFTA Arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules (2005), Metlianex Corporation v. United States of America, Final Award; available at: et seq.; NAFTA Arbitration under UNCiTt�AL Rules (2003), Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Amended Statement of Defence of Respondent United States of America, , last visited: 1 August 2006, paras. 366 et seq.; the latter with further references. For a morc introductory account of the issue of non-discrimination in customary international law, refer to lan Brownlie, Principles of Public International Laib, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003), 546 et seq.; Warwick McKean, Eguality and Discrimination under International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). t "[A]ny taking that is pursuant to discriminatory or arbitrary action, or any action that is without legitimate justification, is considered to be contrary to the non-discrimination requirement, even absent any singling-out on the basis of nationality. This includes prohibition of discrimination with regard to due process and payment of compensation requirements. Morcovcr, the non-discrimination requirement demands that governmental measures, procedures and practices bc non-discriminatory even in the treatment of members of the same group of aliens." UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, Vol. 1/3 (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2004), 239. 12 See supra, footnote 5 for further references on the ongoing debate in international investment law on how to determine "likeness". t3 The term "mle" is to bc understood in this article as a legally binding provision and is synonymous with law.

  • r;Tlurnderbirdv.Mexico (Separate Opinion), para. 107. 15 Again, in this article, I refer to the principle of non-discrimination as contained in international investment treaties. "' Wälde states in his Separate Opinion in Thunderbird that discriminatory elements, although not giving rise to a violation of the no7-discrimination requirement, reinforce legitimate expectations [Fliiitiderl)ird v. Mexico (Separate Opinion), paras. 6, 102 et seq.; see also Thomas Walde, Investment Arbitration wider the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of Key Issues, 1 TnrvM (2004), available at: , last visited: 9 May 2006]. The authority cited in support of his Statement [cf Eureko, Partial Award and Separate Opinion, para. 242] was, however, within a context ofiiidirect expropriation in which thc host State authorities deprived the foreign investor ofbenefits derived from contractual rights. Not at issuc at this stage was thc fair and equitable treatment standard. This issue was discussed earlicr on in Eureko, Partial Award and Separate Opinion, paras. 233 et seg. Wälde's application ofthe fair and equitable treatment standard is to bejudged in the context of his cautious approach to the compensation issue; please note Thunderbird v. Mexico (Separate Opinion), paras. 1 19 et seq. See, in respect of the good faith principle as the underlying element of the fair and equitable treatment standard: Otcn, Fnir and Equitnble 1 ientment, 38 et seq.; for the role of, legitimate expectations within the process of establishing indirect expropriation, see OECD. "Iiidirect Exproprintion" and the "Right to R�etilate in International Investmerrt Law, Working Papiers on International Investment (No. 2004/4) (Paris: OECD. 2004), 19; note also: Todd Grierson Weiler, Of Wateifowl and Unilied Standards of Regulatory Treatment, (unpublished manuscript); Yas Banifatemi, "Expropriation" and "Fair and Equitnble Treatment" Standards in Recent IcsiD Jurisprudence, 7? International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (IcsiD): Tnking the Stock after 40 Years (21r28 April 2006), Frankfurt/Main (Germany), available at: , last visited: 20 May 2006. 17 Oecu, Fair and Equitnble Treatment, 25 et seq.; see also: Richard H. Kreindler, Fair and Equitable Treatment- A Comparative International Law Approach, International Investment Law at a Crossroads (3 March 2006), Harvard Law School, International Law Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts, available at: http://www.shearnian.coiii/fdes/ Ptiblication/fbba03e4-5af6-47f')-912a-25caf4dab342/Presentatioii/PubhcationAttachment/61 230f72-1 58d-41d7- bdd2-285d888c27b7/Harvard-Vortrag%20RK.pdfr, last visited: 10 March 2006; Richard Happ, Aktuelle Rechtsprechung der Icsin-Schicdsgerichte, Die neue Zeitschrift für Schiedsverfahren (SchiedsVZ) (Gennan Arbitration Journal) (2005), 21 et seq., 22 et seq.

  • zu IcsiD (2003), The Loewen Group, Inr. and Raymond L. Lvemen v. United `States of America, Case No. ARn(AF)/9R/3, Award; availablc at: chttp://www.investmentclaims.com/decisious/Loewen-US-Award-26Jun2003.pd6, last visited: 6 May 2006, para. 140. See also zum, footnote 5. 19 As in respect of the first step of the non-discrimination test, the determination of "likeiiess", there is also no general understanding in regard to the construction of the second step, which is closely interrelated with the first one. For referenccs, see supra, footnote 5. 20 In this respect, it is worth notiug that "discrimination requircs a certain matcriality and weight" (Thunderbird v. Mexica (Separate Opinion), para. 106]. =c C%Wälde, National Treatment; Weiler, Of Waterfoml. zz Feldman, Award, paras. 176 et seq.; see also l7rnnderbird v. Mexico (Separate Opinion), paras. 4, 105. z3 The majority of arbitrators in 77itinderijird examined the facts against the background of duc diligence requirements and burden of proof rules derived from commercial arbitration. See, c.g. 7hunderbird v. Mexico (Final Award), paras. 164 et seq. For the Separate Opinion criticising the aforementioned approach, see 7lnrnderbird v. Mexiro (Separate Opinion), para. 4.

  • 21 Gutbrod and Hindelang, Externalizatiorr of Effective Legal Protection a,Qainst Indirect Expropriation, 70. Of the same opinion but not diffcrcntiating: Zeyad A. AlQurashi, Indirect Exproprintion in the Field of Petroleum, 5 ].W.I.T. 6 (December 2004), 897 er seq., 914. Notion applied in IcsiD (2001), Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, liic. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic r f Estonia, Award, Case No. ARB/99/2; available at: �www.ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ Gcmn-Award.pdβ, last visited: 2 January 2006. See also T7iiiiiderbird v. Mexico (Separate Opinion), para. 106; UM v. Canada, Statement of Claims. -e I.e. the administration has no choice but to pronounce the legal consequence exactly defined by the rule if thc requirements for its application arc fulfilled (mandatory nile). See infra, footnote 39, for an example of how to define whether a given rules provides for discrction or is mandatory. 2(, For example, this ability could be constrained by the Statute of limitations. 21 An opinon which alleges that the principle oflegality demands the immediatc proper execution ofthe law in question implies that the principle of legality takes precedence over the principle of equality (non- discrimination). This can be doubted. The principle oflegality carries inherently the demand of proper application of the principle of equality. See Christoph Kölbel, Gleichheit "im Unrecht", Verwaltungswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen (Köln: Hcymann, 1998), 43 and 83. 2R Volkmar Götz, Über die "Gleichheit im Unrecht in: O. Bachof and others (eds.), Verwaltungsrecht zwischen Freiheit, Teilhabe und Bindung: Festgabe aus Anlass des 25jährigen Bestehens des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts, (1978), 245 er seq., 254; see also Peter Ingram, Procedural Equality, in: S. Guest and A. Milne (eds.), Equality and Discrimination: Essays in Freedom andJustice: Eleventh Annual Conference of the United Kinqdom Association.for Legal and Social Philosophy 1984, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie; Beiheft 21, (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag- Wicsbaden-GmbH, 1985), 39 ei seg., 46: "[A] full application ofthe rulc requires a full cquality in treatment under it."; note Patrick Day, Prncedural Equality: A Reply to Mr. Ingram, in: S. Guest and A. Milne (eds.), Equality atid Discrimination: Essays in Freedom and Justice: Eleventh Annual Confermce of the United Kingdom Association for Legal and Social Philosophy 1984, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie; Beiheft 21, (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag- Wiesbaden-GmbH, 1985), 51 et seq.

  • 21 Kölbel, Gleichheit "im Unrecht", 80 et seg., especially p. 141 (English summary). See in this respect also the recent judgmcnt of the Bundesverfassungsgeridn (Germany Federal Constitutional Court) on the unconstitutionality of the taxation of speculation gains in cases in which the tax authorities are unable to execute then respective laws equally against all tax payers: Bundesverfassungsgerirht (BVerfG) (German Federal Constitutional Court) (2004), 2 BvL 17/02 (Re Taxation ofSpeculation Gains); available at: (http://www.bundcsverfassungsgericht.de/ entscheidungen/ls20040309_2bvI001702.htmb, last visited: 10 May 2006. 3U Some footnotes added and some others omitted. Gutbrod and Hindelang, Extemalization ofeffective Legal Protection against Indirect Expropriation, 71. '� [In German] "Gleichheit". z [In German "Gleichstelluyq". 33 The administration of a host State shall investigate if there are other cases which demand equal treatment. s3 An exception to this rulc, for example, might bc made in situations in which immediate action is necessary in order to avert damage to life and limb. 35 This includes, of course, also the possibility of bringing a "test case" to court with the intention that a success motivates bringing other cases to trial. In other words, this "test case" must be part of a uniform conceptual approach. 3� Kölbel, Gleichheit "im Unrecht", 82 and 90. 3� lt would be entitled to compensation not because the host State has treated the foreign investor uncqually in comparison to its competitors which find thentselves placed in an illegal situation but because the State failed generally to apply the given mle equally and enforced it arbitrarily against the foreign investor. 3ö Discretion is usually granted in order to prevent over-regulation and to provide the administration with a necessary degree of flexibility, practicability and efficiency in its conduct.

  • 3y Developed legal orders offer a wealth of doctrine in this respect. For example, in German administrative law thc concepts of "Frnie-�seii" and "unbestimmter Rechtsbegriff' are applied by the legislature to grant discretion to the administration. A rulr consists of an i�part (elements to be firlfilletl) and a then part (legal consequences). A rule may contain elements which leave a wide margin of appreciation ("ijoibestiin?�it(� Reclit-�b�e4ffe"; discretion in the if part of rule) and/or grant the administration a choice in respect of the detemlination of the legal consequences ("Ermessen"; discretion in the then part of the rule). Turning to the t�part ofa a rule, some elements ofa rule are clear from the outset (e.g. "8.00 pm" or "within the tcrritory of thc Federal Republic of Gemuny") and sole are less clear. Among the latter group, somc elements right be clearly deterntinable by interpretation through the courts. But there are also such elements which are left for determination by the administration. Whether somebody is "reliable", or whether something constituted an "important motivation" or a "case of hardship", are decisions where usually not just one answer would be correct. In such situations, the administration enjoys "discretion" in determining whether an elcment is fulfilled or not. Discretion can also be found in the then part of a rule, i.e. in respect of the choice of legal consequences ("Ermessen"). There are rules which-if the elements of the rule are firlfilled-grant thc administration a choice in respect of the determination of the legal consequences, and there are some which do not. In the fomier case, one can speak about "non-confined administration" ("nicht geblmdene Venl'altllllg"). In such a situation, a rule is usually phrased: "If the elements of (A), (B) and (C) are fulfilled, then the administration can choose From the consequences (1 ), (2) or (3)." Here, the administration cannot choose whether it acts or not but only how it acts. Ifa rule is drafted as follows, thc administration can choose whether to act or not: "If the elements of (A), (B) and (C) are fulfilled, then the administration can take action (1)"; or "If the elements of (A), (B) and (C) are fulfilled, then the administration should take action (1)". In contrast to the aforen �entioned, the administration lacks any discretion ("confined administration") if a rule spells out that: "If the elements of (A), (B) and (C) are fulfilled, then the administration shall (must) take action (1)." Here, no discretion is granted in respect of the enforcement of the legal consequence and, so to say, enforcement of the rule is mandatory. g' Steffen Detterbeck, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht mit Verwaltungsprnzessrecht, 2nd cd. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004), rnargin numbers 311 et seq.; for a common-law perspective, see, for example., William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Lau" 8th ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000), 315 et seq.; Paul Craig, Grounds for Judicial Review: Substantive Control over Discretion, in David Feldman (ed.), English Public Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), 831 et seq. 4in Cf Icsid (2003), Aar Group v. United States ofAmerica, Award, Case No. Arb(AF)/00/1, available at: Mondev International v. Llnited States of America, Award, AI<.H(AF)/99/2, available at: . last visited: 10 May 2006, para. 136.; both in the context ofAnicle 1105(1) NAFTA. 41 The actual legal rcquircments such a system has to meet on a national level are not decisive for our findings. The rcquirements presumed in this article are only used for illustrative purposes, especially to demonstrate the applicability of thr non-discrirnination principle contained in intemational invcstmcnt agreements (Itns) to such a system. An intcresting question, which awaits a systematic analysis, would be the one ofwhat impact Ims, especially the fair and equitable treatment Standard contained therein, have on such system. One could even go further, and ask whether, if thc respective national legal order does not have this kind of system, Ims implicitly require the dcvelopment of such a system in order for a national administration not to be exposed to thc charge of arbitrariness. For a comparative analysis of the legal requircments stipulated in European and Anglo-Arnerican national legal ordcrs concenling the discharge of discretion, rcfcr to Albert Bleckmann, Ermessensfehlerlehre: Völker- und Europarecht, vergleichendes Verwaltungsrecht (Cologne: Hcymann, 1997), 97 et seq. (if pan of a rule), 171 et seq. (then part of a rulc), with further references. As a general obscrvation, while the French and German legal orders seem to lay down radrer high standards for the exercise of the discretion found in the if part of nie, the Belgian, Italian and Anglo-American legal orders tend to leave the exercise thereof to the political instances f1 Bleckmann,, Erniessetisfuhlerlehre, 166 et seq., 119.] Thc exercise of the discretion contained in the then part of rufe is undcr all abovetnentioned legal orders subject to a tighter control by the judiciary than that of the discretion found in thc if part of a rule. However, thc intensity of review and, consequently, the standards to which the exercise of the discretion found in the then part of a rule must conform varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction [cf Bleckmann, Ermessensfehlerlehre, 171 et seq., 263]. fi...roIO/l",f", ..."c.ot;.,..uul.....,. """,'VI ""/I"£>\

  • Morcover, for our purposes, it is also not decisive which "types" of discretion, i.e. for example, discretion found in the i/'and the then part of a rule, or interpretative, application and enforcement discretion, or for whatever categorisation the respective national legal order might havc provided, is exercised. This article does not look at the question of how to deal with the irnproper exercise of discretion by national authorities in a single instance in international investment arbitration but at the question of how to deal with thc large-scale ill-application of a rule "in all but one case". For this purpose, it is only important that all investors, foreign and domestic alike, are placed in the same illegal situation due to an exercise of discretion which is decmed illegal. The grounds contained in thc respective national legal order which led to this state of illegality are not our concern. In this respect, the "type" of discretion ultimately exercised unlawfully is of "second importance" because the investor does not complain that the discretionary powers are exercised improperly in his case but that those powers are only exercised properly in his case. ;2 Cf Kölbel, Gleichheit "im IJnrecht", 61. 1. a3 Cf id. ar Legal consequence. 'S Here especially under the consideration of the principle of non-discrimination and absence of arbitrariness. 36 Here especially under consideration of the teloc of the rule. ;� The attribute of "foreign origin" is not a valid criterion in our example.

  • 48 Suppose there is no ground of justification for the deviation from the system. 49 These Standards, as mcntioned above, are defined by the respective national legal order.

  • 50 This is Only truc if no other valid criterion can be found which could be used instead of the invalid one and which is also met by those who met the old criterion. For our purposes, we assume there is no such valid criterion. 5� Kölbel, Gleichheit "im Unrecht", 64. Sz This can even lead to the situation that the foreign investor is temporarily in a better position than national investors. This would be, for example, the case if a rule were to provide for legal conscqucnces in the form of fines between € 5.00 and € 5,000.00 but does not foresee a possibility of no fine at all. Consider that a fine of € 5.00 is illegally (due to use of invalid criteria in the process of discharging discretion) imposed upon all national investors. The foreign investor is legally charged with a fine of € 500.00. If now the rule should temporarily not be applied to the foreign investor, it would (temporarily) not be fined at all.

  • 5?Thunderbirdv.Mexico (Separate Opinion), para. 106.

  • Bundesverfassungsgericht (Bverfg) (German Federal Constitutional Court) (2004), 2 Bvl 17/02 (Re Taxation of Speculation Gains); available at: ‹http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/ entscheidungen/1s20040309_2bv1001702.html›, last visited: 10 May 2006.

  • ICSID (2003), ADF Group v. United States of America, Award, Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1; available at: ‹http://www.investimentclaims.com/decisions/ADF-US-Award-9jan2003.pdf›, last visited: 10 May 2006.

  • ICSID (2001), Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic of Estonia, Award, Case No. ARB/99/2; available at: ‹http://www.ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Genin-Award.pdf›, last visited: 2 January 2006.

  • AlQurashi, Zeyad A., Indirect Expropriation in the Field of Petroleum, 5 J.W.I.T. 6 (Dccember 2004), 897 et seq.

  • Bachof, Otto and others (eds.), Verwaltungsrecht zwischen Freiheit, Teilhabe und Bindung: Festgabe aus Anlass des 25 jährigen Bestehens des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts, (1978).

  • Banifatemi, Yas, "Expropriation" and "Fair and Equitable Treatment" Standards in Recent ICSID Jurisprudence, The International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Taking the Stock after 40 Years (26-28 April 2006), Frankfurt/Main (Gennany); available at: ‹http://www.merton-zentrum.uni-frankfurt.de/Archiv/Sommersemester_2006/Tagungsbeitraege/ Banifatemi_Paper.pdf›, last visited: 20 May 2006.

  • Bleckmann, Albert, Ermessensfehlerlehre: Völker- und Europarecht, Vergleichendes Verwaltungsrecht (Cologne: Hcymann, 1997).

  • Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003).

  • Paul Craig, Grounds for Judicial Review: Substantive Control over Discretion, in Feldman, op. cit., 831 et seq.

  • Day, Patrick, Procedural Equality: A Reply to Mr. Ingram, in: Guest and Milne (eds.), op. cit., 51 et seq.

  • Detterbeck, Steffen, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht mit Verwaltungsprozessrecht, 2nd ed. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004).

  • Dolzer, Rudolf,FairandEquitableTreatment: AKeyStandard in Investment Treaties, 39 International Lawyer (2005), 87 et seq.

  • Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter and Lothar Ehring, WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views from the Perspective of the Appellate Body's Experience, 26 Fordham Int'l L. J. (2002-2003), 1505 et seq.

  • Ad Hoc Arbitration (The Netherlands-Republic of Poland BIT) (2005), Eureko B. V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award and Separate Opinion of J. Rajski; available at: , last visited: 12 March 2006.

  • Feldman, David (ed.), English Public Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004).

  • Goco, Jonell B., Non-Discrimination, "Likeness", and Market Definition in World Trade Organization Jurisprudence, 40 Journal of World Trade (2006), 315 et seq.

  • Götz, Volkmar, Über die "Gleichheit im Unrecht", in: Bachof and others (eds.), op. cit., 245 et seq.

  • Guest, Stephen and Alan Milne (eds.), Equality and Discrimination: Essays in Freedom and Justice: Eleventh Annual Conference of the United Kingdom Association for Legal and Social Philosophy 1984, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie; Beiheft 21, (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag-Wiesbaden-Gmbh, 1985).

  • Gutbrod, Max and Steffen Hindelang, Externalization of Effective Legal Protection against Indirect Expropriation—Can the Legal Order of Developing Countries Live Up to the Standards Required by International Investment Agreements? A Disenchanting Comparative Analysis, 7 J.W.I.T. 1 (February 2006), 59 et seq.

  • Idem,TheMissing Bits—ToBeSubstitutedbyBITs? TheInadequacyofRussianLaw in regard to theEffektive ProtectionofForeign Investors,TheRoleof BITSand theNeed forReformComing from within the State, 1 SIAR (2006:2), forthcoming.

  • Hague Academy of International Law (ed.), Report of the 2004 Research Seminar on International Investment Law, (The Hague: forthcoming 2006).

  • Happ, Richard, Aktuelle Rechtsprechung der ICSID-Schiedsgerichte, Die Neue Zeitschrift für Schiedsverfahren (Schiedsvz) (German Arbitration Journal) (2005), 21 et seq.

  • Ingram, Peter, Procedural Equality, in: Guest and Milne (eds.), op. cit., 39 et seq.

  • NAFTA Arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules (2006), International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States, Final Award; available at: ‹http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/ Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird_Award.pdf›, last visited: 12 March 2006.

  • NAFTA Arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules (2006), International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States, Separate Opinion of T.W. Wälde; available at: ‹http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird_Dissent.pdf›, last visited: 12 March 2006.

  • Kölbel, Christoph, Gleichheit "im Unrecht", Verwaltungswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen (Köln: Heymann, 1998).

  • Kreindler, Richard H., Fair and Equitable Treatment-A Comparative International Law Approach, International Investment Law at a Crossroads (3 March 2006), Harvard Law School, International Law Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts; available at: ‹http://www.shearman.com/ files/Publication/fbba03e4-5af6-47f9-912a-25caf4dab342/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 61230f72-158d-41d7-bdd2-285d888c27b7/Harvard-Vortrag%20RK.pdf›, last visited: 10 March 2006.

  • Kurtz, Jürgen, National Treatment, Foreign Investment and Regulatory Autonomy: The Search for Protectionism or Something More? in: Hague Academy of International Law (ed.), op. cit.

  • ICSID (2003), The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award; available at:

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