Indonesia’s Maritime Governance

Law, Institutions and Cooperation

in The Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law


Since President Joko Widodo took office in 2014, he has placed maritime governance at the top of his agenda, as evidenced by the introduction of his vision on Indonesia as a ‘global maritime fulcrum’. This article discusses how his administration has been working towards such a goal. First, it provides an overview of Indonesian laws related to maritime governance. Second, it looks at the institutions responsible for administering, enforcing, and/or applying those laws and how they have been performing their functions. Third, it explores how those institutions cooperate with external parties in four areas of Indonesia’s major interest at present: maritime security; safety of navigation; protection of the marine environment; and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Lastly, this article also discusses the challenges faced by the State in governing its maritime affairs and offers suggestions for a better maritime governance.


Since President Joko Widodo took office in 2014, he has placed maritime governance at the top of his agenda, as evidenced by the introduction of his vision on Indonesia as a ‘global maritime fulcrum’. This article discusses how his administration has been working towards such a goal. First, it provides an overview of Indonesian laws related to maritime governance. Second, it looks at the institutions responsible for administering, enforcing, and/or applying those laws and how they have been performing their functions. Third, it explores how those institutions cooperate with external parties in four areas of Indonesia’s major interest at present: maritime security; safety of navigation; protection of the marine environment; and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Lastly, this article also discusses the challenges faced by the State in governing its maritime affairs and offers suggestions for a better maritime governance.

1 Introduction

Around Indonesia’s vast and sprawling chain of islands, the seas are the nation’s lifeblood. Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo fully understands this. Since his election in 2014, Widodo has placed maritime governance at the top of his priorities. He introduced the doctrine of Indonesia as a ‘global maritime fulcrum’, a grandiose plan to transform Indonesia into a maritime force that will connect the Pacific and Indian Oceans.1 This doctrine directs the government to focus on enhancing five elements: maritime culture, marine resources, maritime infrastructure and connectivity, maritime diplomacy and maritime defence.2 Widodo then appointed Susi Pudjiastuti as the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries,3 who has not only revamped the legal and institutional framework for marine and fisheries governance, but has also taken unprecedented actions against illegal fishing, such as blowing up poaching vessels.4 In order to ensure smooth cooperation and communication between the different agencies responsible for maritime affairs, Widodo also re-established the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, which had functioned from 1964 to 1967.5

In light of the above, it is important to assess the interaction between law, institutions and cooperation in Indonesia’s maritime governance. For that purpose, this article looks at how the law in Indonesia is enforced and applied by governmental institutions, and subsequently explores how those institutions cooperate with external parties in matters of common concern.

2 Overview of Legal and Policy Framework

Indonesia is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”);6 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, as amended (“SOLAS”);7 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, as amended (“COLREG”);8 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by its Protocol of 1978 (“MARPOL”), as well as Annexes III, IV, and V of the Convention;9 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (“CLC”) and its Protocol of 1992;10 and the Food and Agriculture Organization Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (“PSMA”).11

Indonesia has also enacted national legislation implementing some of the above treaties, such as Law No. 6 of 1996 on Indonesian Waters (“Waters Law”),12 Government Regulation No. 36 of 2002 relating to innocent passage (“Innocent Passage Regulation”),13 and Government Regulation No. 37 of 2002 relating to the passage through Indonesia’s partially designated archipelagic sea lanes (“Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage Regulation”),14 all of which implement UNCLOS;15 and Government Regulation No. 21 of 2010 on the Protection of the Maritime Environment,16 which implements the CLC and its Protocol of 1992.17

Indonesia’s maritime governance is based on numerous pieces of legislation, varying from those relating to maritime law and maritime crimes to maritime zones and maritime resources. Maritime law is primarily embodied under Law No. 17 of 2008 on Shipping (“Shipping Law”).18 This Law contains 355 articles, which govern both public and private aspects of maritime law, including safety of navigation, maritime security, seaworthiness, credit and security, port affairs and protection of the marine environment.19 The Shipping Law established an institutional framework for the Sea and Coast Guard20 and Port Masters,21 in addition to creating a Shipping Information System.22 The Shipping Law also provides penal sanctions for violations of various provisions of the Law, ranging from six months’ imprisonment and a fine of IDR 100 million (±USD 7,300)23 to life imprisonment24 and a fine of up to IDR 2.5 billion (±USD 183,500).25 Maritime crimes, such as piracy and hijacking of vessels, are proscribed and punishable under Articles 438–479 of the Penal Code.26

Regulation of maritime zones and passage is enshrined in various pieces of legislation, including Law No. 32 of 2014 on Ocean Affairs (“Ocean Law”),27 the Waters Law,28 Law No. 5 of 1983 on the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone,29 the Innocent Passage Regulation,30 and the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage Regulation.31 Protection of the marine environment is governed, for instance, under Law No. 32 of 2009 on the Protection and Management of the Environment32 and Government Regulation No. 19 of 1999 on the Control of Marine Pollution and/or Degradation.33 The management of coastal areas and small islands is regulated under Law No. 27 of 2007, as amended by Law No. 1 of 2014 (“Coastal Law”).34

In the fisheries sector, Law No. 31 of 2004 on Fisheries, as amended by Law No. 45 of 2009 (“Fisheries Law”),35 is the primary legislation and is supplemented by numerous ministerial regulations.36 Under the Fisheries Law, foreign-flagged vessels may apply for licenses to fish in the Indonesian exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”).37 However, Minister Pudjiastuti has enacted a series of regulations since 2014, which prohibit the granting or renewal of fishing licenses for all vessels built outside Indonesia.38 This means foreign-flagged vessels and Indonesian-flagged vessels that were built outside the country are now banned from fishing in Indonesian waters and EEZ.39 In 2016, the government also revised the Negative Investment List, officially closing the capture fisheries sector to foreign investment.40 However, under Indonesian constitutional law, government or ministerial regulations cannot amend a Law passed by the House of Representatives.41 This is why, in early 2017, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (“MMAF”) started discussion with the House to revise the Fisheries Law.42

The above pieces of legislation are complemented by Indonesia’s Ocean Policy, the government’s official policy document on maritime affairs that was adopted in February 2017.43 The document includes two annexes: the National Document of the Indonesian Ocean Policy,44 which aims to provide an “explanatory narrative of the ocean policy”;45 and the Plan of Action of the Indonesian Ocean Policy 2016–2019, which aims to “implement various programs and activities in ocean areas”.46

3 Institutional Framework

Maritime and ocean laws are administered, enforced and/or applied by at least twenty-one State organs: eighteen executive agencies, two judicial organs, and a quasi-judicial body. Their roles and functions are described in this section.

3.1 The Executive

The primary responsibility for regulating matters pertaining to the seas, as well as administering and monitoring the implementation of ocean law is assigned to the MMAF, which is also in charge of managing the country’s fisheries.47 Besides the MMAF, other ministries that are mandated to adopt regulations concerning the seas and oversee their implementation are the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources48 and the Ministry of Tourism.49 The works of these three ministries, the Ministry of Transportation, and “other institutions deemed necessary” are coordinated by the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs.50

The Ministry of Transportation, especially its Directorate-General of Sea Transportation, is the main administrator of shipping affairs.51 It has the power to enact regulations, grant licenses, and oversee the implementation of the Shipping Law in relation to marine transportation, port affairs, shipping and seafarers, navigation, and the Sea and Coast Guard.52 Each of these subject-matters is dealt with by a Directorate within the Directorate-General.53 The Directorate-General of Sea Transportation is also Indonesia’s focal point in the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”).54

Other executive organs dealing with maritime and ocean laws include the Ministry of Finance – in particular, its Directorate-General of Customs and Excise – which is responsible for State revenues generated from customs and excise related to the shipping industry;55 Ministry of Environment and Forestry, which is responsible for preventing and curbing marine pollution;56 Ministry of Law and Human Rights, which cooperates with other ministries in drafting maritime-related Laws for the President’s approval;57 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which engages with other countries in promoting and protecting Indonesia’s maritime interests;58 Ministry of Home Affairs, whose responsibilities include determining State boundaries, including those surrounding the outermost islands,59 and has a sub-directorate tasked with synchronising the works of provincial/municipal governments in marine affairs and fisheries;60 and the Ministry of Defence, which has the power to formulate defence regulations and policies.61

Maritime and ocean laws are enforced by a variety of executive organs. The State Police62 – especially its Marine Division – is responsible for law enforcement on all Indonesian waters,63 whereas the Navy64 is responsible for defence and law enforcement on all “waters under national jurisdiction in accordance with national and international laws”,65 suggesting that the Navy is also entrusted with safeguarding the Indonesian EEZ.66 Other agencies include the Maritime Security Agency (Badan Keamanan Laut/“Bakamla”), which is responsible for patrolling the Indonesian waters and other waters under Indonesia’s jurisdiction,67 and the Attorney-General’s Office, which is responsible for representing the government in legal affairs,68 including those relating to maritime and ocean laws. Another agency whose functions are closely related to the enforcement of maritime and ocean laws is the State Intelligence Agency, which collects and manages intelligence for national security purposes.69 The last nine agencies, in addition to the Ministry of Communications and Informatics and Ministry of the Empowerment of State Organs and Bureaucracy Reform are coordinated by the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law, and Security.70

Enforcement of fisheries law is carried out by the Fishery Supervisors within the purview of the MMAF Directorate-General of the Monitoring of Marine and Fishery Resources.71 The Fishery Supervisors have the authority to carry firearms, arrest and detain ships and/or individuals, take them to the nearest port for further questioning and/or burn vessels that have committed violations of the Fisheries Law.72 The Fishery Supervisors may also be equipped with Fishery Monitoring Ships.73

In 2015, President Widodo strengthened the institutional framework for combating illegal fishing by establishing the Task Force to Eradicate Illegal Fishing (“Illegal Fishing Task Force”), which is answerable directly to the President.74 It is headed by the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries and is composed of the heads or senior officials of the Navy, Bakamla, State Police, and Attorney-General’s Office.75 The Task Force is not a new institution, but rather a unit in which those institutions are responsible for working in coordination with each other and with other relevant agencies76 to combat illegal and unreported fishing.77 Such a responsibility includes coordinating the deployment of those institutions’ assets, technology and human resources,78 as well as coordinating the exchange of data and information between them.79

3.2 The Judiciary

Judicial application and interpretation of maritime and ocean laws are carried out by the Supreme Court and the Courts within its purview, as well as the Constitutional Court. The Supreme Court, which is responsible for hearing final appeals and conducting certain judicial reviews oversees the District Courts, which serve as courts of first instance, and the High Courts, which act as appellate courts.80 The Supreme Court also oversees the Fishery Courts, which are special courts positioned within the District Courts.81 The Fishery Courts are vested with the power to hear and decide upon criminal cases in accordance with the Fisheries Law.82 While the aforementioned Courts examine primarily contentious cases, the Constitutional Court has the power to hear and decide upon questions of the constitutionality of Laws.83

3.2.1 Supreme Court and the Courts within Its Purview

The Supreme Court and the lower Courts have decided upon a number of criminal cases where defendants had been charged based on the Penal Code and/or the Shipping Law. For instance, in 2007, the District Court of Kuala Tungkal found an accused guilty of ‘coastal piracy’,84 defined under the Penal Code as violent acts committed by a vessel on Indonesian waters against another vessel or people or property on board.85 The defendant was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment.86

The Courts have not only sentenced those who committed violence against ships, but also those who have failed to comply with seaworthiness requirements. For instance, in January 2016, the Mataram District Court found an accused guilty of navigating a ship despite the Port Master’s warning that the ship was unseaworthy for not having life-saving equipment and first-aid kit.87 The court convicted him pursuant to Article 302(1) of the Shipping Law, which forbids a ship’s captain from knowingly navigating an unseaworthy ship.88 He was consequently sentenced to six months’ imprisonment.89

The Fishery Courts, which were established in 200490 but only started functioning in 2007,91 have also handed down hefty punishments in a number of cases. For instance, in 2013, the Tanjung Pinang Fishery Court, one of the ten Fishery Courts currently functioning in the country92 sentenced a Vietnamese national who had fished in the Indonesian EEZ without a license to pay a fine of IDR 1 billion (±USD 73,000).93 The Court also confiscated his ship and equipment, and ordered that his fishing gear be destroyed.94 At the appeal stage, the Pekanbaru High Court essentially upheld this judgment, but altered the order to pay the fine such that if the convict could not pay it, he would serve four months in prison.95

The Fishery Courts do not only hear cases on illegal fishing, but also on fishing activities that harm the environment. In January 2017, the Fishery Court of Medan convicted an individual of deliberately using fishing gear that impaired and damaged the sustainability of fishery resources, a crime punishable under the Fisheries Law.96 He had been fishing using a beam trawl,97 a type of fishing gear prohibited under MMAF Regulation No. 2/PERMEN-KP/2015.98 Consequently, the Court sentenced him to five months’ imprisonment and ordered that his ship and fishing gear be destroyed.99 The Medan High Court subsequently increased the prison sentence to six months, while upholding the rest of the judgment.100 The Prosecutor’s appeal for the six months’ prison sentence to be increased was dismissed by the Supreme Court.101

3.2.2 Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court has handed down a number of judgments regarding the Shipping Law and the Coastal Law. In one of those cases, the Constitutional Court was faced with the question of whether Article 90(3)(g) of the Shipping Law102 was discriminatory and created monopoly by PT Pelindo – a State owned company in charge of port affairs – and was therefore, contrary to the Constitution.103 The Court answered the question in the negative, holding that the said article allows any enterprise to engage in stevedoring services, as long as it complies with the Shipping Law.104

In another case, the Constitutional Court declared a number of provisions under the original Coastal Law unconstitutional, and consequently repealed them.105 In its 2011 judgment, the Court stated that various articles under the original Coastal Law giving the right to individuals, companies or adat communities106 to exploit coastal waters for an extendable period of twenty years were in violation of the Constitution.107 The Court was of the view that these provisions would enable companies and individuals with financial power to dominate the exploitation of coastal waters, thereby wiping out traditional fishermen and indigenous people.108 The Court not only struck down the three articles of the Coastal Law that the applicants had petitioned to rescind, but also eleven other articles, even though the applicants had not asked the Court to revoke them.109 As a consequence of this judgment, the government revised the original Coastal Law and adopted Law No. 1 of 2014 as the amendment thereto.

3.3 Quasi-Judicial Body

The Shipping Law established the Court of Shipping Affairs (Mahkamah Pelayaran).110 This Court is charged with investigating maritime incidents and enforcing seafarers’ code of ethics.111 Incidents that the Court has jurisdiction over include ship collisions, shipwrecking and fire on board.112 In investigating these incidents, the Court initially relies on preliminary evidence supplied by port masters,113 but subsequently acts independently, since it may summon ships’ captains, other crew members and/or government officials in charge of navigational safety.114

Despite its name, the Court is in fact, not a court of law. It is part of the executive organ, under and answerable to the Minister of Transportation.115 Many of its functions are more similar to those of a fact-finding commission116 or an ethics commission,117 and its decisions are advisory and/or administrative in nature.118 The Court has hardly applied the substantive law in great detail, in stark contrast with the discussion of facts, thereby showing that the Court’s role is closer to that of a fact-finding agency.119 The only judicial power that the Court has is to decide whether crew members are responsible for incidents on the ground of ‘fault’ or ‘negligence’,120 which demonstrates its quasi-judicial nature. However, the Shipping Law is silent on how the Court should perform its function in assessing the defendant’s responsibility. It does not, for instance, give guidance as to whether the Court should apply the criminal or civil standard of proof. In practice, the court largely refers to Chapter III of the Second Book of the Commercial Code on the rights and obligations of ships’ captains, crew members, and passengers.121 In cases involving foreign-flagged vessels and/or foreign crew, the Court also refers to treaties to which Indonesia is a party, such as UNCLOS and COLREG.122

For example, in April 2017 the Court decided upon a case concerning an explosion and fire aboard KM Ise Baru – an Indonesian-flagged vessel – which caused the ship to sink in the waters off Surabaya, East Java.123 In its judgment, the Court extensively discussed the facts leading up to the incident, the causes and the crew’s rescue efforts.124 However, when assessing the responsibility of the ship’s captain, the Court only briefly cited some provisions of the Commercial Code.125 The Court did not elaborate those provisions and subsequently decided that the captain “had not fully complied with [the requirements for] good seamanship”.126

In a 2012 judgment concerning the collision between MT Norgas Cathinka, a Singaporean-flagged vessel and KMP Bahuga Jaya, an Indonesian-flagged vessel, the Court also examined the facts in great detail, such as whether the ships’ speed and distance, as well as the angle of the rotation that one of them made to avoid the other, showed that the crew had taken all measures necessary to avoid collision.127 In this case, the Court applied the relevant provisions of COLREG; however, its legal analysis is significantly briefer than its examination of facts.128

The decisions of the Court might strike many as being very lenient. It is only empowered to recommend administrative penalties to the Minister of Transportation,129 and those punishments are only limited to warnings or temporary revocation of mariner licenses.130 In some cases where the Court attributed the responsibility for an incident to foreign crew, it did not even hand down any punishment, but merely transferred a copy of its judgment to the embassy of the country that issued the mariner’s certificate and left the matter to that country’s discretion.131

The functions of the Court in some ways overlap with those of the Supreme Court and the Courts within its purview, as well as the National Transportation Safety Committee. While the Court of Shipping Affairs has the power to determine the administrative liability of mariners,132 the Supreme Court and its subordinate Courts may also decide on the mariners’ civil and criminal liabilities. The National Transportation Safety Committee also has the competence to investigate marine incidents, despite not having the power to determine any liability.133 These concurring powers and competences may easily result in contradictory findings.

4 Maritime Cooperation

This section looks at maritime cooperation in four fields that represent Indonesia’s major areas of interest at present: maritime security, safety of navigation, protection of the marine environment and illegal fishing.

4.1 Maritime Security

Indonesia cooperates with other States and international organisations in maintaining and improving maritime security. A large number of maritime security cooperative frameworks that Indonesia has entered into are in the form of military patrols or exercises. In 2004, Indonesia, together with Malaysia and Singapore launched the Malacca Straits Patrol, a framework for cooperation to secure the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (“SOMS”).134 Thailand joined in 2008.135 This initiative not only consists of maritime and aerial patrols, but also established the Information Fusion Centre (“IFC”) based in Singapore to facilitate exchange of information and intelligence between the littoral States.136 The Malacca Straits Patrol is an example of Indonesia’s successful cooperation in maritime security.137 The SOMS, which used to be listed as a “high-risk war zone”138 now have “almost zero” incident of piracy and armed robbery.139

Recently, together with Malaysia and the Philippines, Indonesia launched the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas Patrol, a similar cooperative framework to safeguard the Sulu Sea and Sulawesi Sea.140 This initiative also includes maritime and air patrols,141 but has yet to establish a centre to manage information and intelligence exchange similar to the IFC. The initiative has been hindered by deficient resources to secure such a vast body of water.142 The lack of a sophisticated system of information and intelligence exchange, and lack of sustainable funds similar to those of the Cooperative Mechanism for the SOMS143 also challenge the success of the initiative.

Besides these initiatives, Indonesia has also conducted bilateral naval exercises with a number of States, including Singapore,144 India145 and the United States (US).146 Multilateral naval exercises are normally conducted under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) Defence Ministers’ Meeting – Plus,147 which have conducted military exercises since 2013.148 Indonesia also participated in the Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training, an initiative led by the US involving South and Southeast Asian nations.149 Indonesia itself leads and hosts the Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo, a bi-annual naval exercise that was launched in 2014.150 In 2016, 35 countries participated in this exercise,151 making it one of the largest multilateral naval exercises in the world.152 Furthermore, the ASEAN member States recently launched the first ASEAN Multilateral Naval Exercise, which was hosted by the Royal Thai Navy on 21 November 2017.153 All of the member States but Laos – a landlocked country – participated in the exercise.154

Besides participating in naval patrols and exercises, Indonesia also cooperates with other actors in formulating regional and multilateral policies to enhance maritime security. For example, the ASEAN Regional Forum155 has adopted the 2015–2017 Work Plan for Maritime Security, which aimed, among other things, to improve capacity-building, confidence-building, and exchange of information on maritime security.156 Another forum is the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, whose Three-Year Work Programme for 2014–2016 focused, inter alia, on maritime security cooperation157 and establishing a Direct Communications Link to respond promptly to security threats, including maritime crimes.158 Moreover, Indonesia has also been a big part of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (“AMMTC”), which adopted the 1999 ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime159 and the 2002 Work Programme to implement the Plan of Action.160 The Work Programme contains detailed measures to prevent and suppress transnational crimes, including piracy.161 The AMMTC reiterated its pledge to combat piracy in the 2015 Kuala Lumpur Declaration in Combating Transnational Crime.162

Another actor with which Indonesia has engaged in maritime security cooperation since 1961 is the IMO.163 For instance, in implementing the IMO-adopted International Ship and Port Facility Code pursuant to Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS,164 the Minister of Transportation enacted Regulation No. PM 134 of 2016.165 As a result, more than 742 Indonesian-flagged vessels and over 247 port facilities have complied with the Code,166 which aims to detect potential threats to the security of ships or port facilities and enable States to take measures against those threats.167

4.2 Safety of Navigation

Indonesia cooperates extensively with the IMO in enhancing navigational safety. Indonesia consulted with the organisation in designating partially its archipelagic sea lanes,168 which constitute a routeing system169 to promote safety of navigation.170 Indonesia also established the Cooperative Mechanism171 with Malaysia and Singapore in 2007 pursuant to Article 43 of UNCLOS to ensure safety of navigation and environmental protection in the SOMS.172 The Cooperative Mechanism has three components: the Cooperation Forum, which facilitates dialogue between the three littoral States, user States, the shipping industry and other stakeholders;173 the Project Coordination Committee, which coordinates the implementation of projects to enhance safety of navigation and environmental protection in the Straits;174 and the Aids to Navigation Fund, which is administered by the littoral States to allow interested parties to make voluntary financial contributions to the maintenance of navigational aids.175

Under the Cooperative Mechanism, the three littoral States not only cooperate with each other, but also with other States and non-State actors. For instance, Malaysia led the removal of shipwrecks in the Straits, a project carried out with India and Germany.176 Indonesia engaged with Japan and China in two projects to replace and maintain navigational aids damaged by the 2004 tsunami.177 Singapore also led a project with China and India to establish wind, tide, and current measurement system.178 Moreover, several non-State actors have also pledged to contribute to the Cooperative Mechanism. The Nippon Foundation contributed approximately USD 1.4 million to finance a site survey for the purpose of maintaining and repairing navigational aids.179 The International Chamber of Shipping pledged to provide expertise and capacity-building support.180 The Middle East Navigation Aids Service committed USD 1 million to the Aids to Navigation Fund.181

Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore also frequently work on various projects with the IMO. The IMO assisted the three States with a demonstration trial of Automatic Identification System Class-B Transponders on small ships, a project led by Singapore that involved Australia, Japan and South Korea.182 The IMO also contributed to the study on the establishment of emergency towing vessels’ capability in straits.183 Furthermore, the IMO established the Malacca and Singapore Straits Trust Fund pursuant to a Joint Technical Arrangement signed between the IMO and the littoral States in 2009.184 The Trust Fund, which is aimed at inviting sponsors for Cooperative Mechanism projects,185 complements the Aids to Navigation Fund. In 2010, the Trust Fund managed to collect USD 1,238,193 and EUR 315,000.186 The Trust Fund has been used to finance many of the Cooperative Mechanism projects,187 and by the end of 2017, USD 116,910 still remained in the Trust Fund.188

Cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the IMO is also demonstrated by the IMO’s adoption of traffic separation schemes and ship reporting system to ensure safety of navigation in the Straits. The traffic separation schemes extend 250 nautical miles long between Permatang Sedepa (One Fathom Bank) and near Horsburgh Lighthouse.189 The reporting system, called STRAITREP, is mandatory for ships of at least 300 gross tonnage or are at least 50 metres long, or ships that carry hazardous substances or are equipped with Very High Frequency.190 They are required to inform the Klang, Johor, or Singapore Vessel Traffic Service authorities – depending on the sector where they are located or are about to enter – of their identities, positions, hazardous cargo (if any), as well as course and speed.191 They are also required to notify the above authorities when passing through certain spots, such as the line joining Tg. Piai and Pulau Karimun Kecil.192

The Cooperative Mechanism, albeit not perfect, has shown positive progress. The Automatic Identification System Class-B Transponders Project has been completed,193 and the Cooperative Mechanism has also received substantial financial contributions from the stakeholders, which have been disbursed on many of the Cooperative Mechanism projects.194

4.3 Protection of the Marine Environment

Besides aiming to improve safety of navigation, the Cooperative Mechanism is also aimed at protecting the marine environment.195 This is shown by a project led by Malaysia to forge cooperation and capacity-building to enhance preparedness and response capabilities against hazardous and noxious substances (“HNS”) in the Straits.196 This project – which also involved Australia, China, the European Commission and the US197 – was estimated to cost US$ 3.5 million for two years.198 The project consisted of four components: the development of a HNS databank,199 to which Australia offered to contribute its expertise;200 the adoption of a Standard Operating Procedure for dealing with HNS spills;201 capacity-building;202 and the establishment of HNS Response Centres.203 Several States have assisted with the capacity-building. In 2008, the US Coast Guard trained the littoral States on how to respond to and be prepared for HNS leakage.204 China has also expressed its intention to run an HNS Train-the-Trainers Programme for Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.205

Indonesia also takes part in various other regional and multilateral initiatives to promote protection of the marine environment, including ASEAN initiatives. This can be seen in the adoption of three ASEAN instruments: the ASEAN Marine Water Quality Criteria,206 the ASEAN Criteria for National Marine Protected Areas207 and the ASEAN Criteria for Marine Heritage Areas.208 All of these instruments were adopted by ASEAN members’ environmental ministers.209 Furthermore, Indonesia also cooperates with the ASEAN Working Group on Coastal and Marine Environment,210 including by hosting its 15th meeting in Jakarta in June 2014.211

Indonesia is one of the six States participating in the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security.212 The member States established the initiative in 2009213 and equipped it with a regional secretariat, rules of procedure, staff regulations and financial regulations in 2011.214 The regional secretariat, which is located in Manado, Indonesia,215 has a limited legal personality216 and in 2015, concluded a Host Country Agreement on Privileges and Immunities with Indonesia.217 As part of this initiative, the participating States have adopted a Regional Plan of Action for 2009–2019, which has five goals: to designate and manage effectively “Priority Seascapes”, including investment plans and management of marine and coastal resources; to take an ecosystem approach to fisheries management and other marine resources; to establish and effectively manage marine protected areas; to take measures to adapt to climate change; and to improve the status of threatened species, such as sharks, sea turtles, mangroves and corals.218

The Indonesian government’s commitment to protecting corals and coral reefs is further demonstrated by its cooperation with a number of States after a recent incident that resulted in an extensive damage to its coral reef. On 4 March 2017, MV Caledonian Sky, a Bahamian-flagged cruise ship owned by a Swedish company and run by a British tour operator,219 had taken tourists for a bird watching trip in the waters off Raja Ampat, Indonesia, when it ran aground at low tide and hit the coral reef underneath.220 As the 4,200-ton ship tried to break free by having a tug boat tow it multiple times, it caused more damage to the reef.221 Upon assessing the extent of the damage, the government found that the incident had destroyed coral reef covering an extensive area of 18,882 square metres.222 It estimated that it would take at least fifty years to restore the reef,223 which could cost approximately US$ 18.6 million.224 Indonesia was planning to prosecute the ship’s captain, Keith Michael Taylor, a British national;225 file a civil law suit;226 and/or take the case before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”).227 However, the ship and its captain left the Indonesian waters not long after the incident occurred.228

Indonesia subsequently summoned the UK Ambassador in Jakarta to a meeting with the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs.229 The Ambassador expressed positive views on the meeting and gestured willingness to cooperate.230 The Bahamas, as the ship’s flag State, has also expressed its readiness to assist Indonesia with the investigation into the incident.231 It also agreed to cooperate with Indonesia in restoring the coral reef.232

The government was initially reluctant to accept compensation by the tour operator’s insurance company, since it was of the view that the compensation would be insufficient to cover the losses incurred.233 However, the government finally agreed to accept compensation from the London Protection and Indemnity Club, despite not disclosing the amount.234 It is unclear whether the government still plans to prosecute the captain and/or bring the matter before ITLOS. If Indonesia wanted to prosecute the ship’s captain, or call for his prosecution by his country of nationality, it will have to invoke an extradition agreement or mutual legal assistance agreement. However, Indonesia and the UK do not currently have either agreement between them.235

If Indonesia wanted to submit the matter to ITLOS, it will have to decide against whom it will file a claim. In this case, the Bahamas, as the flag State of the ship, may be the defendant.236 Indonesia will have to argue that the Bahamas has breached its obligations as a flag State under Article 94 of UNCLOS by not exercising proper jurisdiction and control in “administrative, technical and social matters” over Caledonian Sky, and by not taking appropriate actions even after being informed by Indonesia of the incident.237 However, the Bahamas has stated that it will cooperate with Indonesia and will launch investigation into the matter.238 Since this is a developing case, it remains to be seen how Indonesia’s cooperation with all the relevant States and entities will progress.

4.4 IUU Fishing239

One of the pillars on which President Widodo built his ‘global maritime fulcrum’ vision is the development of the fishing industry.240 To achieve this, Indonesia has forged and intensified cooperation with other States and international organisations to suppress illegal, unreported and unregulated (“IUU”) fishing. On 23 June 2016, Indonesia deposited its ratification instrument of the PSMA.241 Indonesia became the third Southeast Asian State to ratify the Agreement, after Myanmar and Thailand.242 By being a party to the Agreement, Indonesia hopes to engage in a more intensive cooperation and exchange of information with other States parties in combating IUU fishing.243 However, the low number of ratifications of the Agreement by ASEAN members indicate either that the magnitude and severity of IUU fishing in the region might not be shared by all of the Southeast Asian States, or not all of them have the capacity to implement all of the obligations under the Agreement.

Indonesia was also part of a high-level consultation that adopted a Joint Declaration against IUU fishing between ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center,244 a regional fishery body composed of the ASEAN member States and Japan.245 Indonesia also contributed to the adoption of Resolution on Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security for the ASEAN Region towards 2020,246 which serves as a basis for the adoption of the 2015 ASEAN Guidelines for Preventing the Entry of Fish and Fishery Products from IUU Fishing Activities into the Supply Chain.247 Moreover, Indonesia has co- organised workshops on IUU fishing involving members of the ASEAN Regional Forum,248 in order to provide a platform for dialogue and encourage a stronger cooperation in combating IUU fishing.249 Indonesia has also repeatedly called for stronger actions and cooperation to combat IUU fishing on various occasions, such as at the 29th ASEAN Summit Retreat,250 2016 ASEAN-US Summit,251 as well as several ASEAN meetings in August 2017,252 including the 50th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila.253

Recently, Indonesia pledged to share its Vessel Monitoring System (“VMS”) data with Global Fishing Watch,254 a Delaware non-profit corporation.255 This would allow anyone to view fishing activities in Indonesian waters from an online data platform.256 Indonesia registered this commitment with the United Nations during the Ocean Conference on 5–9 June 2017.257 Indonesia is the first State to make such a commitment and encouraged other States to follow suit.258 Following Indonesia’s footsteps, Peru made the same commitment.259 Minister Pudjiastuti said that the disclosure of the data would allow the public to report suspicious activities on Indonesian waters to the authorities, thereby contributing to the eradication of IUU fishing.260 Minister Pudjiastuti also said that in order to prevent the leakage of classified data, the government will not share real-time VMS data.261

Indonesia also cooperates with other States and stakeholders to fight other crimes that are closely linked to IUU fishing, such as human trafficking. In April 2015, the authorities discovered wide-scale human trafficking practices in the fishing industry after hundreds of fishermen from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand were found in Benjina, Maluku, in appalling conditions.262 They had been recruited by a Thai company to work for PT Pusaka Benjina Resources, an Indonesian fishing company.263 Many of these fishermen suffered from physical abuse and received little or no pay for working extremely long hours.264 The Indonesian authorities also discovered a mass graveyard suspected of being the burial ground of many other fishermen.265 After an extensive investigation and a series of trials, eight sea captains and slave masters – five Thai nationals and three Indonesians – were convicted of human trafficking and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.266 Each of them was also fined approximately USD 12,000.267

The discovery of human trafficking in Benjina gave impetus to the government’s determination to ensure human rights protection in the fishing industry. The MMAF cooperated with the International Organization for Migration (“IOM”) in identifying and addressing key issues pertaining to human trafficking practices in the fishing industry. These issues were discussed in the ASEAN Workshop on Human Trafficking and Forced Labour in the Fishing Industry organised by the government and the IOM on 15–16 August 2016268 and in the Report on Human Trafficking, Forced Labour and Fisheries Crime in the Indonesian Fishing Industry composed by the MMAF, IOM and Coventry University.269

In the regional context, ASEAN member States now have a stronger legal basis to cooperate in combating human trafficking in the fishing industry after the entry into force of the ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children on 8 March 2017.270 Although the Convention does not specifically proscribe fisheries-related human trafficking, it will be interesting to see if and how Indonesia – a country that constantly advocates tougher measures against IUU fishing – will use the Convention to ‘break the silence’ in the region by calling for cooperation against human trafficking in relation to IUU fishing.

Moreover, due to the close link between IUU fishing and other crimes, such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, and illegal wildlife trade,271 Indonesia has urged the United Nations and the European Commission272 to classify IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime.273 Such a classification would open doors for greater cooperation with the Interpol.274 Although Sweden and Norway supported Indonesia’s proposal,275 it seems that Indonesia still has a long way to go before seeing IUU fishing classified as a transnational organised crime.276

5 Towards Better Maritime Governance

Under Widodo, Indonesia has stepped up its efforts to better govern its maritime affairs. Despite its many successes, Indonesia still faces challenges in achieving its goal of becoming a ‘global maritime fulcrum’. In addition to the challenges that have been discussed above, Indonesia still needs to do more to make sure that its pieces of legislation are in order, its institutions and officials are working in unison and well-trained, and all of its policies are consistent with international law, especially UNCLOS.

Out of the issues listed above, the lack of capacity and competency of officials is probably the direst one. Although Indonesia has a lot of brilliant officials, some officials are in need of more capacity-building. For example, in December 2016, the Central Jakarta District Court tried an Indonesian national charged with co-perpetrating piracy in the Malacca Strait.277 Both the Indonesian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code stipulate that Indonesian courts have jurisdiction over certain crimes, including piracy, regardless of the territory where they are committed and the nationality of the perpetrators and/or victims.278 Article 438 of the Indonesian Penal Code – with which the defendant was charged – requires that piracy be committed on the high seas,279 similar to the provision in UNCLOS.280

In this case, the defendant hijacked MT Joaquim, a Singaporean-flagged vessel, and robbed the light cycle oil it was carrying.281 At the time of the crime, MT Joaquim was on Malaysia’s territorial waters.282 Despite the fact that the crime was not committed on the high seas and therefore, did not meet the locus delicti requirement under Article 438 of the Penal Code, the Court found the defendant guilty of piracy and sentenced him to four years and eight months of imprisonment.283 Upon appeal, the Jakarta High Court reaffirmed the defendant’s guilt and increased his sentence to six years’ imprisonment.284

The misapplication of the law might have stemmed from the judges’ misunderstanding of the definition of the high seas. The judges seem to have mistaken the high seas for any seas outside Indonesia’s territorial waters, including the neighbouring countries’ territorial seas. They appear to have focused on the extraterritorial application of Indonesian laws in cases of piracy, but failed to apply one of its most important elements: that it must take place on the high seas. Subject to certain requirements, the defendant may appeal against this judgment to the Supreme Court.285 This case shows that some judges lack knowledge of international law. Indonesia has been cooperating with international partners to build the capacity of judges,286 but it would need to ensure that these efforts will be continuous and sustainable.

Another problem that Indonesia is facing is the fact that there are numerous agencies with overlapping powers and jurisdictions in enforcing ocean and maritime laws. There are at least five agencies responsible for the enforcement of marine and fisheries laws: the Directorate of Sea and Coast Guard (“DSCG”),287 the Marine Police, the Navy, Bakamla, and the Fishery Supervisors.288 The boundaries between their respective functions are not always clear. For instance, all of them have been involved in efforts to apprehend illegal fishing vessels.289 Furthermore, it is also unclear whether the Marine Police, Navy, and Bakamla always have to act jointly under the auspices of the Illegal Fishing Task Force in combating illegal fishing.290 On a few occasions, they apprehended suspected poachers individually, outside the purview of the Task Force.291

By law, Bakamla is the institution responsible for coordinating and integrating the functions of all agencies in charge of maritime security and safety under a single command.292 In practice, however, it is difficult to do so. Bakamla was only established in 2014293 with only three vessels.294 It had to borrow vessels from the Navy and Marine Police to carry out its functions.295 Although the Navy, the MMAF, and the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs have all pledged to give some of their respective vessels to Bakamla,296 it still only had six vessels as of 30 August 2016.297 Besides this lack of resources, Bakamla also suffers from a lack of personnel.298 The fact that many of Bakamla’s assets are lent or given by the same agencies it should coordinate299 might make Bakamla look toothless to those agencies and thus, it is not surprising if many of these agencies are reluctant to accept Bakamla’s authority to coordinate them. After all, some agencies – such as the Navy – are much older, much more powerful, and equipped with more resources than Bakamla.

The difficulty in coordinating those institutions cannot be separated from inter-agency competition that has long been plaguing Indonesia’s maritime governance. For instance, the Shipping Law governs the Sea and Coast Guard (“SCG”), which is in charge of ensuring safety and security of navigation, protecting the marine environment, and enforcing the law at sea.300 When the Shipping Law was enacted in 2008, the Ministry of Transportation interpreted the provisions regarding the SCG under the Law as referring to the DSCG.301 However, when Bakamla was established under the Ocean Law six years later, the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security understood that Bakamla was the SCG under the Shipping Law.302 This may be due to some similarities between Bakamla’s functions and those of the SCG under the Shipping Law.303 On the other hand, some opine that Indonesia does not yet have an SCG, since neither the DSCG nor Bakamla is the SCG as stipulated under the Shipping Law.304

Some suggest that the DSCG and Bakamla should be merged to form the SCG.305 Otherwise, the government should clarify the functions of Bakamla; whether it is meant to be the SCG as provided by the Shipping Law, and if not, what institution should play that role. Likewise, the tasks and functions of all the agencies responsible for maritime security should also be clarified so as to eliminate the overlap of powers amongst them.

Indonesia also needs to ensure that its policies are in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS. A lot of questions have been raised on the legality of Indonesia’s ‘burn the vessels’ policy. Article 69(4) of the Fisheries Law provides that upon collecting sufficient preliminary evidence,306 the authorities may burn and sink vessels that have violated that Law307 in the Indonesian fisheries management territory,308 which includes the EEZ.309 Pursuant to this provision, the government had blown up 317 vessels as of April 2017, the majority of which were found to have committed IUU fishing.310 They include Chinese, Malaysian, Papua New Guinean, Philippine, Thai and Vietnamese-flagged vessels.311 The statistics, however, do not provide details of how many vessels were captured in the Indonesian EEZ, territorial waters, or archipelagic waters.

This distinction matters. Article 73(2) of UNCLOS provides that in the event that the coastal State arrests a vessel and/or its crew for alleged violations of its laws in its EEZ, the State must promptly release the vessel and crew after a reasonable bond or other security is posted.312 Thus, the owners and/or operators of those vessels captured in the Indonesian EEZ could have paid bonds to Indonesia and asked for their vessels to be promptly released. However, the government has not taken Article 73(2) of UNCLOS into serious consideration, as shown by the high number of the vessels destroyed and the government’s pledge to continue sinking illegal fishing vessels.313

It is unlikely that Indonesia would change Article 69(4) of the Fisheries Law anytime soon. The sinking of vessels policy enjoys a wide popular support in Indonesia,314 fuelled by the government’s narrative that its anti-IUU fishing measures are aimed at preserving and upholding the country’s sovereignty in the face of foreign poachers.315 The government also regularly publishes statistics showing an increase in Indonesia’s maximum sustainable yield,316 people’s consumption of fish,317 and GDP and economic growth rate in the fisheries sector,318 all of which are aimed at attesting to the success of the policy of sinking vessels.319 However, along with this success, Indonesia also needs to be aware that its right to enforce its own laws comes with a set of international obligations. Indonesia’ success in closing the gap between the exercise of its rights and compliance with its obligations will determine its success in building a robust maritime governance.

1Rendi A. Witular, Jokowi Launches Maritime Doctrine to the World, THE JAKARTA POST, Nov. 13, 2014, available at; Hadyu Ikrami, Indonesia’s Reform of Its Fisheries Law and Policy & Cooperation with ASEAN in Combating IUU Fishing, 2(2) Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy 318 (2017) at 318.
2Witular, supra note 1.
3The Straits Times Indonesian Bureau, Indonesian President Joko Widodo Names 34-Member Cabinet, THE STRAITS TIMES (Oct. 26, 2014), available at; Ikrami, supra note 1, at 318.
4See Ikrami, ibid, at 318–328.
5Information and Legal Bureau, Serah Terima Jabatan Menteri Koordinator Bidang Kemaritiman Jakarta, 28 Juli 2016, Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs (Jul. 30, 2016), available at; see Presidential Regulation No. 165 of 2014 on the Arrangement of the Duties and Functions of the Working Cabinet (State Gazette Year 2014 No. 339), arts. 1(1)(4) & 15; see Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2015 on the Organisation of State Ministries (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 8), art. 1(4); see Presidential Regulation No. 10 of 2015 on the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 11).
6United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Status as at: 25-05-2016 05:00:38 EDT, United Nations Treaty Collection, available at
7Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of which the International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depository or other Functions, International Maritime Organization (Dec. 8, 2017), available at, at 15.
8Ibid, at 92.
9Ibid, at 110, 116, 119 & 123.
10Ibid, at 250 & 268.
11Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Food and Agriculture Organization (last updated Nov. 16, 2017), available at [PSMA], at 2.
12Law No. 6 of 1996 on Indonesian Waters (State Gazette Year 1996 No. 73, Supplementary State Gazette No. 3647) [Waters Law].
13Government Regulation No. 36 of 2002 on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Vessels in Making an Innocent Passage through Indonesian Waters (State Gazette Year 2002 No. 70, Supplementary State Gazette No. 4209) [GR 36/2002].
14Government Regulation No. 37 of 2002 on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Vessels and Aircraft in Making an Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage through the Designated Archipelagic Sea Lanes (State Gazette Year 2002 No. 71, Supplementary State Gazette No. 4210) [GR 37/2002]. Indonesia’s current archipelagic sea lanes were partially designated. Infra note 168.
15These pieces of legislation govern various subject-matters, such as territorial waters, archipelagic waters, exclusive economic zone, innocent passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage, in a very similar manner to how they are governed under UNCLOS.
16Government Regulation No. 21 of 2010 on the Protection of the Maritime Environment (State Gazette Year 2010 No. 27, Supplementary State Gazette No. 5109).
17For instance, the wording of Article 30(2) of the said Government Regulation is mostly the same as the provision under Article VII(1) of the CLC.
18Law No. 17 of 2008 on Shipping (State Gazette Year 2008 No. 64, Supplementary State Gazette No. 4849) [Shipping Law].
19Ibid, Chapters VIXIII.
20Ibid, Chapter XVII.
21Ibid, Chapter XI.
22Ibid, Chapter XV.
23These punishments may be imposed, for instance, on maritime transport operators who do not have their liabilities insured. Ibid, art. 292.
24This punishment may be imposed on anyone who deliberately damages navigational or communication instruments or facilities resulting in a marine incident and death. Ibid, art. 316(1)(c).
25This may be imposed on those who discharge waste, ballast water, and other substances into the water resulting in a death. Ibid, art. 325(3).
26Indonesian Penal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht), Staatsblad 1915 No. 732, Chapter XXIX on Maritime Crimes [Penal Code], arts. 438–479.
27Law No. 32 of 2014 on Ocean Affairs (State Gazette Year 2014 No. 294, Supplementary State Gazette No. 5603) [Ocean Law].
28Waters Law, supra note 12.
29Law No. 5 of 1983 on the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (State Gazette Year 1983 No. 44, Supplementary State Gazette No. 3260).
30GR 36/2002, supra note 13.
31GR 37/2002, supra note 14.
32Law No. 32 of 2009 on the Protection and Management of the Environment (State Gazette Year 2009 No. 140, Supplementary State Gazette No. 5059).
33Government Regulation No. 19 of 1999 on the Control of Marine Pollution and/or Degradation (State Gazette Year 1999 No. 32, Supplementary State Gazette No. 3816).
34Law No. 27 of 2007 on the Management of Coastal Areas and Small Islands (State Gazette Year 2007 No. 84, Supplementary State Gazette No. 4739), as amended by Law No. 1 of 2014 (State Gazette Year 2014 No. 2, Supplementary State Gazette No. 5490).
35Law No. 31 of 2004 on Fisheries (State Gazette Year 2014 No. 118, Supplementary State Gazette No. 4433), as amended by Law No. 45 of 2009 (State Gazette Year 2009 No. 154, Supplementary State Gazette No. 5073) [Fisheries Law].
36For example, Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Regulation [MMAF Regulation] No. 57/PERMEN-KP/2014 concerning the prohibition on transhipment; MMAF Regulation No. 35/PERMEN-KP/2015 concerning the protection of human rights in the fishing industry.
37Fisheries Law, supra note 35, art. 27(2).
38MMAF Regulation No. 58/PERMEN-KP/2014 on the Discipline of Civil Servants at the MMAF in Enforcing Policies on Moratorium of Fishing Licenses, Transhipment at Sea, and Employment of Foreign Shipmasters and Sailors, art. 3(a)(1)–(2); MMAF Regulation No. 56/PERMEN-KP/2014 on the Moratorium on Capture Fisheries Licenses in the Indonesian Fishery Management Territory, as amended by MMAF Regulation No. 10/ PERMEN-KP/2015, arts. 1 & 2. Minister Pudjiastuti decided not to extend the moratorium after it ended on October 31, 2015. Irene Inriana, Menteri Susi Pastikan Tak Perpanjang Moratorium Kapal, CNN INDONESIA (Nov. 3, 2015), available at However, by virtue of the MMAF Secretary-General Letter No. B-195/SJ/11/2016 dated February 11, 2016, the moratorium has, in effect, become a permanent ban. KKP News, Penghapusan Kapal Eks Asing dari Daftar Kapal Indonesia, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Republic of Indonesia (Jun. 17, 2016), available at
40Presidential Regulation No. 44 of 2016 on the List of Businesses which are Closed and Conditionally Open to Investment, Annex III at 13.
41See Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Formation of Legislation (State Gazette Year 2011 No. 82, Supplementary State Gazette No. 5234), arts. 7, 8 & 9(2).
42KKP – DPR Bahas Rencana Revisi UU Perikanan, KKP NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017), available at
43Presidential Regulation No. 16 of 2017 on Indonesian Ocean Policy (State Gazette Year 2017 No. 32), as translated into English by the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, available at [PP 16/2017].
44Ibid, Annex I.
45PP 16/2017, supra note 43, art. 1(3).
46Ibid, art. 1(4). The Plan of Action, available at
47Presidential Regulation No. 63 of 2015 on the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 111), as amended by Presidential Regulation No. 2 of 2017 (State Gazette Year 2017 No. 5), art. 3.
48See Presidential Regulation No. 68 of 2015 on the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 132), as amended by Presidential Regulation No. 105 of 2016 (State Gazette Year 2016 No. 289), art. 3.
49See Presidential Regulation No. 19 of 2015 on the Ministry of Tourism (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 20), art. 3.
50Presidential Regulation No. 10 of 2015 on the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 11), art. 4.
51See Presidential Regulation No. 40 of 2015 on the Ministry of Transportation (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 75), art. 13.
52Shipping Law, supra note 18, arts. 1(64), 9(6), 28(1)(c), 71(4), 116(2), 133, 172(1) & 276(3), among other provisions.
53Ministry of Transportation Regulation [MOT Regulation] No. PM 189 of 2015 on the Organisation and Procedure of the Ministry of Transportation (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 1844), as amended by MOT Regulation No. PM 86 of 2016 (State Gazette Year 2016 No. 1012), as amended by MOT Regulation No. PM 44 of 2017 (State Gazette Year 2017 No. 816) [MOT Organisation and Procedure Regulation], art. 260.
54Public Relations Division of the Directorate-General of Sea Transportation, Indonesia Kembali Calonkan Diri sebagai Anggota Dewan IMO Periode 2018–2019, Directorate- General of Sea Transportation (Feb. 17, 2017), available at
55See Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 234/PMK.01/2015 on the Organisation and Procedure of the Ministry of Finance (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 1926), art. 689.
56Presidential Regulation No. 16 of 2015 on the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 17), arts. 3 & 22.
57Presidential Regulation No. 68 of 2005 on the Procedure for Preparing Drafts of Laws, Government Regulations in Lieu of Laws, Government Regulations, and Presidential Regulations, arts. 1(9), 7, 14–19.
58See Presidential Regulation No. 56 of 2015 on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 100), art. 5.
59Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation No. 43 of 2015 on the Organisation and Procedure of the Ministry of Home Affairs (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 564), arts. 284 & 330.
60Ibid, arts. 641(c), 650 & 651.
61Presidential Regulation No. 58 of 2015 on the Ministry of Defence (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 102), art. 3.
62The State Police is an executive organ because it answers to the President. Law No. 2 of 2002 on the State Police of the Republic of Indonesia (State Gazette Year 2002 No. 2), art. 8.
63Chief of State Police Regulation No. 6 of 2017 on the Organisation and Procedure of the Organisational Units at the Headquarters of the State Police of the Republic of Indonesia (State Gazette Year 2017 No. 558), Annex XVII, “Baharkam Polri”, at (1)(b)(3)(c)(5)(1)(iii)–(iv).
64The Navy is an executive organ because the Indonesian Armed Forces are commanded by the President in matters requiring the deployment of military assets, and are “under the coordination” of the Ministry of Defence in matters pertaining to defence policy and strategy, as well as administrative support. Law No. 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces (State Gazette Year 2004 No. 127, Supplementary State Gazette No. 4439), art. 3.
65Ibid, art. 9(b).
66See Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and Siswanto Rusdi, Maritime Security Agencies in Indonesia: More Not Merrier, RSIS COMMENTARIES NO. 001/2013 (Jan. 2, 2013), available at, at 1.
67Ocean Law, supra note 27, art. 61; Presidential Regulation No. 178 of 2014 on the Maritime Security Agency (State Gazette Year 2014 No. 380) [PR 178/2014], art. 2.
68Law No. 16 of 2004 on the Public Prosecutors’ Office of the Republic of Indonesia (State Gazette Year 2004 No. 67, Supplementary State Gazette No. 4401), art. 30(2).
69Presidential Regulation No. 90 of 2012 on State Intelligence Agency (State Gazette Year 2012 No. 220), as amended by Presidential Regulation No. 73 of 2017 (State Gazette Year 2017 No. 168), art. 3; Law No. 27 of 2011 on State Intelligence (State Gazette Year 2011 No. 105; Supplementary State Gazette No. 5249), art. 1(1).
70Presidential Regulation No. 43 of 2015 on the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law, and Security (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 83), art. 4; PR 178/2014, supra note 67, art. 1(1).
71MMAF Regulation No. 17/PERMEN-KP/2014 on the Work of the Fishery Supervisors (State Gazette Year 2014 No. 528), arts. 1(20), 3(3)–(4), 18(1)&(3), 19; MMAF Regulation No. 6 of 2017 on the Organisation and Procedure of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, arts. 536–537.
72Fisheries Law, supra note 35, art. 69.
73Ibid, art. 66C(2).
74Presidential Regulation No. 115 of 2015 on the Task Force to Eradicate Illegal Fishing (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 235) [PR 115/2015], art. 1.
75Ibid, arts. 1(2) & 4(1).
76They include the Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Finance, Centre for Reports and Analysis of Financial Transactions, State Intelligence Agency, and PT Pertamina (state-owned company trading in oil and gas). PR 115/2015, supra note 74, arts. 2(1) & 3(b).
77PR 115/2015, ibid, arts. 2–3.
78Ibid, art. 2(1).
79Ibid, art. 3(b).
80Law No. 2 of 1986 on the General Courts (State Gazette Year 1986 No. 20, Supplementary State Gazette No. 3327), as amended by Law No. 8 of 2004 (State Gazette Year 2004 No. 34, Supplementary State Gazette No. 4379), as amended by Law No. 49 of 2009 (State Gazette Year 2009 No. 158, Supplementary State Gazette No. 5077), arts. 3 & 6; Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court (State Gazette Year 1985 No. 73, Supplementary State Gazette No. 3316), as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 (State Gazette Year 2004 No. 9, Supplementary State Gazette No. 4359), as amended by Law No. 3 of 2009 (State Gazette Year 2009 No. 3, Supplementary State Gazette No. 4958), arts. 28(1), 31–31A.
81Fisheries Law, supra note 35, art. 71(2) & (4).
82Ibid, arts. 71 & 71A.
83Law No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court (State Gazette Year 2003 No. 98, Supplementary State Gazette No. 4316), as amended by Law No. 8 of 2011 (State Gazette Year 2011 No. 70, Supplementary State Gazette No. 5226), art. 10.
84Public Prosecutor v. Komarudin AKA Kama bin Mading, Judgment of the District Court of Kuala Tungkal No. 98/Pid.B/2007/PN. Ktl (28 Jun. 2007), available at, at 32.
85Penal Code, supra note 26, art. 439(1).
86Public Prosecutor v. Komarudin, supra note 84.
87Public Prosecutor v. I Gusti Ketut Gunawan, Judgment of the Mataram District Court No. 374/Pid.Sus/2015/PN Mtr (Jan. 14, 2016), available at, at 58–60.
88Ibid, at 63.
90Fisheries Law, supra note 35, art. 71. The Courts were established under the original Fisheries Law of 2004.
91Peresmian Pengadilan Perikanan pada Pengadilan Negeri Ambon, Sorong, dan Merauke, DATA TPP NASIONAL (Dec. 17, 2014), available at
92The other Fishery Courts are located in the District Courts of North Jakarta, Tual, Bitung, Medan, Pontianak, Ranai, Ambon, Sorong, and Merauke. Ketua MA Resmikan Peradilan Perikanan, HUKUMONLINE.COM (Dec. 11, 2014), available at
93Public Prosecutor v. Pham Phu Quoc, Judgment of the Tanjung Pinang Fishery Court No. 03/Pen.PID.Sus/Prkn/2013/PN.TPI (Jul. 2, 2013), available at, at 22.
95Public Prosecutor v. Pham Phu Quoc, Judgment of the Pekanbaru High Court No. 181/PID.SUS/2013/PTR (Jan. 8, 2014), available at, at 18–19.
96Public Prosecutor v. Isa Maulidin AKA Muhammad Iqbal AKA Lidin, Judgment of the Medan Fishery Court No. 21/Pid.Sus-PRK/2016/PN MEDAN (Jan. 10, 2017), available at
98MMAF Regulation No. 2/PERMEN-KP/2015 on the Prohibition on the Use of Trawls and Seine Nets as Fishing Gear in the Fisheries Management Territory of the Republic of Indonesia (State Gazette Year 2015 No. 31).
99Public Prosecutor v. Isa Maulidin, supra note 96.
100Public Prosecutor v. Isa Maulidin AKA Muhammad Iqbal AKA Lidin, Judgment of the Medan High Court No. 50/PID.SUS-PRK/2017/PT MDN (3 Feb. 2017), available at, at 11.
101Public Prosecutor v. Isa Maulidin AKA Muhammad Iqbal AKA Lidin, Judgment of the Indonesian Supreme Court No. 859 K/Pid.Sus/2017 (10 May 2017), available at, at 7.
102This Article essentially stipulates that port services in respect of ships, passengers, and goods include stevedoring services.
103Judicial Review of Law No. 17 of 2008 on Shipping, Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 74/PUU-VIII/2010, available at, at 92–93, paras. 3.17–3.18.
104Ibid, at 93–97, paras. 3.19–4.3 & 5.
105Judicial Review of Law No. 27 of 2007 on the Management of Coastal Areas and Small Islands, Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 3/PUU-VIII/2010, available at
106Adat communities practice adat laws, which are bodies of laws derived from indigenous/native customs. See Yetty Komalasari Dewi et al., Indonesian Legal System 2005, Paulus E. Lotulung et al., (Ed.), ASEAN Law Association – Legal Systems in ASEAN (Mar. 2005), available at, at 34–42.
107Judicial Review of Law No. 27 of 2007, supra note 105, at 158–165, paras. 3.15.5–3.15.10.
109Ibid, at 165–168, paras. 3.15.11–4.3 & 5.
110Shipping Law, supra note 18, art. 250.
111Ibid, art. 251.
112Ibid, arts. 252 & 245; Minister of Transportation Regulation No. KM.55 of 2006 on the Procedure for Investigation into Marine Incidents, art. 2(2); Government Regulation No. 1 of 1998 on the Investigation into Marine Incidents (State Gazette Year 1998 No. 1, Supplementary State Gazette No. 3724), art. 2(2).
113Shipping Law, supra note 18, arts. 220(1)–(2) & 221(3).
114Ibid, art. 254.
115Ibid, arts. 250(1) and 1(64); Decision of the Minister of Transportation No. KM 15 of 1999 on the Organisation and Procedure of the Court of Shipping Affairs, art. 1(1).
116See infra notes 124–128 and accompanying text.
117See supra note 111.
118See infra note 129–131 and accompanying text.
119See infra notes 124–128 and accompanying text.
120Shipping Law, supra note 18, art. 253(1)(a).
121Indonesian Commercial Code (Wetboek van Koophandel voor Indonesië), Staatsblad 1847 – 23, Second Book, Chapter III, arts. 341–394a.
122See Case concerning Collision between MV. Vishva Prerna and TK. Sahabat Kapuas Mandiri XXXII while Towed by KT. Mega Prima II, Judgment of the Court of Shipping Affairs No. HK.2010/48/XII/MP.14 (Dec. 19, 2014), available at [Vishva Prerna Case], at 32–34; see Case concerning Collision between MT. Norgas Cathinka and KMP. Bahuga Jaya, Judgment of the Court of Shipping Affairs No. HK.2010/34/XII/MP.12 (Dec. 11, 2012), available at [Norgas Cathinka Case], at 603–607, 610–612.
123Case concerning Fire and Sinking of KM. Ise Baru, Judgment of the Court of Shipping Affairs No. HK.210/12/IV/MP.17 (Apr. 3, 2017), available at
124Ibid, at 27–32.
125Ibid, at 32–34.
126Ibid, at 34.
127Norgas Cathinka Case, supra note 122, at 597–611.
128See ibid, at 603–607, 610–612.
129Shipping Law, supra note 18, art. 253(1)(b).
130Ibid, art. 253(2).
131Norgas Cathinka Case, supra note 122, at 612, para. V; Vishva Prerna Case, supra note 122, at 34, para. VI.
132Supra notes 111, 129–131 and accompanying text.
133Shipping Law, supra note 18, art. 256(1)–(3).
134Singapore’s Ministry of Defence [Mindef], Official Release, Fact Sheet: The Malacca Straits Patrol (Apr. 21, 2016), available at
136Ibid; Mindef, Official Release, Fact Sheet: Information Fusion Centre (IFC) (Feb. 13, 2015), available at
137See IMB Piracy Report Notes Decline in Piracy, ICC Commercial Crime Services, available at
138Koh Swee Lean Collin, The Malacca Strait Patrols: Finding Common Ground, RSIS COMMENTARY NO. 091 (Apr. 20, 2016), available at, at 2.
139Statement of Malaysia’s Navy Chief, Admiral Ahmad Kamarulzaman, cited in Melissa Goh, Joint Patrols in Sulu Sea to Start in April: Malaysia Navy Chief, CHANNEL NEWSASIA (Mar. 14, 2017), available at
140Francis Chan and Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines Launch Joint Operations in Sulu Sea to Tackle Terrorism, Transnational Crimes, THE STRAITS TIMES (Jun. 19, 2017), available at; Prashanth Parameswaran, What’s Next for the New Sulu Sea Trilateral Patrols?, THE DIPLOMAT (Jun. 20, 2017), available at
142Various commentators point out insufficiencies in Indonesia’s and the Philippines’s military assets and personnel. See J.N. Mak, ‘Unilateralism and Regionalism: Working Together and Alone in the Malacca Straits’, in Graham Gerard Ong-Webb (Ed.), Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006) 134 at 155–156; Angel Rabasa, ‘Case Study: The Sulawesi-Mindanao Arc,’ in Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA, 2007) 111 at 143–144, available at
143See infra notes 175, 184–188 and accompanying text.
144Mindef, Official Release, Ex Eagle Indopura: Singapore and Indonesian Navies Commemorate over Four Decades of Bilateral Ties (Mar. 5, 2016), available at
145Coordinated Patrol and India-Indonesia Bilateral Maritime Exercise Commence at Belawan, Indonesia, Indian Navy, available at
146Prashanth Parameswaran, US, Indonesia Launch Naval Exercise, THE DIPLOMAT (Sep. 12, 2017), available at
147The ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus consists of the ten ASEAN member States in addition to Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the US. About the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM-Plus), ADMMASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (Feb. 6, 2017), available at; Activities, ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Community Information-Sharing Portal, available at [AMSCIP].
148 AMSCIP, ibid.
149Navy News Service, Exercise Enhances Cooperative Maritime Security Efforts, U.S. Department of Defense (Aug. 21, 2017), available at; “Singapore Participates in Multilateral Maritime Security Exercise,” Mindef (Aug. 29, 2017), available at
150Information Division, Latma Multilateral Komodo 2014, 27 KRI dan 14 Kapal Perang Negara ASEAN dan ASEAN Plus Tiba di Perairan Batam, Indonesian Navy (Mar. 29, 2014), available at; NTB to Host 3rd Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo Event in 2018, THE JAKARTA POST (Sep. 19, 2017), available at [The Jakarta Post].
151Task Force 73 Public Affairs, Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo Kicks Off in Indonesia, United States Navy (Apr. 12, 2016), available at
152The next exercise is scheduled to take place in Lombok in May 2018. The Jakarta Post, supra note 150.
153The 1st ASEAN Multilateral Naval Exercise, ASEAN INTERNATIONAL FLEET REVIEW 2017 (Nov. 21, 2017), available at
155The Forum consists of the ten ASEAN member States, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, and the United States. About the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Regional Forum, available at
156ASEAN Regional Forum Work Plan for Maritime Security 2015–2017, ASEAN Regional Forum, available at, at 4–6.
157ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Three-Year-Work Programme 2014–2016, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, available at–2016%20(Final).pdf, at para. 3.2.1.
158About the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, available at
159ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (Jun. 23, 1999), available at
160Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (May 17, 2002), available at
161Ibid, especially at para. 3.
162Kuala Lumpur Declaration in Combating Transnational Crime (September 30, 2015), available at, at 2 para. 7.
163Member States, International Maritime Organization, available at
164SOLAS XI-2 and the ISPS Code, International Maritime Organization, available at
165Minister of Transportation Regulation No. PM 134 of 2016 on Ships Security Management and Port Facilities. The first preambular paragraph and Article 1(1) of the Regulation show that the Regulation was adopted to implement the SOLAS amendment on the ISPS Code.
166Indonesia and the International Maritime Organization, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in London, the United Kingdom (Dec. 11, 2009), available at
167SOLAS XI-2 and the ISPS Code, supra note 164.
168IMO Maritime Safety Committee Resolution MSC.72(69), Adoption, Designation, and Substitution of Archipelagic Sea Lanes (May 19, 1998), Annex: Partial System of Archipelagic Sea Lanes in Indonesian Archipelagic Waters, available at
169Decision of the IMO Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, 43rd Session, cited in IMO Resolution MSC.71(69) (adopted on 19 May 1998), Adoption of Amendments to the General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing (Resolution A.572(14) as amended), at preambular para. 3.
170Regulation V/10, 1974 SOLAS Convention, as amended, Ships’ Routeing, at 1.
171For further discussion on the Cooperative Mechanism, see Leonardo Bernard, ‘The Cooperative Mechanism in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ in Robert C. Beckman et al. (Eds.), Freedom of Navigation and Globalization, Center for Oceans Law and Policy series, vol. 18 (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden and Boston, 2015) 196.
172Establishment, Cooperative Mechanism, available at; “Contribution,” Cooperative Mechanism, available at; Bernard, supra note 171, at 212.
173Cooperation Forum, Cooperative Mechanism, available at; see Bernard, supra note 171, at 212.
174Project Coordination Committee (PCC), Cooperative Mechanism, available at; see Bernard, supra note 171, at 212–214.
175Aids to Navigation Fund, Cooperative Mechanism, available at; see Bernard, supra note 171, at 214.
176Contribution, supra note 172.
179Joshua H. Ho, Enhancing Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: The Cooperative Mechanism, 40(2) Ocean Development & International Law 233 (2009) at 241.
180Ibid, at 242.
182Contribution, supra note 172.
184IMO Straits Trust Fund, Cooperative Mechanism, available at
186Most of this came from Greece’s contribution of USD 1 million in 2008. IMO Straits Trust Fund, supra note 184.
187See e.g. Secretariat of the Aids to Navigation Fund, Marine Department Malaysia, Update on the Aids to Navigation Fund under the Cooperative Mechanism between the Littoral States and User States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Cooperative Mechanism (Aug. 31, 2012), available at, at para. 5.0.
188Hiro Yamada, Updates on IMO Malacca and Singapore Straits Trust Fund, Cooperative Mechanism (Oct. 2–3, 2017), available at
189BIMCO and the Maritime Authorities of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore (Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore), Safe Passage: The Straits of Malacca and Singapore (BIMCO, Bagsvaerd, Denmark), available at; see IMO, Ships’ Routing, 2015 Edition, 12th ed. (London: IMO Publishing, 2015), Part B, Section V.
190IMO Maritime Safety Committee, Resolution MSC.73(69), Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems (19 May 1998), Annex 1: Description of the Mandatory Ship Reporting System in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, available at, at clause 1.
191Ibid, at clauses 3.2 & 3.2(.4).
192Ibid, at clause 3.2(.3).
193Contribution, supra note 172.
194Supra notes 179–181, 186–188 and accompanying text.
195Establishment, supra note 172.
196Contribution, supra note 172.
198Ho, supra note 179, at 237.
199Contribution, supra note 172.
200Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore [MPA], News Release, IMO Fund Raises Straits Co-operation to a New High, (Oct. 14, 2009), available at
201Contribution, supra note 172.
204 MPA, supra note 200.
20617 Parameters – ASEAN Marine Water Quality Criteria, adopted by the ASEAN Environment Ministers at the 7th Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (IAMME) on 20 November 2002 in Vientiane, Lao PDR, available at
207 ASEAN Criteria for National Marine Protected Areas, available at
209Coastal and Marine Environment, ASEAN Cooperation on Environment, available at
210See e.g. ASEAN Discusses Coastal and Marine Preservation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (May 14, 2017), available at
211Aditia Maruli Radja (Ed.), Indonesia Hosts ASEAN’s Coastal, Marine Environment Meeting, ANTARA NEWS (Jun. 11, 2014), available at
212The other participants are Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste. About–History of CTI-CFF, Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security, available at
213Coral Triangle Initiative Leaders’ Declaration on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security, Manado, Indonesia (May 15, 2009), available at
214Agreement on the Establishment of the Regional Secretariat of the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security (Jakarta, Oct. 28, 2011, in force Nov. 20, 2014) [Agreement on CTI-CFF Secretariat]; Rules of Procedure; Staff Regulations; Financial Regulations, also adopted in the 3rd CTI-CFF Ministerial Meeting on Oct. 28, 2011 in Jakarta, available at
215About the Regional Secretariat, Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security, available at
216Agreement on CTI-CFF Secretariat, supra note 214, art. 3.
217Host Country Agreement between the Regional Secretariat of the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Privileges and Immunities (Manado, Dec. 1, 2015), available at
218Regional Plan of Action, Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security (CTI-CFF), available at, at ii–iii.
219Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, 50 Years Needed to Restore Raja Ampat Coral Reef Destroyed by Cruise Ship: Indonesian Minister, THE STRAITS TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), available at
220News Desk, Cruise Ship Smashes into Coral in Raja Ampat, THE JAKARTA POST (Mar. 13, 2017), available at
221AFP, British Cruise Ship Damages Pristine Indonesian Coral Reef, THE STRAITS TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017), available at
222Caledonian Sky Destroyed More Than 18,000 M² of Pristine Raja Ampat Reefs, Survey Concludes, THE JAKARTA POST (Mar. 22, 2017), available at
223Soeriaatmadja, supra note 219.
224Haeril Halim, Insurance Company to Pay for Coral Reef Damage in Raja Ampat, THE JAKARTA POST (Jun. 27, 2017), available at
225Fabian Januarius Kuwado, Kapolri: Nahkoda-Pemilik Caledonian Sky Terancam Pidana dan Perdata, KOMPAS.COM (Mar. 16, 2017), available at
227Haeril Halim, Indonesia Considers Taking Caledonian Sky Case to International Court, THE JAKARTA POST (Mar. 20, 2017), available at
228Fabian Januarius Kuwado, Kapal Pesiar Perusak Terumbu Karang Raja Ampat Kini Ada di Filipina, KOMPAS.COM (Mar. 13, 2017), available at
229UK Ambassador to Indonesia Summoned over Coral Damage, BBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2017), available at
231Ade Junida and Ade P. Marboen, Bahama Bantu Indonesia Investigasi Kasus MV Caledonian Sky, ANTARA NEWS (Apr. 5, 2017), available at
233Halim, supra note 224.
234Ibid; Damaged Raja Ampat Coral Reefs Require 100 Years to Recover, TEMPO.CO (Mar. 24, 2017), available at
235See International Criminality Unit, International MLA & Extradition Agreements the UK Is Party to, UK HOME OFFICE (updated Apr. 2016), available at
236See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Annex VI to UNCLOS (Dec. 10, 1982), 1833 UNTS 561, arts. 20–22.
237See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, Dec. 10, 1982), 1833 UNTS 3 [UNCLOS], art. 94.
238Supra notes 231–232.
239This section draws on Ikrami, supra note 1, at 318, 323–330.
240Witular, supra note 1.
241PSMA, supra note 11.
242See ibid.
243See Arifin Asydhad, Ratifikasi PSMA, Indonesia Makin Serius Perangi Illegal Fishing, DETIK FINANCE (Jul. 12, 2016), available at
244Joint ASEAN-SEAFDEC Declaration on Regional Cooperation for Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing and Enhancing the Competitiveness of ASEAN Fish and Fishery Products (Aug. 3, 2016), available at, especially p. 4 point 3.
245About SEAFDEC, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, available at; Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, available at
246Resolution on Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security for the ASEAN Region towards 2020 (Jun. 17, 2011), available at
247ASEAN Guidelines for Preventing the Entry of Fish and Fishery Products from IUU Fishing Activities into the Supply Chain (2015), available at, p. xi para. 2.
248For membership of the Forum, see supra note 155.
249Indonesia Chairs ARF Workshop on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia (Apr. 22, 2016), available at
250Istman MP, Jokowi Highlights Illegal Fishing in ASEAN Summit, TEMPO.CO (Sep. 7, 2016), available at
251Ayomi Amindoni, Jokowi Urges ASEAN, US to Combat Illegal Fishing, THE JAKARTA POST (Sep. 8, 2016), available at
252Tama Salim, RI Brings Struggle against Illegal Fishing to ASEAN, THE JAKARTA POST (Aug. 8, 2017), available at
253Joint Communiqué of the 50th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Manila, Philippines (Aug. 5, 2017), available at, para. 39.
254Joint Statement from the Republic of Indonesia and Global Fishing Watch, Inc. (Jun. 2017), available at [Joint Statement].
255Terms of Use, Global Fishing Watch (last modified Oct. 10, 2016), available at
256See About the Project, Global Fishing Watch, available at
257Task Force Combatting Illegal Fishing and Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Eradication of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) and to Promote Fisheries Crimes as a Transnational Organized Crime, United Nations – The Ocean Conference, available at; “About”, United Nations – The Ocean Conference, available at
258Joint Statement, supra note 254.
259A New Era for Transparency: First-Ever Public Release of Vessel Monitoring System Data, Global Fishing Watch, available at
260Muhammad Razi Rahman, Menteri Susi: Transparansi VMS Perbaiki Pengelolaan Perikanan, ANTARA BABEL (Jul. 6, 2017), available at; see Zulfi Suhendra, Menteri Susi Ajak Anggota PBB Buka Data Pemantauan Kapal, LIPUTAN 6 (Jul. 6, 2017), available at
261Galih Gumelar, Menteri Susi Kukuh Buka Data Kapal Meski Banyak Diprotes, CNN INDONESIA (Jul. 1, 2017), available at
262Robin McDowell & Margie Mason, Over 300 Slaves Rescued from Indonesia Island after AP Investigation into Forced Labor, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 4, 2015), available at; Robin McDowell, Margie Mason & Martha Mendoza, AP Investigation: Slaves May Have Caught the Fish You Bought, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 25, 2015), available at; Abby Phillip, Nearly 550 Modern-Day Slaves were Rescued from Indonesia’s Fish Trade and that’s just the Beginning, THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 10, 2015), available at
263Public Prosecutor v. Surachai Maneephong, Judgment of the Tual District Court No. 108/Pid.Sus/2015/PN.TUL. (Mar. 10, 2016), available at, at 99–101, 104–105.
264Ibid, at 101, 105–106.
265Elisa Valenta Sari, 77 Kuburan Asing Ditemukan di Lokasi Perbudakan Benjina, CNN INDONESIA (Apr. 7, 2015), available at; Elisa Valenta Sari, Benjina, Kisah Perbudakan Ratusan Nelayan di Timur Indonesia, CNN INDONESIA (Apr. 7, 2015), available at
266Public Prosecutor v. Surachai Maneephong, supra note 264, at 118; Public Prosecutor v. Hatsaphon Phaetjakreng, Judgment of the Tual District Court No. 109/Pid.Sus/2015/PN.TUL. (Mar. 10, 2016), available at; Daniel Leonard, 8 Men Sentenced to 3 Years in Jail for Enslaving Fishermen, THE JAKARTA POST (Mar. 11, 2016), available at
268Menteri Susi Ajak Negara ASEAN Cegah Human Trafficking dan Forced Labor, KKPNEWS (Aug. 15, 2016), available at
269International Organization for Migration, Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, and Coventry University, Report on Human Trafficking, Forced Labour and Fisheries Crime in the Indonesian Fishing Industry (IOM, 2016), available at
270See ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Kuala Lumpur, Nov. 21, 2015, in force Mar. 8, 2017), available at
271Asydhad, supra note 243.
272Prashanth Parameswaran, Indonesia Wants Global War on Illegal Fishing, THE DIPLOMAT (May 9, 2017), available at
273Dwi Atmanta, Minister Susi Ups Ante in Fight against Fisheries Crime at UN, THE JAKARTA POST (May 24, 2016), available at
274Parameswaran, supra note 272.
276Atmanta, supra note 273.
277Public Prosecutor v. Aan Hana Rambe AKA Budi, Judgment of the Central Jakarta District Court No. 1081/Pid.B/2016/PN JKT.PST. (Dec. 8, 2016), available at
278Penal Code, supra note 26, arts. 3–9, especially 4(4); Law No. 8 of 1981 on the Criminal Procedural Law (State Gazette Year 1981 No. 76, Supplementary State Gazette No. 3258) [Criminal Procedure Code], art. 86 and its Elucidation.
279Penal Code, supra note 26, art. 438(1)(1); see the charge against the defendant in Public Prosecutor v. Aan Hana Rambe, supra note 277, at 5–14.
280UNCLOS, supra note 239, art. 101.
281Public Prosecutor v. Aan Hana Rambe, supra note 277, at 59–64, 14–15.
282Ibid, at 10–11.
283Ibid, at 68.
284Public Prosecutor v. Aan Hana Rambe AKA Budi, Judgment of the Jakarta High Court No. 18/PID/2017/PT.DKI (Feb. 9, 2017), available at
285Criminal Procedure Code, supra note 278, arts. 244–258, 263–269.
286See Support for Reform of the Justice Sector in Indonesia (SUSTAIN), UNDP in Indonesia, available at; “Judicial Sector Support Program,” Center for International Legal Cooperation, available at
287The DSCG is within the purview of the Ministry of Transportation Directorate-General of Sea Transportation. MOT Organisation and Procedure Regulation, supra note 53, arts. 260, 384–385.
288See supra notes 62–67, 71–73 and accompanying text.
289Bartanius Dony, Polisi Kembali Tangkap 4 Kapal Vietnam Terkait Illegal Fishing, DETIKNEWS (Apr. 22, 2017), available at; Fajar Pratama, TNI AL Tangkap Kapal Ikan Berbendera Cina di Perairan Natuna, DETIKNEWS (Jun. 18, 2016), available at; Enni, Operasi Nusantara IV Bakamla Tangkap Tiga Kapal Illegal Fishing di Perairan Natuna, BAKAMLA (May 4, 2016), available at; Kapal Pengawas Perikanan Tangkap 8 Kapal Vietnam, Directorate-General of the Monitoring of Marine and Fishery Resources – Pontianak Station, available at; Director-General of Sea Transportation’s Notice to Port Masters No. 27/II/DN-15 on Vessels Suspected of IUU Fishing (Feb. 3, 2015), signed by the Director of Sea and Coast Guard, available at
290See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
291See Donny; Pratama; Enni, supra note 289.
292Ocean Law, supra note 27, arts. 61–63.
293Ibid, art. 59(3).
294Halimatus Sa’diyah, Bertugas Jaga Kemanan Laut, Bakamla Hanya Punya Tiga Kapal, edited by Esthi Maharani, REPUBLIKA (May 27, 2015), available at
295Suara Pembaruan, Bakamla Dapat Aset Awal 10 Kapal TNI AL, BERITA SATU (Jan. 10, 2015), available at
297Kristian Erdianto, Kurang Peralatan dan Personel, Bakamla Diminta Tingkatkan Koordinasi dengan TNI AL, KOMPAS.COM (Aug. 30, 2016), available at
299Supra notes 292–296 and accompanying text.
300Shipping Law, supra note 18, arts. 276–279.
301Supriyanto and Rusdi, supra note 66, at 2; see supra note 287.
302Abraham Utama, Tumpang-tindih Aturan Penegakan Hukum Maritim, CNN INDONESIA (Oct. 5, 2015), available at
303Compare Ocean Law, supra note 27, arts. 61–63 and PR 178/2014, supra note 67, arts. 2–4 to Shipping Law, supra note 18, arts. 276–278.
304Anggi Kusumadewi and Tiara Sutari, Jokowi Diminta Tak Pakai Kapal Perang Hadapi Masalah Ikan, CNN INDONESIA (Jun. 27, 2016), available at; Hadijah Alaydrus, Ide Jonan Membentuk Ditjen Penjagaan Laut & Pantai Dikritik, BISNIS.COM (Jun. 11, 2015), available at
305Muhamad Hilman, Sea Coast Guard Kian Mendesak, BISNIS.COM (Aug. 25, 2014), available at; Dirjen Tonny: Tak Ada Rencana KPLP Digabung Ke Bakamla, BERITATRANS (Aug. 17, 2016), available at
306“Sufficient preliminary evidence” includes evidence that the ship was caught red-handed fishing without a license. Fisheries Law, supra note 35, Elucidation of art. 69(4); Ikrami, supra note 1, at 322.
307Fisheries Law, supra note 35, art. 69(4); Ikrami, supra note 1, at 321–322.
308Fisheries Law, supra note 35, art. 69(1).
309Ibid, art. 5(1).
310Fabian Januarius Kuwado, Lagi, 81 Kapal Pencuri Ikan Ditenggelamkan di Penjuru Indonesia, KOMPAS.COM (Apr. 1, 2017), available at; Ikrami, supra note 1, at 322.
312UNCLOS, supra note 239, art. 73(2).
313Fabian Januarius Kuwado, Alasan Menteri Susi Tak Akan Berhenti Tenggelamkan Kapal Pencuri Ikan, KOMPAS.COM (Oct. 29, 2017), available at
314See Ambaranie N. M. Movanita, Survei Kinerja Menteri, Susi Pudjiastuti Terbaik dan Anies Mengejutkan, KOMPAS.COM (Mar. 22, 2017), available at
315Kuwado, supra note 313.
316Lilly Aprilya Pregiwati, Menteri Susi: Kenaikan MSY Salah Satu Manfaat Perang Melawan Illegal Fishing, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Republic of Indonesia (Jun. 16, 2017), available at; Ikrami, supra note 1, at 330.
318PDB Perikanan Meningkat Selama 2011–2015, KKP NEWS (Mar. 29, 2016), available at; Ikrami, supra note 1, at 330.
319Kuwado, supra note 313.

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