Introduction

Whilst direct access to the sea was advantageous for medieval commercial cities, reality was often different. Scattered across medieval Europe, trade hubs relied on outports situated closer to shorelines or riverways for market access. Merchants and their cargo had to pass through these ports before reaching the main commercial city, posing potential risks to the city’s commercial successes. Consequently, trade hubs sought to exert control over their outports. The complexities of these relationships have puzzled historians for decades. Sicking coined the concept ‘the paradox of maritime access’ to describe situations where commercial cities were less accessible from the sea as compared to their outports. Despite their more favourable geographical positions, these outports failed to capitalise on their advantages and remained subservient to the main city. Nonetheless, whilst direct maritime access could benefit commercial hubs, it also brought risks; for instance, shorelines were vulnerable to seaborne attacks¹.

Numerous examples from the late medieval period illustrate the paradox of maritime access. For instance, the city of Rouen grew dominant over Le Havre, and both Cádiz and San Lúcar de Barrameda served as subservient outports for Seville. This article scrutinises the case of Bruges, which dominated its outports in the Zwin estuary that, via a canal, connected the city to the North Sea². To reach Bruges, merchants’ freight had to be transferred into smaller boats at several locations along the canal, leading to the development of small towns (Mude, Hoeke, Monnikerede, Damme and Sluys (see map 1)). Bruges established primacy over these towns by acquiring rights to drainage and diking constructions in the Zwin and securing extensive staple rights. The city was also the legal head (hoofdvaart) over its outports³.

The paradox of maritime access, however, did not always persist. Geographical, economic, political, and technological developments could shift, or even reverse, the hierarchical dynamics between outports and commercial hubs⁴. The Zwin estuary, for instance, began to silt up shortly after it was created by a series of storm surges in the twelfth century, and this process continued over time. As ships grew larger over the course of the late medieval period, it became increasingly difficult to navigate the canal leading to Bruges. In response, the city invested heavily in its waterways and, in collaboration with the count of Flanders and the Four Members of Flanders (a representative institution of the cities of Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, and the rural but powerful Liberty of Bruges), initiated projects to improve accessibility to the city. These efforts did not pay off. By 1500, only very small ships could enter the Zwin⁵. Considering these environmental changes, Dillen argued that Bruges’ outport Hoeke managed to escape from the stranglehold of this metropole, as the Zwin silted up and the outport was no longer situated at the waterfront. Although Hoeke did not develop into a major commercial hub, its institutions developed around the domain of land ownership, enabling municipal officials to increase their power, compared to the period when Hoeke served as Bruges’ outport⁶.

However, Sluys, Bruges’ most important outport, retained its access to sea. Located directly on the Flemish shoreline, Sluys occupied the most favourable location of Bruges’ outports and had grown into a town of considerable size since its establishment around 1290. As such, the town posed the largest risk for Bruges’ dominance within the Zwin. By the late fifteenth century, when the Zwin estuary had become increasingly difficult to navigate, Bruges’ commercial success waned concurrently, largely due to the political instability brought about by the Flemish revolt against Maximilian I (1483–1492). Sluys, then, arguably became even more crucial for Bruges. With the upstream port towns along the canal to Bruges practically inaccessible, Bruges carefully maintained its dominance over Sluys, as ships could still dock there⁷.

Bruges’ authority over Sluys was never absolute. Especially during the late medieval period, the counts of Flanders wielded significant authority over the Flemish cities and frequently intervened in the dynamics between Bruges and Sluys. Like Bruges, Sluys, which was a city itself, received its own charters and privileges, that could only be granted on behalf of the count⁸. Conflicts between Bruges and its outport became common as Bruges regarded Sluys’ rights as infringements upon its own privileges. Litigation occurred regularly. Although Bruges occasionally faced setbacks, the city often emerged victorious, consolidating its dominance by securing favourable court decisions⁹.

During Bruges’ commercial decline at the end of the fifteenth century, Sluys secured a series of generous privileges from the count of Flanders, which had the potential to diminish the power disparity between Bruges and Sluys. Litigation ensued and many of the recently granted rights were revoked in favour of Bruges. Despite its own decline, Bruges managed to maintain its dominance over its outport by successfully challenging Sluys’ acquired rights through legal action. In 1566, Bruges further extended its hold over Sluys by purchasing the outport¹⁰. Although the conflicts between Bruges and Sluys have repeatedly been described in historiography, the legal aspects of these disputes received only scant attention. In particular, the legal battles during Bruges’ decline have been overlooked¹¹. This article examines these legal conflicts, shedding light on how Bruges maintained its primacy in the Zwin during a period of economic decline. I argue that the shrinking economic success of a commercial hub did not necessarily correspond to diminished control over its outports. The hierarchical dynamics between Bruges and Sluys were established in law early on, and Bruges continued to enforce them successfully. The conclusions drawn here offer a foundation for further research into the legal dynamics between Bruges and its outports.

In the context of the late medieval Low Countries, inter-city litigation has been extensively researched by Wijffels, who argued that smaller towns facing larger cities in court often struggled to achieve favourable outcomes. The clout that large cities wielded could disrupt the peace in the realm and posed a risk to the prestige of the courts, whose primary task was to administer justice whilst maintaining peace. Additionally, larger cities skilfully leveraged notions of the bonum commune and their previously acquired rights and privileges to their advantage. As a result, Wijffels argued that unless smaller towns could support their claims with regularly granted exemptions or were geographically situated at a strategic location, these towns had little chance of winning court cases against bigger cities¹². This article confirms that most of the above-mentioned factors played a crucial role in Bruges’ ability to uphold its dominance over Sluys. However, whilst Sluys theoretically held a strategic location near the sea, it was Bruges that successfully appropriated claims of authority rooted in geographical circumstances. Thus, although the paradox of maritime access is a concept invoked by modern historians to interpret self-contradictory geographical circumstances in the context of power relations, the situation that the paradox describes was already exploited in Bruges’ legal strategy to maintain its primacy over its outport during the late medieval period itself.

The notion of primacy merits some further explanation. In this respect, this article demonstrates that Bruges’ authority over Sluys should be interpreted in the context of late medieval manifestations of layered sovereignty. First and foremost, the approach in this article is inspired by Benton’s work on the pre-modern entanglement between geographical tropes and claims to sovereignty. Benton, albeit for the scope of European empires, highlighted that before the nineteenth century, factual territoriality was not yet the defining element of sovereignty. Sovereignty was a divisible quality and Europeans used fluid, strategic, and symbolic legal discourse in which geographical tropes featured prominently to claim authority. Additionally, sovereignty was layered: a variety of individuals and groups could carry delegated legal authority into empire¹³. The case under scrutiny here largely fits in this framework. Bruges did not own any of the harbour facilities or any significant area of real estate or land that belonged to Sluys yet was able to claim far-reaching authority over the city¹⁴. Additionally, following Pennington: ‘No institution in the Middle Ages possessed an unitary sovereignty; there were sovereignties’¹⁵. Different authorities, offices and levels of government coexisted, which could combine autonomy with delegated powers¹⁶. Given the fragmented legal and institutional landscape, these different sovereignties always overlapped with other jurisdictions¹⁷. For medieval France, Quaritsch highlighted that although the concept of sovereignty was attributed to the King of France, it was also used in relation to other high powers and officers. A baron, for example, could have sovereignty within his own barony, even to the extent that he could draft his own laws, whereas the King, at the same time, was sovereign over all¹⁸. Sovereignty, as a result, was connected to a myriad of different actors: Emperors, Kings, magnates, ecclesiastical institutions, the people, assemblies, and most importantly for this article: cities¹⁹. Whereas Bruges was formally subjected to the count of Flanders, the city, at the same time, experienced a significant degree of autonomy and used an array of different sovereignty concepts to exert its own legal status within the county. Although Bruges ultimately derived its authority from the privileges awarded by the count, these were regarded as a valid source for autonomous legal action²⁰. Thus, in Bruges’ quest for primacy over Sluys, central and urban sovereignties interacted, overlapped, clashed, and were, most of all, constantly negotiated.

The observations in this article are derived from various sources: privileges, city accounts, and court decisions. This article leans heavily on the source editions compiled by Gilliodts-Van Severen. As Bruges’ city archivist during the nineteenth century, Gilliodts-Van Severen made a significant contribution to the accessibility and interpretation of its late medieval records. However, some caution must be taken whilst using his published work. Gilliodts-Van Severen frequently translated or summarised original source material to contemporary language; mistakes cannot be ruled out. The source editions are not complete either; it is possible that more relevant information on the conflicts between Bruges and Sluys remains hidden in the archives. Furthermore, as most of the sources were drawn up by clerks, it is impossible to know how these sources reflect the literal claims of the involved parties, although it is likely that the arguments do touch upon their main standpoints. Lastly it must be noted that most of the used material stems from the side of Bruges. Unfortunately, Sluys’ city archives have heavily decayed throughout the centuries which complicates researching its late medieval legal and political institutions. The remainder of this article is set up as follows. In the first section I provide an overview of the earlier legal conflicts between Bruges and Sluys, as these play a role in the analysed disputes. The second part analyses the privileges that the count of Flanders awarded to Sluys around the turn of the sixteenth century. The third part of this article focuses on the legal conflicts that followed.

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Kaart van de Zwinstreek, Jan de Hervy, Musea Brugge via artinflanders.be, photographed by Hugo Maertens, public domain, labels added by author.

Citation: Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis / Revue d'histoire du droit / The Legal History Review 92, 3-4 (2024) ; 10.1163/15718190-20243405

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The counts of Flanders, urban privileges and early conflicts between Bruges and Sluys

Conflicts over privileges between Bruges and Sluys intensified shortly after Sluys, originally known as Lamminsvliet, was founded at the end of the thirteenth century. In 1322, Count Louis of Nevers (r. 1280–1322) granted Sluys the right to hold a market and build a crane. The town also gained jurisdiction over the Zwin waters. Some historians suggest that Nevers granted Sluys these advantages, and at times even encouraged Sluys to resist Bruges, in an effort to counterbalance Bruges’ growing power vis-à-vis the count²¹. These developments deeply unsettled Bruges. The city claimed that the measures of 1322 opposed its own privileges, leading to an escalation when Bruges’ militia attacked and burnt its outport in 1323. Under pressure, the count revoked many of the privileges that were bestowed on Sluys. Consequently, Bruges gained significant authority over its outport as it secured extensive staple rights, subordinated Sluys’ crafts to its own, imposed its own bylaws on the town and prohibited Sluys to build forts²².

In 1385, the rise to power of the House of Valois-Burgundy coincided with a revolt among the Flemish cities. The outcome of this revolt, once again, altered the dynamics between Bruges and Sluys. The new Count of Flanders, Philip the Bold (r. 1384–1404) granted Sluys the right to hold a fair and to seal cloth²³. Sluys also obtained comital permission to annex certain areas of the Liberty of Bruges. Supposedly, craftsmen residing in the annexed areas continued to follow the customs of the Liberty of Bruges. Bruges perceived this as a violation of the 1323 agreements that had subordinated Sluys’ crafts to its own. After enduring quarrels the count issued the verdict of Conflans in 1390, reaffirming the subservience of Sluys’ crafts to those of Bruges²⁴. These rights were largely reconfirmed in 1400. Thus, Bruges successfully reasserted its earlier dominance over its outport²⁵.

Yet, a period in which Sluys gained privileges followed. In 1416, Count John the Fearless (r. 1404–1419) allowed foreigners to settle in Sluys and exercise their craft provided they bought the citizenship of the town. The money earned came to the benefit of Sluys itself, as the town now struggled with mounting debts. Bruges protested, but its claims were dismissed as invalid²⁶. In 1419 and proceeding under the reign of Philip the Good (r. 1419–1467), Sluys obtained more independence from Bruges. Despite Bruges’ protests, the count continued to bestow privileges on Sluys, particularly in relation to foreign trade²⁷. When Bruges rebelled against the count in 1436–1438, he punished the city by granting Sluys new rights. During and shortly after this period the Council of Flanders repeatedly decided court cases in favour of Sluys, too, and the outport was no longer subjected to Bruges’ jurisdiction²⁸. In 1438 Sluys was even granted staple rights over several goods, including herring, wood, cork, pitch, tar, dry fish, and coal²⁹. Bruges, in turn, accused Sluys of abusing these rights and demanded the reinstatement of the privileges it held before the revolt. The ensuing disputes led to the verdict of Hesdin in 1441, where the count established regulations surrounding the staple and the relationship between the crafts of the two cities; chiefly in favour of Bruges³⁰. This verdict largely defined the relationship between Bruges and Sluys for the following decades³¹.

However, conflicts did not subside entirely, and Bruges continued its legal campaign against Sluys. In the 1440s and 1450s Sluys’ annual gifts of wine to Bruges were contested. Whereas Bruges (and especially it crafts) claimed that Sluys owed the city a certain amount of wine yearly; Sluys recurrently denied this. Although seemingly trivial, the ritual of wine gifting had an important symbolic function in the late medieval city as it was associated with honour, reciprocity, and prestige³². The (rejection of) wine gifts thus clearly demonstrate the tense relationship between Bruges and its outport. In the 1440s, for example, Bruges demanded an annual amount of wine from Sluys. When the latter refused, the city took this case to the Council of Flanders. Although the case was rejected, Bruges skilfully used the fragmented political-legal landscape and attempted to uphold its authority over its outport by bringing the case before the Parlement of Paris, which accepted it in 1444. This case ended with an agreement between the cities in 1447³³. The Parlement, during this period, repeatedly examined verdicts of the Flemish courts concerning the relations between Bruges and Sluys. In 1449, the barbers of Sluys appealed to the Parlement following a judgement of the Great Council regarding a yearly gift of wine to the Bruges' barbers. However, the original judgment was confirmed, a victory for Bruges³⁴. In 1456, the Parlement annulled a judgment of the Council of Flanders wherein it was denied that the Parmenters of Sluys owed taxes and gifts of wine to those of Bruges³⁵. In 1461, Sluys’ coopers appealed to the Parliament following a judgement in favour of Bruges at the Council of Flanders surrounding Bruges’ control over the craft. The Parlement confirmed the original judgement³⁶. Thus, despite Sluys’ efforts to dispute Bruges’ dominance and repeated favourable decisions of the Council of Flanders, the outport remained subordinate. If Bruges did not obtain victory within Flanders, it sought recourse elsewhere while exploiting the complicated jurisdictional framework it had at its disposal.

With the ascension of Mary of Burgundy (r. 1477–1482) as Countess of Flanders, Bruges gained even more control over Sluys. Many of the privileges granted by Philip the Good were revoked and Bruges regained its jurisdiction over Sluys. Although Bruges demanded Sluys’ subordination, the outport took some initiative as well. Supposedly, its magistrate was so corrupt that its inhabitants now preferred Bruges’ control to that of their own administration³⁷. Additionally, influence of comital officials in the port was reduced³⁸. After Mary of Burgundy’s death, Sluys experienced a violent chapter in its history. Mary’s husband, Maximilian I of Austria (r. 1477–1494), became regent of Flanders as their son Philip the Fair (r. 1482–1506) was still in infancy. Maximilian’s rule provoked widespread discontent among the Flemish political elite. When he refused to reconfirm the privileges granted in 1477 and engaged in costly military campaigns, a revolt, or downright civil war ensued (1483–1492)³⁹.

Throughout most of these years, Sluys sided with the rebels and thus, in a certain respect, collaborated with Bruges. Maximilian and his allies, repeatedly attempted to seize Sluys but were largely unsuccessful. A key figure in the defence of Sluys, especially in the later years of the revolt, was Filips van Kleef (1459–1528), Lord of Ravenstein. Initially a staunch ally of Maximilian, Van Kleef switched sides in 1488 after Maximilian was released from a months-long imprisonment in Bruges. Van Kleef had stood as bail, guaranteeing that Maximilian would honour the concessions he made to the revolting crowd whilst imprisoned. However, when Maximilian broke his promises and launched an attack on Flanders, Van Kleef joined the rebels and became the governor-general of Flanders. As the revolt dragged on, the rebels lost ground to Maximilian. Additionally, commerce in Flanders declined and by 1490, with Bruges cut off from its supply of goods, most rebels agreed to start peace negotiations. Van Kleef, however, was not ready to concede defeat. He blocked the Zwin’s entryways, leveraging Sluys’ strategic location. The port became Van Kleef’s last stronghold during the revolt but in 1492, it was surrounded by Maximilian’s troops and forced to surrender⁴⁰. This event underscores Sluys’ important military function. In addition to serving as Bruges’ main outport, Sluys repeatedly acted as the primary defensive point for maritime Flanders⁴¹.

In conclusion, Bruges generally managed to maintain a strong hold over Sluys throughout the centuries, even when different rulers of Flanders took measures favouring the outport as a counterbalance to Bruges’ power. The hierarchical relationship between the two cities fluctuated, particularly in response to political developments. However, Bruges consistently managed to regain its dominance over Sluys, often by employing legal instruments to its advantage.

Philip the Fair and Sluys’ privileges of 1498 and 1500

The disputes between Bruges and Sluys flared up once again at the turn of the sixteenth century, as the latter received a new set of privileges. Philip the Fair (r. 1494–1506) had become Count of Flanders in 1494 and visited Sluys in 1498 when the city declared its inability to repay its debts and interests on its annuities. Although Sluys faced financial difficulties throughout the fifteenth century, the situation had worsened due to the recent revolt. As urban dwellers during this time were liable in person and goods for their town’s debts, Sluys’ citizens could not continue their trade and other activities⁴². In response, the count granted Sluys a series of privileges and concessions⁴³.

The privileges proved insufficient. In 1500, after the people of Sluys once again turned to the count for debt relief, a new set of supportive measures was introduced. These privileges were justified by emphasising Sluys’ vital geographical location. The town, ‘historically one of the foremost small towns of Flanders and the best harbour of all lands’, had suffered greatly during the recent war. As the natural circumstances in the Zwin estuary deteriorated, there was an urgent need to save the town from total decay⁴⁴. It is important to highlight that the count had a vested interest in Sluys’ financial health, as the town had previously generated significant seignorial revenues for the counts of Flanders. Philip the Fair’s financial policies were largely focused on restoring these revenues; an improvement in Sluys’ financial position could help achieve this goal⁴⁵.

Among the privileges granted, the most drastic measure was a comital takeover of the town’s government and finances, which meant that Sluys practically belonged to the count⁴⁶. This provision must be regarded in a broader context. Around 1490, multiple towns in the Low Countries faced financial difficulties due to the recent political instability. Like Sluys, these cities had increasing difficulties to pay off their annuities. For instance, Leiden was nearly bankrupt and received permission to delay debt payments, whilst Haarlem had its statutes redrafted by a committal committee⁴⁷. Prins explained these concessions because of the centralising ambitions of both Maximilian I and Philip the Fair. The financial troubles among cities were an opportunity to challenge urban autonomy⁴⁸. Especially considering Sluys’ key role in the recent revolt, it is plausible that Philip the Fair saw fit to take over total control of the town. It is also possible that Sluys’ residents believed that placing themselves under the count’s authority would bring relief.

Further examination of the specific contents of the privileges granted to Sluys reveals their implications for the hierarchical relationship with Bruges. The measures roughly addressed three main areas: trade and crafts, debt repayments, and administration and governance. In terms of trade and crafts, the privileges allowed skippers to unload and sell herring publicly in Sluys; abolishing the requirement to bring the fish to Damme’s staple first⁴⁹. This change likely stemmed from ongoing conflicts between Damme and the count over herring trade privileges. Another possible reason for this shift was the significant economic growth that the herring trade had brought to smaller towns in coastal Flanders over the previous decades. Herring trade lured important foreign merchant nations to port towns whilst offering benefits to the local population too⁵⁰. It was likely anticipated that Sluys’ involvement in the herring trade would help revive the town’s economy.

Sluys also gained staple rights for coarse salt. When salt ships were too large to navigate the Zwin, skippers were required to unload in Arnemuiden (an outport of Middelburg in Zeeland) and transfer their cargo to smaller vessels for the journey to Sluys, whilst paying for the usual custom duties. Similar rules applied to other goods: all ships, regardless of size, were required to unload in Sluys, with exceptions for goods destined for Bruges, Damme, Hoeke, Monnikereede, and Oostburg as these were ‘free cities’ with their own staple rights⁵¹. These measures accounted for the changing environmental circumstances in the Zwin and ensured that ships would continue to dock in Sluys despite the silting process. Another provision aimed at attracting ships to Sluys was the extension of the period during which vessels could not be seized after arrival, from six weeks in 1498 to three full months in 1500. Additionally, those who wished to travel onwards through Flanders, including local merchants, were allowed to do so without being held accountable for Sluys’ debts⁵².

Yet, Sluys’ locals received additional rights related to trade and crafts. Local skippers and fishers were exempted from paying the wertghelt (a tax levied on fishers by brokers and hostellers who sold the fish)⁵³. The wertghelt had been a relatively high fee, which disadvantaged local skippers and fishers in favour of the hostellers and brokers, who represented the interests of foreign merchants⁵⁴. Other fees typically levied by hostellers for facilitating (foreign) business transactions were also reduced⁵⁵. Directly related to Bruges, every person was allowed to practice all crafts in Sluys, with some exemptions for drapery, without interference from Bruges. Given that many conflicts between Sluys and Bruges had centred on Bruges’ authority over its outports’ crafts, this provision was particularly bold⁵⁶.

Regarding debt repayment, policies were lenient, and debt also played a role in luring new inhabitants to Sluys. Debt acquired within four months before applying for citizenship of the town would not be enforced against the new citizens. Individuals applying for citizenship enjoyed the usual privileges of Sluys and could travel freely through the count’s realm and even engage in trade. Debts, however, had to be registered honestly and an eighth part of their total amount had to be paid back annually. Debts acquired after obtaining citizenship were enforced as usual⁵⁷. This privilege resembled a moratorium which was typically granted in a princely lettre de grâce⁵⁸. This is striking as debt imprisonment was still ubiquitous during this period, especially in Bruges⁵⁹. As such, Sluys was turned into a sort of asylum city to which debtors could escape by buying citizenship. Typically, individuals who requested asylum in such cities were traders who had previously operated in prominent commercial cities⁶⁰. Perhaps not coincidentally, the cycle of the annual fairs of Flanders, wherein commercial cities organized subsequent markets to attract a large number of traders, took place in the months before this provision was granted to Sluys. Cities were more eager to accept people of lower economic positions with their community when they needed a growing population⁶¹. This measure thus likely targeted traders who could, despite their debts, help revive economic activity in Sluys⁶².

In terms of administration and governance, the salaries of Sluys’ civil servants were reduced, the revenue was directed toward repaying the city’s debts. Anti-corruption measures were also implemented⁶³. The bailiffs of Sluys and Mude, comital representatives notorious for their dishonesty and close ties to Bruges, were barred from claiming rights on ships, herring, or other goods arriving in the port⁶⁴. The activities of other harbour officials were equally regulated and the captain of the castle of Sluys, an elite figure who, by virtue of his office, held an important military function in the defence of Flanders, was forbidden to resell wines, beers, meats, or other beverages of any kind. Instead, taxes on beer were lowered for ordinary inhabitants of Sluys⁶⁵. Yet, the most significant administrative change was the merger of the legal apparatus of Sluys and Mude. From 20 June 1500 onwards, the merged system consisted of two mayors and seven councillors, chosen from among the residents of these towns or from respected inhabitants of Bruges and the Franc of Bruges⁶⁶. This move must have been a thorn in the side of Bruges especially, as Mude’s aldermen had held significant jurisdiction on the Zwin water in the form of the waterrecht⁶⁷.

Whilst these privileges should be viewed in the broader context of the count’s efforts to revive the Zwin area – Philip the Fair also granted privileges to Bruges to boost commerce – they clearly provided Sluys with an opportunity to acquire increased independence from Bruges, challenging the hierarchical relationship between the two towns, and by consequence, Bruges’ longstanding primacy over its outport. Unlike earlier privileges granted to Sluys, the measures, probably drafted whilst considering the decline in international trade, now targeted a wider, more ‘ordinary’ public. Sluys’ locals were encouraged to participate in trade and crafts, whereas more ‘elite groups’ were disadvantaged. Although the provisions built on older disputes, such as the herring staple, the conditions under which the new privileges were granted clearly accounted for the changing circumstances in the Zwin area. The requirement to use vessels that could still navigate the silted-up area around Sluys testifies that the environmental changes were considered too. As Sluys was the only city in the Zwin still accessible to seagoing vessels, these measures were likely intended to strengthen its position, so that it could continue to fulfil this crucial function in Flanders. However, as will be shown, Bruges did not agree with this assessment, and contested the privileges granted to Sluys.

Bruges reclaims primacy over Sluys

Shortly after Sluys received its new privileges, legal conflicts with Bruges escalated to the Council of Flanders and the Great Council. This process appears to have significantly accelerated after Philip the Fair had died and Maximilian, as custodian for his grandson Charles V, resumed control once again. The timing of the conflicts may be explained by the fact that when a new ruler ascended the throne, he was expected to pledge to the previous customs and privileges⁶⁸. In these legal battles, Bruges was notably successful in reversing the concessions granted to Sluys. This section examines how Bruges managed to win these cases despite its own decline. In contrast to some of the earlier disputes between the two cities, relationships to the count appear to have played a lesser role. Both cities, for example, had revolted in the war against Maximilian and peace within Flanders had returned in the meantime. Therefore, this section seeks to uncover underlying factors that influenced the outcomes of these legal conflicts.

On 3 November 1506, the board of Bruges’ Cloth Hall, supported by the city’s magistrate, appeared before the Council of Flanders in a case against the cloth merchants of Sluys. Bruges argued that Sluys’ cloth merchants had overstepped their privileges by violating restrictions on drapery production and trade. To support their claim, the plaintiffs referred to the conditions in the verdicts of Conflans and Hesdin, which imposed strict limitations on Sluys’ participation in the drapery industry. In response, Sluys’ cloth merchants invoked the recently granted privilege allowing them to participate in all crafts without interference from Bruges, asserting that ‘once a city was granted privileges by the count to promote its welfare, those privileges could not be revoked’⁶⁹. Although the relevant privilege included some limitations for the drapery sector of Sluys, the defendants claimed that they were merely adhering to their longstanding customs and that no violation had occurred. Despite this defence, Bruges won the case⁷⁰.

In this dispute, both Bruges’ and Sluys’ cloth merchants relied on the authority of the count, recognizing him as the granter of indefinite privileges. Bruges clung to its long-standing privileges, which it fiercely protected as the city declined⁷¹. Sluys, conversely, defended itself using the privileges recently granted. Two points clarify how these claims should be understood. First, although arguments based on ‘ancient freedom and privileges’ were increasingly dismissed by the courts after 1477, the most important privileges – especially those of cities which held the power to disrupt peace within the realm – often remained uncontested⁷². This gave Bruges a clear advantage. The verdicts of Conflans and Hesdin were highly valued, and it was unlikely that Bruges would have these challenged without elaborate protest. Sluys held less leverage in this respect. Second, Sluys’ recently granted privileges surrounding the crafts, and especially those surrounding cloth, had always been contentious. Even in the 1498 and 1500 privileges, drapery production was subject to exemptions. It is possible that the Sluys’ merchants simply had exceeded their rights.

Although Bruges’ victory in this case was not unexpected, geographical references played a significant role in the arguments presented by both cities. Sluys emphasised its strategic location as a valuable frontier of Flanders, whilst Bruges highlighted its status as the ‘principal mercantile city of the West, had held this status for six hundred years and had since held the principal staple of Flanders, long before Lamminsvliet (referring to Sluys’ original name) even existed’. The city further claimed that ‘before the entrance of the Zwin estuary became associated with the city of Sluys, it had been linked to nearby places’, likely implying Bruges itself. The plaintiffs argued that ‘Bruges had always held authority and pre-eminence over Sluys’ crafts and had served as its legal head’⁷³.

Here, a connection between geography and claims to legal authority can be drawn. Bruges resorted to its seniority within the Zwin estuary as compared to Sluys. The references to authority (auctoriteyt) and pre-eminence (preheminencie) likely served to reinforce this argument. In ancient Rome, auctoritas referred to the de facto influence of a body or an individual. There was no formal legal measurement for auctoritas, but it was based on prestige, honour, and influence. The Senate, for example, held auctoritas. Outside of the political domain, the paterfamilias also held auctoritas. He acted as an auctor and gave legal effect to the acts of the partially incapable persons in his household⁷⁴. It is likely that medieval city lawyers trained in Roman law, such as the city pensionaries of Bruges, were familiar with this concept and used it to emphasise its de facto dominance over Sluys. Whilst the latter was a city with its own charters and privileges granted by the count, Bruges held authority over its outport due to its ancient status and its dominance over its crafts and legal apparatus⁷⁵. This becomes all the more likely whilst considering that in late medieval Flanders, a system of (feudal) male-line primogeniture was in place. This meant that the oldest son inherited the main estate, whilst the younger sons and daughters received only small endowments. The duty of the heir who enjoyed primogeniture was to take care of his younger brothers and sisters⁷⁶. Thus, as the firstborn within the Zwin estuary, Bruges’ power over Sluys’ was legit.

This case did not mark the end of disputes over Sluys’ awarded privileges. On 17 November 1506, just two weeks later, the count annulled the provision allowing indebted individuals to take up citizenship in Sluys. Bruges, supported by the other three Members of Flanders had complained about the generous debt policy implemented for Sluys. Many fishers and farmers from the Liberty of Bruges, as well as hostellers from Bruges, had taken advantage of this rule and migrated to Sluys⁷⁷. Hostellers, who acted as representatives for foreign merchants in transactions during their absence, were personally liable for their clients’ debts⁷⁸. Their migration to Sluys undermined the trust of foreign merchants in the hostellers and brokers of Bruges, leading to a further decline in trade. This, in turn, harmed the common good of the people of Flanders which was ‘one of the principal things on which the land of Flanders was founded’. The privileges granted by Philip the Fair were deemed ‘exorbitant and contrary to the nature, laws, customs, and privileges of the county of Flanders’⁷⁹.

The language used in this last argument connects to the concept of the bonum commune, which was highly valued in late medieval politics. Resorting to the bonum commune was a powerful rhetorical tactic that was frequently employed in inter-city disputes, particularly in quarrels over privileges wherein both parties, in principle, had a valid point⁸⁰. In the late medieval period (international) commercial activity was regarded as part of the notion of the bonum commune, as well as the safeguarding of peace, concord in the realm, protection of old rights, and regulation of food prices and a stable mint. Originally, this concept was primarily associated with urban politics, but over time the count was expected to safeguard the bonum commune within his realm. As such, it spilled into a more centralized concept; the count was sometimes even portrayed as the sovereign of the bonum commune⁸¹. Dumolyn argued that resorts to the bonum commune served as a tool of negotiation between the count and his subjects, notably the cities⁸².

Soon more of the 1498 and 1500 privileges were revoked. In 1507, Bruges submitted a case at the Great Council which eventually resulted in the annulment of the union of the law of Mude and Sluys on 22 January 1508. Notably, Bruges was required to financially contribute to Sluys’ legal system after this decision, as it could not sustain itself without aid. The annulment was justified by arguing that it violated Bruges’ staple privileges⁸³. Bruges defended its staple privileges extremely fiercely. Rejecting the cities’ rights in this domain could potentially disrupt the peace in the realm, which likely made it risky to judge against them. Bruges’ legal arguments referring to staple privileges in the context of dominance over Sluys were implicitly embedded in a claim to authority that was related to geography. The staple, after all, served to safeguard Bruges’ incoming trade while diminishing the commercial threat of its outports. The staple was intertwined with dominance over the city’s environment. De ruysscher has established that in the late fifteenth century, the concept of the staple of Bruges became increasingly linked to the term emporium. The concept iura emporia occurred in multiple legal documents and was derived from classical works. It denoted an attractive merchant city with a favourable geographical situation which included closeness to the sea. In this context, a certain people had only one emporium. The term iura emporia, in the context of Bruges and Sluys, thus implied Bruges’ dominance over the Zwin estuary, all the way to the shoreline⁸⁴.

The process of the annulment of Sluys’ privileges was not entirely linear. Maximilian reconfirmed Sluys’ privileges in the herring trade on 5 October 1509. These privileges praised Sluys for its harbour which was ‘supposedly famous all over the world, was the key to the border of Flanders, and had been rich in merchandise’⁸⁵. Sluys was one of the largest harbours of Europe in the fifteenth century indeed and was able to accommodate a large number of different ships⁸⁶. Now applying the bonum commune argument to Sluys, the privilege stated that Sluys’ decline was disadvantageous to the common good, as it was the harbour of Bruges. Once more, the reputation of Sluys as a key location was used to legitimize its worth of privileges⁸⁷.

This warrants some further attention, as it is here where the function of Sluys as a frontier and port city gains relevance. The notion of the bonum commune included the safeguarding of the realm, which Sluys’ function as frontier city related to. Like Sluys, different frontier cities in the Low Countries used this image in political and legal affairs. Amsterdam propagated its position as a frontier city when Philips the Fair visited the town in 1497⁸⁸. The small town of Gorinchem successfully used its key location in a court case against the five principal cities of Holland, securing a tax exemption due to its suffering during wars with Gelderland and Utrecht⁸⁹. Although Sluys’ privileges were justified due to its favourable location, I have found no evidence that the frontier and port argument worked it might have to its advantage in court cases against Bruges. In the 1506 case before the Council of Flanders it proved useless, and in a case before the Great Council in 1515, as will be outlined hereafter, the argument did not yield significant advantages either. How can this be explained?

As outlined in the introduction, a benefit for commercial cities using an outport was that such a port could provide protection against sea attacks. Already for Ancient Rome, Ostia was established as a colony on the shoreline because it could protect the city from danger⁹⁰. Contemporary authors described this phenomenon, too. For London, John Stow argued that its more inland position was beneficial because it was distant from enemies attacking from the sea. The inland position allowed the city to serve the realm best⁹¹. Thus, it was advantageous for important commercial cities to use outports. Although the relation between commercial successes and peace was embedded in medieval economic thought and by proxy in the concept of the bonum commune, Sluys’ position as Bruges’ outport likely weakened its ability to successfully invoke arguments related to its frontier location⁹². The argument might have been useful in cases directly related to (the consequences of) maritime defence, or in matters between the count and Sluys with the aim of justifying why the city was worth to help. However, in court cases that challenged Bruges’ trade privileges, these arguments merely confirmed the hierarchical dynamics between the cities.

Maximilian’s confirmation of Sluys’ herring privileges in 1509 also highlighted the worsening financial situation in Sluys due to the high costs of judicial processes following the privileges granted by Philip the Fair in 1498 and 1500. Damme now also sought to litigate against Sluys’ privileges in the herring trade. However, the Great Council had not yet made a decision and Maximilian confirmed that Sluys was still allowed to disembark, weigh, mark, and sell herring according to the customs of Damme, Oostende, and Nieuwpoort⁹³. Politically charged cases before the Great Council were often delayed⁹⁴. Bruges reacted furiously to this decision. The city felt ‘utterly trapped and hindered in its rights and privileges’. On 12 April 1510, the court preliminary decided that as long as the case dragged on, the privileges granted to Sluys would be halted⁹⁵. Eventually, the privilege was announced void on 15 December 1511⁹⁶.

Before this final judgment was made, Bruges paid a myriad of public officials, often of great social standing and educated in law, to further its interests in the case against Sluys. It is likely that a lot of lobbying went on in and around cases dragged before the Great Council⁹⁷. Bruges recurrently sent deputies to, especially, Brussels, to promote the cities’ cause in the case surrounding the herring staple of Sluys. The city’s lawyer Jacob Snagghaert, who had enjoyed a legal education, repeatedly travelled around Flanders in relation to the case. He was accompanied by several aldermen and mayors of the city who came from prominent families, such as the squire Jan de Baenst, a descendant of a long dynasty of administrators of Bruges with ties to the comital court. His grandfather had even served on the Great Council. The city’s pensionaries, who had enjoyed university training in (Roman) law also accompanied the embassies⁹⁸. The city had contacts close to the Great Council itself. James of Luxembourg, Lord of Fiennes, who was a chamberlain at the comital court along with Jean Carondelet and Nicolas Utenhove, both members of the Great Council, were mentioned in the city accounts for their extraordinary efforts related to the herring case against Sluys⁹⁹. This highlights the clout that human capital and urban networks brought. It is doubtful whether Sluys had access to the same networks, and by consequence, legal resources. Although the city still employed a pensionary in 1498, the court cases discussed here suggest that the legal means of Sluys were only barely sustained financially¹⁰⁰. Unfortunately, it is difficult to establish who represented Sluys in these cases, as many of its local archives have been lost, but it is likely that Bruges, despite its decline, simply had more resources left for successful litigation. Especially as Bruges had traditionally spent considerable sums of money to the cases in the comital court to defend their staple rights against the Zwin towns¹⁰¹. In this respect, another question that would warrant further investigation is what the exact relations between the count, the comital courts and the cities were during this period? After all, Sluys had managed to receive considerable privileges whilst the comital courts did not hesitate to announce these void following Bruges’ protest.

A final case consolidates the factors contributing to Bruges’ legal victories over Sluys. In 1515 the count had granted Sluys and Mude the privilege of voorladingh. This privilege granted shipmasters from these towns the first right to load and transport freight from their harbours, potentially reducing Bruges’ dominance over its outports. However, Bruges, unsurprisingly, sought to control the transport of goods within the Zwin itself¹⁰². Bruges, supported by the cities of Antwerp and Brussels, contested this privilege. The support of Antwerp is striking, as this was the city which surpassed Bruges dominant commercial position during this period. Commercial competition did not always prevent effective collaboration between cities where it concerned common benefits. The aldermen and council of Sluys and Mude brought the case before the Great Council¹⁰³. Before the case appeared in court, Bruges, again, sent embassies to promote its interests. Jacob Snagghaert and the pensionaries of Bruges recurrently travelled to Brussels where they propagated the city’s cause along with numerous members of the magistrate from prominent families and individuals with close ties to the Great Council¹⁰⁴.

Once in court, on 8 March 1518, the defendants argued that ‘the Zwin of Bruges, from which one could go to all kingdoms and districts of the world, had been a free harbour (a port franc) for all since ancient times’¹⁰⁵. The voorladingh had disrupted this freedom. As a result, skippers from Antwerp avoided the Zwin, since they were forbidden to load ships returning to their harbour. This harmed trade and the bonum commune of Flanders and of Bruges. This was especially true since merchants often requested the services of the skippers of Antwerp as they were exempted from a certain tax called gheleede. According to the defendants, the skippers of Sluys had also abused the right of voorladingh. The skippers supposedly left the harbour without fully loading their ships, which delayed shipping and resulted in losses for the merchants. To further support their arguments the defendants reminded the court that Bruges held jurisdiction in the canal which connected the Zwin all the way to Bruges. Additionally, Sluys still owed Bruges overdue custom duties. Denying the 1500 privileges, the defendants resorted to the sentence of Hesdin and once again highlighted that Sluys’ crafts were subjected to those of Bruges. As such, the skippers of Sluys should obey to Bruges to begin with¹⁰⁶.

In response, Sluys and Mude highlighted their function as frontier cities. The two towns further claimed ‘that they held the means and ships necessary for merchandise to be transported to all places so that no one was allowed to stop them’, referring to their favourable location on the shoreline¹⁰⁷. Additionally, the plaintiffs had only acquired the privilege of voorladingh because Bruges, Antwerp and other cities had similar rights. However, Bruges supposedly conspired in a pact with Antwerp and cities in the province of Zeeland. This alliance intentionally excluded Sluys and Mude, so that only foreigners could make money in the Zwin area. The plaintiffs went on and debunked the reports on delays and other difficulties caused by the voorladingh as the cities had constructed clear statutes regarding these matters. The two towns also argued that the Zwin did not belong to Bruges: ‘the nature of the sea was put in the hands of those of Sluys and Mude and it was them who held jurisdiction over the waters’¹⁰⁸. Again, this is an argument resorting to the self-image of the location of these cities, as the aldermen of Mude held jurisdiction over the water holding the waterrecht. However, this waterrecht was executed along with the water bailiff. This comital representative was, during this time, appointed by Bruges which resulted in the city’s increased interference in the interpretation of waterrecht. Additionally, the statement that the ‘nature of the sea’ was in the plaintiff’s hands was rather bold as the coastal line, including the mouth of the Zwin, was part of the Flemish stream (Vlaamse stroom) which formally belonged to the count¹⁰⁹.

Although the plaintiffs attempted to refute Bruges’ claims of jurisdiction over the Zwin, their arguments were far from foolproof. It is unlikely that Sluys and Mude strengthened their previous arguments by claiming that they held the right to do what favoured their own towns. This reasoning is especially striking as this went directly against the triumphant bonum commune argument, wherein particular interests of cities were propagated as necessary measures for the prosperity of the entire realm. In their reply, the defendants seized this opportunity to emphasise that the voorladingh of Sluys and Mude was something that belonged in the domain of private affairs and did not promote the bonum commune, but only the interests of some individual skippers. Now resorting to the count’s task to administer justice to safeguard the bonum commune, the defendants argued that ‘privileges granted by princes were not allowed to be detrimental to others, especially when it came to public affairs such as trade’¹¹⁰. Thus, the privilege of voorladingh as granted to Sluys and Mude should be revoked.

The defendants also admitted that Bruges used the voorladingh itself indeed. However, the ‘ancient laws of the sea’, were acknowledged when it came to the transport of freight between Antwerp, Zeeland, and Bruges¹¹¹. These ‘laws’ were recently re-evaluated and probably referred to the by-laws of waterrecht, which were recodified in 1510 after Bruges had obtained the position of the water bailiff and was not entirely knowledgeable on the rights and duties connected to this office, as well as the situation in Mude. The first acknowledged rule that was referred to was that all skippers that brought goods to a harbour, could load in the same city or area where they came from. The second was that no skipper could load in another port or city than the one he came from¹¹². So, what Sluys and Mude called an alliance, were in fact just old customs and thus, there was no real exclusion of these towns.

As Bruges and its skippers held property rights over the canal from Sluys to Bruges as well as over the inlet from where the Zwin merged with the sea, it was, according to the defendants, justified to invoke the privilege of voorladingh there¹¹³. These canals were owned by the city indeed¹¹⁴. On the contrary to this claim of ownership, it was once again emphasised that the Zwin and the harbour of Sluys was free (franc) since ancient times and had been accessible to all. The voorladingh could thus not apply there, as this would contradict the free status of the harbour¹¹⁵. There were some aspects of the Sluys’ port that connected to the late medieval notion of a free port. Free ports were often associated with a liberal policy towards settlement and trade to individuals regardless of their background. The absence of trade duties was also important. In 1479, the tolls in Sluys were largely abolished¹¹⁶. However, the Renaissance concept of the free port often served to suit people’s own purposes. There was no mention of the free port in grand legislation. It formed a flexible concept that actors strategically used when they sought to influence policy¹¹⁷. Labelling a harbour as a free port thus also serves as a tool to establish power in a certain area and could correspond with substantial benefits for the dominant actor involved in the negotiations¹¹⁸. Once more, Bruges managed to embed Sluys’ geographical location in an argument favouring their own cause. Antwerp further contributed to this plea by proposing that they used their right of voorladingh only on open sea and not ‘at the expense of those behind them who would lose their merchandise’ as was the case for Sluys and Bruges. The right of voorladingh in Sluys would be like granting it to Arnemuide. The latter was an outport of Middelburg, with a similar hierarchical relationship as the one of Bruges and Sluys¹¹⁹. The paradox of maritime access was thus clearly articulated in the legal arguments provided by dominant commercial cities. Finally, the court decided that the privilege of voorladingh too would be void¹²⁰.

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that even during its economic decline Bruges was able to retain its dominance over its main outport Sluys. The city successfully litigated in the different courts that were available for these purposes. Consequently, privileges which held the potential to lessen the hierarchical relationships between Sluys and Bruges were annulled. Sluys did not manage to diminish, let alone escape, the paradox of maritime access.

How can this be explained? Multiple factors which possibly played a role in Bruges’ victories came to light. First, the legal clout that Bruges had acquired as the main commercial city of Flanders, in the form of privileges and court verdicts (such as Conflans and Hesdin), was deeply consolidated. The courts likely realised all too well that denying big cities such as Bruges their privileges in cases against much smaller towns formed a risk for the peace within the realm. Furthermore, Bruges managed to retain its position by using networks that it had built up over the years, which involved the Members of Flanders as well as other important cities, such as Antwerp, in its court cases. Additionally, individuals, often educated in (Roman) law and with a long line of great social standing, were used. Bruges was also prepared to invest considerable sums of money in the court cases against Sluys.

It is unlikely that Sluys was able to call on the same resources. First, although the city had fallen in the hands of comital representatives and was recently granted new rights, the foundations of these privileges were not as deep-rooted as those of Bruges had been. Sluys’ urban legal apparatus was also in dire straits. Despite Mude’s support in the voorladingh case, as an outport, Sluys probably was not able to enjoy the same benefits that networks could offer as compared to Bruges. As Dillen argued, in maritime network theory older nodes generally have more links than younger nodes and successful nodes attract more links than unsuccessful ones; this seems to have applied to the cases of Bruges and Sluys, too¹²¹.

This article paid special attention the geographical arguments that Bruges used in its claims of authority over Sluys. In line with the paradox of maritime access, Bruges, despite its more inland position, managed to appropriate claims related to the geographical conditions in the Zwin estuary that suggested its dominance there. The exact elements of Sluys’ location that could serve Bruges (being a frontier city especially) became entangled with Sluys’ self-image in court cases, leaving a vacuum for Bruges to promote its dominance with arguments referring to geographical features that weakened the outports’ legal position. Bruges managed to flexibly connect contemporary symbolism, legal resources, and ideas on geography against Sluys. The city adjusted the position of Sluys as needed: in the 1506 case, the city claimed authority over its port by highlighting its status as the firstborn, whereas in 1518, it connected the concept of the freeport to Sluys, to overturn its right regarding the voorladingh. Tazzara argued that one’s ‘capacity to make economic arguments depended on his relationship to the regime and his mastery of the genre conventions associated with bureaucratic memoranda […] making some argumentative strategies sensible and other feckless’¹²². Bruges, as a city, clearly possessed this capacity within the legal domain by exploiting its previously consolidated networks, financial means and previously acquired legal clout. Its resorts to authority over Sluys were embedded in accepted symbolism related to geography, but also in other accepted legal sources and relevant notions of the bonum commune. From the cases in this article, it became clear that Sluys was not able to effectively argue before the court. It likely lacked the connections, personnel and legal know-how to invoke comparable sources; it did not master the conventions surrounding legal action as well as Bruges did. This contributed to its continued hierarchical relationships to Bruges, even when the latter lost its commercial attractiveness.

Finally, this contribution sheds light on the idea of layered sovereignty in the late medieval period. Bruges was able to uphold its own primacy over Sluys, by using the authority of comital institutions in its own advantage. Although the count had granted privileges to Sluys, that challenged Bruges’ dominance over its outport, the courts that Bruges had at its disposal were successfully used to overturn these central rights. The fact that cities were dependent on the count for rights and privileges in the late medieval period did thus not prevent a city with considerable clout such as Bruges to appropriate the count’s own instruments to claim its own legal primacy over areas situated in the landscape of fluid and overlapping jurisdictions that was late medieval Flanders.