Summary
This contribution examines the role of the city of Rouen in the co-ratification of the Treaty of the More in 1525. On looking into the deliberations of Rouen’s city council, this article provides a local perspective into the participation of cities in treaty processes, challenging the traditional view that such affairs were solely the domain of monarchs and their courts. This contribution analyses the correspondence of the Regent of France, Louise of Savoy, and the council of Rouen. The findings reveal how Rouen’s City Council balanced loyalty to the French crown with efforts to preserve local interests, using diplomatic channels and delaying tactics. This case-study illustrates the complexity of power politics in 16th-century France, where cities like Rouen played a significant, yet often overlooked, role in shaping international agreements. The article contributes to broader historiographical debates on the development of modern diplomacy and the agency of cities.
1 Introduction
In sixteenth century Europe, the role of the city within the emerging state was still evolving. In the Holy Roman Empire, cities like Frankfurt, Lübeck, and Cologne, known as ‘freie Städte’ and ‘Reichsstädte’, enjoyed significant autonomy within the Empire’s framework. Similarly, Italian city republics like Genoa, Florence, and Venice, were fully autonomous, forming alliances with and against each other, while engaging in relations with outside powers1. Although early modern French cities did not have the same level of autonomy, they still played vital roles in the kingdom’s judicial and financial administration. Important, fortified, and prominent cities that were ‘close’ to the French Crown were termed ‘bonnes villes’. These cities fulfilled various roles within the French kingdom2, the most remarkable one being a modest role in diplomacy, as this contribution intends to show. An example of an important bonne ville was the city of Rouen, located on the river Seine and the Norman coast. This article explores the diplomatic role of Rouen within the kingdom of France during the sixteenth century from the perspective of the city and its municipal institutions.
Rouen was administered by the ‘vingt-quatre du conseil’ or ‘council of twenty-four’. The Archives départementales Seine-Maritime keeps the so-called ‘délibérations’ of the council. For the period of 1404–1671 an index exists of the topics discussed by the council in Rouen that were deemed noteworthy3. Roughly between 1500 and 1600 four entries stood out among the more mundane city matters. These were references to the following treaties concluded between France and England, as well as between France and Spain: the renewal of the Treaty of Étaples in 1498, which had previously been concluded in 14924, the Treaty of Noyon 15165, the Treaty of the More 15256, the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis 15597.
The délibérations open a local perspective on the practices of early modern diplomacy in general, and more specifically on the role of cities therein. They also provide insight into the relation of municipal governments to the French royal authorities and give a local perspective of French foreign policy. This article aims to shed light on the understudied theme of municipal government in sixteenth-century France and its role in diplomacy. Moreover, the concept of ‘co-ratification’ will be explored.
2 Anglo-French relations in the sixteenth century
In the 1520s, the European diplomatic arena was dominated by three young monarchs, Charles v (1500–1558), Henry viii (1491–1547) and Francis i (1494–1547), who jockeyed for power and influence on the continent. An alliance of two against the other could upset the balance8. Francis clashed with both but, the complex relationship with Henry viii was marked by relatively long periods of peace between France and England. Peace was mutually beneficial, especially since Henry viii received a ‘pension’, or ‘tribute’ for ‘his’ crown of France from the French9. The Treaty of Étaples in 1492, concluded by Francis’ predecessor Louis xii (1462–1515), sought to normalize Anglo-French relations. The Treaty of Étaples allowed unhindered trade across the Channel and into the interior, which was crucial for a commercial city like Rouen10. Mollat describes a more than twofold increase of traffic between France and England between 1497–98 and 1508–09. This significant growth in Anglo-French trade is also confirmed by Giry-Deloison11.
However, by 1512 this traffic was obstructed by King Louis xii who obliged merchants to once again obtain safe conducts. This was a response to Henry viii joining the Holy League. England and France found themselves at war in 1512–1514. Meanwhile, Pope Leo x (1475–1521) saw the looming threat of the Ottoman empire. This prompted the English Cardinal Wolsey (1473–1530), Chancelor to the king, to broker a non-aggression pact among European powers, which resulted in the ambitious Treaty of London (1518). This treaty did little to curb the fighting on the European continent. In the summer of 1520, Francis i and Henry viii met in the Pale of Calais for the so-called ‘Field of the Cloth of Gold’. This rendezvous, engineered by the ambitious cardinal, was in tended to normalize the relations between the two kingdoms. While the Field of the Cloth of Gold was an ostentatious expression of wealth, outward cordiality, and mutual goodwill, Anglo-French relations quickly cooled again12.
In the late fifteenth century, the Italian War broke out, pitting France against Spain, and by 1522, England had declared war on France as well13. This conflict quickly became a debacle for the French, culminating in the humiliating defeat at Pavia in late February 1525. This battle saw Francis i captured by the Spanish and a great slaughter of French nobles reminiscent of the battle of Agincourt a century earlier14. After Francis’ capture his mother, Louise of Savoy (1476–1531), acted as the Regent of France in his stead and did everything in her power to avert further disaster and to keep her son’s kingdom under control15. Her main objective was to deliver Francis from Spanish captivity as soon as possible while simultaneously striving to end hostilities between France and England. As Henry viii and Charles v failed to cooperate militarily, the threat of a renewed English invasion still loomed large16. Eventually, peace with England was reached via the Treaty of the More, negotiated at one of Wolsey’s estates in Hertfordshire during the summer of 1525. On August 30th, 1525, ambassadors sent by Louise of Savoy arrived at an agreement with the English. Meanwhile, Francis i would be released from Spanish captivity in March of 1526, after signing the humiliating Peace of Madrid with Charles v.
Despite intermittently being hampered by hostilities, by the 1530s Anglo-French trade reached a high point, the English were regular visitors in Rouen17. The Treaty of the More certainly helped in this regard, as it secured Anglo-French peace from 1525 until 1544. During this period Anglo-French relations were good, while tensions between France and Spain were at an all-time high, as Francis i broke the Treaty of Madrid almost immediately on his return to France. This meant that the English could serve as intermediaries in trade between the French and the Habsburg Low Countries18. The Treaty of the More formed, in the words of Charles Giry-Deloison, ‘une alliance contre nature’19. As unnatural as this alliance might have been, it proved to be a boon to the merchants of Rouen.
3 Co-ratification and pre-Westphalian diplomacy
In the context of present-day international law, the presence of a clause in an international peace treaty requiring ratification by a city would certainly raise an eyebrow among legal professionals. The references to peace treaties in the sixteenth-century déliberations of the conseil of Rouen confirm that ratification in this period was not a matter exclusive to the state. Nowadays, a state indicates its consent to uphold the terms stipulated in a treaty by first having its representatives sign the treaty. Subsequently procedures of ratification take place in the national legislative body and thereafter the treaty is published in accordance with art. 102 UN Charter20. This modern approach to concluding and ratifying treaties has its roots in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which can be regarded as the cradle of modern international diplomacy and a milestone in the history of international relations21. Westphalia served as a watershed moment, which saw the creation of the modern nation state and a new equilibrium of power on the European stage22.
Lesaffer characterises the two centuries from 1450 to ‘Westphalia’ as a crucial transitional period in the development of the modern European state system and international law in general23. In the first half of the sixteenth century the last vestiges of the medieval European legal order had eroded, which paved the way for the modern sovereign state that would rise to prominence in the early eighteenth century24. The Catholic Church saw its influence decline, and along with it the ideal of the medieval respublica christiana25. Factors contributing to this shift were the struggle between the Christian monarchs Francis i and Charles v on the continent and the emergence of Protestantism, which meant that ‘Christian Europe’ was no longer unified under Catholicism26. As the spiritual leadership of the Pope over all of Europe diminished, so did the prominence and relevance of Canon law, which had been the corpus of rules that governed the relations between Christian rulers and kingdoms for centuries27. By the 1550s, Europe was left in a state of flux, in which the medieval legal order had collapsed, and a new system had not been fully established.
Another crucial factor was that the modern ‘sovereign’ nation state had not yet fully matured. According to Quaritsch, in the Middle Ages ‘true’ sovereignty and sovereign kingship did not exist, while following Pennington one can assert that it is more appropriate to speak of ‘sovereignties’ in the medieval context, since sovereignty existed in many different forms28. In the context of modern international law sovereignty is categorized into ‘external’ or ‘Westphalian’ and ‘internal’ or ‘domestic sovereignty’29. In short: ‘external sovereignty’ describes the absence of a higher political power than the sovereign ruler of said state, i.e. its independence from powers outside the state. ‘Internal sovereignty’ refers to the supremacy of the ruler over all other authorities within a given territory, i.e. to be the one that issues decrees30. However, this division only came into being after the sixteenth century. Moreover, since the ‘modern’ sovereign state was still developing in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, rulers of pre-modern states like Louis xii and Francis i did not enjoy the monopoly of representing their kingdom like their absolutist successors of later centuries. Since there was no monopoly, stakeholders like the nobility, clergy, and towns, had an important part in the treaty making process.
Treaties were still regarded as personal agreements of the ruler, more akin to a contract in private law rather than an agreement between abstract entities, i.e. states. Up until the seventeenth century, it was not self-evident that the heirs and successors of the signatory princes were bound to a treaty. Hence, explicit provisions were added to ensure their commitment to honouring the terms of the treaty31. Moreover, co-ratification was normal practice. Powerful actors within the kingdom were involved in the process of implementing treaties, be it political elites like nobles, high-ranking clergy like bishops and abbots, but also important cities, assemblies like estates and Parlements. All these actors could be named as conservatores, or guarantors, to uphold the provisions of the treaty32. Heirbaut describes the role of the medieval guarantor to a treaty as concomitant with feudal practice. In the High Middle Ages, in Flanders guarantors confirmed that their lord would abide by the terms of the treaty. Guarantors did not, in the sense of modern or Roman law, become liable to perform the obligation themselves. In practice, guarantorship meant offering counsel but could also extend to the refusal of military or monetary aid in case the lord entered a conflict with the treaty party. Guarantors could even support the other treaty party if their lords chose to disregard the terms of the treaty33. While guarantors had to swear to make the King uphold the treaty, it seems that guarantees in the Treaty of the More went beyond what Heirbaut describes for Flanders in the Middle Ages. In the Latin text of the treaty, the cities and magnates are not only held to ensure that Francis i upholds the treaty, but they are also liable themselves, sub hypotheca et obligacione omnium bonorum, if the treaty is not upheld34. In the case of the Treaty of the More this provision was extra relevant, because with the treaty came the obligation of an indemnity payment of two million gold crowns to the English.
The practice of co-ratification may therefore have been closer to the collective oath than to guarantorship in the feudal sense35. Indeed, the conservatores were treaty parties themselves, because they had to swear, observe, and fulfil all obligations specified36. Leveleux-Texeira describes the practice of oaths sworn in 15th century France by towns, burghers, magnates, and prelates, to abide by the terms of peace treaties, for instance after the Peace of Arras (1415)37. An oath thus sworn for a ‘stable’ and ‘firm’ peace, renders the burghers doubly responsible, on the one hand to ‘uphold’ the peace themselves and to ‘ensure it is upheld’. The object of the oath is the peace or ordinance, not the monarch itself, which demonstrates a shift from personal loyalty to adherence to legal acts. Leveleux-Texeira asserts that these collective oaths represent an immediate phase in the development of the state, the shift from personal loyalty to institutionalisation38. Co-ratification in the case of the Treaty of the More fits this mould, since a likely aim was to strengthen the entire realm’s allegiance to the treaty, especially relevant given the monarch’s imprisonment39. However, the co-ratification of the Treaty of the More goes beyond Leveleux-Texeira’s notion, because the co-ratifiers – the cities, nobles, and estates – could be confronted directly if a treaty were broken40. This view is shared by Wilandowski, who sees co-ratification by institutions, cities, and vassals as an additional safeguard, which also served the purpose of integrating said institutions into the framework of the agreement. Along with this integration, she describes the amalgamation of Roman, canon and customary law that governed early modern treaties, which is visible in the Treaty of the More. Additionally, co-ratification could be interpreted as a procedural safeguard and a ‘political ritual’, since ratification was usually accompanied by much pomp and circumstance41.
The practices of negotiation and the role of ambassadors should also be mentioned briefly42. In the early modern period, the figure of the ‘ambassador’ emerges as an official representative who enjoys legal protections43. Giry-Deloison sheds light on Anglo-French diplomacy, and the way ambassadors were endowed with certain powers by the monarch, since communication and travel were both slow and burdensome44. Primarily, ambassadors were given a letter of credence from their sovereign. This letter was accompanied by an instruction, which endowed the ambassadors with the necessary authority to represent their sovereign within the limits of said instruction45. Among these powers was the royal promise of ratification. The monarch would, in good faith, ratify everything that his ambassadors negotiated within the scope of their given powers46. While this seems unproblematic, the intricacies of early modern monarchy could considerably complicate matters47. Towns, provinces, estates, and individuals often held various privileges, which could clash with promises made by ambassadors, as they were not themselves involved in the negotiations. This, then, was another reason to have the stakeholders co-ratify treaties.
4 Rouen and its municipal institutions
One of the towns required to co-ratify the Treaty of the More was Rouen. During the reign of Francis i, Rouen was the second largest city in France and was referred to as a bonne ville, indicating its close ties to the monarchy48. Bonnes villes held considerable importance, as the chronicler Georges Chastellain (1405–1475) put it in the late fifteenth century: ‘Pour venir au tiers membre qui fait le royaume entier, c’est l’estat des bonnes villes, des marchans et gens de labeur’49.
Chevalier notes that between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, cities in France generally emancipated themselves, as they were largely left to their own devices. They became relatively autonomous subjects of public law, which meant that they could exercise police powers50. Among these bonnes villes Rouen was quite prominent because it had a permanent ‘sovereign’ court since 1499, the ‘Echequier’, which was later redesignated a ‘Parlement’ by Francis i in 151551. In terms of population, Rouen was second only to Paris, with Mollat estimating between 30.000 and 40.000 inhabitants in 1500–153052. Benedict puts Rouen’s population at approximately 75.000 during the 1550s53. Rouen served as an important entrepot for goods from the Iberian Peninsula to Bruges and the Baltic, as well as for goods bound for the British Isles, while its location on the Seine linked it to Paris. The city was dependent on trade and its domestic textile industry, which also leaned heavily on wool imports from the British Isles.
Rouen’s municipal government had changed since the late twelfth century. The ‘Établissements de Rouen’ (1170) had awarded the city a remarkable degree of municipal autonomy within the Duchy of Normandy. The city could nominate three candidates for the post of mayor, one of which would be confirmed by the Duke of Normandy, and later by the King of France54. However, as Normandy became part of France, French dominance curtailed this municipal independence, especially after the ‘Harelle’, a violent tax revolt in 1382. In its aftermath King Charles vi (1368–1422) all but abolished the ‘commune’ of Rouen, the city lost its legal status, privileges, guilds, and municipal government. The position of mayor was not reinstated until the late seventeenth century55. The city was left without a proper government for several years. After some time privileges were returned piecemeal (sometimes only after the payment of a lump sum by the inhabitants) and a new city government was allowed to form under strict royal control.
This new municipal government was known as the ‘council of twenty-four’ (vingt-quatre du conseil), though it did not always have exactly twenty-four members. The council was centred around the ‘bailli’, the royal bailiff, or, in practice, his lieutenant-general, as the bailli was often absent. He was assisted by six conseillers-échevins, municipal councillors. These were further divided into junior conseillers modernes and senior conseillers anciens. Other members of the conseil were the quarteniers, the leaders of each of the four quarters, pensionaries, and some other royal officials56. This structure of municipal government has been described as oligarchical, as only the members of the urban elites were allowed to vote. Once every three years they elected four new conseillers-échevins57. Each of the four quarters could nominate twelve men for the positions of conseillers-échevins, the outgoing conseil would then elect their successors from among the nominees58. Moreover, in important matters a grand conseil would be assembled; the council of twenty-four was then joined by church officials and other notables, mostly wealthy lawyers, and merchants. After Rouen was captured by English forces, after a drawn-out siege in 1419, the municipal government of the city was maintained. The English merely replaced key figures and royal officials like the bailli with loyalists59. When the French retook the city three decades later, the structure of the council of twenty-four was retained.
5 The road to ratification: the Treaty of the More in Rouen
5.1 Prelude: a king captured
By 1521, the Italian War had broken out, France clashed with Charles v over the Duchy of Milan. Charles v had formed a secret alliance with Henry viii. After a failed campaign to conquer Lombardy, Francis i crossed the Alps again in the autumn of 1524 and made the fateful decision to besiege Pavia60. This ‘Italian adventure’ ended in disaster, as Francis i became a captive of Charles v in the wake of the humiliating French defeat at the Battle of Pavia on 24 February 1525. News of the King’s capture reached the council in Rouen by letter on March 761. The letter, sent by the Regent, Louise of Savoy, was written by Florimond Robertet (1459/65–1527), a prominent courtier, administrator, and senior advisor. The news prompted extensive correspondence between the vingt-quatre du conseil and the Regent’s Council. All the letters received were likely summarized by the town clerk.
Louise’s meandering letter of March 7 touched on several topics. First, it instructed the council to publicly announce the King’s capture to the city’s inhabitants, who were praised for their loyalty62. It went on to warn the city of the threat of a looming English invasion of Normandy. A brief report of the battle followed, mentioning the deaths of Louis de la Trémoille (1460–1525) and the Seigneur de Bonnivet (1488–1525). The letter continued that the Regent would do everything in her power to bring back the King and work for the good of the kingdom and keep order. She asked the bonnes villes of the kingdom, notables and ‘l’estat de polletique’ (the body politic) to assist her in this endeavour and to resist any incursions by the English63. The letter digressed to give suggestions to preserve the moral character of the kingdom, reminding the conseil to enforce prohibitions on blasphemy and gambling (dice games and cards)64. The Regent also offered practical advice, instructing the city to set up artillery, such as cannons and harquebuses, and to further fortify the city by having able-bodied beggars dig ditches and build ramparts. She concluded her letter by expressing her hope that the kingdom would remain intact and that the King would soon be released, acknowledging the subjects’ love for their true and natural sovereign65. On behalf of the city, the lieutenant general of the bailli, Robert Langloys, reaffirmed the city’s loyalty to the crown and vowed to obey the Regent in all matters pertaining to the good of the kingdom and to defend the city66.
Meanwhile, French ambassadors had arrived in England by March 967. On May 28, another letter from the Regent reached the city, this time stating that the threat of the English invasion had dissipated. This was true, as King Henry viii’s ‘Amicable Grant’, a ham-fisted attempt to levy more taxes to fund an invasion of France, had only produced unrest in England. Therefore a meeting at the negotiating table served English interests better at that time68.
5.2 Negotiations commence
Over the course of the summer of 1525 Wolsey negotiated with the French ambassadors. One was Jean Brinon (?–1528), sieur des Villaynes, chancellor d’Alençon, who also served as the president of the Parlement of Rouen, and the other was Jean Joachim de Passano (1465–1551), sieur de Vaulx. The negotiations took place at Wolsey’s castle at the More, culminating in a treaty on August 30. The goals were to end hostilities, establish a defensive alliance with England and secure Henry’s assistance in persuading Charles v to release Francis on acceptable terms. Knecht argues that the English monarch required additional guarantees because the captive Francis could not sign the treaty in person69. The treaty applied to both kings, their heirs, and successors, as well as all their lands, cities, towns, vassals, and subjects. The Latin text of the treaty lists guarantors for the French side, including magnates such as Cardinal Charles Louis de Bourbon (1493–1556) and the Grand-Seneschal of Normandy, Louis de Brézé (?–1531), along with others like Guillaume Montmorency (1453–1531). It also names nine major French cities: Paris, Lyons, Rouen, Orleans, Toulouse, Amiens, Bordeaux, Tours, and Reims70. The treaty bound not only the municipal government but also the inhabitants of these cities, making them liable if the terms were to be broken71. As an additional safeguard, the treaty had to be registered and ratified by the Parlements of Paris, Rouen, Toulouse, and Bordeaux as well as the Estates of Languedoc and Normandy72. The French delegation at the More anticipated resistance to these guarantees early on, as indicated by their correspondence73. The ambassadors themselves served as additional guarantees, they had to remain in England until the ratification was complete. Letters requesting ratification were sent to all those mentioned in the treaty. While ratification from the nobles was swift, securing ratification from the various cities and the Estates of Normandy and Languedoc proved challenging74. The English monitored the process of ratification with keen interest, as evidenced by the correspondence on the matter in the ‘Letters and Papers Foreign and Domestic of Henry viii’75.
News of the treaty reached Rouen on October 4, 1525. According to the registers of déliberations, the council assembled in the customary manner to discuss multiple letters received from the Regent and from Louis de Brézé, these letters were dated September 14, 17 and 24, regarding the peace made with Henry viii76. The letters stated that the ambassadors had signed the peace and agreed that ‘les principalles villes de ce royaume’ were invited to uphold and observe everything that was contained in the minutes and would send letters to confirm, i.e. to ratify77. The council was reminded of the importance of said treaty for commerce and warned that it would not take effect if the city refused to confirm the promises made by the ambassadors78. The entry continued with a French summary of the main terms of the treaty compared to the full Latin text. The summary highlighted provisions on the cessation of hostilities both on land and sea, and the free trade that was particularly relevant for Rouen79. The treaty allowed merchants of both kingdoms to travel freely and to buy and sell all goods not expressly outlawed80. Letters of marque and counter-marque would be abolished, along with various tolls and taxes, for a period of fifty years. Prisoners of war would be returned. The summary of the treaty ends with a list of foreign sovereigns and dignitaries included in the treaty. The conseil responded by deferring its decision to another day, arguing that it was too important a matter to decide with only a small number of councillors present81.
5.3 Ratification, a drawn-out process
The previous letters allowed the process of ratification by the city of Rouen and the estates in Normandy to begin in earnest. The next entry, dated October 9, mentioned a larger assembly consisting of the conseil, and other city dignitaries, the centeniers, cinquanteniers and dixieniers among with ‘personnes tant nobles, gens de justice, marchands’, to elect representatives for a meeting of the Estates of Normandy, to be held the next day82. An extensive list of attendees follows, and three men were elected to represent the city at the estates to hear proposals from the royal commissioners. On October 11, another meeting was held to hear the city’s delegates report on what was discussed at the Estates of Normandy83. Another key aspect of the Treaty of the More immediately became known: France had to pay a large indemnity of two million écus and various other pensions84. The two million écus had to be paid to the English in annual instalments of 100,000 écus85. A large share of this sum, 637,340 livres, had to be paid by Normandy, including its most populous city, Rouen. A significant portion of this amount needed to be collected by November 1, within about three weeks86. The sureties negotiated by the English were the magnates and cities87. This might explain the subsequent reluctance to proceed with ratification. The lieutenant-general offered to reach out to d’Alençon, the ambassador and president of the Parlement in Rouen, regarding the matter88. New sessions of the Norman estates were planned for November89.
On October 13, the conseil met again, this time joined by church representatives, to discuss additional letters received from Louise of Savoy mentioning that Francis had fallen gravely ill in Spanish captivity90. The entry notes that prayers were offered, processions were organised, and a mass was held in the King’s honour for his recovery91. Nevertheless, it appears that the clergy’s efforts to help the Regent and the King were limited to prayer, as both Jacqueton and Prentout note that the clergy in Rouen refused to elect any delegates to the estates or consent to any treaty with the English92. The source stays silent for a while, making it improbable that an immediate decision was made. Jacqueton confirms that the city of Rouen took its time with the ratification process93. Meanwhile, Louise of Savoy was forced to obtain an extension of the deadline. Correspondence between Louise and her ambassadors shows desperation, as her ambassadors wrote on October 30th: ‘So, if the ratifications do not come soon, some other provision must be made for the November payment. Beg that the letter for the surety of arrears, and the gift to the Cardinal [Wolsey], may be dispatched, which they will not deliver until they obtain the English ratification’94.
The next assemblies on the matter took place about a month later, on November 10. The entry mentions summarized letters patent sent by Louise of Savoy to the city, dated late October95. The letter was addressed to ‘noz tres chers et bien amiez, les conseillers bourgoys et habitanz de la bonne ville de Rouen’96. Again, Louise of Savoy noted the importance of the ratification for the ‘tranquillity of the kingdom’ and to ‘help guarantee the deliverance of her son, our dear lord’97. She asked the city to honour the promises made by her ambassadors to the English, emphasising that this treaty was the only chance to bring about peace and tranquillity. The city was assured that they would suffer no damage or loss stemming from the treaty98. The letter was addressed to ‘noz tres chers et bien amiez, les conseillers bourgoys et habitanz de la bonne ville de Rouen’. A second letter dated October 24, reiterated the plea to comply with the treaty and to proceed with ratification as demanded by the King of England. In this letter, the Regent also promised to compensate the city and its inhabitants for any losses resulting from the treaty99. Louise begged the city to comply with the formalities of the ratification as demanded by the English100. In another meeting, which was also held the November 10, the ‘gens de l’eglise’ met joined by the council and numerous nobles101. During this session, delegates to the meeting of the Estates of Normandy were to be elected102. Not everyone seemed to be on board. Among others, Jehan Mustel, a royal advocate, suggested that discussion and election of delegates in such an important matter should be postponed to a larger assembly. Others agreed with this opinion103. This shared view prevailed, and a new meeting was planned for November 13th to elect delegates to the estates.
On November 12, a general assembly was convened in the city hall, presided by Robert Langloys, the lieutenant general of the bailli. Many churchmen attended, along with other citizens and inhabitants. Langloys reminded those present that the assembly was held at the behest of Madame Regent to obtain ratification of the treaty’s terms as promised by the French ambassadors. The earlier promise to indemnify the city for any damages suffered was expressly mentioned again104. Despite the promise to indemnify the city another obstacle to ratification quickly emerged: the terms of the treaty were written in Latin and the ‘communaulte’ of the city would require a French translation before being able to agree to any terms105. In the meanwhile, the council also wished to investigate the ratification proceedings in Paris106. As a result, ratification by the city council was pushed back anew. On the 13th, delegates were appointed, despite renewed complaints about the quorum from the clergy107.
A meeting held the following day, on the 14th of November, led to the first substantial discussion on the necessity of peace. A clergyman, monsieur de Berience, told the assembly on behalf of the Archbishop of Rouen that it was better to ‘fight with money than to spill blood’ and that ‘war hurts commerce and turns women into widows and little children to beggars’108. Therefore, he advised in favour of ratification. In this meeting, another letter from the Regent requesting ratification, dated a week earlier, was attached. In this letter, Louise of Savoy reminded the city the peace had been concluded and that it was promised that the bonnes villes of the kingdom would accept it. The good of the kingdom and ‘la chose publique’, as well as the deliverance of her son, the King, depended on the city’s acceptance to fulfil this promise. She asked the conseil to include the ratification as further specified in the letter109. If there was still any difficulty in proceeding with the ratification, she would provide additional reasons for doing so. Louise concluded by remarking that ratification would be a great service to the King110. The meeting concluded with the question if there were any more instructions, but there were none.
Then the record contains a gap, of about three months, from the middle of November until February 3111. Fortunately, the ‘Letters and Papers of Henry viii’ help fill this gap, as they contain the correspondence of Louise and her ambassadors and record the ratification of the treaty by various guarantors. On November 17th, a letter reached the ambassadors, informing them that the Parlements of Paris and Rouen still refused to ratify112. In a letter dated November 26, Louise of Savoy informed her ambassadors that the Parlement of Rouen had finally registered the treaty, but the Estates of Normandy had not113. Ratification was still not forthcoming, so she bid her ambassadors to ask Wolsey to extend the term for ratification until January 15 of the following year, while expressing concern that this delay might reflect poorly on the French114. A letter from an English spy in France, dated December 18, reports that Rouen and Normandy refused to provide the payment demanded by the Regent to pay the English115. On 27 January 1526, Louise of Savoy sent another letter to her ambassador, the chancellor d’Alençon, ordering that the Estates of Normandy be postponed to March116. On the February 3 we find the mention of a procession organised to pray for Francis’ release117. Preparations for a meeting of the estates in March were underway on February 28, when a congregation generalle de la communaute met to elect delegates118. March 2, the council met to discuss what was proposed at the estates119. Monsieur de Berience reported that the archbishop expressed the great love the King and the Regent enjoyed in Normandy, and that the King, who has recovered from his illness, requested a considerable sum of money to support him in his affairs120. However, there is no word on ratification in the account of estates. Only further mention that the estates wished a tax on wine abolished and that estates reported that certain bailiwicks lacked soldiers121. The following entry in the délibérations is after Easter, on 14 April 1526, which is later than Rouen’s ratification122. Because correspondence of Louise and her ambassadors shows that Rouen had ratified the Treaty of the More on 7 March 1526, as one of the three last cities to do so123.
5.4 Excursion: co-ratification in Lyon
The drawn-out process and sluggish of ratification in Rouen can be contrasted with the swift ratification by the city of Lyon, where Louise of Savoy had taken up residence124. Lyon decided on the matter of ratification in a mere three assemblies over the span of only one month. In the first assembly, held on 22 September 1525, a letter on the treaty with England signed by Robertet dated the 14th of the same month was recorded by the councillors of Lyon125. Just as in Rouen, a French summary of the terms was also recorded. Then follows a gap of about a month between receiving the letter and the assembly to call for the formal vote (October 20) on ratification and the actual ratification a day later. During this month, the councillors of Lyon met on other matters without discussing ratification. In Rouen, ratification was a recurring issue, even if various excuses were found to postpone it. This suggests that ratification in Lyon was more of a formality, mainly because of the proximity of the Regent. Moreover, as an important financial centre Lyon had strong ties to the crown, while Normandy was more ‘distant’, and strove to retain its particularities126. Lyon ratified unanimously, all votes being recorded as elaborate variations on consent, for instance, ‘passer et faire ladicte ratification selon la forme envoyé’, ‘le doibt faire merement et simplement comme madicte dame le mande’, or ‘faire et passer indifferemment sans aucune contordiction’127. In general Lyon seems more compliant and cooperative, for example Lyon’s council considered the consequences of a delay: the peace would be broken, and the King’s release could be delayed, which would reflect very badly on the city, a councillor remarked128. The council in Rouen did not share these scruples129.
There is also a palpable difference in the tone of Regent’s letters, she appeals more to pathos in her correspondence to Rouen, reminding the city of its duty to her son, the King. In Lyon, the council independently reflected on the matter, noting that withholding ratification could delay the King’s release and bring shame to the city130. This difference in tone, ‘asking’ (at times almost begging) in the case of Rouen versus ‘telling’ in Lyon, can be seen in both structure and contents of the letters. The very first letter addressed to Lyon starts with detailed instructions on the formalities regarding the signing and subsequent proclamation. The Regent instructed Lyon that the treaty had to be proclaimed on the bridges over the Saône River, fires had to be lit and the following Sunday a procession généralle had to be held to mark the auspicious event131. In Rouen Louise had to negotiate and make promises, for instance to fully indemnify the city for any costs incurred132.
Furthermore, Lyon received a Latin instrument of ratification that had supposedly been used to ratify the treaty in Paris133. This text instructed all other cities to ratify the treaty in the same manner as Paris, without any change or deviation134. But this ‘Parisian instrument of ratification’ was either a deliberate fabrication or merely a model of a ratification since correspondence both between Louise and her ambassadors and between Wolsey and his English agents in France shows that Paris had in fact not ratified by late September and would remain quite obstinate135. In reality Lyon was the very first city to ratify the Treaty of the More, doing so on October 21. In Rouen we find only a passing mention of such an instruction136. In addition, the council in Rouen doubted that Paris had ratified, as it stated on November 12, ‘Et que cependant inquisicion seroit faicte de ce que la ville de Paris tenue a f[ait] ladit ratifficacion et obligation par lesdit traicte sur ce este fait ratifie ou oblige pour la prochaine assemblee’137.
Another remarkable difference is the role of the clergy in the proceedings regarding the ratification: in Rouen ‘les gens de l’eglise’ were present for most of the sessions. Another group mentioned in Rouen were the merchants. In Lyon there is no explicit mention of the clergy or the merchants, just the notables and masters of the guilds were called to assemble and vote on ratification. The large role of the clergy in Rouen can be explained that the clergy needed to send representatives to the Norman estates. Hence, they needed to elect delegates, which in turn slowed down proceedings138.
6 Analysis
This brief foray into the déliberations of the vingt-quatre du conseil in Rouen provide an original, albeit partial, perspective into early modern diplomacy and the practice of co-ratifying peace treaties. The perspective is inevitably one-sided, as the record, maintained by city clerks, reflects their inherent bias. Gaps in the record could to some degree be filled by consulting the ‘Letters and Papers of Henry viii’. The letters the city of Rouen received from the Regent had been paraphrased, and from the overall neatness of the text, it is evident that the minutes in the déliberations were curated with a degree of care. The conseil comprising both royal and city officials sought to portray itself in a favourable light, as loyal subjects of the King, while simultaneously striving to retain and assert the city’s privileges. The letters paint the picture of a desperate Regent, who tried her utmost to keep the kingdom together and to secure her son’s release from Spanish captivity. This correspondence serves as a rare testimony of the relations of the French crown with one of its chief bonne villes in a time of crisis and humiliation. The urgency of Louise of Savoy’s letters is contrasted by a tepid response from the city, especially in light of the response of Lyon. In Rouen Louise’s letters were dutifully copied and included, but a substantive response or a discussion of their contents are not recorded. Additionally, the city’s municipal officials and clergy did everything in their power to stall and obstruct ratification. There is a focus on formality, as seen by multiple interjections on the quorum of the requisite assemblies and postponing sessions without reaching any final decision or any attempt dive into the substance of the matter. Personal connections were also employed, as the lieutenant-general Langloys offered to reach out to ambassador d’Alençon, who was the president of the Parlement of Rouen139. Furthermore the city investigated the ‘supposed’ ratification by the city of Paris140. The insistence on a French copy of the treaty, requested only in November, when the first payment was already due, underscores this bureaucratic inertia. This inefficiency, deliberate or not, can be contrasted with the way in which other cities like Lyon, Toulouse, and Amiens managed ratification. For instance Lyon had complied, ‘comme madicte dame le mande’, withing four weeks upon receiving Louise of Savoy’s first missive at the end of September, while Rouen would hold out for almost six months141. The positions of various officials on the peace are not extensively documented during the proceedings, the notable exception being the brief plea of monsieur de Berience, who advocated for peace on the grounds that it benefits commerce and that war is inherently detrimental. Another notable aspect is the key role reserved for the clergy in these municipal proceedings. The clergy had to send delegates to the Estates of Normandy, however they were also present for a majority of the sessions of the conseil. Their attitude seems hypocritical, on the one hand they are the strongest objectors to the ratification by trying to block the convocation of the estates, while on the other hand they organized masses and processions for the King’s health142.
An explanation for these various ‘stalling tactics’ might be that a more overt or public declaration of dissent may have brought negative consequences, allegations of disloyalty or even treason, for the city and those involved in the matter once the King had returned143. Therefore, stalling and trying to unsuccessfully enforce a ‘formal quorum in such a serious matter’ might have had the same effect as outright refusal, while minimizing the risk of repercussions. Knecht suggests that the Regent’s Council later told Francis of the obstructionism in securing the obligations of the Treaty of the More and that ‘these acts required punishment’144. Despite that, there seem to have been no consequences for the city or the council of Rouen. However, this does not explain why we do not find a mention of the actual ratification in the délibérations in Rouen in March. After all, a late ratification is better than no ratification.
Taking a step back, this case-study tells us more about the development of the early modern French state and the relations between the Crown and mayor cities like Rouen and representative organs like the Estates of Normandy. There is a palpable and underlying tension, because not all state powers were in the hands of the monarch, making the promise of ratification unreliable. Louise’s ambassadors had promised the English ratification by principal cities and estates, without prior consultation of the city of Rouen and the Estates of Normandy. In effect Rouen was saddled with a burden: a promise was made on its behalf to function as guarantors for something over which they held little control, and along with it came a considerable financial burden and risk. Because according to the treaty, the city was liable, sub hypotheca et obligacione omnium bonorum, in case of a breach. The city officials found themselves in a bind, which might explain why they did not rubberstamp and draft a ratification at the first opportunity, but instead deliberated on the matter and postponed it to further reassess their position, even hoping the request would blow over or the payment be decreased. We must not forget that a lot of money was involved for Normandy and Rouen, more than 600,000 livres, while French finances were in a dismal condition145. This meant that new taxes would have to be levied, agreeing with ratification would be akin to agreeing with more taxes. Prentout delves deeper into the matter in the context of the Norman estates. He remarks that in the matter of paying for the peace, the Third Estate would be left holding the bag. The nobility was exempted from taxes and the clergy argued that it could not be made to pay any tax without prior assent from the Holy See. According to Prentout the Normans made the following argument: if the tax to pay for the peace is levied by force, ratification becomes unnecessary. In that case the Normans are no different from serfs and a serf cannot consent or ratify anything, after all consent presupposes freedom146. Prentout continues that an appeal was made to even convene the General Estates. He concludes: ‘Il montre aussi comment subsistait alors cette idée que la monarchie n’était pas absolue et qu’elle n’avait pas le droit d’engager la parole de la France sans le consentement des États’147.
7 Conclusion
The struggle for co-ratification of the Treaty of the More demonstrates that French royal power in the sixteenth century was still far from the supposed absolutism of later centuries and that the consent of regional estates and cities was necessary to govern. Certain aspects of the process towards the treaty are distinctly medieval: asking ratification of vassals or towns, having to explicitly mention that a treaty would bind heirs and successors. On the other hand, the demand for ratification by ‘representative’ assemblies, like the Estates of Normandy or a municipal government, can also be interpreted as the precursor of the modern ratification by a representative assembly. In other words, the involvement of representative and judicial organs marked a step in the transformation of treaties from personal agreements between rulers to treaties between abstract entities, i.e. states148. The state develops into an abstract institution, held together firm by an institutional framework of municipal governments, courts and estates, rather than relying on personal ties to the monarchs149. For the estates ratification was not a mere formality, evidenced by the argument made by the estates, summarised by Prentout as: no taxation without consent of the estates and consent requires freedom of choice150. Of course, one must beware of the pitfalls of anachronism, for sixteenth century municipal government and estates did not fulfil the same representative role as a modern elected parliament.
Within the history of international law, the déliberations on the ratification in Rouen offer an insight into early modern or pre-Westphalian diplomacy from a ‘bottom up’ or local perspective. It is testimony to the little researched roles of cities in early diplomacy and an excellent example of the rather obscure concept of co-ratification. As Lesaffer argues, co-ratification meant that internal powers (i.e. towns, magnates, and estates) would not only serve as guarantors but be bound directly by the treaty. The bid for co-ratification marks a distinct phase in the development of the early modern French state, in which internal sovereignty was still lacking151. The demand for co-ratification implies that important vassals, towns, and subjects were subjects of international law, in the sense that Henry viii had addressed them directly. These actors could, at least to some degree, act autonomously, albeit merely by withholding their expressed consent. The co-ratification of the Treaty of the More paints the picture of a space where sovereign powers are, to some extent, shared and exercised by national, local, and private actors. Louise and Henry viii’s agreement depended, at least on paper, on the consent of the cities and various ‘representative’ assemblies.
In contemporary international law, attention is shifting toward the role of non-state actors and cities. While traditional black letter international law has ignored the city as an actor, in the last three decades attention has shifted toward the city on the international stage152. Or as Blank puts it:
Yet, an undercurrent of the democratic conception of cities – of sovereign cities that are no mere administrative subdivision of their states and that possess authority over a wide range of issues – is perennial in international law. […] local governments throughout the world are appearing to gain independent legal status in international law153.
The role of cities as political and diplomatic actors becomes increasingly relevant as more than half of the global population lives in cities, many in ever expanding metropolises154. This shift is further influenced by the global push for decentralisation, which has elevated cities’ political clout on both national and international stages155. As Swiney notes, cities have gained influence as political actors, not only on the national but on the global stage, soft power156. Soft power is the ability to influence the actions of others without force or coercion, which can also be applied to non-state actors and cities157. This evolving perspective resonates with historical precedents: the role of cities like Rouen in early modern treaty ratification offers valuable context for understanding cities’ roles in modern diplomacy and international relations. The past thus provides an alternative lens through which to view the development of the post-Westphalian nation-state.
In the end, events overtook the need for co-ratification by the various guarantors. Francis i secured his release from Spanish captivity by signing the Peace of Madrid on January 14, 1526, he was set free on March 6 and coincidentally Rouen ratified the Treaty of the More a day later on the 7th. The Estates of Normandy never ratified the treaty and by March 17 Francis i had ratified the treaty himself, which satisfied Henry viii as the issue of co-ratification was not raised again158. Nevertheless, cities in early modern France did follow in Blank’s conception, in that they were more than merely administrative subdivisions. The cities were active participants, which is highlighted by the vastly different approaches taken by Rouen and Lyon. While Lyon opted for immediate compliance, Rouen tried to delay making concessions as long as possible to reassess its position. Not only by stalling but also actively employing connections between Langloys and d’Alençon, using what Swiney calls soft power, and independently gathering information on ratification in Paris to further its own goals. Goals that might differ from those of the Regent, monarch, and kingdom.
Notes
This article was written as part of the erc-funded project ‘Causal Pattern Analysis of Networked Economic Sovereignty’ (erc Consolidator Grant 101044356).
S. Neff, Justice among nations, Cambridge 2014, p. 75–77.
B. Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France du xive au xvie siècle, Paris 1982, p. 56–60.
3 e 1 /anc/ab – Extraits des délibérations et journaux – 1404–1671.
3 e 1 /anc/a9 – Délibérations communales – 1491–1501, fol. 288.
3 e 1 /anc/a11 – Délibérations communales – 1512–1520, fol. 62.
3 e 1 /anc/a12 – Délibérations communales – 1520–1527, fol. 379.
3 e 1 /anc/a17 – Délibérations communales – 1555–1559, fol. 302.
R. Knecht, Renaissance warrior and patron: The reign of Francis i., Cambridge 1996, p. 170.
G. Richardson, The contending kingdoms: France and England 1420–1700 in: The contending kingdoms, G. Richardson (Ed.), Aldershot 2008, p. 7; S. Gunn, Henry viii’s foreign policy and the Tudor cult of chivalry, in: François Ier et Henri viii, Deux Princes de la Renaissance (1515–1547), C. Giry-Deloison, R. Mettam (Eds.), Lille 1995, p. 27; doi:
M. Mollat, Le commerce maritime Normande au fin du Moyen Age, Paris 1952, p. 137.
C. Giry-Deloison, France and England at peace, 1475-1513 in: The contending kingdoms, G. Richardson (Ed.), Aldershot 2008, p. 43–47.
Knecht, op. cit. (supra, n. 8), p. 175; on the extreme opulence of the meeting see also: T. Schroder, ‘A marvel to behold’: Gold and silver at the court of Henry viii, Woodbridge 2020, p. 153–174.
Knecht, op. cit. (supra, n. 8), p. 178, 200.
R. Knecht, The rise and fall of Renaissance France 1483-1610, Oxford 2001, p. 117–119.
F. Rouget, Propagande et polémique après la défaite de Pavie (1525), Cahiers de recherches médiévales et humanistes, 32 (2016), p. 248–249; doi:
Knecht, op. cit. (supra, n. 8), p. 227–231.
Mollat, op. cit. (supra, n. 10), p. 141–143.
Mollat, op. cit. (supra, n. 10), p. 141–143.
C. Giry-Deloison, Une alliance contre nature? Le paix franco-anglaise de 1525-1544 in: François Ier et Henri viii, Deux Princes de la Renaissance (1515–1547), C. Giry-Deloison, R. Mettam (Eds.), Lille 1995, p. 53–62; doi:
A. McNair, The law of treaties, Oxford 1961, p. 129–131; A. Nollkaemper, Kern van het international publiekrecht, Den Haag 2004, p. 169–172.
L. Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, The American Journal of International Law, 42:1 (1948), p. 20–41.
D. Gaurier, Histoire du droit international, Rennes 2014, p. 368.
R. Lesaffer, Peace treaties from Lodi to Westphalia, in: Peace treaties and international law in European history, R. Lesaffer (ed.), Cambridge 2004, p. 11.
In this regard see also: Gaurier, op. cit. (supra, n. 22), p. 376–377.
R. Brand, Sovereignty: The state, the individual, and the international legal system in the twenty first century, Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev., 25:3 (2002), p. 281–282.
G. Mattingly, An early nonaggression pact, The Journal of Modern History, 10:1 (1938), p. 3.
Lesaffer, op. cit. (supra, n. 23), p. 12; Neff, op. cit. (supra, n. 2), p. 55–74.
H. Quaritsch, Souveränität, Entstehung und Entwicklung des begriffs in Frankreich und Deutschland vom 13. Jh. bis 1806, Berlin 1986, p. 34–38; according to Quaritsch the term ‘sovereignty’ itself is confusing in the French context since it had been in use since the 12th century as a rather generic superlative and later as a term for specific royal prerogatives; K. Pennington, The prince and the law, 1200–1600, Berkeley 1993, p. 31–33, 91–107. Sheehan describes that sovereignty appears more as a ‘basket’, of different rights, powers and aspirations, rather than the ‘monolith’ as it is depicted in theory, J. Sheehan, The problem of sovereignty in European history, The American Historical Review, 111:1 (2006), p. 2–3.
S. Krasner, Power, the state and sovereignty, Abington 2009, p. 184–186, 193–197; however, the idea of Westphalian sovereignty and the shift in diplomacy is contested, see: P. Piirimäe, The Westphalian myth and the idea of external sovereignty, in: Sovereignty in fragments, H. Kalmo & Q. Skinner (eds.), Cambridge 2011, p. 64–66.
Lesaffer, op. cit. (supra, n. 23), p. 13–14; M. Fowler, J. Bunck, Law, power and the sovereign state, University Park 1995, p. 4–6, 36–53; Krasner, op. cit. (supra, n. 29), p. 184-–186, 193–197.
D. Fedele, The medieval foundations of international law, Leiden 2021, p. 370–375; R. Lesaffer, Peace treaties and the formation of international law, in: The Oxford handbook of the history of international law, B. Fassbender, A. Peters (eds.), Oxford 2012, p. 81–82, This can also be seen in the primary source material: Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 380: ‘[…] Leurs hoires et successeurs leurs royaummes payz villes chasteulx sieurs places vassaulx et subgetz […]’.
Gaurier, op. cit. (supra, n. 22), p. 105; Lesaffer, op. cit. (supra, n. 23), p. 81–82.
D. Heirbaut, Over heren, vazallen en graven, Brussel 1997, p. 221–231.
E. Levasseur, Ordonnances de rois de France, Regne de François Ier, (Tome iv), Paris 1933, p. 104–105.
Fedele, op. cit. (supra, n. 31), p. 366; Fedele describes that the Northern Italian communes occasionally engaged in collective oath taking of the citizenry to ratify treaties made by a nuntius.
Levasseur, op. cit. (supra, n. 34), p. 104–105: ‘et eorum quilibet sive quelibet, premissa omnia et singula, in hoc tractatu specificata, fideliter observabunt pro parte sua et realiter perimplebunt, observabit et perimplebit, neque unquam eisdem contravenient ipsi, heredesve aut successores sui, curabunt, et quisque sive queque curabit’, C. Leveleux-Teixeira, Des serments collectifs au contrat politique, in : Avant le contrat social, F. Foronda (ed.), Paris 2011, p. 269–289; doi:
Leveleux-Teixeira, op. cit. (supra, n. 36), p. 269–289.
Leveleux-Teixeira, op. cit. (supra, n. 36), p. 269–289.
Lesaffer, op. cit. (supra, n. 23), p. 82; G. Wilandowski, Frieden schreiben im Spätmittelalter, Berlin – Boston 2017, p. 78. Leveleux-Texeira decribes that in difficult times, for instance between 1401–1415, the French monarchs were keen to use oaths to strengthen the symbolic bonds between the subjects and the monarch. Leveleux-Teixeira, op. cit. (supra, n. 36), p. 269–289.
Lesaffer, op. cit. (supra, n. 23), p. 19; G. de Flassan, Histoire générale et raisonnée de la Diplomatie Française, (Tome i), Paris 1811, p. 347; De Flassan decribes that in case of the Treaty of the More the cities had to issue a bond for the whole sum that was agreed.
Wilandowski, op. cit. (supra, n. 39), p. 78-79, 242; on ‘political rituals’ see, S. Lukes, Political ritual and social integration, in: Sociology, 9:2 (1975), p. 289-308. Leveleux-Texeira also mentions the formalities and symbolic acts surrounding the swearing of oaths throughout the kingdom, the use of special green seals and silk ribbons etc., which can be seen as an expression of ‘political ritual’, Leveleux-Teixeira, op. cit. (supra, n. 36), p. 269–289.
See also: D. Queller, The office of ambassador in the Middle Ages, Princeton 1967; doi:
D. Fedele, Plurality of diplomatic agents in premodern literature on the ambassador, in: Beyond ambassadors: Consuls, missionaries, and spies in premodern diplomacy, M. Ebben [and] L. Sicking (eds.), p. 41–43.
C. Giry-Deloison, La naissance de la diplomatie moderne en France et en Angleterre au début du xvie siècle (1475–1520), Nouvelle Revue du xvie Siècle, 5 (1987), p. 44–45.
D. Fedele, Naissance de la diplomatie moderne (xiiie–xviie siècles): L’ambassadeur au croisement du droit, de l’éthique et de la politique, Baden-Baden 2017, p. 233–465.
Giry-Deloison, op. cit. (supra, n. 44), p. 44–45.
A similar problem that Fedele describes occurs when an ambassador ‘oversteps’ the bounds of his instruction; Fedele, op. cit. (supra, n. 43), p. 265–280.
Chevalier, op. cit. (supra, n. 2), p. 8–9.
J. Kervyn de Lettenhove, OEuvres de Georges Chastellain, (Tome vii), Brussels 1863, p. 13.
Chevalier, op. cit. (supra, n. 2), p. 197–202.
The Echequier had much older roots, as an iterant court of Norman pedigree. Note the use of the adjective ‘sovereign’, Quaritsch, op. cit. (supra, n. 28), p. 27–32.
M. Mollat, Histoire de Rouen, Rouen 1978, p. 159–163.
P. Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, Cambridge 1981, p. 2-3; Mollat estimates almost 100.000 inhabitants in 1560.
See also: A. Giry, Les Établissements de Rouen, Paris 1883; Chevalier, op. cit. (supra, n. 3), p. 204–205.
Mollat, op. cit. (supra, n. 52), p. 123–125.
Benedict, op. cit. (supra, n. 53), p. 35–36.
G. Small, Late medieval France, London 2009, p. 185–186.
Benedict, op. cit. (supra, n. 53), p. 37–38.
See: A. Curry, Les villes normandes et l’occupation anglaise: l’importance du siège du Rouen (1418–1419), in: Les Villes normandes au Moyen Âge, P. Bouet [and] F. Neveux (Eds.), Caen 2006; doi:
Knecht, op. cit. (supra, n. 14), p. 117–119.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 357: ‘la prise du Roy faicte par ses ennemys devant pavye’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 358.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 358.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 359: ‘Il est requis cesser et desister aux excerrables, juremences et blasphemes du nom de dieu et de ses saints. Aussi que tous jeuz prohibez comme jeuz de dez et cartes a tous autres soient cessez’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 359: ‘En expectant lesditz subjectz a ce quilz ayent tousous bonne amour au Roy leur vray et naturel seigneur’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 359–360.
D. Mayer, The Great Regent – Louise of Savoy 1476–1531, London 1966, p. 196.
H. Prentout, Les États Provinciaux de Normandie, (Tome i), Caen 1925, p. 263–264, Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 373–374; Mayer, op. cit. (supra, n. 67), p. 202–203; G. Jacqueton, La politique extérieure de Louise de Savoie : relations diplomatiques de la France et de l’Angleterre, pendant la captivité de François Ier : 1525–1526, Paris 1892, p. 108.
R. Knecht, Francis i, Cambridge 1982, p. 185–186; Prentout, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 264.
Levasseur, op. cit. (supra, n. 34), p. 104–105: ‘[…] etiam primarie civitates ejusdem regni, videlicet Parisius, Lugdunum, Aurelianum, Tolosa, Ambianum, Rhotomagum, Burdegala, Turonum et civitas Remensis, firmissime se obligabunt et astringent, sub hypotheca et obligacione omnium bonorum suorum, […]’.
Jacqueton, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 171; De Flassan, op. cit. (supra, n. 40), p. 346–347.
J. Brewer Letters & Papers, Vol. 4, July 1525, 16-31, London 1875, no. 1525, 1601.
J. Brewer, Letters & Papers, Vol. 4, August 1525, 16-31, London 1875, no. 1603.
Mayer, op. cit. (supra, n. 67), p. 210.
J. Brewer, Letters & Papers, Vol. 4, September 1525, 1–11, London 1875, no. 1635.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 377–378.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 378: ‘que les principalles villes de ce royaume bailleroient leurs l[ett]res en bonne forme de entretenir et observer […] tant ce qui avoit este fait traicte promis et accorde selon qu’il en est contenu en la mymute et forme […]’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 378: ‘ladit ville a faire ladit promesse et expedicion pour l’ennvoyer ausdits ambassadeurs autrement ladit paix seroit rompue’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 378.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 379: ‘frequenter communiquer traffiquer marchander vendre achapter de toutes sortes de marchandises et joyaulx non prohibez et deffendus par les loix et statuts des pays et royaumes […]’.
Jacqueton, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 189–190.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 380: ‘[…] pour faire election des personnes quy sont [illegible] et esleuz pour assister a la convencion des trois estatz de ce pais et duche de normendye termez a estee […] en cested[it] ville au dixieme jour de ce [present] moys d’octobre’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 383; Prentout, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 265–266; Prentout mentions that the Parlement also refused to register the treaty in the first instance.
C. Giry-Deloison, Henry viii pensionnaire de François Ier, in: François Ier et Henry viii, Deux Princes de la Renaissance (1515–1547), C. Giry-Deloison (Ed.), Lille 1991, p. 127–129; Jacqueton, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 116–117, 120; Levasseur, op. cit. (supra, n. 34), p. 109 (footnote).
On the instalments of the payment there seems to have been some confusion: The déliberations mention that ‘les deux mylyons a paier aux quatre termes egaulx’; Délibérations 1520–1527 op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 382. However, Ferguson mentions two million crowns, but half of which is to be paid in ready money and the rest in instalments of 100.000 crowns per annum. C. Ferguson, Naked to mine enemies – The life of Cardinal Wolsey, Boston 1958, p. 317; Prentout mentiones a total sum of 2.665.000 livres of which Normandy had to pay 637.340; Prentout, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 263.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 381; Prentout, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 263.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 383-384; De Flassan, op. cit. (supra, n. 40), p. 346–347.
Délibérations 1520-1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 384: ‘Monsieur le lieuten[ant] a dit […] Item aussi parler de la matiere d’Allencon’.
Prentout, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 263.
Knecht, op. cit. (supra, n. 8), p. 245.
Délibérations 1520-1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 384; see also: J. Brewer, Letters & Papers, Vol. 4, October 1525, 1–15, London 1875, no. 1692, 1694.
Prentout, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 266–267; Jacqueton, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 165.
Jacqueton, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 163–165.
J. Brewer, Letters & Papers, Vol. 4, October 1525, 16-31, London 1875, no. 1729.
Délibérations 1520-1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 385–386.
Délibérations 1520-1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 386.
Délibérations 1520-1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 386.
Délibérations 1520-1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 386: ‘en faisant la Rat[ification] des traictez de paix faiz en angleterre vous ne[…] portez aucune perte dommage indempuite comme vous verrez plus amplement’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 387: ‘Et nous comme Regente leur promectons de la relener de toute indampnite et dommage quilz […] avoir’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 388: ‘De voulloir passer et octroyer les obligacions en la forme que leur ennoyoue et que icelluy roy d’angletrre demande’.
The chronology seems muddled, because the meeting of the November 12 (folio 387 verso) precedes the one marked for November 10 (folio 388 verso) in the record. I presume that this is a different meeting, held on the same day but recorded later, because the clergy is in attendance in one of the meetings.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 388.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 388–389, for instance: ‘Jehan le Roux a dit que l’assemblee n’est suffisante faire demain plus grant assemblee’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 387: ‘[…] avec la promesse de mad[ite] dame [Louise of Savoy] de rendre indampus la ville et le pays de lad[it] ratifficacion et obligacion’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 388: ‘Requis pour faire ratifficacion et obligacion seroit translate de […] en francoys’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 388: ‘Et que ce pedant inquisicion seroit faicte de ce que la ville de Paris tenue a […] lad[ite] ratifficacion et obligacion par lesd[it] traicte’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 391; the margin reads: ‘Etats de la Province’, ‘Jehan le Roux dit que l’assemblee n’est point suffisante pour procéder a l’election et nominacion des procureurs pour assister aux estatz.’; Jacqueton, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 164.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 393: ‘Monsr. de Berience a rapp[orté] que ce jourduy led[it] sr. de Rouen a propose et dit’, ‘[…] et myeulx vault laquerir par argent que par effusion de sang et que la ou nous aurons paix […]. La guerre pour ce la marchandise na [ilegible] de lourd par guerre les femmes demeurent veufes, les petis enffans mendres […].’, ‘A ceste cause il est requis ratiffier le traictez’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 394: ‘vous voullez faire lad[it] ratiffication jouxte la forme quy vous a este envoye’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 7), fol. 394.
Jacqueton, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 191: ‘le 14 [Novembre 1525] arrivent d’autres lettres de Madame, datées du 7, priant une fois de plus les Conseillers rouennais de passer l’obligation […]’. Ce sont les derniers renseignements fournis par le registre de la ville.
J. Brewer, Letters & Papers, Vol. 4, November 1525, 17-31, London 1875, no. 1770.
Brewer, op. cit. (supra, n. 112), no. 1783.
Brewer, op. cit. (supra, n. 112), no. 1783.
J. Brewer, Letters & Papers, Vol. 4, December 1525, 16–31, London 1875, no. 1830.
J. Brewer, Letters & Papers, Vol. 4, January 1526, 26–31, London 1875, no. 1929.
Délibérations 1520-1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 395.
Délibérations 1520-1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 397.
Délibérations 1520-1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 399.
Délibérations 1520-1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 399: ‘Monsr. de berience […] en ses affaires’.
Délibérations 1520-1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 399.
Délibérations 1520-1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 400.
J. Brewer, Letters & Papers, Vol. 4, March 1526, 1–14, London 1875, no. 2018, the others being Bordeaux and Tours: ‘Obligation of the city of Rouen for the same [to observe the Treaty of the More]. Hôtel de Ville, 7 March 1525’.
Knecht, op. cit. (supra, n. 8), p. 179.
Registre des actes consulaires – bb41, 04-01-1525/05-12-1525, fo. 276–277.
Normandy tried to keep its own identity and status, the Charte aux Normands was confirmed until the revolution of 1789, along with it Normandy kept some of its customary law and institutions, see: S. Poirey, La Charte aux Normands, instrument d’une contestation juridique, in: C. Bougy & S. Poirey, Images de la contestation du pouvoir dans le monde normand (xe–xviiie siècle), Caen 2007, p. 105-106; doi:
Registre des actes consulaires, op. cit. (supra, n. 125), fol. 281–285.
Registre des actes consulaires, op. cit. (supra, n. 125), fol. 281: ‘ladicte paix seroit cesser par faulte de faire ladicte ratiffication et pourroit retarder le relache du roy estant prisonnier en espaigne. Dont s’en pourvoit ensuyvir a ladicte ville quelque indignation’.
Or as Jacqueton remarks: ‘Les normands, gens expert en chichane […]’, Jacqueton, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 165.
Registre des actes consulaires, op. cit. (supra, n. 125), fol. 281: ‘ladicte paix seroit cesser par faulte de faire ladicte ratiffication et pourroit retarder le relache du roy estant prisonnier en espaigne. Dont s’en pourvoit ensuyvir a ladicte ville quelque indignation’.
Registre des actes consulaires, op. cit. (supra, n. 125), fol. 279; see also: Wilandowski, op. cit. (supra, n. 39), p. 78–79, 242; Lukes, op. cit. (supra, n. 41), p. 289–308.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 388: ‘relener de perte, dommage, indempuite comme vous verrez plus amplement’.
Registre des actes consulaires, op. cit. (supra, n. 125), fol. 278–279.
Registre des actes consulaires, op. cit. (supra, n. 125), fol. 279: ‘C’est la forme que la ville de Paris a tenne en faisant ladicte obligation laquelle il est requis les autres villes farent toute pareille et fais aucune mutation et changement […]’.
J. Brewer, Letters & Papers, Vol. 4, October 1525, 1–15, London 1875, no. 1701; J. Brewer, Letters & Papers, Vol. 4, November 1525, 2–15, London 1875, no. 1758; J. Brewer, Letters & Papers, Vol. 4, November 1525, 17–30, London 1875, no. 1770, 1788. In letter no. 1788, November 28, 1525, Louise to her ambassadors: ‘You are to ask the King to prolong the term for the ratifications, not yet obtained, to the 15 Feb., if possible, or at least till 15 January. The English ambassadors write about this. Some difficulties have been raised about making these ratifications, especially by those of Paris, not by the great people, but the merchants, – all for want of understanding what is asked of them’. Despite that it was believed in Lyon that Paris had already ratified, because many votes are recorded to proceed with ratification, ‘comme a Paris’, Registre des actes consulaires, op. cit. (supra, n. 125), fol. 285.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 394: ‘vous voullez faire lad[it] ratiffication jouxte la forme quy vous a este envoye’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 388.
Prentout, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 264-271.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 384: ‘Monsieur le lieuten[ant] a dit […]. Item aussi parler de la matiere d’Allencon’.
Délibérations 1520–1527, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), fol. 388: ‘Et que ce pedant inquisicion seroit faicte de ce que la ville de Paris tenue a […] lad[ite] ratifficacion et obligacion par lesd[it] traicte’.
Jacqueton, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 172; Registre des actes consulaires, op. cit. (supra, n. 125), fol. 285.
Prentout, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 266–268.
In Lyon, the city council reflected on this explicitly, remarking that withholding ratification would reflect very badly on the city. The councillors in Rouen must have realised this too.
Knecht, op. cit. (supra, n. 8), p. 249.
Knecht, op. cit. (supra, n. 8), p. 185–199.
Prentout, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 268–269.
Prentout, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 270–271.
Lesaffer, op. cit. (supra, n. 23), p. 82–83.
This is especially interesting given the further development of France in the later centuries, the erosion of the representative institutions gave rise to patrimonial absolutism, T. Ertmann, Birth of the Leviathan, Cambridge 1997, p. 90–102.
Prentout, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 269 : ‘Si on lève une taille de force point n’est besoin de ratification ; mais, en ce cas, les Normands ne sont plus que des serfs ; « et ung serf ne se peut obliger : approuver ne ratiffier présuppose libre condicion de l’homme »’.
Lesaffer, op. cit. (supra, n. 23), p. 19.
C. Swiney, The urbanization of international law and international relations: The rising soft power of cities in global governance, in: Michigan Journal of International Law, 41:2 (2020), p. 233–234.
Y. Blank, The city and the world, in: Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 44:3 (2006), p. 898.
J. Nijman, Renaissance of the city as global actor: The role of foreign policy and international law practices in the construction of cities as global actors, in: G. Hellmann, A. Fahrmeir, & M. Vec (Eds.), The transformation of foreign policy: drawing and managing boundaries from antiquity to the present, Oxford 2016, p. 209–220; doi:
See: International Guidelines on Decentralization and the Strengthening of Local Authorities (2007), [https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/664756?ln=en]; this theme has spawned a range of literature, for example: B. Barber, If mayors ruled the world, New Haven 2013.
Swiney, op. cit. (supra, n. 152), p. 236.
Swiney, op. cit. (supra, n. 152), p. 270.
Prentout, op. cit. (supra, n. 68), p. 271; Knecht, op. cit. (supra, n. 8), p. 185–186.
