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Protecting the Environment during Non-International Armed Conflicts: The International Law Commission’s PERAC Principles as a Blueprint for Deeds of Commitment

In: Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online
Authors:
Martha M. Bradley Associate Professor at the Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg, Research Associate, NRF SARChI, Johannesburg, South Africa; Visiting Research Fellow, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland

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Quillene M. Vertue LLD Candidate, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, NRF SARChI, Pretoria, South Africa

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Danielle Crafford LLD Candidate, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg, NRF SARChI, Johannesburg, South Africa

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Abstract

The majority of contemporary armed conflicts are classified as non-international armed conflicts, often occurring in biodiversity hotspots with the destruction of the environment continuing to fall victim to the violence of these conflicts. A startling lacuna in the law of non-international armed conflicts is its lack of direct protection for the environment under International Humanitarian Law. While some scholars argue that indirect protection of the environment may be afforded when interpreting the law of non-international armed conflicts, this falls short of providing legal certainty and promoting ‘buy-in’ from non-State armed groups. For these reasons, the contribution made by the International Law Commission in its 27 Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts is ground-breaking. The authors of this contribution argue that deeds of commitment, a form of soft law, is the appropriate vehicle to operationalise the Principles of the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts. Ultimately, the authors of this contribution sample Principles 13, 5 and 8 in a proposed blueprint for a thematic deed of commitment, without prejudice to other potential content, unilaterally binding signatory non-State armed groups.

1 Introduction*

Gieseken and Murphy in their contribution ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment Under International Humanitarian law: The icrc’s 2020 Guidelines’ contemplate three developments below.1 These three developments, if operationalised, signify that the International Law Commission’s (ilc) Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts (perac)2 and the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (icrc) Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict (2020 Guidelines)3 offer a significant response to fill certain gaps in international law regarding the activities by non-State armed groups (nsags)4 that affect the environment.5 These developments are the following:

First, the perac principles do not make a distinction between international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts, and thus the Principles that apply during conflict govern the conduct of non-State armed groups except where distinctions are made in the Principles or in their commentaries. Second, Recommendation 18 of the icrc Guidelines encourages parties to non-international armed conflicts to apply rules of ihl that enhance protection of the natural environment, without differentiating based on the conflict’s classification as international or non-international. […] Third and finally, scholarship is exploring models that could be promoted – as a matter of policy – of environmental responsibilities under international human rights law and international environmental law based on the non-State armed groups’ level of territorial control. The most pressing frontier for progress is thus the operationalization of both the existing law and gap-filling recommendations for policy and practice of these groups.6

The authors of this contribution agree that operationalisation, specifically of the perac Principles, is one of the most rewarding developments for progress in the context of protecting the environment during non-international armed conflicts (niacs).7 While this contribution does not seek to take away from the work of the icrc in its 2020 Guidelines, this specific contribution focuses on the work of the ilc’s perac Principles. Not only were the perac Principles adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (unga) on 7 December 2022,8 but the special thematic focus of this 27th Volume of the Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law adds to the theme of the ‘Assessment of the International Law Commission: The Past, Present, and Future’.9 Ultimately, the authors of this contribution seek to celebrate the work of the ilc on perac. This contribution explores the potential to employ the perac Principles of the ilc, in addition to the basic principles of targeting, thus without prejudice to other potential content, as a blueprint for a thematic deed of commitment,10 which aims to achieve greater protection for the environment through dialogue with and a commitment from nsags that are parties to niacs.11

The need to find a legal response to the goal of protecting the environment, as a consequence of increasing risk to the climate and rising armed conflict, was highlighted by the icrc in its Twelve Issues for 2022 report.12 International armed conflicts (iacs) occur infrequently, while a majority of contemporary armed conflicts are classified as niacs.13 Unfortunately, these niacs often transpire in biodiversity hotspots.14 The damaging effects of armed conflict on the environment is unavoidable and is well-documented.15 Armed conflicts provide a direct threat to the environment and endanger the survival of human beings and animals.16 Further, armed conflict settings exacerbate the consequences of climate change, leading to human displacement, the loss of livelihoods, food and water insecurity and deforestation.17

Environmental damage remains a significant collateral to the violence created during an niac.18 Consequently, as a party in an niac, an nsag also must respond to the icrc’s plea as articulated in the Twelve Issues for 2022 report, and endorse its efforts to limit the environmental damage during an armed conflict.19 The authors of this contribution are of the opinion that nsags bear a responsibility to limit conflict-related environmental damage when engaging in an niac.20

International Humanitarian Law (ihl) treaty law, which binds nsags, offers nil-specific environmental protection.21 The customary status of Rule 45, which deals with environmental protection during iacs, does not have application in niacs.22 Scholars argue that an interpretation of existing treaty law of the law of non-international armed conflicts (LoNIAC) offers at least indirect protection of the environment in niacs.23 However, this situation does not promote legal certainty and ‘buy-in’ from nsags.24

The basic principles of ihl, which extend to circumstances during an niac, provide protection owing to the civilian status of the environment.25 The authors of this contribution agree that Rule 43 of the icrc customary study, concerning the ‘Application of General Principles on the Conduct of Hostilities to the Natural Environment’ does find application in an niac and has achieved customary ihl status26 and can therefore offer protection to the environment when targeting decisions are made by nsags. However, in the content of the icrc customary study established in Rule 44 (‘Due Regard for the Natural Environment in Military Operations’)27 and Rule 45 (‘Causing Serious Damage to the Natural Environment’)28 which both read, ‘State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in international, and arguably also in non-international, armed conflicts’,29 the use of the term ‘arguably’ is quite distinctive. The authors are compelled to reiterate the arguments posited by Smith and Pretorius; employing the term ‘arguably’ could suggest an implied acknowledgment that the norm has not attained customary international law status yet.30 Therefore, the rationale behind its applicability to niacs appears to be relatively unconvincing.31 Thus, a single regulatory customary rule (Rule 43) is not enough to offer comprehensive environmental protection during niacs.

The authors of this contribution argue that the ilc has responded to the lacuna identified in the protection of the environment during armed conflict provided by ihl through its work on perac.32 The commitment of the members of the ilc and the two Special Rapporteurs is to progressively develop and codify the law relating to perac.33 This was achieved through the ilc’s recent adoption of 27 Principles together with a Preamble and commentaries on second reading during its seventy-third session.34 Further, on 7 December 2022 the unga adopted a resolution that gives effect to the conclusions in the work of the ilc on the topic.35 Significantly, a majority of the perac Principles apply also to niacs36 and, consequently, fill a critical gap in LoNIAC. The perac Principles reflect the lex lata and lex lege ferenda, yet it is still unclear whether all lex lata principles apply to nsags.37 Where the perac Principles are to be included in deeds of commitment to which nsags agree to bind themselves, it will contribute to at least two factors, namely, their operationalisation and the promotion of environmental protection during niacs.

The potential value of deeds of commitment should not be underestimated.38 Deeds of commitment are effective legal tools that improve the compliance by armed groups with ihl.39 Bangerter points out that ‘[t]hese documents provide an entry point for substantive dialogue on the law, and a basis for engaging armed groups in addressing violations’.40 In addition, Bangerter remarks that ‘rules contained in a [nsag’s] code of conduct may repeat existing obligations of international humanitarian law, fall short of it, or extend beyond it’.41 There is evidence that some nsags include certain protections for the environment in their codes of conduct.42 Geneva Call provides limited and indirect environmental protection in its Deed of Commitment that relates to ‘the prevention of starvation and addressing conflict-related food insecurity’.43 In terms of this evaluation of the effect of deeds of commitment, the authors of this contribution aim to stimulate discussion that will result in the development of a theme-specific deed of commitment that is concerned exclusively with the protection of the environment.

The limitations of LoNIAC in respect of explicitly providing protection to the environment in niacs have been widely explored in scholarship.44 This contribution examines the potential of perac to address those limitations, specifically in respect of nsags. Deeds of commitment and perac are the starting point, and the methodology employed is through doctrinal research. The contribution is structured as follows: Section 2 makes a case to employ deeds of commitment as a vehicle to operationalise perac; Section 3 briefly introduces the ilc’s perac project and highlights its particular significance to niacs; in Section 4, specific perac Principles are sampled for the proposed category of a deed of commitment in relation to the protection of the environment during niacs. Lastly, a conclusion is drawn.

2 The Potential of Deeds of Commitment to Promote nsag Compliance with the perac Principles

This section of the contribution argues that deeds of commitment are a suitable tool to promote compliance by nsags towards the protection of the environment. Specifically, the authors argue that a theme-specific deed of commitment which operationalises the perac Principles could minimise environmental devastation during niacs as it may unilaterally promote compliance by nsags to both norms of lex lata and lex lege ferenda. To achieve the research objective, this section is structured as follows: first, Section 2.1 explains what a deed of commitment is and examines the legal nature of this instrument; in Section 2.2 the authors turn to the benefits surrounding deeds of commitment to argue why this avenue will promote compliance from nsags to better protect the environment during niacs.

2.1 Understanding Deeds of Commitment

A deed of commitment forms part of soft law instruments that may be used to develop ihl and other bodies of international law.45 Droege and Giorgou write that soft law instruments may provide clarification and implementation of the law, interpretation of existing legal norms and also practical measures which may aid in compliance with existing obligations.46 In addition, deeds of commitment may also contribute to the meaning and clarification of law.47 Compliance towards ihl by nsags may in turn influence States and consequently, owing to the actions of States, generate state practice, opinio juris and consequently elevate the norms underpinning such relevant rules included in the deeds of commitment to achieve customary international law.48

Geneva Call, based in Switzerland, is a humanitarian organisation that works to promote respect for ihl norms and principles amongst nsags and de facto authorities.49 The purpose of engaging with these parties to an armed conflict is to increase knowledge of obligations under ihl, and for Geneva Call itself to understand what the rules of nsags are, how nsags internally regulate themselves and what their behaviours and observations are towards ihl.50 This is navigated through three avenues, firstly through dissemination and training, secondly through organising bilateral meetings with commanders and lastly through establishing meetings between parties to a conflict and relevant stakeholders.51 As Heffes explains, one of the main features adopted by Geneva Call is to develop deeds of commitment, which are tools used to ensure that ‘nsags commit publicly to respect certain international obligations’ and which are regularly monitored by Geneva Call.52

According to Geneva Call, a deed of commitment is a mechanism whereby nsags and de facto authorities pledge to respect norms that stem from ihl and International Human Rights Law (ihrl) and by doing so may be held publicly accountable through their signature and agreement to a deed of commitment.53 Essentially, a deed of commitment is a manifestation of a unilateral application of ihl.54 Kleffner explains that, traditionally, ihl is conceptualised as a body of ‘mutually binding, horizontal international legal rules agreed upon by States that govern the relationship between parties to armed conflicts’.55 Kleffner’s explanation recounts the binding obligations of nsags to the LoNIAC through Common Article 3 (ca3) to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949, at a horizontal level.56 Kleffner describes this as follows: ‘Unilaterilization encapsulates the idea that norms that regulate armed conflict take the form of commitments of one party whose validity are not dependent on being reciprocated, whether it be by its (would be) opponent or by other international actors, most notably states’.57 Although the international legal status of unilateral commitments made by nsags, outside of Article 96(3) of Additional Protocol i (api),58 is described as ‘tenuous’, the common tenet of unilateral commitments is that they provide a certain standard.59 Firstly, to assess the behaviour of a signatory nsag during an niac, and secondly to prescribe the norms on which the groups base their behaviour.60 Kleffner highlights that unilateral commitments undertaken by nsags have normative force and, further, establish normative relations between the nsag and the other actors.61 Further, they may provide ‘common features’ of standards of behaviour for parties during an armed conflict.62 For example, the ‘Unilateral Declaration on Humanitarian Access and Assistance’ signed by the Georgian National Liberation before the Russian occupation of Ukraine in 2022 recognised that objects indispensable for survival should not be damaged.63 Geneva Call’s engagement does not end with the signing of a deed of commitment, but it assists signatory nsags to respect their obligations by monitoring complaints and conducting missions of inquiry into alleged violations, and, in some cases, to issue a public statement should an nsag fail to be compliant.64

At the time of writing, 118 deeds of commitment have been signed.65 Geneva Call has mostly succeeded in gaining an acceptance and willingness of support from nsags by way of a deed of commitment.66 Apart from general deeds of commitment,67 Geneva Call has focused on thematic areas which cover circumstances such as child protection and education, sexual violence and gender discrimination, health care, landmines and explosive weapons.68 Regrettably, the protection of the environment has not had a thematic focus; the only form of protection offered indirectly is through the Deed of Commitment for the Prevention of Starvation and Addressing Conflict-Related Food Insecurity which recognises the protection of the natural environment under starvation and in Term 3 which addresses conflict-related food security.69 It also recognises the right to a healthy environment,70 however this falls within the body of ihrl and extends beyond the scope of this article.

2.2 The Benefit of Deeds of Commitment

This next section will explore the benefit of deeds of commitment by firstly looking at the specific need for a thematic deed towards the protection of the environment and secondly, discussing why a deed of commitment is beneficial as a soft law instrument and how it may invoke compliance by nsags.

The LoNIAC provides for the regulation of the conduct of hostilities between parties to the conflict who ‘resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State’.71 The treaty bodies that regulate niacs, and which form the lex lata to ihl, are ca3 to all four the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol ii (apii), which supplements the four Geneva Conventions and extends obligations to parties in an armed conflict.72 ca3 does not expressly mention the protection of the environment during conflict.73 Nor does apii, which is more extensive than ca3 and is the only treaty regulating high-intensity niacs.74 Whilst the treaty obligations may not expressly provide for protection of the environment or regulation of damage to the environment in niacs or for nsags, soft law instruments such as deeds of commitment can provide for unilaterally-binding mechanisms which in turn can serve to enforce ihl compliance.75

The pivotal purpose of this section of the article is to promote the protection of the environment through ihl for nsags. Since a lack of treaty obligations exists for the protection of the environment in all niacs, the authors of this article are of the opinion that the perac Principles, which have been identified by the ilc to apply in both iacs and niacs, may inform a deed of commitment which may be specifically geared towards environmental protection during niacs. Deeds of commitment have successfully been implemented as a tool for promoting compliance to ihl by Geneva Call.76 The proposed deed of commitment will thus include perac obligations for nsags.

Sivakumaran highlights that an additional benefit to deeds of commitment is that an analysis of the ad hoc commitments adopted by States and nsags demonstrates that they are ‘a more accurate reflection of the operation of humanitarian norms in practice’.77 The understanding of how deeds of commitment are developed and operationalised promotes a greater comprehension of ihl.78 Sivakumaran also considers the possibility that ad hoc deeds of commitment may advance existing humanitarian standards.79 Lastly, Sivakumaran underlines that a deed of commitment creates an entry point for dialogue and debate within a specific nsag.80 A perac-themed deed of commitment may be a case in point. The blueprint for a deed of commitment that protects the environment may be a means to generate a discussion within an nsag about its content and, even if the deed is not signed, could result in greater protection for the environment.

The discussion now turns to exploring why specific soft law instruments are useful, how ihl develops over time and how compliance for ihl may increase.

2.2.1 Deeds of Commitment and nsags

The backdrop for the beneficial aspects of a deed of commitment provides for the entry point into this sub-section of Section 2. This section seeks to determine the strengths of a deed of commitment in promoting compliance by nsags towards ihl and the protection of the environment. The authors will expand upon reasons for a deed of commitment promoting compliance in this regard.

Deeds of commitment express the minimum standards binding nsags.81 They are employed as a vehicle that promotes compliance with and respect for ihl by nsags.82 It is reasoned that, despite ihl being binding on every nsag, for example, through ca3, and in some cases apii,83 a deed of commitment is a method of ensuring the commitment of nsags to the rules (or specific rules) of ihl.84 In the context of nsags, deeds of commitment are legal tools for implementing nsag compliance with ihl, in that the content of a deed of commitment can exceed existing ihl rules to include general practices that are aimed at filling the gaps, providing solutions in the absence of clear law, and interpreting existing legal norms.85 In the view of the authors, it is an ideal format for the blueprint suggested, which will include principles relevant to perac that have both lex lata and lex lege ferenda status.86

Further scholarly examination regarding the use of deeds of commitment enhancing compliance with ihl confirms the value of soft law instruments for this purpose.87 According to Bangerter there are several instruments used by armed groups to create internal structure and regulations.88 These may include a variety of instruments such as oaths, operational orders, military manuals, penal codes, internal structure and codes of conduct.89 Codes of conduct are particularly valuable in understanding the modus operandi of an armed group as they are associated with a group’s oaths, shape the organisation and define a certain standard behaviour.90 There is evidence that deeds of commitment may close the ‘ownership gap’91 where nsags are bound by treaty law that is negotiated by States and signed by States.92 It is argued that if rules are not ‘merely imposed by the States fighting’ nsags,93 then nsags are more compliant if they are engaged in the process of and are involved in finalising the content of a deed of commitment.94 Moreover, the signature of one group attached to a deed of commitment creates ‘peer pressure’ and encourages other nsags to sign up.95 It is anticipated that the signature of an nsag to a perac-themed deed of commitment will influence other nsags in the region to follow suit. A deed of commitment signed by an nsag has been shown to serve as a draft for others and has an impact on other actors.96

It is not an unrealistic proposition to introduce a thematic deed of commitment geared towards the protection of the environment,97 as there is some evidence that nsags include a level of environmental protection in their codes of conduct.98 The ‘Eight Codes of Conduct of the Revolutionary United Front’ evidenced in the Sesay case, for example, dictate that crops must not be damaged.99 In addition, several other codes of conduct provide for the protection of the environment through various forms. The Karen National Liberation Army has a forest policy which sets out obligations for the protection of forests under its territorial control;100 the Counsel National de Liberation provides, among other rules, ‘[d]o not destroy or trample, do not step on the villagers’ fields’;101 the 15-point programme of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement provides that forests shall be suitably used and protected through afforestation and reforestation programmes and to promote environmental consciousness.102 The Free Libyan Army provides for protection through two broad avenues: first, the Frontline Manual of 2011 prohibits soldiers from attacking and destroying cultural objects, including historical and heritage sites;103 second, the Libyan Liberation Army’s code of rules and attitudes of the organisation for the successful conduct of fighting prohibits soldiers from ‘intentional deprivation’ of food, water and shelter.104 Lastly, the Code of Conduct for Commanders/Code of Conduct for Members, 1982, Sendero Luminoso provides for the protection of the produce of farmers.105

In addition to the codes of conduct mentioned, Bangerter also argues that political documents, such as agreements between parties, may aid in defining and enforcing standards of behaviour.106 Agreements may specifically define rules of behaviour during and after armed conflicts.107 Several peace agreements established after a conflict consider the environment, which may further stress the need to address the environment in a deed of commitment. In the most basic form, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Dignity in 1994 in a Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement referenced the repair of waterholes.108 Subsequently, the Agreement Establishing Permanent Peace Between the Government of the Republic of Niger and the ‘Organisation de la Résistance Armée’ of 1995 states that both paramilitary forces and civilians are to protect the flora and fauna of the natural environment through various means.109 More extensively, the Pacte National Conclu Entre Le Gouvernement de la République du Mali et les Mouvements et Fronts Unifies de L’azawad Consacrant le Statut Particulier du Nord du Mali of 1995 provides for express protection of the environment through the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry to investigate any damage to the environment and destruction of livestock.110 Further it provides for programmes regarding livestock, habitat preservation of ecosystems, hydraulics, the development and protection of historic sites, the management of land heritage and encouraging the exploration of natural resources.111

The blueprint that is based on the perac Principles may face challenges in the effort to engage nsags. Representatives of member States and other actors, like the icrc and the United Nations Environment Programme (unep), played a role in the commenting and adoption of perac at an international level.112 Principles proposed to be included in the perac-themed deed of commitment represent both the lex lata and lex lege ferenda, and will have an effect of binding nsags to obligations greater than those observed by States and other actors. Sassòli’s experience leads him to caution that ‘armed groups are more concerned that the law applies to them equally and that it is realistic than that they may contribute to its development’.113 The authors of this contribution aim to use a selected sample of three of the 27 perac Principles to argue for a thematic deed for the protection of the environment. These include Principles 5, 8 and 13 of perac.114

On that cautionary note, the authors of this contribution acknowledge that the proposed blueprint might face criticism, but view it as a positive starting point in engaging with nsags on the issue of perac, and suggest that in consultation the contents can be tailored so that nsags accept their normative obligations to match societal demands. The next section endeavours to provide an assessment of the ilc’s work on perac, specifically concerning niacs.

3 Introducing perac and Its Relation to niacs

The purpose of Section 3 is to introduce the ilc’s work on perac, to highlight the status of the perac Principles and to consider whether the perac Principles may be considered a binding source of international law. Further, the relationship between perac and the protection of the environment during niacs will be explored.

In 2011, during its sixty-third session, the ilc reached a decision to include perac in its long-term programme of work.115 This decision was initiated by a report produced by the unep,116 which requested the ilc to ‘examine the existing international law for protecting the environment during armed conflict and recommend how it can be clarified, codified, and expanded’.117 The proposal put forward by a fellow body in the UN was seen as an appropriate topic in the long-term programme of work of the ilc.118 Subsequently, during its sixty-fifth session in 2013, the ilc placed this topic in its programme of work.119 Arguably, the action taken by the ilc during this period is a turning point for the consideration of the environment as a ‘silent victim’ of warfare.120 These decisions led to the appointment of the Special Rapporteurs Jacobsson in 2013121 and Lehto in 2017.122 The ilc has produced six reports authored by the Special Rapporteurs.123 Their work on this topic has led to the ilc adopting 27 Principles, a Preamble as well as commentaries,124 but also to the adoption of a Resolution by the unga on 7 December 2022.125 The Resolution necessitates that, as far as is practicable, the perac Principles be disseminated by ‘States, international organizations and all who may be called upon to deal with the subject’.126 For their trailblazing work on perac, the Special Rapporteurs, in their capacity as ambassadors, in 2023 received the Elisabeth Haub Award.127

The general understanding is that the work of the ilc is non-binding, but its output carries much weight,128 and more importantly, contains clarification and codification of what the ilc has deemed existing legal obligations.129 In terms of the status of the perac Principles, the obligation each principle embeds is evident from the wording of the text as well as the commentaries.130 The unga decision clearly states that some principles are non-binding.131 It reads:

[T]o the extent that they do not reflect customary or treaty-based obligations of States, as applicable, the draft principles provide recommendations for the progressive development of international law, inter alia, through examples of effective voluntary measures to enhance the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts.132

With regard to any relationship between the perac Principles and an application to niacs, the unep report specifies that a workable and logical instrument is needed that takes into account iacs and niacs.133 The unep proposed more clarification and codification of this body of law, including the extension of applicable rules in iacs to niacs134 in response to the absence of explicit environmental protection provided in LoNIAC treaties.135 Jacobsson, in her preliminary report, envisioned that the work would deal with iacs and niacs.136 The inclusion of niacs in the scope of the topic was met with scepticism137 as well as optimism138 among delegates of the Sixth Committee and by members of the Commission. The interest Jacobsson expressed in her preliminary report139 was shared by Lehto in her subsequent reports.140 In her first report Lehto signalled her intention to address issues concerning the protection of the environment during niacs,141 and this intention is evident in her second report.142 The recent adoption of the Principles attests to the success in fulfilling this intention.143

In respect of the scope of application of the Principles, the version adopted in the sixty-eighth session reads: ‘The present draft principles apply to the protection of the environment before, during or after an armed conflict’.144 Paragraph 3 of the commentary to Draft Principle 1 states: ‘Regarding the ratione materiae of the draft principles, reference is made to the term “protection of the environment” as it relates to the term “armed conflicts”. No distinction is made between international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts’.145

By way of contrast, Principle 1, adopted during the seventy-third session, was drafted to state that ‘[t]he present draft principles apply to the protection of the environment before, during or after an armed conflict, including in situations of occupation’.146 Paragraph 2 of the commentary to the Principle reads:

Regarding the scope ratione materiae of the draft principles, reference is made to the term ‘protection of the environment’ as it relates to the term ‘armed conflict’. No distinction is generally made in these draft principles between international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.147

Paragraph 3 of the commentary to Principle 1 specifically states that the Draft Principles apply to parties to an armed conflict, including nsags,148 which is a noteworthy addition to the adopted Principles.

A survey of the perac process clearly indicates that there was a great deal of debate among delegates to the Sixth Committee as well as among the members of the Commission regarding the distinction between iacs and niacs, also in relation to the overall inclusion of niacs.149 Weir sums up the mood in the debate, which he describes as ‘a legally ticklish area’.150 The attention given to niacs by the Special Rapporteurs, nevertheless, has been well-received by several States, as well as by members of the ilc.151

A significant addition to the perac Principles is the Preamble (added during the seventy-third session)152 which reinforces their application to both categories of armed conflict.153 The Preamble, adopted in unga Resolution 77/104,154 is specifically ‘[c]onscious of the need to enhance the protection of the environment in relation to both international and non-international armed conflicts, including in situations of occupation’.155 Further, it states:

Considering that effective protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts requires that measures are taken by States, international organizations and other relevant actors to prevent, mitigate and remediate harm to the environment before, during and after an armed conflict.156

Hence, the majority of the perac Principles apply to niacs. In respect of some principles, the authors of this contribution are aware of the fact that the unga Resolution is non-binding on States and on nsags.157 Some of the principles constitute lex lata but, for the most part, this applies to iacs and not to niacs.158 Thus, it is critical that the perac Principles be made operational during an niac159 by utilising a deed of commitment. The next section explores specific perac Principles for a theme-specific deed of commitment as a suitable vehicle to engage nsags and a means to promote a dialogue to incorporate perac Principles as a foundation for advancing the protection of the environment during niacs.

4 perac Principles as a Blueprint

This section seeks to offer a sample of perac Principles to form the basis of the proposed blueprint for a deed of commitment. In addition to selected perac Principles, the basic principles of the law of targeting160 must be included in the proposed thematic deed of commitment.161 The authors agree that Principle 13, which concerns the general protection of the environment, is the core minimum for a perac-themed deed of commitment towards enhancing the protection of the environment during niacs. The authors agree that various other principles162 could potentially be included in a proposed deed of commitment, and, notwithstanding the spatial limitations, the authors additionally sampled Principle 5 on the protection of the environment of indigenous peoples and Principle 8 on human displacement as these Principles would be a significant factor in a proposed deed of commitment.

The reasons for the selection of a deed of commitment to be the instrument chosen to promote compliance with perac is discussed in Section 2. This section is structured as follows: first Principle 13 will be surveyed; second, Principle 5 and, lastly, Principle 8.

4.1 Principle 13: General Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflict

Since the inclusion of environmental considerations and the damage threshold in the 1977 api,163 protection of the environment, in general, has received growing recognition.164 The protection of the ‘general’ environment provides for a workable foundation for the development of international law where contemporary situations of armed conflict may require legal interpretation and guidelines concerning the application of the law of armed conflict.165

Principle 13 serves to apply existing ihl through clarifying the rule of law applicable to the protection of the environment by inserting three general obligations.166 This reform is attained through adopting an integrative approach of dual respect and adherence to international law and, particularly, the law of armed conflict (loac).167 In addition, the perac Principles build on the 2011 ilc study on Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties through the inclusion of various bodies of international law, alongside loac and by expanding the legal application to niacs in certain instances.168 The proposed blueprint towards a deed of commitment provides Principle 13 as the starting Principle.

Through an analysis of Principle 13 the following sub-sections of the Principle are explored and will include deciphering the lex lata of ihl. Principle 13 reads as follows:
  1. (1)The environment shall be respected and protected in accordance with applicable international law and, in particular, the law of armed conflict.
  2. (2)Subject to applicable international law: care shall be taken to protect the environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage; the use of methods and means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment is prohibited.
  3. (3)No part of the environment may be attacked, unless it has become a military objective.169

Each of the three sub-sections of Principle 13, which range from adherence to the law of armed conflict to conducting military assessments, provides for a general obligation in the protection of the environment.170

Sub-Section 1 emphasises respect for the law of armed conflict as well as the application of the rules specifically contained in this body of international law.171 In a comment on Sub-Section 1, a proposal was made to exclude the word ‘natural’ from the phrase ‘the environment shall be’, for the reason that the ‘environment’ can be read in more general terms with respect to applicable international law.172 In addition, as represented in the commentary to Principle 13(1), Sub-Section 1 applies to armed conflict ‘in general’, and Principle 13 is read with broad application to all parties to an armed conflict. Therefore, respect for international law, in particular the law of armed conflict, might be applicable to all niacs and consequently nsags.173

Sub-Section 2 reflects a copy-and-paste insert of the texts of Article 55(1) and Article 35(3) of api.174 The threshold for environmental damage, namely, in the form represented as ‘widespread, long-term and severe’, is broad and requires a high level of destruction to be met.175 However, a review of the drafting process of Principle 13 indicates that the ilc intended to apply the threshold to prevent a double standard between a consideration of environmental damage in an iac and an niac.176 Comments made by States regarding the drafting of Principle 13 remarked on three themes, namely, (i) confusion as to how the sub-section applied to niacs, (ii) disagreement over the customary status of Article 55(1) of api itself and (iii) a reflection of the nature of the damage threshold of Article 55(1).177 Essentially, the purpose of this approach was to maintain consistency between the existing ihl framework and the perac Principles and to recognise the international customary law status of Articles 55(1) and 35(3).178 For the above reasons, Principle 13 can be reproduced as part of a proposed deed of commitment; however, the authors caution against the use of the existing ihl threshold of damage to the environment, found in api, which cannot be practically met.

Sub-Section 3 provides for an assessment that identifies when the environment or elements thereof qualifies as a military objective.179 The identification follows the basic principles of ihl and, specifically, the principle of distinction.180 The principle of distinction discriminates between legitimate military objectives that may be targeted and civilian objects that may not be targeted.181 Two categories of distinction are required for the principle to be fulfilled:182 first, the category of parties to the conflict, where a distinction is made between combatants as well as non-State actors and civilians;183 second, the category of property, as there is a distinction between civilian objects and property that may be a military objective. It is on this point that an assessment of damage to the environment is conducted.184 In terms of the debate surrounding civilian objects, it clearly is viewed as intrinsically part of the environment and, based on a determination created by the principle of distinction, a broad field of objects and property cannot be damaged, destroyed or targeted.185 Objects of this type includes land, nature reserves, objects indispensable for survival, works and installations that carry dangerous forces and could release large amounts of water or radioactive material,186 rivers, wetlands and coastlines, cultural objects and places of worship linked to the environment, and civilian property such as houses, livestock and crops.187 As per Article 52 of api, objects are military objectives if they ‘by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’.188 Objects identified in this form lose their protection (or civilian status) when used for military purposes.189

The lex lata of Principle 13 requires the environment to be respected in terms of international law, in particular, the adherence to the law of armed conflict.190 This is, first, to prevent damage to the environment including by the use of methods of warfare that cause or carry an intent to cause ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ damage to the environment;191 second, to determine what a legal military objective is in terms of which property or objects may be attacked.192 Including Principle 13 of the perac Principles in a deed of commitment that protects the environment, has the effect that the ihl text which governs an iac is copied into LoNIAC. The lex ferenda of Principle 13 entails the application of the threshold of damage in respect of the environment and the compliance of nsags. Existing obligations are reflected in Principle 13, as well, in that by employing ‘shall’ rather than ‘should’,193 it establishes a duty on parties to the armed conflict, such as an nsag, to give effect to Principle 13.194

Principle 13 is highly significant as presenting the potential to form the basis in developing a blueprint for a deed of commitment directed at protecting the environment. However, aspects such as including the threshold of damage found in api is already high for States, not even to mention the threshold for nsags.

4.2 Principle 5: Protection of the Environment of Indigenous Peoples

The authors suggest that Principle 5 be included in the proposed blueprint for a deed of commitment, as nsags party to an niac frequently operate in biodiversity hotspots. It is estimated that indigenous peoples comprise of at least 5 percent of the planet’s population and manage almost 20 to 25 percent of the planet’s land surface, with an 80 percent overlap with global land biodiversity.195 For this reason they are given the title of ‘stewards of the world’s biodiversity and cultural diversity’.196 Research has revealed that, generally, armed conflict primarily transpires on the lands of indigenous people and, typically, in a biodiversity hotspot.197 In 2019 speakers in the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues emphasised that at the core of indigenous culture, heritage, identity and livelihoods is traditional knowledge that is transferred from one generation to the next and which should be safeguarded and upheld.198

In addition, as noted in the report of the ilc on its seventy-third session,199 instruments such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples200 and the International Labour Organisation Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention201 acknowledge the connection between the environment and indigenous peoples.202 Yet, when Jacobsson introduced a draft principle in her third report,203 the need to address issues concerning indigenous peoples and their significance to the topic under discussion did not seem to resonate with some States.204 Other States were of the view that the circumstances of indigenous peoples should be respected during armed conflict and welcomed the inclusion of the draft principle.205 Notably, an earlier version of the draft principle submitted during the seventy-first session reads: ‘States should take appropriate measures, in the event of an armed conflict, to protect the environment of the territories that indigenous peoples inhabit’.206

This submission contrasts with the formulation in the recently adopted Principle 5.207 Paragraph 1 of Principle 5 reads: ‘States, international organizations and other relevant actors shall take appropriate measures, in the event of an armed conflict, to protect the environment of the lands and territories that indigenous peoples inhabit or traditionally use’.208 This paragraph recognises the need for protection to be provided that is specific to the environment of indigenous peoples.209 It acknowledges that indigenous peoples have close ties with the land they inhabit, including the continued use of resources and close cultural, traditional and religious ties that reflect decades, if not centuries, of ancestral heritage.210 Paragraph 7 of the commentaries to Principle 5 is an acknowledgment of the vulnerability of indigenous peoples and their close ties to the land.211 It reads: ‘Armed conflict may have the effect of increasing existing vulnerabilities to environmental harm or creating new types of environmental harm on the lands and territories concerned and thereby affecting the survival and well-being of the peoples connected to them’.212

As noted by Lehto, nsags in various niacs exercise control over people and territory. She recommended that the first paragraph of the draft principle should include non-State actors.213 The Nordic countries submitted that the special relationship between the environment and indigenous peoples warrants protection and, therefore, its own draft principle.214 Remarkably, the Czech Republic submitted, by extending the Principle 5 to non-State actors, that progressive development of international law could be achieved.215 In the plenary debate, in support of the change to the first paragraph, Jalloh referred to modern civil wars, such as those conducted by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone where organised armed groups regularly take control of territory.216 In addition, in Africa, among the lands of indigenous people subject to heavy militarisation217 are those of the Tuareg of Mali under Bamako-based governance; the Karamoja region of Uganda during the fighting between the Lord’s Resistance Army and the government of Uganda and where groups similar to Boko Haram exercise military control over the traditional lands of indigenous communities in Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon.218 Jalloh was of the view that an extension of the draft principle to include non-State actors, such as organised armed groups, captured the reality of contemporary armed conflict.219

The proposals in the Draft Principle are celebrated as being ‘progressive’ in nature.220 However, it should be noted that the work of the ilc does not necessarily bind States or non-State actors such as armed groups.221 The use in Principle 5 of ‘shall’ rather than ‘should’ mirrors the situation referring to existing obligations.222 Paragraph 2 of the commentary to Principle 5 elaborates on the fact that there is a responsibility on parties to an armed conflict, such as nsags under the law of armed conflict (that are ‘well established’), to protect the environment when de facto control is exercised over a territory.223

From the above discussion, the effort made by Lehto to extend the applicability of this Principle to non-State actors, specifically nsags, is clearly an advance in addressing problems relating to niacs and is not only seminal to the survival224 of the ‘stewards of the world’s biodiversity and cultural diversity’,225 but also a noble effort to give a ‘voice to the voiceless’.226 The ilc is to be applauded for the specific acknowledgment that obligations under Principle 5 apply to other parties as well as to States.227 Principle 5 is a significant factor to be considered for a potential blueprint for a deed of commitment.

4.3 Principle 8: Human Displacement

It is an unfortunate reality that internal displacement flows from the presence of all niacs, especially a prolonged niac where armed groups control territory.228 The authors view it as important that Principle 8 is included in the proposed blueprint towards a thematic deed of commitment aimed at environmental protection during niacs.

The United Nations Refugee Agency in its Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement defines internally displaced persons as:

persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.229

Human suffering and environmental damage have been highlighted as representative of the negative outcomes of population displacement that result from an armed conflict,230 regardless of the classification as an iac or niac.231 The recent and ongoing niacs in Sudan232 and Ethiopia233 and the iac in Ukraine234 present examples of large-scale human displacement.235 In September 2023 it was estimated that the number of internally displaced persons in Sudan had almost doubled since the conflict broke out in April 2023 and had reached a figure of approximately 7.1 million internally displaced persons.236 On 23 August 2023 it was reported that more than half of the 4.38 million internally displaced people in Ethiopia resulted from armed conflict.237 As of September 2023, reports suggest that almost 3.67 million people have been displaced by the conflict in Ukraine that has been ongoing since February 2022.238 In addition, the commentaries cite a 2014 study by the International Law and Policy Institute concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which reads: ‘Massive conflict-induced displacement of civilian populations associated with protracted conflict may have even more destructive effects [on] the environment than actual combat operations’.239 These examples stress the direct impact of internal displacement on the environment.

Lehto’s second report paid specific attention to the incidental environmental effects of human displacement and the illegal exploitation of natural resources.240 Lehto argues that these circumstances are a representation of the widespread complications arising from contemporary niacs.241 However, she noted that they did not present a basis for a wide-ranging deliberation on the environmental issues that arise out of niacs and are not restricted to niacs.242

Principle 8 addresses the environmental effects of human displacement during and after an armed conflict, as well as in situations of occupation.243 It reads as follows:

States, international organizations and other relevant actors should take appropriate measures to prevent, mitigate and remediate harm to the environment in areas where persons displaced by armed conflict are located, or through which they transit, while providing relief and assistance for such persons and local communities.244

Most notably, paragraph 3 of the commentaries to Principle 8 flags that displacement, particularly during niacs, is the cause of significant effects, which includes placing under stress the environment in areas impacted by the armed conflict.245 The objective projected by Principle 8 is two-fold.246 It attaches importance to minimising the effect on the environment caused by displacement and allows for assistance to be provided to persons displaced by armed conflict.247

Delivered by the seventy-first session, paragraph 7 of the commentary reads: ‘Draft principle 8 addresses States, international organizations and other relevant actors’.248 Note the concerns raised by the Czech Republic regarding a reference to ‘other relevant actors’ because their responsibilities and compliance with Principle 8 are unclear.249 The Nordic countries, on the contrary, recommended the inclusion of nsags in paragraph 7 of the commentary to Principle 8.250 The amended paragraph 7 in the commentary to Principle 8 reads: ‘Draft principle 8 addresses States, international organizations and other relevant actors, including non-State armed groups, which may exercise de facto control over territories in which displaced persons are located or through which they transit’.251 The use of a conditional term ‘should’ means that there is not a specific obligation on the parties to the armed conflict.252 Therefore, per paragraph 7 of the commentaries to Principle 8, actors, such as nsags, are merely recommended253 to ‘take appropriate measures to prevent and mitigate environmental degradation in areas where persons displaced by armed conflict are located, while providing relief and assistance for such persons and local communities in accordance with their international obligations’.254 Reports that niacs have a significant effect on causing human displacement255 and the explicit reference to nsags in the commentary256 are reasons why the authors regard Principle 8 as a positive and progressive development.257 The aim is to expand the protection provided to the environment during niacs by emphasising that nsags equally should give effect to Principle 8.258 Principle 8 is non-binding,259 but its inclusion in a deed of commitment can bind an nsag that is a signatory. Principle 8 included in a deed of commitment may inform state practice and, over time, possibly lead to the generation of customary international law.

In short, Weir and Pantazopoulos argue that:

because the ilc’s perac draft principles will not form the basis of a new international binding instrument, there is a risk that they will become orphaned. If these are to change the behaviour of States and non-State actors, there is an urgent need for a vehicle that promotes and monitors the implementation of the draft principles and helps sustain the existing momentum.260

The authors of this contribution therefore argue, in line with the concerns raised by Weir, Pantazopoulos,261 Gieseken and Murphy,262 that operationalising the perac Principles by way of a deed of commitment with Principles 13, 5 and 8 as the basis for a blueprint for such a deed of commitment, is one step in the right direction in adhering to the unga’s call for their ‘widest possible dissemination’,263 therefore, encouraging its implementation and compliance with perac, and supporting the existing momentum in light of its application to niacs.264

5 Conclusion

While recent conflicts are eerily reminiscent of ‘total war’ policies, the triple threat to the environment means that we must capitalize on the momentum created by the ilc perac Principles to drive forward greater environmental protection in armed conflict.265

The reality is that treaty law of LoNIAC is silent on the protection of the environment in niac, and customary ihl in this regard is limited and disputed. In response to Hulme’s appeal, this contribution argues that deeds of commitment offer a realistic option in niacs. Specifically, the perac Principles, in addition to the basic principles of targeting, and without prejudice to other potential content, have been addressed as informing a bare minimum of obligations that should be included in a thematic blueprint that unilaterally is binding on a signatory nsag.

*

This research benefited from a research grant afforded to Martha M. Bradley by the National Research Foundation of South Africa (Grant number cspr2204285108) and the Land Steiermark Senior Fellowship awarded by the Law Faculty of the University of Graz. The authors would also like to thank Ms Jessie Phyffer, Dr Walter Mckay and Ms Isabeau de Meyer for their editorial assistance.

1

H.O. Gieseken and V. Murphy, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment Under International Humanitarian Law: The icrc’s 2020 Guidelines’ (2023) 105(924) International Review of the Red Cross 1180–1207.

2

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’ (18 April–3 June and 4 July–5 August 2022) goar 77th Session Supp. 10 (a/77/10), at 92–187.

3

‘Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict: Rules and Recommendations Relating to the Protection of the Natural Environment Under International Humanitarian Law, with Commentary’ (2020) International Committee of the Red Cross, available from <https://shop.icrc.org/guidelines-on-the-protection-of-the-natural-environment-in-armed-conflict-rules-and-recommendations-relating-to-the-protection-of-the-natural-environment-under-international-humanitarian-law-with-commentary.html> (accessed 12 February 2024) (‘icrc Guidelines 2020’).

4

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a ‘Dule’ (Opinion and Judgment) (Trial Chamber i) [7 May 1997] icty it-94-1-t, at para. 561; See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka ‘Dule’ (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) [2 October 1995] icty it-94-1-a, A.Ch, at para. 70; See M.M. Bradley, ‘The Development of the Law of Armed Conflict by International Criminal Tribunals’ in S. Sivakumaran and C.R. Burne (eds), Making and Shaping the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press 2024) 173–196, at 178–181; M.M. Bradley, ‘Revisiting the Notion of “Organised Armed Group” in Accordance with Common Article 3: Exploring the Inherent Minimum Threshold Requirements’ (2018) 1 African Yearbook for International Law 50–79; E. Heffes, Detention by Non-State Armed Groups under International Law (Cambridge University Press 2022), at 29–69 (Chapter 1: ‘Non-State Armed Groups, Legal Personality and Typology’).

5

Gieseken and Murphy, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment Under International Humanitarian Law’, at 1203–1204.

6

Ibid., at 1203–1204 (emphasis added).

7

D. Weir and S. Pantazopoulos, ‘Feasibility Study: An Implementation Vehicle for the International Law Commission’s Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’ (2020) The Conflict and Environment Observatory, available at <https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/CEOBS_An+implementation+vehicle+for+the+International+Law+Commission+on+the+Protection+of+the+environment+in+relation+to+armed+conflicts.pdf/197ee9ae-5f1e-2732-4ad9-1099f4b66b76?t=1614077308636> (accessed 1 February 2024). Concerning the compliance by nsags on the protection of the environment, see also Gieseken and Murphy, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment Under International Humanitarian Law’, at 1201 where the authors cite ‘Reducing Civilian Harm in Urban Warfare: A Handbook for Armed Groups’ (1 March 2023) International Committee of the Red Cross, at 13, 15, 16 and 23, available at <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4682-reducing-civilian-harm-urban-warfare-handbook-armed-groups> (accessed 15 January 2024); T. de la Bourdonnaye, ‘Greener Insurgencies? Engaging Non-State Armed Groups for the Protection of the Natural Environment During Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2020) 102(914) International Review of the Red Cross 579–605.

8

unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’ (7 December 2022) which supports the endorsement of the perac Principles by States.

9

‘Call for Submissions – Volume 27 of the Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (unyb)’ The Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law, available at <https://www.mpfpr.de/2023/05/08/call-for-submissions-volume-27-unyb/> (accessed 13 June 2024).

10

See ‘Deeds of Commitment’ Geneva Call, available at <https://www.genevacall.org/deed-of-commitments/> (accessed 11 July 2024) where it defines ‘Deeds of Commitment’. See also De la Bourdonnaye, ‘Greener Insurgencies?’, at 602.

11

See also, for example, De la Bourdonnaye, ‘Greener Insurgencies?’, at 602 where the author proposed a new deed of commitment specifically for the protection of the environment which could potentially ensure that nsags comply with ihl.

12

See ‘Twelve Issues for 2022: What States Can Do to Improve Respect for International Humanitarian Law’ (21 March 2022) The International Committee of the Red Cross, available at <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/twelve-issues-what-states-can-do-improve-respect-ihl-2022> (accessed 15 January 2024).

13

See Y. Dinstein, Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2021), at 1–2. Dinstein refers to niacs occurring in ‘scores of countries all over the globe’, such as Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, Nigeria, Philippines, Syria, Thailand, Turkey and Yemen. Similarly, see A. Bellal, ‘The War Report: Armed Conflicts in 2017’ (March 2018) The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, available at <https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/The%20War%20Report%202017.pdf> (accessed 17 January 2024), at 17, 30–31, 49–157, read in conjunction with A. Bellal, ‘The War Report: Armed Conflicts in 2018’ (April 2019) The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, available at <www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/The%20War%20Report%202018.pdf> (accessed 17 January 2024), at 19, 32–34, 82–156; see also M.M. Bradley, ‘Additional Protocol ii: Elevating the Minimum Threshold of Intensity?’ (2020) 102(915) International Review of the Red Cross 1125–1152, at 1126; ‘Today’s Armed Conflicts’ Geneva Academy, available at <https://geneva-academy.ch/galleries/today-s-armed-conflicts> (accessed 17 January 2024).

14

See T. Hanson et al., ‘Warfare in Biodiversity Hotspots’ (2009) 23(3) Conservation Biology 578–587, at 578. Additionally, Daskin and Pringle concluded that from 1946 to 2010, armed conflicts took place in 71% of protected areas in Africa. See J.H. Daskin and R.M. Pringle, ‘Warfare and Wildlife Declines in Africa’s Protected Areas’ (2018) 553(7688) Nature 328–332, at 328. See also V. Murphy and H.O. Gieseken, ‘Fighting Without a Planet B: How ihl Protects the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict’ (25 May 2021) Humanitarian Law and Policy, available at <https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2021/05/25/fighting-without-planet-b/> (accessed 16 January 2024). In Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, Ansar al-Sunna, the non-State armed actor party to the conflict, frequently destroys, pillages and burns public infrastructure and properties. See, for example, D.A. Bekoe, S.M. Burchard and S.A. Daly, ‘Extremism in Mozambique: Interpreting Group Tactics and the Role of the Government’s Response in the Crisis in Cabo Delgado’ (March 2020) Institute for Defense Analyses, at 13, available at <https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ex/extremism-in-mozambique-interpreting-group-tactics-and-the-role-of-the-governments-response/d-13156.ashx> (accessed 20 January 2024). See also Q.M. Vertue, ‘Towards the Protection of the Environment in Cabo-Delgado: Looking Beyond the Existing Legal Framework and Engaging Ansar al-Sunna’ in M. Svicevic and M.M. Bradley (eds), Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Conflict: International Humanitarian Law and Regional Security (Routledge 2024), at 139–157. See wcs, Government of Mozambique and usaid, ‘Key Biodiversity Areas (kbas) Identified in Mozambique: Factsheets Vol. ii: Red List of Threatened Species and Ecosystems, Identification and Mapping of Key Biodiversity Areas (kbas) in Mozambique’ (2021), available at <https://comboprogram.org/Portals/1/Documents/1622457927-2021_KBAs_Moz_vol_ii_Factsheets_EN.pdf?ver=F2plHBM5lZ2x3-c8UYcMoA%3D%3D> (accessed 20 January 2024), at 8–9. Islamist and militant groups are known to frequently operate in protected areas and national parks throughout the Western Sahel region, Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger, disrupting the conservation efforts in the area. See ‘Containing Militancy in West Africa’s Park W’ (26 January 2023) International Crisis Group, available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso-niger-benin/310-containing-militancy-west-africas-park-w>; E. Hsiao et al., ‘Protected Zones in Context: Exploring the Complexity of Armed Conflicts and their Impacts on the Protection of Biodiversity’ (2023) 105(942) International Review of the Red Cross 1412–1440, at 1416–1418; E. Kenward, ‘War and Wildlife: The Deleterious Effects of Armed Conflicts in Biodiversity Hotspots and the Merits of Environmental Peacekeeping’ (2020) DPhil thesis, Tulane University; A. Garside, ‘Achieving Effective Biodiversity Protection During War and Armed Conflict’ (10 December 2021) rusi, available at <https://shoc.rusi.org/blog/achieving-effective-biodiversity-protection-during-war-and-armed-conflict/> (accessed 10 January 2024); J.A. McNeely, ‘War and Biodiversity: An Assessment of Impacts’ in J.E. Austin and C.E. Bruch (eds), The Environmental Consequences in War: Legal, Economic and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2010) 353–378. See also B.A. Hilario-Husain et al., ‘Caught in the Crossfire: Biodiversity Conservation Paradox of Sociopolitical Conflict’ (2024) 3(10) npj Biodiversity 1–9.

15

For examples of the damaging effects of armed conflicts on the environment, see U.C. Jha, Armed Conflict and Environmental Damage (Vij Books 2015); J.E. Austin and C.E. Bruch (eds), The Environmental Consequences in War: Legal, Economic and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2010); J. Crawford et al., Development Without Destruction: The UN and Global Resource Management (Indiana University Press 2010). See also R. Rayfuse, ‘War and the Environment: International Law and the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict – Introduction to the Special Issue’ (2013) 82(1) Nordic Journal of International Law 1–5, at 1.

16

See in general ‘Framework for Environmental Management in Assistance Programmes: International Committee of the Red Cross (icrc), Assistance Division, September 2009’ (2010) 92(879) International Review of the Red Cross 747–797; ‘Update: Protecting the Environment in Armed Conflict’ (16 January 2024) Geneva Environment Network, available at <https://www.genevaenvironmentnetwork.org/resources/updates/protecting-the-environment-in-armed-conflict/> (accessed 20 January 2024). In addition, violence caused by the conflict has increased climate change risks, through deforestation of mangroves for charcoal production to secure funds. See ‘Military Coup has Exacerbated Already Severe Climate Risks in Myanmar: UN Experts’ (27 November 2023) Reliefweb, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/military-coup-has-exacerbated-already-severe-climate-risks-myanmar-un-experts> (accessed 10 January 2024). Also see ‘Nature Conservation in Times of Conflict: Myanmar’ (25 May 2023) iucn nl, available at <https://www.iucn.nl/en/story/nature-conservation-in-times-of-conflict-myanmar/> (accessed 10 January 2024). Deforestation drivers are also known to impact Myanmar, which is set as a ‘global biodiversity hotspot’ owing to having the largest forest cover in Southeast Asia. See C.L. Lim et al., ‘Untangling the Proximate Causes and Underlying Drivers of Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Myanmar’ (2017) 31(6) Conservation Biology 1362–1372, at 1362; ‘Environmental Fragility in the Sahel’ (September 2022) The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, available at < https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/environmental-fragility-in-the-sahel_4950c277-en.html> (accessed 10 January 2024).

17

See in general ‘Framework for Environmental Management in Assistance Programmes’; ‘Update’ Geneva Environment Network. See ‘Military Coup has Exacerbated Already Severe Climate Risks in Myanmar: UN Experts’. Also see ‘Nature Conservation in Times of Conflict: Myanmar’. See Lim et al., ‘Untangling the Proximate Causes and Underlying Drivers of Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Myanmar’, at 1362; ‘Environmental Fragility in the Sahel’. See also in general, ‘When Rain Turns to Dust: Understanding and Responding to the Combined Impact of Armed Conflicts and the Climate and Environment Crisis on People’s Lives’ (2020) The International Committee of the Red Cross, available at <https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/rain_turns_to_dust_climate_change_conflict.pdf> (accessed 27 May 2024).

18

Vertue, ‘Towards the Protection of the Environment in Cabo-Delgado’, at 140–143. See in general ‘Witnessing the Environmental Impacts of War: Environmental Case Studies from Conflict Zones Around the World’ (November 2020) Zoï Environment Network, available at <https://zoinet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Witnessing-the-environmental-impacts-of-war_EN.pdf> (accessed 29 January 2024). Further, in 2015 in North Darfur, villages were attacked and burned by the Janjaweed. See ‘Sudan: The Janjaweed Militia Attacked and Burned to Ashes Nineteen (19) Villages in North Darfur 8th to 10th February 2015’ (16 February 2015) Reliefweb, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/janjaweed-militia-attacked-and-burned-ashes-nineteen-19-villages-north-darfur-8th-10th> (accessed 29 January 2024).

19

‘Twelve Issues for 2022’.

20

M. Mack and J. Pejic, ‘Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2008) The International Committee of the Red Cross 1–32, available at <https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/0923-increasing_respect_for_international_humanitarian_law_in_non-international_armed_conflicts.pdf> (accessed 10 January 2024); ‘Chair’s Summary Report of State Expert Meeting on ihl: Protecting the Environment in Armed Conflicts’ (8 August 2023) The International Committee of the Red Cross 1–33, available at <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/chairs-summary-report-state-expert-meeting-ihl-protecting-natural-environment-armed> (accessed 10 January 2024), at 21, 26 and 28. See De la Bourdannye, ‘Greener Insurgencies’; C.L. Mckay and D.K. Anton, ‘Protecting the Silent Victim from Irregular Actors: Improving Non-State Compliance with the International Law of Environmental Protection in Armed Conflict’ (2012) anu College of Law Research Paper 1–51.

21

No explicit protection of the environment is mentioned in Common Article 3. See Common Article 3(1) to all four Geneva Conventions: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 unts 31; Geneva Convention for the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force on 21 October 1950) 75 unts 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 unts 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 unts 287. Further, in Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 unts 609 (‘Additional Protocol ii’), none of the articles provide explicit protection of the environment. See J. Pejic, ‘The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More Than Meets the Eye’ (2011) 93(881) International Review of the Red Cross 1–37; see in general J. Pretorius, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment in Non-International Armed Conflict Under International Treaty Law’ (2018) lld thesis, University of Pretoria.

22

J.M. Henckaertz and L. Doswold-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume i: Rules (Cambridge University Press 2009); Customary Rule 45 which includes the prohibition of ‘causing serious damage to the natural environment’, at 151–152. See also ‘International Humanitarian Law Databases: Rule 45’ The International Committee of the Red Cross, available at <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule45> (accessed 13 June 2024). See S. Bagheri, ‘The Legal Limits to the Destruction of Natural Resources in Non-International Armed Conflicts: Applying International Humanitarian Law’ (2023) 105(923) International Review of the Red Cross 882–913, at 895.

23

P. Antoine, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed Conflict’ (1992) 291 International Review of the Red Cross 517–537; A. Bouvier, ‘Protection of the Natural Environment in Time of Armed Conflict’ (1991) 285 International Review of the Red Cross 567–578; A. Bouvier, ‘Recent Studies on the Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed Conflict’ (1992) 291 International Review of the Red Cross 554–566. See, in general, J. Pretorius, ‘Enhancing Environmental Protection in Non-International Armed Conflict: The Way Forward’ (2018) 78 Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 903–932; T. Smith, ‘The Prohibition of Environmental Damage During the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2013) PhD thesis, University of Galway.

24

M. Bothe et al., ‘International Law Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: Gaps and Opportunities’ (2010) 92(879) International Review of the Red Cross 569–592. No positive obligations under ihl provide for liability of nsags and damage of the environment. See C.E. Bruch, ‘All’s Not Fair in (Civil) War: Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage in Internal Armed Conflict’ 25(3) (2001) Vermont Law Review 695–752, at 711–716 and A. Lopez, ‘Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage Occurring in Times of Non-International Armed Conflict: Rights and Remedies’ (2007) 18(2) Fordham Environmental Law Review 231–271; C. Droege and M.L. Tougas, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict – Existing Rules and Need for Further Legal Protection’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 21–52.

25

icrc Guidelines 2020, at 7–8, 17–19, 46–62; Henckaertz and Doswold-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume i, at 143–147.

26

‘International Humanitarian Law Databases: Rule 43’ The International Committee of the Red Cross, available at <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule43#:~:text=the%20natural%20environment-,Rule%2043.,it%20is%20a%20military%20objective.> (accessed 13 June 2024).

27

‘International Humanitarian Law Databases: Rule 44’ The International Committee of the Red Cross, available at <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule44> (accessed 13 June 2024).

28

‘International Humanitarian Law Databases: Rule 45’.

29

See ‘International Humanitarian Law Databases: Rule 44’ and ‘International Humanitarian Law Databases: Rule 45’. See also Rules 1 to 3.A of the icrc Guidelines 2020, at 27–43.

30

Smith, ‘The Prohibition of Environmental Damage during the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflict’, at 111; Pretorius, ‘Enhancing Environmental Protection in Non-International Armed Conflict’, at 921–922.

31

Pretorius, ‘Enhancing Environmental Protection in Non-International Armed Conflict’, at 923.

32

M.G. Jacobsson, ‘Working to Protect the Environment in Armed Conflict’ (2 November 2016) The United Nations Environment Programme, available at <https://unep.medium.com/working-to-protect-the-environment-in-armed-conflict-ce9aff1aa479> (accessed 12 February 2024); Vertue, ‘Towards the Protection of the Environment in Cabo-Delgado’, at 140–146.

33

For a record of the work done by the ilc on perac dating back to 2011–2022, see ‘Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission: Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’ (9 June 2023) The International Law Commission, available at <https://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/8_7.shtml> (accessed 12 February 2024).

34

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 92–187.

35

unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’; see ‘Ambassadors from Finland and Sweden to Receive 2023 Elisabeth Haub Award for Environmental Law and Diplomacy for Their Ground-Breaking Work to Protect the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict’ (7 September 2023) Pace University: Elisabeth Haub School of Law, available at <https://law.pace.edu/news-and-events/news/2023-elisabeth-haub-award-environmental> (accessed 14 January 2024).

36

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, commentary to Preamble, at 98; commentary to Principle 1, at 100; commentary to Principle 5(10), at 111; commentary to ‘Principles Applicable During Armed Conflict’, at 135; commentary to Principle 13(10), at 143 (see footnote 641); commentary to Principles 14(3)–(4) and (8), at 144–146; and commentary to Principle 16(1), at 149. ‘Interview with Marja Lehto: Former International Law Commission Special Rapporteur on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’ (2023) 105(924) International Committee of the Red Cross 1169–1179.

37

This is owing to ihl treaty law and customary law that is concerned with environmental protection regulating only iac. Henckaertz and Doswold-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume i, at 143–151, namely: Customary Rule 43, ‘The General Principles on the Conduct of Hostilities Apply to the Natural Environment’; Customary Rule 44, ‘Methods and Means of Warfare Must Be Employed With Due Regard to the Protection and Preservation of the Natural Environment’; Customary Rule 45, ‘Serious Damage Towards the Environment’. The basic principles of ihl apply to niacs should the argument hold that the environment has a civilian characteristic. This viewpoint has generated debate and negative comment. See Major J.J. Marsh, ‘Lex Lata or Lex Ferenda? Rule 45 of the icrc Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 198 Military Law Review 116–164; R. Holman, A. Aubut and I. Cristescu, ‘Draft Principles on Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict’ (16 January 2024) Lieber Institute, available at <https://lieber.westpoint.edu/draft-principles-protection-environment-armed-conflict/> (accessed 17 January 2024).

38

E. Heffes and J. Somer, ‘Inviting Non-State Armed Groups to the Table: Inclusive Strategies Towards a More Fit for Purpose International Humanitarian Law’ (2021) Briefing Note, Centre for the Study of Armed Groups, December 2020, available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3761793> (accessed 13 February 2024).

39

O. Bangerter, ‘A Collection of Codes of Conduct Issued by Armed Groups’ (2011) 93(882) International Review of the Red Cross 483–501. For examples of the efficacy of such tools, see in general ‘From Words to Deeds Research Project’, available at <https://words2deeds.org/> (accessed 13 June 2024).

40

Bangerter, ‘A Collection of Codes of Conduct Issued by Armed Groups’, at 486.

41

Ibid., at 484.

42

See Codes of Conduct that reference the protection of the environment through various forms, obtained from ibid., at 483–501. The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army/People’s Liberation Army (pla) (China, 1947–1949) in their ‘Eight Points for Attention’, at 487, state: ‘Do not damage crops’. The New People’s Army (npa) (Philippines, 1969), at 488–489 state in Point 3 B. 6): ‘Do not destroy people’s crops’. The National Liberation Army (eln) (Colombia, 1964) in their ‘Code of War Under Limits on the Methods and Means of Warfare’, at 490–492 state: ‘Acts of sabotage shall, as far as possible, avoid causing environmental damage’; in addition, ‘Religious sites, cultural objects, and installations containing dangerous forces such as dams or nuclear material shall not be attacked’. The Revolutionary United Front (ruf) (Sierra Leone, 1991–2002) in their ‘Eight Codes of Conduct’, at 497 state: ‘Do not damage crops’.

43

The Deed in Term 3 states the following: ‘To protect objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, including when such objects are part of the natural environment’. See ‘Documents’ Geneva Call, available at <https://www.genevacall.org/resources/documents/?_sf_s=starvation> (accessed 9 February 2024). Also see ‘News’ Geneva Call, available at <https://www.genevacall.org/news/armed-conflict-and-the-environment/> (accessed 9 February 2024).

44

A. Dienelt, Armed Conflicts and the Environment: Complementing the Laws of Armed Conflict with Human Rights Law and International Environmental Law (SpringerLink 2022); T. Smith, ‘The Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources in Armed Conflict’ in S. Sayapin et al. (eds), International Conflict and Security Law: A Research Handbook (SpringerLink 2022) 421–442; Vertue, ‘Towards the Protection of the Environment in Cabo-Delgado’; J. Phyffer, ‘Armed Conflict, Climate Change and the Preparedness of International Law Through the Lens of Mozambique’ in M. Svicevic and M.M. Bradley (eds), Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Conflict: International Humanitarian Law and Regional Security (Routledge 2024).

45

See in general C. Droege and E. Giorgou, ‘How International Humanitarian Law Develops’ (2022) 104(920–921) International Review of the Red Cross 1798–1839.

46

Droege and Giorgou, ‘How International Humanitarian Law Develops’, at 1820.

47

Ibid., at 1820.

48

E. Crawford, Non-Binding Norms in International Humanitarian Law: Efficacy, Legitimacy and Legality (Oxford University Press 2022), at 1–39; See the case of the Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić (Appeals Chamber) [2 October 1995] icty it-94-1-ar72, at paras 102–108 where the Court accepted practice from nsags.

49

‘About Us’ Geneva Call, available at <https://www.genevacall.org/about-us> (accessed 11 June 2024).

50

‘In and Around War(s) Podcast: Season 2/Episode 1 Engaging with Armed Groups’ Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jYSGbi5QAk0> (accessed 11 June 2024); E. Heffes, ‘Non-State Actors Engaging Non-State Actors: The Experience of Geneva Call in niacs’ in E. Heffes, M.D. Kotlik and M.J. Ventura (eds), International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors: Debates, Law and Practice (Asser Press 2020) 427–451.

51

Heffes, ‘Non-State Actors Engaging Non-State Actors’, at 433–434; M. Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare (Edward Elgar Publishing 2019), at para. 10.243–10.244.

52

Heffes, ‘Non-State Actors Engaging Non-State Actors’, at 433–434.

53

For an in-depth legal analysis of this mechanism, see ‘Deeds of Commitment’ Geneva Call.

54

J. Kleffner, ‘The Unilateralization of International Humanitarian Law’ (2022) 104 (920–921) International Review of the Red Cross 2153–2169, at 2153–2156; see ‘How We Work’ Geneva Call, available at <https://www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/> (accessed 5 February 2024) and ‘Deeds of Commitment’ Geneva Call.

55

Kleffner, ‘The Unilateralization of International Humanitarian Law’, at 2153.

56

Ibid., at 2153. See Common Article 3 to all four Geneva Conventions, at footnote 21.

57

Kleffner, ‘The Unilateralization of International Humanitarian Law’, at 2155.

58

Art. 96(3) of Additional Protocol i to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 unts 3 (‘Additional Protocol I’).

59

Kleffner, ‘The Unilateralization of International Humanitarian Law’, at 2155. See also S. Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press Oxford 2012), at 109–110 and 118–124.

60

Kleffner, ‘The Unilateralization of International Humanitarian Law’, at 2155.

61

Ibid. Deeds of Commitment may also extend beyond existing ihl frameworks. See also ‘Roots of Restraint in War’ (June 2018) The International Committee of the Red Cross, available at <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4352-roots-restraint-war> (accessed 7 February 2024) 1–78, at 64.

62

Kleffner, ‘The Unilateralization of International Humanitarian Law’, at 2155.

63

‘Their Words: Unilateral Declaration on Humanitarian Access and Assistance’ Geneva Call, available at <http://theirwords.org/?country=UKR&ansa=287> (accessed 10 January 2024).

64

Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law, at para. 10.245; P. Bongard and S. Jonathan, ‘Monitoring Non-State Actor Compliance with Humanitarian Norms: A Look at International Mechanisms and the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment’ (2011) 93(883) International Review of the Red Cross 673–706.

65

‘Deeds of Commitment’ Geneva Call.

66

‘How We Work’ Geneva Call.

67

‘Deeds of Commitment’ Geneva Call.

68

Ibid. See also ‘Thematic Areas: Our Commitment’ Geneva Call, available at <https://www.genevacall.org/areas-of-intervention/> (accessed 14 June 2024).

69

See footnote 43.

70

See ‘Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for the Prevention of Starvation and Adressing Conflict-Related Food Insecurity’ Geneva Call, available at <https://www.genevacall.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Official-DoC-Preventing-Starvation-And-Adressing-Conflict-Related-Food-Insecurity.pdf> (accessed 11 July 2024), at 1.

71

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), at para. 70.

72

See Common Article 3 to all four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol ii.

73

See Common Article 3 to all four Geneva Conventions.

74

Art. 1(1) of Additional Protocol ii determines this scope of application. ap ii applies only to those niacs where the armed forces of a territorial State party to ap ii fights against an organised armed group who, under responsible command, has the ability to exercise control over part of the State’s territory, to implement ap ii and finally, to carry out sustained and concentred military attacks.

75

Crawford, Non-Binding Norms in International Humanitarian Law, at 1–39.

76

‘Thematic Areas: Our Commitment’ Geneva Call.

77

S. Sivakumaran, ‘Implementing Humanitarian Norms Through Non-State Armed Groups’ in H. Krieger (ed.), Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region (Cambridge University Press 2015) 125–146, at 132.

78

Ibid., at 133; A. Roberts and S. Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 37(1) The Yale Journal of International Law 107–152, at 133–134.

79

Sivakumaran, ‘Implementing Humanitarian Norms through Non-State Armed Groups’, at 133.

80

Ibid.

81

O. Bangerter, ‘Internal Control: Codes of Conducts within Insurgent Armed Groups’ (2012) 31 Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 1–130, at 12.

82

Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law, at para. 10.242.

83

That meets the requirements of Art. 1(1) of Additional Protocol ii. See in general M.M. Bradley, ‘Revisiting the Scope of Application of Additional Protocol ii: Exploring the Inherent Minimum Threshold Requirements’ (2019) 1 African Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 81–120.

84

Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law, at para. 10.242.

85

Ibid., at para. 10.242. See also ‘How We Work’ Geneva Call; Droege and Giorgou, ‘How International Humanitarian Law Develops’, at 1820.

86

See footnote 37.

87

S. Sivakumaran, ‘Implementing Humanitarian Norms Through Non-State Armed Groups’; U. Schneckener and C. Hofmann, ‘The Power of Persuasion’ in H. Krieger (ed.), Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region (Cambridge University Press 2015) 79–111; M. Sassóli, ‘Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve their Compliance with International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 1 International Humanitarian Legal Studies 5–51; A. Bellal, P. Bongard and E. Heffes, ‘From Words to Deeds: A Study of Armed Non-State Actors’ Practice and Interpretation of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Norms’ (Geneva Academy September 2022) 1–8; O. Bangerter, E. Heffes and B.E. Frenkel, ‘The International Responsibility of Non-State Armed Groups: In Search of the Applicable Rules’ (2017) 8(1) Goettingen Journal of International Law 39–72.

88

Bangerter, ‘A Collection of Codes of Conduct Issued by Armed Groups’, at 10.

89

Ibid.

90

Ibid.

91

Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law, at para. 10.242.

92

Bangerter, Heffes and Frenkel, ‘The International Responsibility of Non-State Armed Groups’, at 54.

93

Ibid.

94

Ibid., at 51; Roberts and Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors’, at 127.

95

Sivakumaran, ‘Implementing Humanitarian Norms through Non-State Armed Groups’, at 131; Roberts and Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors’, at 131.

96

Sivakumaran, ‘Implementing Humanitarian Norms through Non-State Armed Groups’, at 131; Roberts and Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors’, at 131.

97

See also for example De la Bourdonnaye, ‘Greener Insurgencies?’, at 602 where the author proposed a new deed of commitment specifically for the protection of the environment which could potentially ensure that nsags comply with ihl.

98

Bangerter, ‘A Collection of Codes of Conduct Issued by Armed Groups’, at 486; Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law, at para. 10.243; see also J. Somer, ‘Environmental Protection and Non-State Armed Groups: Setting a Place at the Table for the Elephant in the Room’ (4 December 2015) The Conflict and Environment Observatory, available at <https://ceobs.org/environmental-protection-and-non-state-armed-groups-setting-a-place-at-the-table-for-the-elephant-in-the-room/> (accessed 10 January 2024).

99

Sivakumaran, ‘Implementing Humanitarian Norms through Non-State Armed Groups’, 125–146, at 135; Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgment) [2 March 2009] scsl-04-15-t, at para. 705.

100

See Policy 4 on ‘knu Land Policy – Dec 2015 (English Language)’ at ‘Policies’ Karen National Union, available at <https://knuhq.org/en/policies> (accessed 10 January 2024).

101

‘Les huit commandements de l’armée du peuple’, available at <http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/1_cd_cnl_01-fbdd68697cb005b6e8bf6200463add30.pdf> (accessed 10 January 2024).

102

‘The Fifteen-Point Programme of the splm: Vision and Programme of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (splm)’ (March 1998) splm Political Secretariat, available at <http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/sd_splm_a_1998_51-3be918204bb5d36f06c1eb2e8796ae18.pdf> (accessed 10 January 2024).

103

For examples of cultural heritage sites, which often include nature reserves and forests, and which form part of the environment, see for example, ‘2020 World Monuments Watch’ World Monuments Fund, available at <https://www.wmf.org/2020Watch> (accessed 15 June 2024); ‘World Heritage List’ unesco World Heritage Convention, available at <https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/> (accessed 15 June 2024); ‘Libya’ unesco World Heritage Convention, available at <https://whc.unesco.org/fr/etatsparties/ly> (accessed 15 June 2024). See the heritage sites found in Libya which are sites linked to culture, heritage and the environment. In addition, 47 of the sites listed have conservation status.

104

Art. 16 of Additional Protocol ii provides for the ‘protection of cultural objects and of places of worship’; see ‘Introduction to Guidelines’ Libyan Liberation Army, available at <http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/1_ly_ntc_2011_03-ef921ee4a9e2826b1ad8c267b8254c97.pdf> (accessed 10 January 2024); ‘To the Members of the Libyan Liberation Army: Code of Rules and Attitudes of the Organisation for the Successful Conduct of Fighting’ Libyan Liberation Army, 2011, Geneva Call: Their Words available at <http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/ly_ntc_2011_04_eng-37607a6aa5ec5080127c21e730a8f9e9.pdf> (accessed 10 January 2024).

105

‘Code of Conduct for Commanders/Code of Conduct for Members’, 1982, Geneva Call: Their Words, available at <http://theirwords.org/?country=PER&ansa=72> (accessed 10 January 2024).

106

Bangerter, ‘Internal Control’, at 4.

107

Ibid., at 7.

108

‘Agreement on Peace and National Reconciliation’ The Front for the Restoration of Unity and Dignity, 1994, Geneva Call: Their Words available at <http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/1_dj_frud_1994_01-bea4b28c048907e9d79da88a1ba58caa.pdf> (accessed 10 January 2024).

109

‘Agreement Establishing Permanent Peace Between the Government of the Republic of Niger and the “Organisation de la Résistance Armée (o.r.a.)” (Organisation of the Armed Resistance ora)’, 1995, Geneva Call: Their Words available at <http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/1_ne_ora_1995_04-d59138b334bafd857fead1e605ce2c3b.pdf> (accessed 10 January 2024).

110

‘Pacte National Conclu Entre le Gouvernement de la République du Mali et les Mouvements et Fronts Unifies de L’azawad Consacrant le Statut Particulier du Nord du Mali’, 11 April 1992, The University of Edinburgh: pa-x Analytics – Peace and Transition Process Data, available at <https://pax.peaceagreements.org/agreements/637/> (accessed 11 July 2024).

111

Ibid., at 7, Section iii Specific Status of Northern Mali, 15.B.

112

See in general ‘Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission: Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’.

113

Sassòli, ‘Taking Armed Groups Seriously’, at 21.

114

As mentioned in the introduction, several Principles could be included in a perac-themed deed of commitment, however, owing to the spatial limitation, the authors only sample three perac Principles.

115

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-Third Session’ (26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 2011) goar 66th Session Supp.10 (a/66/10), at 289, 351–359.

116

See unep, ‘Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law’ (November 2009), available at <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/7813/Protecting%20the%20Environment%20During%20Armed%20Conflict_An%20Inventory%20and%20Analysis%20of%20International%20Law-2009891.pdf?sequence=3&amp%3BisAllowed=> (accessed 14 January 2024), at 6. This was a joint report published by unep, in cooperation with the Environmental Law Institute, the icrc as well as international law specialists; UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-Third Session’, at 356.

117

unep, ‘Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict’, at 6. See M. Jacobsson and M. Lehto, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts: An Overview of the International Law Commission’s Ongoing Work’ (2020) 10(1) Goettingen Journal of International Law 27–46, at 29.

118

Jacobsson and Lehto, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’, at 29.

119

UN ilc, ‘Summary Record of the 3171st Meeting’ (28 May 2013) UN Doc. a/cn.4/3171; UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-Fifth Session’ (6 May–7 June and 8 July–9 August 2013) goar 68th Session Supp. 10 (a/68/10), at paras 131–132.

120

See in general G. Bartolini and M. Pertile, ‘The Work of the ilc on the Environment and Armed Conflicts: Enhancing Protection for the “Silent Victim of Warfare?’” (31 December 2016) Questions of International Law: Zoom-In, available at <https://www.qil-qdi.org/work-ilc-environment-armed-conflicts-enhancing-protection-silent-victim-warfare/>.

121

UN ilc, ‘Summary Record of the 3171st Meeting’; UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-Fifth Session’.

122

UN ilc, ‘Provisional Summary Record of the 3389th Meeting’ (4 August 2017) UN Doc. a/cn.4/sr.3389, at 16.

123

To gain access to the six reports, see ‘Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission: Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’.

124

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 90–187.

125

unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’.

126

Ibid., at para. 4 of the Preamble; see also ‘States Agree New Legal Framework on the Environmental Impact of War: Time to Transition to perac Implementation’ (8 December 2022) The Conflict and Environment Observatory, available at <https://ceobs.org/states-adopt-new-legal-framework-on-the-environmental-impact-of-war/> (accessed 14 January 2024).

127

See footnote 35: ‘Ambassadors from Finland and Sweden to Receive 2023 Elisabeth Haub Award for Environmental Law and Diplomacy for their Ground-Breaking Work to Protect the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict’.

128

S. Lekkas, ‘The Uses of the Outputs of the International Law Commission in International Adjudication’ (2022) 69 Netherlands International Law Review 327–359, at 328. See also UN ilc, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’ (16 March 2022) UN Doc. a/cn.4/750, at 14.

129

‘Interview with Marja Lehto’, at 1170 and 1177–1179. See also UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 97–99, paras 1–3 of the commentary to the Preamble.

130

unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’; ‘States Agree New Legal Framework on the Environmental Impact of War’ ceobs.

131

unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’; ‘States Agree New Legal Framework on the Environmental Impact of War’ ceobs; UN ilc, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at 14.

132

unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’, Preamble, at 1.

133

unep, ‘Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict’, at 28.

134

unep, ‘Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict’, at 6, 53; UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-Third Session’, at 356.

135

unep, ‘Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict’, at 6, 53. See, in general, Pretorius, ‘Enhancing Environmental Protection in Non-International Armed Conflict’.

136

UN ilc, ‘Preliminary Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marie G Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur’ (30 May 2014) UN Doc. a/cn.4/674, at paras 7, 12, 14, 59, 74, 167.

137

For statements made by delegates of the Sixth Committee, see the following: For China, see unga Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 22nd Meeting, Seventieth Session’ (6 November 2015) UN Doc. a/c.6/70/sr.22, at para. 74; for Vietnam and the Republic of Korea, see unga Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 25th Meeting, Seventieth Session’ (11 November 2015) UN Doc. a/c.6/70/sr.25, at paras 41 and 82; for Mexico and the Islamic Republic of Iran, see unga Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 29th Meeting, Seventy-First Session’ (2 November 2016) UN Doc. a/c.6/71/sr.29, at paras 75 and 93; for El Salvador, see unga Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 26th Meeting’ (1 November 2017) UN Doc. a/c.6/72/sr.26, at para. 128. For statements made by members of the ilc, see for example UN ilc, ‘Summary Record of the 3264th meeting’ (6 July 2015) UN Doc. a/cn.4/3264, Mr Murase, at para. 67; UN ilc, ‘Provisional Summary Record of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 3468th Meeting’ (22 May 2019) UN Doc. a/cn.4/sr.3468, Mr Huang, at 14–15.

138

For statements made by delegates of the Sixth Committee, see the following: For Slovenia, Lebanon, Austria, Portugal, Croatia, El Salvador, see unga Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 24th Meeting, Seventieth Session’ (10 November 2015) UN Doc. a/c.6/70/sr.24, at paras 40, 60, 70, 78–79, 86, 96; for Switzerland and New Zealand, see unga Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 25th Meeting, Seventieth Session’, at paras 98, 101; for Trinidad and Tobago, see unga Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 25th Meeting’ (31 October 2017) UN Doc. a/c.6/72/sr.25, at para. 34. For statements made by members of the ilc, see for example UN ilc, ‘Summary Record of the 3229th meeting’ (23 July 2014) UN. Doc a/cn.4/3229, Mr Saboia, at para. 3; Mr Hassouna, at para. 20; Mr Robledo, at para. 27; UN ilc, ‘Summary Record of the 3267th Meeting’ (9 July 2015) UN Doc. a/cn.4/3267, Mr Šturma, at paras 6–8; Mr Wood, at para. 15; UN ilc, ‘Summary Record of the 3265th Meeting’ (7 July 2015) UN Doc. a/cn.4/3265, Mr Tladi, at para. 60; UN ilc, ‘Provisional Summary Record of the 3468th Meeting’ (22 May 2019) UN Doc. a/cn.4/sr.3468, Ms Galvão Teles, at 17; UN ilc, ‘Provisional Summary Record of the 3470th Meeting’ (24 May 2019) UN Doc. a/cn.4/sr.3470, Mr Cissé, at 10. See also UN ilc, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Ms Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur’ (2 May–10 June and 4 July–12 August 2016) UN Doc. a/cn.4/700, at para. 15.

139

UN ilc, ‘Preliminary Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marie G Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur’, at paras 7, 12, 14, 59, 74, 167.

140

See, for example, UN ilc, ‘First Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’ (30 April 2018) UN Doc. a/cn.4/720, at para. 100. See also UN ilc, ‘Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’ (27 March 2019) UN Doc. a/cn.4/728, at paras 4, 11, 17, 22, 51–56.

141

UN ilc, ‘First Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at para. 100.

142

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventieth Session’ (30 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2018) gaor 73rd Session Supp. 10 (a/73/10), at para. 182; see also UN ilc, ‘Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at paras 4, 11, 17, 22, 51–56.

143

See in general UN ilc, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’ and UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’.

144

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-Eighth Session’ (2 May–10 June and 4 July–12 August 2016) gaor 71st Session Supp. 10 (a/71/10), at 319 and 322, para. 3 of the commentary to Draft Principle 1.

145

Ibid., at 332, para. 3 of the commentary to Draft Principle 1.

146

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 100.

147

Ibid., at para. 2 of the commentary to Principle 1, at 100 (emphasis added). Note that the term ‘generally’ was added. This serves to show that the ilc acknowledges that not all perac Principles apply as lex lata to iacs and niacs.

148

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 100, para. 3 of the commentary to Principle 1.

149

See footnotes 136–138. For the purposes of this article, the intricate details extend beyond the scope of the article. See also unga Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 29th Meeting, Seventy-First Session’, at paras 75 and 93. See UN ilc, ‘First Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at para. 6; UN ilc, ‘Provisional Summary Record of the 3505th Meeting’ (8 August 2019) UN Doc. a/cn.4/sr.3505, at 4–5. ‘Interview with Marja Lehto’, at 1177. See also S.E. Pantazopoulos, ‘Report: 2019’s UN General Assembly Debate on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’ (December 2019) The Conflict and Environment Observatory, available at <https://ceobs.org/report-2019s-un-general-assembly-debate-on-the-protection-of-the-environment-in-relation-to-armed-conflicts/> (accessed 12 January 2024).

150

D. Weir, ‘States Back Further Progress on Conflict and Environment in UN Legal Debate – Conflict-Affected States Supportive of Draft Legal Principles and There’s Widespread Support for the Continuation of the ilc’s Work on perac’ (9 November 2016) The Conflict and Environment Observatory, available at <https://ceobs.org/states-back-further-progress-on-conflict-and-environment-in-un-legal-debate/> (accessed 12 January 2024).

151

See footnote 138.

152

UN ilc, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at 6, 103–106; UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 97–99.

153

unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’.

154

The wording of the adopted preamble differs from the suggested preamble in UN ilc, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at 6, 103–106.

155

unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’, at 2.

156

Ibid., at 2–3.

157

‘Interview with Marja Lehto’, at 1177; S. Lekkas, ‘The Uses of the Outputs of the International Law Commission in International Adjudication’, at 328; ‘States Agree New Legal Framework on the Environmental Impact of War’ ceobs; D. Weir, ‘The perac Legal Framework, Frequently Asked Questions’ (September 2022) The Conflict and Environment Observatory, available at <https://ceobs.org/perac-principles-frequently-asked-questions/#1663073164735-f59acb18-3a80> (accessed 14 January 2024). unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’, at Preamble, which reads as follows: ‘Recalling that, to the extent that they do not reflect customary or treaty-based obligations of States, as applicable, the draft principles provide recommendations for the progressive development of international law, inter alia, through examples of effective voluntary measures to enhance the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts’; UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at Principle 9(2)–(3).

158

Holman, Aubut and Cristescu, ‘Draft Principles on Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict’; Vertue, ‘Towards the Protection of the Environment in Cabo-Delgado’, at 145 where footnote 140 highlights UN ilc, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at 13, para. 33; M. Sassoli and Y. Shany, ‘Should the Obligations of States and Armed Groups Under International Humanitarian Law Really Be Equal?’ (2011) 93(882) International Review of the Red Cross 425–436, at 430 and 434.

159

See for example Gieseken and Murphy, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment Under International Humanitarian Law’.

160

For an in-depth analysis, see W.H. Boothby, The Law of Targeting (Oxford University Press 2012).

161

See, in general, ibid.

162

See, for example, Principle 12 on Martens Clause with respect to the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts; Principle 14 concerning the application of the law of armed conflict to the environment; Principle 16 on the prohibition of pillage; Principle 18 on protected zones; and Principle 20 concerning the sustainable use of natural resources.

163

Arts 55(1) and 35(3) of Additional Protocol i; A. Bellal and S. Casey-Maslen, The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context (Oxford University Press 2022) 165–166; unga Res. 3475, ‘Prohibition of Action to Influence the Environment and Climate for Military and Other Hostile Purposes, which are Incompatible with the Maintenance of International Security, Human Well-Being and Health’ (11 December 1975) (‘enmod’).

164

J. Goldblat, ‘The Prohibition of Environmental Warfare’ (1975) 4(5/6) Journal for Environment and Society 186–190; M.N. Schmitt, ‘Humanitarian Law and the Environment’ (2000) 28(3) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 265–323; unep, ‘Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict’; icrc Guidelines 2020, at 4; H. McCoubry, International Humanitarian Law: Modern Developments in the Limitation of Warfare (Routledge Revivals 2020), at 33, 227–230; Holman, Aubut and Cristescu, ‘Draft Principles on Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict’.

165

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-Third Session’; B. Sjostedt and A. Dienelt, ‘Enhancing the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts – The Draft Principles of the International Law Commission and Beyond’ (2020) 10(1) Goettingen Journal of International Law 13–25; M. Lehto, ‘Overcoming the Disconnect: Environmental Protection and Armed Conflicts’ (27 May 2021) Humanitarian Law & Policy, available at <https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2021/05/27/overcoming-disconnect-environmental-protection-armed-conflicts/> (accessed 12 February 2024); unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’, at 5, Principle 13 sub-section 1 which reads ‘in accordance with applicable international law and, in particular, the law of armed conflict’; sub-section 2 reflects sub-sections 55(1) and 35(3) of Additional Protocol i which provide for the threshold of damage and means and methods applicable; sub-section 3 provides for the justification of damage to the environment where ‘it has become a military objective’; S. Pantazopoulos, ‘The ilc Draft Principles on Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict’ (4 August 2022) Lieber Institute, available at <https://lieber.westpoint.edu/ilc-protection-environment-armed-conflict/> (accessed 6 January 2024).

166

D. Dam de Jong and B. Sjostedt, ‘Enhancing Environmental Protection in Relation to Armed Conflict: An Assessment of the ilc Draft Principles’ (2021) 44(2) Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 129–156, at 144–145.

167

Ibid., at 144.

168

UN ilc, ‘Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, with Commentaries’ in ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-Third Session’, at 106–130; Dam de Jong and Sjostedt, ‘Enhancing Environmental Protection in Relation to Armed Conflict’, at 144.

169

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 140–141.

170

Ibid., at Principle 13(1)–(3).

171

Ibid., at Principle 13(1).

172

Ibid.; UN ilc, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts: Comments and Observations Received from Governments, International Organisations and Others’ (17 January 2022) UN Doc. a/cn.4/749, at 71–72. See also the statement made by Spain concerning the use of the word ‘natural environment’ versus ‘environment’ in Part Three of the Draft Principles, at 24; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland averred that the term ‘natural environment’ should be retained as a new reference to the environment will raise a debate over a new meaning in relation to the environment; additionally, the term ‘natural environment’ already alludes to the inclusion of civilian objects, at 27; the Czech Republic and France also preferred the use of the term ‘natural environment’ to avoid ambiguity and to be consistent ‘with the draft principles that draw on from Additional Protocol I’, at 8–12.

173

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 109, commentary to Principle 5(2); at 141, paras 1–4, Principle 13(1); at 135, para. 1, Part Three ‘Principles Applicable During Armed Conflict’; T. Ferraro, ‘Expert Meeting: Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory’ (March 2012) The International Committee of the Red Cross, available at <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4094-occupation-and-other-forms-administration-foreign-territory-expert-meeting> (accessed 12 February 2024), at 23 and 124–127.

174

Art. 55(1) Additional Protocol i. The first sentence reads as follows: ‘Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage’. Art. 35(3) reads: ‘It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment’; UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 140–141, paras 5–7 of the commentary to Principle 13.

175

Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (eds), International Committee of the Red Cross: Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Nijhoff 1987) 661–664, at paras 2124–2139 providing that at the time of drafting the articles, drafters could not agree on the wording for the threshold of damage and, thus, inserted the wording reflected in enmod, however, with a different interpretation attached; Bellal and Casey-Maslen, The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in Context, at 202–204; icrc Guidelines 2020, at 32.

176

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 141–142, paras 1 and 5–9 of the commentary to Principle 13(2).

177

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Seventy-Third Session, Comments and Observations Received from Governments, International Organisations and Others’, at 68–71.

178

Henckaertz and Doswold-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume i, at 151–157, Customary Rule 45 which provides that ‘[t]he use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment is prohibited. Destruction of the natural environment may not be used as a weapon’. Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, at 526–527.

179

unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’; see Principle 13(3) and Principle 14 which provides for the ‘Application of the law of armed conflict to the environment’ through the principles of distinction, proportionality and the rules of precaution as underscored in the law of targeting.

180

Art. 48 Additional Protocol i; UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 143–144, paras 10–11 which reflects commentary to Principle 13.

181

C.R. Payne, ‘Protection of the Environment’ in B. Saul and D. Akande (eds), The Oxford Guide to International Humanitarian Law (Oxford University Press 2020) 205–233, at 209–210.

182

Ibid., at 209.

183

Art. 48 Additional Protocol i.

184

icrc Guidelines 2020, at paras 97 and 126.

185

Ibid., at 50. For a discussion on the legal categorisation of the environment as civilian or military, see Payne, ‘Protection of the Environment’, at 209.

186

Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmerman, International Committee of the Red Cross, at 1462–1646, paras 4818–4824.

187

Arts 51(4)(b)–(c) and Art. 51(5)(a) of Additional Protocol i; Arts 15–17 of Additional Protocol ii.

188

Payne, ‘Protection of the Environment’, at 209 for an in-depth discussion of the transformation of elements of the environment from civilian to military.

189

Ibid.

190

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 140–144, Principle 13(1).

191

Ibid.

192

Ibid.

193

UN ilc, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at 13; Weir, ‘The perac Legal Framework, Frequently Asked Questions’.

194

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 140–142, paras 2 and 7 of the commentary to Principle 13.

195

See See UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN desa): Economic Analysis, ‘un/desa Policy Brief #101: Challenges and Opportunities for Indigenous Peoples’ Sustainability’ (19 April 2021), available at <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-101-challenges-and-opportunities-for-indigenous-peoples-sustainability/> (accessed 11 July 2024). See also UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 108–109. See also M. Beattie et al., ‘Even After Armed Conflict the Environmental Quality of Indigenous Peoples’ Lands in Biodiversity Hotspots Surpasses That of Non-Indigenous Lands’ (2023) 286 (110288) Biological Conservation 1–7.

196

UN desa, ‘Challenges and Opportunities for Indigenous Peoples’ Sustainability’.

197

Beattie et al., ‘Even After Armed Conflict the Environmental Quality of Indigenous Peoples’ Lands in Biodiversity Hotspots Surpasses That of Non-Indigenous Lands’, at 1.

198

‘Indigenous People’s Traditional Knowledge Must Be Preserved, Valued Globally, Speakers Stress as Permanent Forum Opens Annual Session’ (22 April 2019) The United Nations, available at <https://press.un.org/en/2019/hr5431.doc.htm> (accessed 13 February 2024).

199

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 109, para. 4 of the commentary to Principle 5.

200

See in general unga Res. 61/295, ‘United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (13 September 2007).

201

See for example Arts 4, 7, 13 of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (adopted 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991) 1650 unts 28383.

202

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 109, para. 4 of the commentary to Principle 5.

203

UN ilc, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur’, at 34–36 and 83.

204

UN ilc, ‘First Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at 6, para. 9. See for example unga Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 29th Meeting, Seventy-First Session’, The Netherlands, at para. 2; Vietnam, at para. 45, Mexico, at para. 76 and Israel, at para. 100.

205

UN ilc, ‘First Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at 6, para. 9. See, for example, unga Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 28th Meeting, Seventy-First Session’ (1 November 2016) UN Doc. a/c.6/71/sr.28, Romania, at para. 19; Federated States of Micronesia, at para. 58; unga, ‘Summary Record of the 29th Meeting, Seventy-First Session’, Malaysia, at para. 33.

206

See for example UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-First Session’ (29 April–7 June and 8 July– 9 August 2019) gaor 74th Session Supp. 10 (a/74/10), at 211, 225; and UN ilc, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at 20–26. Notably, the Special Rapporteur in her third report (at 25 and 109) suggested a reformulation of the latter: ‘Appropriate measures should be taken, in the event of an armed conflict, to protect the environment of the territories that indigenous peoples inhabit’.

207

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 93, 108–111; unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’, at 3.

208

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 108.

209

Ibid., at 108–111.

210

Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala (Judgment, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) [2012] IACtHR Case No. 250, at para. 177, footnote 266; UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 109 (footnote 391) and 110–111.

211

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 110, para. 7 of the commentary to Principle 5. ‘Earth’s Best Defenders Are Indigenous. They Pay a Price: Violence’ (8 June 2023) United States Institute of Peace, available at <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/earths-best-defenders-are-indigenous-they-pay-price-violence> (accessed 14 January 2024).

212

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 110, para. 7 of the commentary to Principle 5.

213

UN ilc, ‘Provisional Summary Record of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 3571st Meeting’ (28 April 2022) UN Doc. a/cn.4/sr.3571, at 4.

214

UN ilc, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts: Comments and Observations Received from Governments, International Organisations and Others’, at 46.

215

Ibid., at 44.

216

UN ilc, ‘Provisional Summary Record of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 3573rd Meeting’ (3 May 2022) UN Doc. a/cn.4/sr.3573, at 11. See also in general A.K. Barume, ‘Unaccounted For: Indigenous Peoples as Victims of Conflicts in Africa’ in Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Unreported Struggles: Conflict and Peace (Institute for the Study of Human Rights Columbia University 2017) 55–79.

217

For an interesting discussion on the impact of militarisation on the rights of indigenous peoples, see UN hrc, ‘Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Sixteenth Session, Study and Advice on the Impact of Militarisation on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (17–21 July 2023) UN Doc. a/hrc/emrip/2023/2.

218

Barume, ‘Unaccounted For: Indigenous Peoples as Victims of Conflicts in Africa’, at 61–62.

219

UN ilc, ‘Provisional Summary Record of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 3573rd Meeting’, at 11.

220

UN ilc, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts: Comments and Observations Received from Governments, International Organisations and Others’, at 44.

221

Lekkas, ‘The Uses of the Outputs of the International Law Commission in International Adjudication’, at 328; see also Vertue, ‘Towards the Protection of the Environment in Cabo-Delgado’, at 145.

222

UN ilc, ‘Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at 14; Weir, ‘The perac Legal Framework, Frequently Asked Questions’.

223

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 109, para. 2 of the commentary to Principle 5.

224

UN ilc, ‘Provisional Summary Record of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 3573rd Meeting’, at 6 for the statement made by Mr Hassouna.

225

UN desa, ‘Challenges and Opportunities for Indigenous Peoples’ Sustainability’.

226

See in general E.B. Hessami, ‘perac: A Voice for Environment and Indigenous Peoples in Conflict’s Grip’ (28 June 2022) New Security Beat, available at <https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2022/06/perac-voice-environment-indigenous-peoples-conflicts-grip/> (accessed 13 January 2024).

227

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 108–111.

228

Ibid., at 119, paras 3 and 7 of the commentary to Principle 8. ‘10 Internal Displacements to Watch in 2022’ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, available at <https://story.internal-displacement.org/10-internal-displacement-situations-to-watch-in-2022/index.html> (accessed 11 February 2024); ‘Colombia: Large-Group Internal Displacement – January to December 2022’ (8 March 2023) Reliefweb, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-large-group-internal-displacement-january-december-2022> (accessed 11 February 2024); ‘The Role of Local and Regional Governments in Protecting Internally Displaced Persons (idps)’ (29 October 2019) Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Council of Europe Report, available at <https://rm.coe.int/the-role-of-local-and-regional-governments-in-protecting-internally-di/168097f950> (accessed 11 February 2024); ‘Displacement in Armed Conflict and the Protection of Civilians’ (August 2023) Center for Civilians in Conflict, available at <https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/CIVIC_Displacement_Brief_Draft2.pdf> (accessed 11 February 2024).

229

unhcr, ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ (2004) UN Doc. ocha/idp/2004/01, at 1, para. 1, concerning the scope and purpose of the Guiding Principles.

230

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 117, para. 2 of the Commentary to Principle 8.

231

Ibid., at 116–117, para. 1 of the commentary to Principle 8, where it is specifies that Principle 8 applies to both iacs and niacs.

232

For an overview of the niac in Sudan, see ‘Non-International Armed Conflicts in Sudan’ (15 May 2023) rulac: Geneva Academy, available at <https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-armed-conflicts-in-sudan#collapse3accord> (accessed 16 January 2024).

233

For an overview of the niac in Ethiopia, see ‘Non-International Armed Conflicts in Ethiopia’ (24 May 2023) rulac: Geneva Academy, available at <https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-armed-conflict-in-ethiopia#:~:text=Overview,People’s%20Liberation%20Front%20(TPLF)> (accessed 16 January 2024).

234

For an overview of the iac in Ukraine, see ‘International Armed Conflict in Ukraine’ (7 June 2023) rulac: Geneva Academy, available at <https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/international-armed-conflict-in-ukraine> (accessed 16 January 2024).

235

See in general ‘Internal Displacement in Sudan Nearly Doubles Since Onset of Conflict’ (5 September 2023) The International Organization for Migration, available at <https://www.iom.int/news/internal-displacement-sudan-nearly-doubles-onset-conflict> (accessed 16 January 2024); ‘More than 4.38 Million People Displaced in Ethiopia, More than Half Due to Conflict: New iom Report’ (23 August 2023) The International Organization for Migration, available at <https://ethiopia.iom.int/news/more-438-million-people-displaced-ethiopia-more-half-due-conflict-new-iom-report> (accessed 16 January 2024); ‘Ukraine’ (October 2023) The International Organization for Migration, available at <https://dtm.iom.int/ukraine> (accessed 16 January 2024).

236

‘Internal Displacement in Sudan Nearly Doubles Since Onset of Conflict’ iom.

237

‘More than 4.38 Million People Displaced in Ethiopia, More than Half Due to Conflict’ iom.

238

‘Ukraine’ iom.

239

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 1117, para. 3 of the commentary to Principle 8.

240

Jacobsson and Lehto, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’, at 41; UN ilc, ‘Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at 7, 20–23.

241

Jacobsson and Lehto, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’, at 41; UN ilc, ‘Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at 7.

242

Jacobsson and Lehto, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’, at 41; UN ilc, ‘Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur’, at 7.

243

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 116 and 120, paras 1 and 12 of the commentary to Principle 8.

244

Ibid., at 116, para. 1 of the commentary to Principle 8.

245

Ibid., at 117, para. 3 of the commentary to Principle 8. The report cites the niacs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as in Rwanda during the genocide and armed conflict that occurred between 1990 and 1994. See 117, paras 2 and 3 of the commentary to Principle 8.

246

Ibid., at 116, para. 1 of the commentary to Principle 8.

247

Ibid., at 116–117, para. 1 of the commentary to Principle 8.

248

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-First Session’, at 234.

249

UN ilc, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts: Comments and Observations Received from Governments, International Organisations and Others’, at 52.

250

Ibid., at 53; see also Vertue, ‘Towards the Protection of the Environment in Cabo-Delgado’, at 144–145.

251

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 119, para. 7 of the commentary to Principle 8.

252

Weir, ‘The perac Legal Framework, Frequently Asked Questions’. See also Vertue, ‘Towards the Protection of the Environment in Cabo-Delgado’, at 145–146.

253

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 97, para. 3 of the general commentary.

254

Ibid., at 119, para. 7 of the commentary to Principle 8.

255

Ibid., at 117, para. 3 of the commentary to Principle 8.

256

Ibid., at 119, para. 7 of the commentary to Principle 8.

257

See also V. Jakjimovska and E. Amani, ‘Protecting the Environment in Non-International Armed Conflicts: Are We There Yet?’ (16 July 2019) ejil: Talk!, available at <https://www.ejiltalk.org/protecting-the-environment-in-non-international-armed-conflicts-are-we-there-yet/> (accessed 18 January 2024).

258

UN ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-Third Session’, at 116–120.

259

Jakjimovska and Amani, ‘Protecting the Environment in Non-International Armed Conflicts’.

260

D. Weir and S. Pantazopoulos, ‘If Not Us, Who? How States – With the Help of Civil Society – Can Implement the Legal Framework Protecting the Environment from Armed Conflict’ (10 June 2021) Humanitarian Law & Policy, available at <https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2021/06/10/states-civil-society-protecting-environment-armed-conflict/> (accessed 13 February 2024).

261

Ibid.

262

Gieseken and Murphy, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment Under International Humanitarian Law’, at 1203–1204.

263

unga Res. 77/104, ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’, at 2.

264

Weir and S. Pantazopoulos, ‘If Not Us, Who?’.

265

K. Hulme, ‘Using International Environmental Law to Enhance Biodiversity and Nature Conservation During Armed Conflict’ (2022) 20(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1155–1190, at 1190.

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