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Al-Samarqandī’s Third Masʾala

Juridical Dialectic Governed by the Ādāb al-Baḥth

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  • 1 McGill University
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Abstract

This article presents, analyzes, and attempts to explain what is probably the most difficult of three problem-questions (masāʾil) contrived by Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī in the closing section of his Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth. The “third masʾala,” from the science of juridical disagreement (khilāf), argues the Shāfiʿī position for the father’s right to guardianship of compulsion (wilāyat al-ijbār) over the virgin major. And in so doing it offers a sophisticated model of a post-classical juristic dialectic articulated in streamlined modes of objection and response, replete with variant species of dilemmatic syllogisms and reductios, and interwoven with logical-philosophical axioms.

Abstract

This article presents, analyzes, and attempts to explain what is probably the most difficult of three problem-questions (masāʾil) contrived by Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī in the closing section of his Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth. The “third masʾala,” from the science of juridical disagreement (khilāf), argues the Shāfiʿī position for the father’s right to guardianship of compulsion (wilāyat al-ijbār) over the virgin major. And in so doing it offers a sophisticated model of a post-classical juristic dialectic articulated in streamlined modes of objection and response, replete with variant species of dilemmatic syllogisms and reductios, and interwoven with logical-philosophical axioms.

1 Introduction and Objectives

Though much research remains to be done before a more complete picture emerges, it is evident that a patently Aristotelian logic was incorporated into certain Islamic legal-theoretical disciplines from at least the time and works of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111).1 And though the precise trajectory and mechanism has yet to be discovered and explained, it is clear that a particular tradition of juridical dialectical theory (jadal, khilāf)—evidently emerging from the works of Raḍī l-Dīn al-Nīshābūrī (fl. 582/1186) and his student Rukn al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī (d. 615/1218), and well-systematized by the latter’s intellectual successor Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 687/1288)—had become, in the 7th/13th century East, shaped by and infused with post-Rāzīan Avicennan logic.2 The differences between the jadal / khilāf works of al-Nasafī and, e.g., those of such 5th/11th century predecessors as Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083), and his students Abū l-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 474/1081) and Abū l-Wafāʾ b. ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119), are both obvious and significant: the principles and idiom of syllogistics are absent from the works of al-Shīrāzī and his circle, while they permeate the works of al-Nasafī and his.3

And it was from this latter circle of al-Nasafī that a disciplinary revolution was soon to emerge, on a pattern sufficiently universal, and a productive scale so large, as to eclipse the variant streams of dialectical theory which preceded it: the ādāb al-baḥth wa-l-munāẓara, or “protocol for dialectical inquiry and disputation.” It was al-Nasafī’s student, Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 722/1322), who first refined and universalized the jadal / khilāf theory of al-Nasafī (and others) as the ādāb al-baḥth, in such works as his Qisṭās al-Afkār and self-commentary, al-Anwār al-Ilāhiyya and self-commentary, al-Muʿtaqadāt, and—most famously—his Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth.4 This latter introductory treatise—an excerpt from which provides the core focus of this article—is relatively short and compact, and was immediately popular. It not only generated its own impressive tradition of commentaries and glosses,5 but inspired a number of additional primary works6—sometimes attributed to seminal scholars like ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), and Ṭāshkubrī Zādah (d. 968/1560)—which in turn generated a massive host of commentaries and glosses.7 In fact, compositions and commentaries in the discipline of the ādāb al-baḥth have been written straight through into the 20th century.8

As for al-Samarqandī’s Risāla, it is—though a clearly and systematically organized teaching manual—at times a difficult treatise for the reader at so many removes from the scholarly idiom and conventions of al-Samarqandī’s time. In his own words, the treatise “is arranged in three parts: the first, on definitions (taʿrīfāt); the second, on the proper ordering of dialectical inquiry (tartīb al-baḥth); and the third, on the problem-cases (masāʾil) I have contrived.”9 Part I introduces key terms and concepts of this streamlined dialectical method with short definitions. Part II concerns itself with the procedure of disputation, including the roles and dialectical moves of the questioner (sāʾil) and the proponent justifying his thesis (muʿallil), and an extensive sequence of dialectical debate in which core moves and formulae are illustrated and modeled. And Part III contains three problem-cases or questions (masāʾil) invented by al-Samarqandī for, I believe, modeling and practice—one each for the sciences of theology (kalām), philosophy (ḥikma), and juristic disagreement (khilāf); and it is in these masāʾil that the universality of the ādāb al-baḥth is clearly demonstrated.10

Each of these, along with the illustrative sequence in Part II, presents its own challenges. Khaled El-Rouayheb, a notable contributor to our knowledge of the ādāb al-baḥth, especially in 16th–17th century Ottoman contexts, observes, in describing the ādāb al-baḥth manual of Ṭāshkubrī Zādah:

It was presumably appreciated as a useful handbook that covered the same ground as Samarqandī’s treatise but nevertheless made less demands on the student, largely because it left out the rather abstruse examples given by Samarqandī of debates in theology, philosophy, and law to which the dialectical principles he outlined could be applied.11

And, in an attached footnote:

These debates are the most demanding parts of Samarqandī’s work and become even more so when the pros and cons of the various positions came to be discussed by later commentators and glossators.12

In agreement with El-Rouayheb, I would suggest that, of all these challenging masāʾil, it is the third masʾala, from the science of khilāf, or juristic disagreement, which proves the most difficult. Its formulation, as we find in the other masāʾil of the Risāla, is sometimes so terse as to be almost cryptic. And some of its terms and concepts, though consonant with the post-Rāzīan, Avicennan logic compiled and systematized by al-Samarqandī in his Qisṭās, are apparently absent from even that comprehensive text.

But for all its difficulties, the third masʾala is a stunning illustration of a refined and subtle legal argument suffused with logical and philosophical concepts, categories, and principles, and articulated in a consistently practiced syllogistic form. Al-Samarqandī’s third masʾala is, as it was intended to be, a provocative and challenging model of juridical dialectic governed by the ādāb al-baḥth. And for these reasons alone—that is, on its own merits—it deserves to be published more broadly and brought to the attention of more scholars of law and legal theory, logic and philosophy.

This is the immediate aim of the current article which, in the main, is expository and raises little in the way of argument beyond tentative interpretational claims. Primary objectives are simply to publish the Risāla’s third masʾala, bringing it before a wider audience of interested scholars, and to render its arguments more accessible through translations, analyses, diagrams, excerpts from two early commentators, and other supporting materials.13 It is hoped that shining a light on the third masʾala will not only expose the extraordinary sophistication of legal argument infused with post-Avicennan logic and governed by the ādāb al-baḥth, but encourage specialists to ponder its nature and significance, and note the presence or absence of parallel argument styles in their own studied material. In short, this textual microstudy aims to add another stone to the foundation from which both the genesis and reception of the ādāb al-baḥth, particularly within the juridical domain, can be postulated and assessed.14

2 Format

For the purposes of maintaining a faithful rendition of the original text, while simultaneously providing a fuller sense of “dialectic in action” than it might afford, and unpacking its terse and often difficult material, I will present al-Samarqandī’s third masʾala thrice in succession. First, the Arabic text will be rendered in unannotated parallel translation, to acquaint the reader with al-Samarqandī’s unaltered formulation of the masʾala and its arguments. Second, I will present a more actively dialogical rendition of the masʾala’s argument sequence, introducing simple, hypothetical objections wherever they might have prompted the Shāfiʿī proponent—literally, the “causal justifier” (muʿallil)—to supply a supporting indicant (dalīl). And, finally, paraphrases and summaries of the text will appear in conjunction with my analyses and explanations, along with associated passages from the early commentators Quṭb al-Dīn al-Kīlānī (fl. ca. 830/1427) and Masʿūd al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī (fl. ca. 840/1436; or d. 905/1499), in what constitutes the main body of this article.

Throughout the analyses and explanations I will develop and employ a set of abbreviations and adapted symbolic notations—keys for which are supplied at the end of the article—as a kind of shorthand intended to (1) reduce somewhat the repetitive and space-consuming verbiage generated by complex premises juxtaposed in syllogistic arrangements, and (2) facilitate the emergence of basic argument patterns. The analyses are followed by a schematic diagram (fig. 2) of the whole third masʾala from start to finish, reduced entirely to symbolic notation, and intended to provide a “bird’s eye view,” or argument map, for the reader, as we navigate this complex dialectical sequence.

3 The Text as it Appears in al-Samarqandī’s Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth15

[§ 48] The Third Masʾala: From the Science of Juridical Disagreement (Khilāf).

Al-Shāfiʿī, may God have mercy upon him, said: “The father possesses the right of compulsion (ijbār), over the virgin major (bikr bāligha), to marriage (nikāḥ),” in opposition to Abū Ḥanīfa, may God have mercy upon him. For this we have [the argument] that one of two guardianships (iḥdā l-wilāyatayn)—such being either [1] before the compulsion (qabla l-ijbār), or [2] at the time of the compulsion (ʿinda l-ijbār)—is confirmed (thābita); and, regardless of whichever one it is, there necessarily ensues the sought-after conclusion (maṭlūb). And to be certain, we said that one of the two guardianships is confirmed only because it must be that [either] [1] the shumūl (universal inclusion) of the guardianship (wilāya) for the two moments is, absolutely (muṭlaqan), a cause (ʿilla) for one of two shumūls—that is the shumūl of the guardianship and the shumūl of its absence, or [2] it is not. And whichever one it is, there necessarily follows one of the two guardianships. As for when it is a cause (ʿilla), then it is obvious (fa-ẓāhir). Because whether or not shumūl of the guardianship is realized (mutaḥaqqaq), one of the two guardianships necessarily ensues.

‮‭[§ 48]المسئلة الثالثة من علم الخلاف * قال الشافعي رحمه ﷲ الأب يملك إجبار البِكر البالغة على النكاح خلافًا لأبي حنيفة رحمه ﷲ * لنا فيه أن إحدى الولايتين ثابتة وهي إمّا قبل الإجبار أو عند الإجبار وأيًّا ما كان يلزم المطلوب * وإنّما قلنا ان إحدى الولايتين ثابتة لأنه لا يخلو من أن يكون شمول الولاية للوقتين علّة لأحد الشمولين مطلقًا أي شمول الولاية وشمول عدمها أو لم يكن * وأيًّا ما كان يلزم إحدى الولايتين * أمّا إذا كان علّة فظاهر لأنّ شمول الولاية سواء كان متحقّقًا أو لم يكن يلزم إحدى الولايتين‬‎

[§ 49] And if it isn’t a cause (ʿilla), then likewise. Because its causality (ʿilliyya) is not a madār for the contradictory (naqīḍ) of the shumūl of the nonexistence (ʿadam), [both] in existence and in nonexistence (wujūdan wa-ʿadaman), in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr). Because if the shumūl of the guardianship or the division (iftirāq) between the two guardianships were to be confirmed, then the contradictory (naqīḍ) of the shumūl of the nonexistence (ʿadam) would be confirmed, no matter whether or not the causality (ʿilliyya) was realized. And when [the causality] is not a madār to the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence, the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence necessarily ensues. Because if the causality (ʿilliyya) is confirmed, the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence is confirmed. And at the time of [the causality’s] nonexistence, it must be that [the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence] is confirmed overall (fi l-jumla). Otherwise, the causality (ʿilliyya) is a madār for it, [both] in existence and in nonexistence. This is a logical impossibility (khulf). And when the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence is confirmed, then it is the case that either the shumūl of the guardianship, or the division (iftirāq), is proven to be true. And whichever one it is, one of the two guardianships necessarily ensues—such being the sought-after conclusion (maṭlūb).

‮‭[§ 49]وإن لم يكن علّة فكذلك لأنّ علّيّته ليست مدارًا لنقيض شمول العدم وجودًا وعدمًا في نفس الأمر * لأنّه لو ثبت شمول الولاية أو الإفتراق بين الولايتين ثبت نقيض شمول العدم سواء كانت العلّيّة متحقّقة أو لم تكن * وإذا لم تكن مدارًا لنقيض شمول العدم يلزم نقيض شمول العدم * لأنّ العلّيّة إن كانت ثابتَةً كان نقيض شمول العدم ثابتًا * فعند عدمها يجب أن يكون ثابتًا في الجملة * وإلاّ كانت العلّيّة مدارًا له وجودًا وعدمًا * هذا خلف * واذا ثبت نقيض شمول العدم فإمّا أن يصدق شمول الولاية أو الإفتراق * وأيًّا ما كان يلزم إحدى الولايتين * وهو المطلوب‬‎

[§ 50] And if it is said: “We concede that the causality (ʿilliyya) is not a madār in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr). But why did you say that it was so by assuming (ʿalā taqdīr) the absence of causality (ʿilliyya) of the shumūl of the guardianship, given the allowance that that assumption is absurd (muḥāl), and the absurd is allowed to necessarily entail the absurd?” We say: “This manʿ (denial, objection) does no harm to us. Because if that assumption (taqdīr) were confirmed in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr), then what we’ve stated is concluded. But even if it isn’t, the causality (ʿilliyya) necessarily ensues, and by way of it the objective (maqṣūd) is obtained, as has passed [in previous discussion].”

‮‭[§ 50]فإن قيل سلّمنا أنّ العلّيّة ليست مدارًا في نفس الأمر لكن لِمَ قلتم أنّها كذلك على تقدير عدم علّيّة شمول الولاية لجواز أن يكون ذلك التقدير محالًا والمحال جاز أن يستلزم المحال * نقول هذا المنع لا يضرّنا لأنه لو كان ذلك التقدير ثابتًا في نفس الأمر يتمّ ما ذكرنا * وإن لم يكن يلزم العلّيّة وبها يحصل المقصود كما مرّ‬‎

4 Introduction to the Masʾala: Does the Father Have Guardianship of Compulsion (wilāyat al-ijbār) over His Virgin Major Ward?

Al-Samarqandī’s opening to the third masʾala does little more than establish its opposing positions: “Al-Shāfiʿī, may God have mercy upon him, said: ‘The father possesses the right of compulsion (ijbār) over the virgin major (bikr bāligha) to marriage (nikāḥ),’ in opposition to (khilāfan li-) Abū Ḥanīfa, may God have mercy upon him.”16 The early commentator on al-Samarqandī’s Risāla, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Kīlānī (fl. ca. 830/1427), offers somewhat more, detailing specifically the key points of consensus (ijmāʿ) and disagreement (khilāf):

To the father belongs the guardianship of compulsion (wilāyat al-ijbār) by scholarly consensus (bi-l-ijmāʿ). However, the cause (ʿilla) of compulsion, according to al-Shāfiʿī, is virginity (bakāra), while according to Abū Ḥanīfa, may God have mercy upon him, it is minority (ṣighar). So, according to al-Shāfiʿī, it is permitted that the father compel the virgin major (al-bikr al-bāligha) to contract marriage (nikāḥ), but not the non-virgin minor (al-thayyib al-ṣaghīra). While, according to Abū Ḥanīfa, may God have mercy upon him, it is permitted that the father compel the non-virgin minor to contract marriage, but not the virgin major.17

The above diagram (fig. 1) is meant to shed further light on the particulars of this masʾala, especially with regard to its temporal designations.

d24577840e834

Figure 1

Al-Shāfiʿī vs. Abū Ḥanīfa on the father’s wilāyat al-ijbār over the virgin major

Citation: Oriens 46, 1-2 (2018) ; 10.1163/18778372-04601003

To be clear, al-Samarqandī’s third masʾala is concerned only with the right of the father with regard to his guardianship of compulsion (wilāyat al-ijbār) over the virgin major, as represented in the right half of fig. 1, the period for which there is khilāf.18 We are concerned with neither guardianship of the virgin minor, nor guardianship of the non-virgin major, except insofar as these cases pinpoint the variant Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī ʿilal, or “causes” giving rise to their opposed rulings (such “causes” being virginity for the Shāfiʿī position and minority for the Ḥanafī).19 And as we have seen in the text of the masʾala, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s20 argument focuses upon “two times” (waqtayn) within that range wherein the father’s ward is both virgin and major: “before the compulsion” (qabla l-ijbār) and “at the time of the compulsion” (ʿinda l-ijbār). Should his guardianship of compulsion be confirmed for either of these times, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil argues, then it is confirmed for both.

5 The Text Rendered as a Fully Engaged Dialectical Sequence

Shāfiʿī Muʿallil: [Thesis and Dalīl #1]21

  • [1.4] “The father possesses the right of compulsion (ijbār), over the virgin major (bikr bāligha), to marriage (nikāḥ) …”

  • [1.1] [because] “… one of two guardianships (iḥdā l-wilāyatayn)—such being either before the compulsion (qabla l-ijbār), or at the time of the compulsion (ʿinda l-ijbār)—is confirmed (thābita) …”

  • [1.2 and 1.3] “… and regardless of whichever one it is there necessarily ensues [1.4] the sought-after conclusion (maṭlūb).”

    Ḥanafī Sāʾil: [simple manʿ #1]

    • [We don’t concede [1.1] that one of the two guardianships is confirmed. Why should it be so?]

Shāfiʿī Muʿallil: [Dalīl #2; supporting [1.1]]

  • [2.1] “… we said that [1.1] one of the two guardianships is confirmed only because it must be that [either] the shumūl (universal inclusion) of the guardianship (wilāya) in the two times is a cause (ʿilla) for one of the two shumūls absolutely (muṭlaqan)—that is the shumūl of the guardianship and the shumūl of its absence—or it is not …”

  • [2.2 and 2.3] “… and whichever one it is, there necessarily follows one of the two guardianships.”

    Ḥanafī Sāʾil: [simple manʿ #2]

    • [We don’t concede [2.2] that when shumūl of the guardianship in the two times is a cause for one of the two shumūls absolutely, one of the two guardianships necessarily follows. Why should it be so?]

Shāfiʿī Muʿallil: [Tanbīh #1; supporting [2.2]]

“As for [2.2] when it is a cause (ʿilla), then it is obvious (fa-ẓāhir) …”

  • [T1.1 and T1.2] “… because whether or not shumūl of the guardianship is realized (mutaḥaqqaq), one of the two guardianships necessarily ensues.”

    Ḥanafī Sāʾil: [simple manʿ #3]

    • [We don’t concede [2.3] that when shumūl of the guardianship in the two times is not a cause for one of the two shumūls absolutely, one of the two guardianships necessarily follows. Why should it be so?]

Shāfiʿī Muʿallil: [Dalīl #3, supporting [2.3], first premise]

“And if it isn’t a cause (ʿilla), then likewise.”

  • [3.1] “Because its causality (ʿilliyya) is not a madār for the contradictory (naqīḍ) of the shumūl of the nonexistence (ʿadam), [both] in existence and in nonexistence (wujūdan wa-ʿadaman), in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr).”

    Ḥanafī Sāʾil: [simple manʿ #4]

    • [We don’t concede [3.1] that its causality is not a madār for the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence. Why should it be so?]

Shāfiʿī Muʿallil: [Dalīl #4; supporting [3.1]]

  • [4.1 and 4.2] “Because if the shumūl of the guardianship or the division (iftirāq) between the two guardianships were to be confirmed, then the contradictory (naqīḍ) of the shumūl of the nonexistence (ʿadam) would be confirmed, no matter whether or not the causality (ʿilliyya) was realized.”

Shāfiʿī Muʿallil: [Dalīl #3, supporting [2.3], (continued)]

  • [3.2] “And when [the causality] is not a madār to the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence, the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence necessarily ensues.”

    Ḥanafī Sāʾil: [simple manʿ #5]

    • [We don’t concede [3.2] that when its causality is not a madār, the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence necessarily ensues. Why should it be so?]

Shāfiʿī Muʿallil: [Dalīl #5; supporting [3.2]]

  • [5.1] “Because if the causality (ʿilliyya) is confirmed, the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence is confirmed.”

  • [5.2] “And at the time of [the causality’s] nonexistence, it must be that [the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence] is confirmed overall (fi l-jumla).”

    Ḥanafī Sāʾil: [simple manʿ #6]

    • [We don’t concede [5.2] that upon the causality’s nonexistence, the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence must be confirmed overall (fi l-jumla). Why should it be so?]

Shāfiʿī Muʿallil: [Dalīl #6; supporting [5.2]]

  • [6.1] “Otherwise, the causality (ʿilliyya) is a madār for it, [both] in existence and in nonexistence.”

  • [6.2] “This is a logical impossibility (khulf).”

Shāfiʿī Muʿallil: [Dalīl #3, supporting [2.3], (continued)]

  • [3.3] “And when the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence is confirmed, then it is the case that either the shumūl of the guardianship, or the division (iftirāq), is proven to be true.”

  • [3.4 and 3.5] “And whichever one it is, one of the two guardianships necessarily ensues—such being the sought-after conclusion (maṭlūb).”

    Ḥanafī Sāʾil: [Manʿ maʿa Mustanad]

    • “We concede that the causality (ʿilliyya) is not a madār in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr). But why did you say that it was so by assuming (ʿalā taqdīr) the absence of causality (ʿilliyya) of the shumūl of the guardianship, given the allowance that that assumption is absurd (muḥāl), and the absurd is allowed to necessarily entail the absurd?”

Shāfiʿī Muʿallil: [Dalīl #7; jawāb-response to manʿ maʿa mustanad]

“This manʿ does no harm to us.”

  • [7.1] “Because if that assumption (taqdīr) were confirmed in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr), then what we’ve stated is concluded.”

  • [7.2] “But even if it isn’t, the causality (ʿilliyya) necessarily ensues, and by way of it the objective (maqṣūd) is obtained, as has passed [in previous discussion].”

6 Analyses, Explanation, Commentary

In what follows, I will attempt a step-by-step argumentative analysis of al-Samarqandī’s third masʾala, referring also to the commentaries of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Kīlānī and Kamāl al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī. In the process, I will make frequent recourse to abbreviations and adapted symbolic notation. There is a “Key to Symbols and Relationships” and “Key to Abbreviations” before the bibliography for reference when necessary. And for a schematic map of the entire masʾala, please reference fig. 2 in section 7, below.

6.1 Dalīl #1

The Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s justification of al-Shāfiʿī’s ruling that the father has guardianship of compulsion over the virgin major begins properly with his first syllogistic dalīl-indicant: wilāya—meaning, throughout this problem-question, guardianship of compulsion (wilāyat al-ijbār)—is confirmed for the father either before (qabla) the compulsion or at the time of (ʿinda) the compulsion; and, whichever it is, the sought-after conclusion (maṭlūb) follows of necessity.22 This first dalīl may thus be qualified as a simple, constructive dilemma.23

Al-Kīlānī expands somewhat on al-Samarqandī’s terse presentation. “The claim (muddaʿā),” he says, “is that the father has guardianship of compulsion (wilāyat al-ijbār) over the virgin major to contract marriage, absolutely (muṭlaqan)—that is, regardless of whether it is before (qabla) the incidence (wuqūʿ) of the compulsion, that is, before the incidence of the marriage-ccontract, or at the time of (ʿinda) the incidence of the compulsion, that is, at the time of the incidence of the marriage-contract.”24 And as for the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s thesis following of necessity from confirmation of either of these incidents, al-Kīlānī explains: “And when one of the two guardianships is confirmed, absolute guardianship (muṭlaq al-wilāya) is confirmed, because the confirmation of the particular (thubūt al-khāṣṣ) is something which necessarily entails the confirmation of the general (thubūt al-ʿāmm).”25

I would consider this “confirmation of the khāṣṣ necessarily entails confirmation of the ʿāmm” to be a logical principle-premise (A);26 perhaps understood as suppressed in al-Samarqandī’s presentation, it is raised and inserted into the argument by al-Kīlānī in his role as both commentator and verifying investigator (muḥaqqiq). Similarly, Masʿūd renders each of the two guardianships as a “particular guardianship” (wilāya khāṣṣa), and “when a particular guardianship is realized, there necessarily follows the realization of absolute guardianship (muṭlaq al-wilāya), which is the sought-after conclusion here.” This, too, is supported by a similarly formulated principle-premise (A): “because confirmation of the general (thubūt al-ʿāmm) is among the implicata (lawāzim) of confirmation of the particular (thubūt al-khāṣṣ), with absolute certainty (jazman).”27

In our argument schema in section 7 (fig. 2) the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s thesis (premise [1.4]) is thus represented as MWi, meaning muṭlaq al-wilāya, or “absolute guardianship.” That is to say, the father has absolute guardianship of compulsion (muṭlaq al-wilāya) with regard to the virgin major, both before the ijbār-compulsion (WiB) and at the time of it (WiT), hence: absolutely (muṭlaqan).28 The whole of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s first dalīl-indicant might now be represented, in adapted symbolic notation, as follows:

[1.1] WiB ∨ WiT
[1.2] (WiB→MWi)
[1.3] (WiT→MWi)
∴ [1.4] MWi.

6.2 Dalīl #2

At this stage, and positing a higher frequency of objection in live debate, we might imagine a Ḥanafī questioner (sāʾil) denying the first premise [1.1] of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s first dalīl, saying something like: “We don’t concede that one of the two guardianships is confirmed. Why should it be so?” In the parlance of the ādāb al-baḥth, such a simple, unsupported objection is called mujarrad al-manʿ, or “mere denial,” in contradistinction to manʿ maʿa mustanad, or “denial with corroboration.”29

In response, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil brings a second dalīl which may also be qualified as a simple, constructive dilemma.30 In short, he presents us with an endoxic31 disjunction of true contradictories whose disjuncts themselves are the antecedents of conditionals entailing his desired consequent: it can only be the case that either the universal inclusion (shumūl) of the guardianship in the two times is a cause (ʿilla) for one of the two shumūls (meaning: [1] of the existence of guardianship, and [2] of the nonexistence of the guardianship, in the two times), absolutely (muṭlaqan), or that it is not; and whichever it is, one of the two guardianships follows of necessity.

Though I have yet to locate a discussion of the precise intention of the term shumūl in dialectic (or, for that matter, in logic), its meaning—and that of subtypes shumūl al-wujūd (universal inclusion of existence) and shumūl al-ʿadam (universal inclusion of nonexistence)—has become clear through repeated examples in al-Kīlānī’s commentary and elsewhere. In short, the shumūl of X with respect to instances A and B means that X is “included” in both A and B, not one or the other. Though it would appear that shumūl al-X is sometimes used interchangeably with shumūl wujūd al-X, I believe the former should be understood as a more general “inclusion” than the latter. That is, the shumūl of X, stated generally, encompasses the potential for both shumūl wujūd al-X (whereby X exists in both A and B) and shumūl ʿadam al-X (whereby X exists in neither A nor B). And the opposite of general shumūl of X in A and B (and thus of the particulars shumūl al-wujūd and shumūl al-ʿadam) is iftirāq (separation, division) between A and B with regard to X; i.e., it is the case that either X exists in A but not in B, or X exists in B but not in A.

Notably, iftirāq is also the opposite of mulāzama (necessary implication), and so a relationship between shumūl-inclusion and mulāzama-implication is apparent. This is confirmed in an illustrative example found in al-Samarqandī’s ʿAyn al-Naẓar, set to instantiate the rules of tripartite disjunction:32

Section. And when that which is confirmed is one of three things, absolutely (muṭlaqan), it necessarily follows that the negation of each one of them—whether such is the first, or the second, or the third—be a malzūm (implicans) for the realization (taḥaqquq) of one of the other two things.

فصل وإذا كان الثابت أحد الأمور الثلاثة مطلقًا يلزم أن يكون انتفاء كلّ واحد منها أوّلاً كان أو ثانيًا أو ثالثًا ملزومًا لتحقّق أحد الأمرين الآخرين‬‎

Like when it is said: “one of three things is a lāzim (implicatum): either [1] iftirāq (separation) between two things, or [2] shumūl al-wujūd (universal inclusion of existence) for both, or [3] shumūl al-ʿadam (universal inclusion of nonexistence) [for both]; and that is by way of ḍarūra (immediate necessity).” For it necessarily follows that the negation of iftirāq be a malzūm for one of the two shumūls; and that negation of shumūl of existence be a malzūm for one of the two [other] things—being either iftirāq, or shumūl of nonexistence. And likewise [with regard to] negation of shumūl of nonexistence.33

‮كما يقال أحد الأمور الثلاثة لازم وهو إمّا الإفتراق بين الشيئين أو شمول الوجود لهما أو شمول العدم * وذلك بالضرورة * فيلزم أن يكون انتفاء الإفتراق ملزومًا لأحد الشمولين وانتفاء شمول الوجود ملزومًا لأحد الأمرين وهو إمّا الإفتراق أو شمول العدم * وكذلك انتفاء شمول العدم‬‎

And likewise: negation of the first and the second [would be] a malzūm for realization of the third, and negation of the second and third a malzūm for realization of the first, and negation of the first and third a malzūm for realization of the second, just as we have determined. And so we would say with regard to one of four things, and more.

‮وكذلك انتفاء الأول والثاني ملزومًا لتحقّق الثالث * وانتفاء الثاني والثالث ملزومًا لتحقّق الأول * وانتفاء الأول والثالث ملزومًا لتحقّق الثاني * كما قررناه * وهكذا نقول في أحد الأمور الأربعة فصاعدًا‬‎

This implicational interplay between iftirāq, shumūl al-wujūd, and shumūl al-ʿadam plays a fundamental role in al-Samarqandī’s third masʾala. But having grasped something of the nature of these relationships here, we might note further clarifications with regard to the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s second dalīl, as gained from the commentaries of al-Kīlānī and Masʿūd.

Al-Kīlānī again provides somewhat more detail, delineating the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s argument that “universal inclusion of the guardianship in the two times” (shumūl al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn) can only either be, or not be, “a necessitating cause (ʿilla mūjiba) for one of the two shumūls—I mean the shumūl of the existence of the guardianship in the two times, and the shumūl of its nonexistence in the two times, absolutely (muṭlaqan), that is, without individual particularization (lā ʿalā l-taʿyīn).”34 This latter explanation allows us to better grasp the meaning of muṭlaq here, which is that such consequents as are to be considered absolutely (muṭlaqan) are to be treated as an undifferentiated aggregate of consequents, not as individually differentiated consequents. This is in keeping with the definition for muṭlaq provided by al-Kīlānī’s contemporary al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, such being: “what indicates a single [thing], unparticularized (mā yadullu ʿalā wāḥid ghayr muʿayyan).”35

With our understanding of al-Samarqandī’s terse formulation somewhat improved, we may now return to the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s second dalīl, and attempt to render it in symbolic notation. First, I would posit that simple “universal inclusion of the guardianship in the two times” (shumūl al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn) is here meant in the general sense, and would represent it as ŠWi2. As for “universal inclusion of the existence of the guardianship in the two times” (shumūl wujūd al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn), it may be rendered ŠWWi2, with the understanding it in fact means that guardianship of compulsion exists both before and at the time of the compulsion (WiB ∧ WiT). And as for “universal inclusion of the nonexistence of the guardianship in the two times” (shumūl ʿadam al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn), it may be rendered ŠAWi2, with the understanding it means that guardianship of compulsion exists neither before nor at the time of the compulsion (¬WiB ∧ ¬WiT). And, finally, the idea that the general shumūl al-wilāya (ŠWi2) might act as a “cause” (ʿilla) for the two particulars shumūl al-wujūd and shumūl al-ʿadam, might be rendered simply as (ŠWi2)I, with the understanding that such actually means ŠWi2—[I]→[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2], with “X–[I]→Y” meaning “X is the ʿilla (cause) of Y” and “[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]” being the undifferentiated aggregate of consequents ŠWWi2 and ŠAWi2 treated muṭlaqan, or “absolutely.” In its shortest form, then, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s second dalīl may be rendered as follows:

[2.1] (ŠWi2)I ∨ ¬(ŠWi2)I
[2.2] (ŠWi2)I→(WiB ∨ WiT)
[2.3] ¬(ŠWi2)I→(WiB ∨ WiT)
∴ [1.1] WiB ∨ WiT.

At this point, I would again posit that “shumūl of the guardianship in the two times” (ŠWi2) is meant to be understood as more general than “shumūl of the existence (wujūd) of the guardianship in the two times” (ŠWWi2) and “shumūl of the nonexistence (ʿadam) of the guardianship in the two times” (ŠAWi2), and that it may in fact also express a general mulāzama-implication between “guardianship before the compulsion” (WiB) and “guardianship at the time of the compulsion” (WiT). That is, whenever guardianship in one exists, so does guardianship in the other (resulting in ŠWWi2); and whenever guardianship in one does not exist, neither does guardianship in the other (resulting in ŠAWi2).

ŠWWi2 and ŠAWi2 are more particular than ŠWi2, which encompasses them both. They are both more specific types of shumūl al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn. And, importantly, we should recognize that both the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī positions claim one of these particular types of shumūl al-wilāya. The Shāfiʿī position is that the father has muṭlaq al-wilāya, “absolute guardianship of compulsion,” which means (WiB ∧ WiT), which is ŠWWi2. And the Ḥanafī position is the contrary—the father has no guardianship of compulsion at either time—which means (¬WiB ∧ ¬WiT), which is ŠAWi2. So both positions commit to a particular, contrary shumūl of shumūl al-wilāya.

Does this mean that both positions concede the general ŠWi2 which encompasses them both, and reflects a mulāzama-implication between “guardianship before the compulsion” (WiB) and “guardianship at the time of the compulsion” (WiT)? It seems difficult to say without knowing more of the Ḥanafī position’s supporting arguments. Note also that in later adilla-indicants the Shāfiʿī position appears also to capitalize on iftirāq between WiB and WiT (rendered WiB//WiT), since, as we know, it requires confirmation of only one to have confirmation of both.36 It is unclear to me, however, whether the Ḥanafī position could do the same by arguing confirmation of the nonexistence of WiB or WiT necessitates nonexistence of both.

If, on the other hand, we assume that both the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī positions concede general ŠWi2, then we may be able to make more sense of why the Shāfiʿī muʿallil introduces a claim that either (ŠWi2)I or ¬(ŠWi2)I, meaning either (ŠWi2—[I]→[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]) or ¬(ŠWi2—[I]→[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]) must be the case. Note that the causality (ʿilliyya) of ŠWi2 for its undifferentiated particulars ŠWWi2 and ŠAWi2 could be used to support either the Shāfiʿī position (which is ŠWWi2) or the Ḥanafī position (which is ŠAWi2). That being the case, neither confirmation of (ŠWi2)I nor of ¬(ŠWi2)I helps either position against the other. Perhaps this is why the Shāfiʿī muʿallil takes the position that it doesn’t matter whether (ŠWi2)I or ¬(ŠWi2)I is the case, since either way one will end up with one of either WiB or WiT. The point in introducing (ŠWi2)I ∨ ¬(ŠWi2)I in the first place might be that it is both a disjunction which a Ḥanafī opponent must concede, and a disjunction from which the Shāfiʿī position, with additional adilla-indicants, can be made to follow.

But whatever the reason for introducing this disjunction (which, on its own, seems useless to either position), the Shāfiʿī muʿallil proceeds to derive his claim of (WiB ∨ WiT) as consequent to both of its disjuncts, as first formulated in the simple, constructive dilemma of dalīl #2.

6.3 Tanbīh #1

Derivation of (WiB ∨ WiT) from the first disjunct is so nearly self-evident that the Shāfiʿī muʿallil says: “As for when it [meaning: ŠWi2] is a cause (ʿilla), then it is obvious (fa-ẓāhir).” This saying “it is obvious (fa-ẓāhir)” is no glib qualification, but a formula found elsewhere in the Risāla and its commentaries, and meant to herald, so far as I understand, the dialectical move of tanbīh, or “appeal to the (self-)evident.”37 The qualified premise is considered evident, whether in an a priori or a posteriori way, to such an extent as needs no supporting dalīl; and indeed a tanbīh is, as in this case, offered in lieu of a dalīl. Nevertheless, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil has a brief explanation prepared which may in fact be rendered as a syllogistic dalīl, again in the form of a simple, constructive dilemma—though something of a unique variant.38 And it is easy to imagine that such is in anticipation of a fastidious (or, perhaps, pedantic) questioner who, as in our more dialogical sequence above, objects: “We don’t concede [2.2] that when shumūl of the guardianship in the two times (ŠWi2) is a cause for one of the two inclusions, absolutely ([ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]), one of the two guardianships (WiB ∨ WiT) necessarily follows. Why should it be so?”

“As for when [ŠWi2] is a cause (ʿilla), then it is obvious,” the Shāfiʿī muʿallil tells us, “because whether or not shumūl of the guardianship [ŠWi2] is realized (mutaḥaqqaq), one of the two guardianships necessarily ensues [WiB ∨ WiT].” Al-Samarqandī says nothing more by way of explaining this first disjunct [2.2]; and, for all its promised transparency, neither premise nor explanation may seem very “obvious” to us, at so many removes from al-Samarqandī’s argumentative contexts. It may be that it was less than obvious to early scholars and students of the ādāb al-baḥth as well, and we are much helped in this regard by commentators such as al-Kīlānī and Masʿūd.

Al-Kīlānī, as is typical of him, begins with a slightly more detailed rendition:

As for when [ŠWi2] is a cause (ʿilla), it is obvious that it necessarily entails one of the two guardianships [WiB ∨ WiT]. Because shumūl of the guardianship for the two times [ŠWi2]—upon assumption of [its] causality (ʿalā taqdīr al-ʿilliyya), [and] regardless of whether or not it is something realized (mutaḥaqqaq) externally (fi l-khārij)39—entails one of the two guardianships [WiB ∨ WiT] by immediate necessity (bi-l-ḍarūra).40

Importantly, al-Kīlānī here employs the formula of what I have elsewhere called “assumptive determination”—whereby “Y is confirmed upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) X.41 Presumably, he does this so we bear in mind that the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s newly-introduced tanbīh qua constructive dilemma holds true only “upon assumption of” (ʿalā taqdīr) the causality (ʿilliyya) of ŠWi2. Assumptive determination is in fact a manifestation of mulāzama-implication, as is shown elsewhere in al-Kīlānī’s Sharḥ when it is proven, within an illustrative dialectical sequence, that “everything that is confirmed by an assumption (taqdīr) [of something] is among its implicata (lawāzim).”42

Al-Kīlānī’s more explicit formulation of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s tanbīh explanation allows us to render it as follows, with the symbol “” for “assumptive determination”43 and “(X)R” meaning “X is realized (mutaḥaqqaq) externally (fi l-khārij):”

[T1.1] (ŠWi2)I[(ŠWi2)R→(WiB ∨ WiT)]
[T1.2] (ŠWi2)I[¬(ŠWi2)R→(WiB ∨ WiT)]
∴ [2.2] (ŠWi2)I→(WiB ∨ WiT)

That is, [T1.1]: upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) the causality (ʿilliyya) of ŠWi2 for [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2], if shumūl of the guardianship for the two times (ŠWi2) is realized externally, then one of the two guardianships (WiB ∨ WiT) follows of necessity; and [T1.2] upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) the causality (ʿilliyya) of ŠWi2 for [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2], if shumūl of the guardianship for the two times (ŠWi2) is not realized externally, then one of the two guardianships (WiB ∨ WiT) [still] follows of necessity; therefore, [2.2] if ŠWi2 is a cause for [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2], then one of the two guardianships (WiB ∨ WiT) follows of necessity.

To our benefit, al-Kīlānī expands further on this. Turning his attention first to [T1.1], he says: “As for when it [ŠWi2] is realized (taḥaqqaqa), then one of the two guardianships [WiB ∨ WiT] is realized, by immediate necessity, because realization of the aggregate (majmūʿ) of the two guardianships necessarily entails realization of one of the two, by immediate necessity.”44 Assuming the causality of ŠWi2 overall, my interpretation of this might be rendered as the following pure hypothetical:

[T1.1.1] (ŠWi2)R→[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]
[T1.1.2] [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]→(WiB ∨ WiT)
∴ [T1.1] [(ŠWi2)R→(WiB ∨ WiT)]

Which is to say that realization of ŠWi2 entails realization of an undifferentiated aggregate containing ŠWWi2, which itself is (WiB ∧ WiT), and which in turn must entail one of either WiB or WiT since (principle-premise B) “realization of the aggregate (majmūʿ) … necessarily entails realization of one of the two, by immediate necessity.”

In fact, it is this self-evident principle-premise B which—although unarticulated by al-Samarqandī—lies at the heart of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s tanbīh, and allows him to claim “it is obvious (fa-ẓāhir)” in the first place. This is confirmed by Masʿūd, who, in treating what I have labelled [T1.1], says: “There is no need for explanation (bayān), because the fact that the aggregate (majmūʿ) of two things necessarily entails one of them is extremely obvious (fī ghāyat al-ẓuhūr).”45

Al-Kīlānī’s explanation is somewhat more involved for what I have labelled [T1.2]; i.e. that, assuming the causality of ŠWi2, one of the two guardianships (WiB ∨ WiT) still follows of necessity even when ŠWi2 is not realized externally.

But as for when it [ŠWi2] is not realized, one of the two shumūls [ŠWWi2 or ŠAWi2] is not realized absolutely (muṭlaqan), because negation of the necessitating cause (ʿilla mūjiba) obliges negation of the effect (maʿlūl). And when one of the two shumūls is not realized absolutely, the aggregate (majmūʿ) of the two shumūls is not realized, because negation of one of two non-particularized things is only via negation of their aggregate. And when the aggregate (majmūʿ) of the two [absolute] shumūls is negated, iftirāq (division) between the two guardianships is realized, by immediate necessity (bi-l-ḍarūra).46 And when iftirāq between the two is realized, one of the two [guardianships] is realized. And when one of the two [guardianships] is realized, absolute guardianship (muṭlaq al-wilāya) is realized, and such is what was claimed (muddaʿā).47

Remarkably, this string of six premises, two of which qualify as principle-premises, has been devised to account for only part of an explanation deemed too “obvious” by al-Samarqandī to merit more than surface treatment. Be that as it may, and introducing “X//Y” as meaning “iftirāq (division) between X and Y” and “[X&Y]” as meaning “X and Y as an aggregate (majmūʿ),” we may render al-Kīlānī’s explanation of [T1.2] as the following constructive hypothetical sorites interspersed with principle-premises:

[principle-premise C] negation of cause (ʿilla) obliges negation of effect (maʿlūl)

[T1.2.1] ¬(ŠWi2)R→¬[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]

[principle-premise D] negation of one of two things, undifferentiated (lā ʿalā l-taʿyīn) only comes about via negation of their aggregate (majmūʿ)

[T1.2.2] ¬[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]→¬[ŠWWi2&ŠAWi2]

[T1.2.3] ¬[ŠWWi2&ŠAWi2]→WiB//WiT [= (WiB ∧ ¬WiT) ∨ (¬WiB ∧ WiT)]

[T1.2.4] WiB//WiT→(WiB ∨ WiT) [= “what is claimed” (muddaʿā)]

Masʿūd contributes a somewhat collapsed version of the same explanation for [T1.2], saying that it is the case: “because [principle-premise C] negation of the cause (ʿilla) of something obliges negation of that something, and when one of the two shumūls does not exist there necessarily follows confirmation of the iftirāq (division), which is among the necessitating factors of the sought-after conclusion (mūjibāt al-maṭlūb).”48

Masʿūd continues on to address a critique of this interpretation of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s argument, in the “and if you say (fa-in qulta) … I would say (qultu) …” format typical to this genre of critically-engaged commentary (taḥqīq). This is important, in that it shows there were variant interpretations of what al-Samarqandī meant by certain of his formulations—in this case, his saying that ŠWi2 is a cause (ʿilla) for “one of the two shumūls, absolutely (li-aḥad al-shumūlayn, muṭlaqan),” in what I have labeled premise [2.1]. Masʿūd’s rebuttal of this critique is multi-leveled, and sheds further light on the logical-philosophical particulars inherent to this masʾala.49

Overall, we might say that arguing to the desired conclusion from the first disjunct posed by the Shāfiʿī muʿallil in his second dalīl, (ŠWi2)I, is relatively uncomplicated. Put simply, if [T1.1] we both assume that general ŠWi2 is an ʿilla for [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2], muṭlaqan, and we assume that ŠWi2 is, in reality, realized, then what we have in fact assumed is that general ŠWi2 entails a real mulāzama-implication and constitutes a truly necessitating ʿilla for the realization of the undifferentiated majmūʿ of its particulars ŠWWi2 and ŠAWi2, both. And having these both, of course means that we have ŠWWi2, which is (WiB ∧ WiT), and which, in turn and by necessity, means that we have one of WiB or WiT, by the principle-premise (B) that “confirmation of the majmūʿ entails confirmation of the part.” And if [T1.2], we both assume that general ŠWi2 is an ʿilla for [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2], muṭlaqan, and we assume that ŠWi2 is not realized in reality, then what we have in fact assumed is iftirāq, or WiB//WiT, which is what ¬(ŠWi2) entails necessarily, and of course that gives us (WiB ∨ WiT), which is only one step away from the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s thesis: MWi. Alternatively, as per Masʿūd, by assuming the causality (ʿilliyya) of ŠWi2, but also that it is not realized, we have in effect removed the ʿilla of our undifferentiated majmūʿ [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]; and, when the ʿilla ceases to exist, so does the maʿlūl by immediate necessity. Thus we are left with ¬[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2], which, again, leaves only iftirāq,50 leading to (WiB ∨ WiT), then to the thesis: MWi.

Having asserted the endoxic disjunction of [2.1] (ŠWi2)I ∨ ¬(ŠWi2)I, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil has shown that he can justify premise [1.1] WiB ∨ WiT when ŠWi2 is an ʿilla. Now, he must prove he can justify it even when ŠWi2 is not an ʿilla. In this manner, the simple, constructive dilemma of dalīl #2 will be safely sealed, and the path to his thesis [1.4] MWi made secure.

6.4 Dalīl #3 (Overview and First Premise)

In a maximally dialogical disputation, we can imagine that turning back to the second dalīl’s final premise, a Ḥanafī sāʾil might object, saying: “We don’t concede [2.3] that when shumūl of the guardianship in the two times (ŠWi2) is not a cause (ʿilla) for one of the two shumūls absolutely [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2], one of the two guardianships (WiB ∨ WiT) necessarily follows. Why should it be so?”

The Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s response is a third and conclusive dalīl consisting of six propositions in yet another constructive dilemma, though the first part in this case is a hypothetical sorites.51 In fact, al-Samarqandī’s terse presentation of this dalīl also includes no less than three supporting adilla: what I have labelled dalīl #4 for the first premise [3.1], dalīl #5 for the second premise [3.2], and dalīl #6 for the second premise of dalīl #5 [5.2]. But if we temporarily set these subsidiary adilla aside, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s third dalīl appears as follows. “And if [ŠWi2] isn’t a cause (ʿilla),” he argues, “then likewise [WiB ∨ WiT] …”

[3.1] “… because its causality (ʿilliyya) is not a concomitant cause (madār) for the contradictory (naqīḍ) of the universal inclusion of the nonexistence (shumūl al-ʿadam), [both] in existence and in nonexistence (wujūdan wa-ʿadaman), in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr).”

[3.2] “And when [the causality] is not a concomitant cause (madār) to the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence, the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence necessarily ensues.”

[3.3] “And when the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence is confirmed, then it is the case that either the shumūl of the guardianship, or division (iftirāq), is proven to be true.”

[3.4 and 3.5] “And whichever one it is, one of the two guardianships necessarily ensues—such being the sought-after conclusion (maṭlūb).”

Thus the Shāfiʿī muʿallil proves premise [2.3]: if the shumūl of the guardianship in the two times (ŠWi2) is not a cause for one of the two shumūls absolutely (such being the antecedent of premise [3.1]) then there necessarily follows one of the two guardianships (such being the consequent of premises [3.4–5]). And with dalīl #2 thus finally secured, dalīl #1 is consequently justified, and the Shāfiʿī thesis is at last vindicated.

Of course this is not the end; that comes only after the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s key objection to premise [3.1], and before even we reach that point there is a considerable amount of conceptual and argumentative unpacking requisite to a full clarification of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s third dalīl. We will begin by returning to the first premise, [3.1]: “because its causality (ʿilliyya) is not a concomitant cause (madār) for the contradictory (naqīḍ) of the universal inclusion of the nonexistence (shumūl al-ʿadam), [both] in existence and in nonexistence (wujūdan wa-ʿadaman), in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr).”

First, we must bear in mind that this third dalīl unfolds “upon assumption of” (ʿalā taqdīr) the non-causality of shumūl of the guardianship in the two times, represented as ¬(ŠWi2)I. This assumptive determination, though unspoken here, is critical in that it constitutes the focus of the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s eventual objection. Second, we are introduced here in [3.1] to the term madār, meaning “concomitant cause,” which merits a brief explanation.

Dawarān, or “concomitance,” is an essential theory and method—along with talāzum / mulāzama (implication) and tanāfin / munāfā (mutual negation)—in both the ādāb al-baḥth and its immediate predecessor-systems in the juridical sciences of jadal (dialectic) and khilāf (disagreement).52 As defined briefly by al-Samarqandī in the Risāla, “Dawarān (concomitance) is the subordination (tarattub) of something to something [else] which has a suitability for causality (ṣulūḥ al-ʿilliyya), either in existence, or in nonexistence, or in both together; and the first is the dāʾir (concomitant effect), while the second is the madār (concomitant cause).”53 A more detailed introduction may be extracted from al-Samarqandī’s ʿAyn al-Naẓar—which treatise, in fact, is dedicated exclusively to the three essential dialectical theories and methods of talāzum, tanāfin, and dawarān:

On Dawarān (Concomitance). And it is [also] called mudāwara; such being an expression denoting the subordination (tarattub) of the effect (athar) to something which has suitability for causality (ṣalāḥ al-ʿilliyya), time after time (marratan baʿda ukhrā). Like the subordination of ownership (milk) to unconditional commutation (bayʿ muṭlaq). And the effect is called a dāʾir (concomitant effect), and the thing which has suitability [for causality]: a madār (concomitant cause). [….] And madāriyya (concomitant causality) might be in terms of [both] existence and nonexistence, in that the dāʾir exists at the time of existence of the madār, always, and does not exist at the time of its nonexistence, likewise [always]. Like the madāriyya of adultery by one with licit sexual access (zinā l-muḥṣan) for obligation of the stoning penalty (rajm). This sort of madāriyya is called ījād (generating). And [madāriyya] might be in terms of existence but not nonexistence [….] And [madāriyya] might be in terms of nonexistence but not existence [….] And … the rules for talāzum (implication) run the same course in this domain; since the madār in the first [type of] madāriyya is [both] a malzūm (implicans) and a lāzim (implicatum). And in the second [type]: a malzūm. And in the third [type]: a lāzim [….]54

Note the assertion in the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s first premise [3.1] that the “causality (ʿilliyya) [of ŠWi2] is not a madār … in existence and in nonexistence (wujūdan wa-ʿadaman),” by which, from al-Samarqandī’s exposition above, we understand that it does not belong to the first type of madāriyya, wherein “the dāʾir exists at the time of existence (wujūd) of the madār, always, and does not exist at the time of its nonexistence (ʿadam), likewise [always].”

Finally, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil also qualifies the lack of madāriyya of (ŠWi2)I as fī nafs al-amr. This relatively difficult conceptual category is variously translated as “in fact;”55 or “in the realm of fact;”56 or “in accordance with what things are in themselves;”57 or “in the truth of the matter;”58 or simply “in the thing itself.”59 Al-Jurjānī, in a single-folio treatise entitled al-Risāla fī Taḥqīq Nafs al-Amr wa-l-Farq baynahu wa-bayn al-Khārij,60 begins with the following description:

Know that the realization (taḥaqquq) of things is either a farḍ ʿaqlī (intellective positing [of a possibility]), being such as is found nowhere other than in the faculties of perception (quwa darrāka), or a [farḍ] ḥaqīqī (true positing [of a possibility]), being such as is found outside (khārij) the faculties of perception, regardless of whether the farḍ ʿaqlī exists or does not exist. And such is what is said to be ‘in the thing itself’ (fī nafs al-amr). And the ḥaqīqī is either via consideration of [things’] very selves (bi-l-naẓar ilā anfusihā), or via relation to what is external to their very selves (bi-l-nisba ilā l-khārij ʿan anfusihā), and [this latter] is what is called khārij (external). So nafs al-amr is external to the faculties of perception, and it is more general (aʿamm) than the external (khārij), and the external [is more general] than the mental (wa-l-khārij min al-dhihn), but in another sense (maʿnā). And such is that there holds true externally (fi l-khārij) that what exists in the mind is something existing in the mind, not that it is something existing externally (fi l-khārij). And it is likewise, exactly, in relation to what is in accordance with the very selves (bi-ḥasab al-anfus).61

That fī nafs al-amr, or “in the thing itself,” is more general than fi l-khārij, or “external,” has obvious implications as to whether taḥaqquq-realization in one entails taḥaqquq-realization in the other. Al-Jurjānī explains this in terms of both the affirmative judgment-assertion (ḥukm ījābī) and negative judgment-assertion (ḥukm salbī). As for the affirmative, “the thing itself” (nafs al-amr) being more general (aʿamm) than the external (khārij), entails that:

when an intension-property (maʿnā) holds true ‘in the external’ (fi l-khārij), it holds true ‘in the thing itself’ (fī nafs al-amr). [….] But as for when it holds true fī nafs al-amr … then it does not hold true in terms of the external (bi-ḥasab al-khārij) if it is not something existing in it (idhā lam yakun mawjūdan fīhi). Because what is not ‘in the external’ (fi l-khārij) is not qualified (mawṣūfan) by way of anything ‘in the external’ (fi l-khārij). However, it is allowed that it be so [qualified] via consideration of itself (bi-l-naẓar ilā nafsihi) ….62

And as for the negative judgment-assertion:

‘the thing itself’ (nafs al-amr) is more particular (akhaṣṣ) than the external (khārij). For if it holds true that blackness is not whiteness ‘in the thing itself’ (fī nafs al-amr) it holds true in terms of the external (bi-ḥasab al-khārij), without the converse (min ghayr ʿaks). Like when it holds true that blackness is not a color ‘in the external’ (fi l-khārij) upon its nonexistence in it, it does not hold true in terms of nafs al-amr. And this is due to what you already know: that the contradictory of the more general (naqīḍ al-aʿamm) is more particular than (akhaṣṣ min) the contradictory of the more particular (naqīḍ al-akhaṣṣ).63

If we return, then, to the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s claim in premise [3.1], we can now understand better some of the implications of his saying the “causality (ʿilliyya) [of ŠWi2] is not a madār for the contradictory (naqīḍ) of the universal inclusion of the nonexistence (shumūl al-ʿadam) … fī nafs al-amr.” As a negative judgment-assertion said to hold true in the more particular nafs al-amr, we may understand that it also holds true in the more general khārij. But were one to make an affirmative judgment-assertion that the causality of ŠWi2 is indeed a madār fī nafs al-amr, then it would not hold true fi l-khārij.

With these considerations in mind, then, we may attempt to render the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s premise [3.1] in symbolic form. Employing “⇒” for “assumptive determination” (taqdīr), and “X–[M]→Y” as meaning “X is the madār (concomitant cause) of Y, in existence and in nonexistence (wujūdan wa-ʿadaman), in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr),” then the first premise of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s third dalīl would appear as follows:

[3.1] ¬(ŠWi2)I⇒¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2]

That is, upon assumption that ŠWi2 is not an ʿilla for [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2], it is the case that ŠWi2 being an ʿilla for [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2] is not a madār for ¬ŠAWi2, in existence and in nonexistence, fī nafs al-amr.

6.5 Dalīl #4 (Supporting 3.1)

That the Shāfiʿī muʿallil proceeds directly to a supporting dalīl in al-Samarqandī’s presentation is a sign that in live disputation this premise might draw objection from the Ḥanafī sāʾil: “We don’t concede [3.1] that its causality is not a madār for the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence. Why should it be so?”

The response (jawāb) comes in the form of another (enthymematic) simple, constructive dilemma,64 and is aimed at showing that (ŠWi2)I simply doesn’t fulfill the requirements of a madār in existence and nonexistence, since its supposed dāʾir (concomitant effect), ¬ŠAWi2, can in fact exist in its absence. In short: [4.1] should (ŠWi2)I be realized, then if either the shumūl of the guardianship or the division (iftirāq) between the two guardianships is confirmed, the contradictory (naqīḍ) of the shumūl of the nonexistence (ʿadam) would be confirmed; and [4.2] should (ŠWi2)I not be realized, then if either the shumūl of the guardianship or the iftirāq between the two guardianships is confirmed, the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence would still be confirmed. And, with the understanding that if Y can be realized when X is not, then X is not a madār in existence and nonexistence for Y, we can conclude from [4.1] and [4.2] that [3.1] (ŠWi2)I is not a madār in existence and nonexistence for ¬ŠAWi2. The whole might be rendered as follows:

[4.1] [(ŠWi2)I]R→[(ŠWi2 ∨ WiB//WiT)→¬ŠAWi2]
[4.2] ¬[(ŠWi2)I]R→[(ŠWi2 ∨ WiB//WiT)→¬ŠAWi2]
∴ [3.1] ¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2].

Al-Kīlānī takes us to a deeper level of understanding with a much-expanded variant on this fourth dalīl. First, if indirectly, he confirms for us that in certain contexts when al-Samarqandī merely says “shumūl al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn,” or even just “shumūl al-wilāya,” which we portray as ŠWi2, he in fact means the more particular “shumūl wujūd al-wilāya,” or ŠWWi2. The proof is in his reformulation of this dalīl. (ŠWi2)I is not a madār for ¬ŠAWi2 because “if we were to presume the shumūl of the existence [ŠWWi2], or the iftirāq between the two guardianships [WiB//WiT], the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2] would be realized—no matter whether the causality of the shumūl of the guardianship in the two moments for one of the two shumūls [(ŠWi2)I] is something realized, or is not realized.”65

Not yet satisfied, al-Kīlānī proceeds to back this up with a short series of subsidiary adilla. First he says this is because “both the shumūl of the existence [ŠWWi2], and the iftirāq [WiB//WiT], are more particular in scope (akhaṣṣ) than the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2]; and [principle-premise A] realization of the particular (khāṣṣ) is something which necessitates realization of the general (ʿāmm).”66 We can immediately see this is true, since the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence of guardianship in the two times (¬[¬WiB ∧ ¬WiT]) must allow for either the possibility of shumūl of the existence of guardianship in the two times (WiB ∧ WiT) or the possibility of iftirāq between the two times in terms of guardianship ([WiB ∧ ¬WiT] ∨ [¬WiB ∧ WiT]). Thus either of these is more particular than ¬ŠAWi2, and, by principle-premise A, realization of either particular must result in realization of the more general ¬ŠAWi2 which contains them.

In fact, al-Kīlānī backs this up with two further adilla, saying: “As for the fact that both the shumūl of the existence [ŠWWi2] and the iftirāq [WiB//WiT] are more particular than the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2], it is because when either of them is realized, the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence must be realized—otherwise, the shumūl of the nonexistence [ŠAWi2] would have been realized, and there would necessarily have followed [both] confirmation (thubūt) of the guardianship and lack of its confirmation, which is absurd (muḥāl).”67 That is, realization of ŠWWi2 or WiB//WiT entails ¬ŠAWi2; for were it not the case, they must entail ŠAWi2, which is absurd since ŠAWi2 means there is no guardianship at either time, while WiB//WiT means there is guardianship at precisely one of the times, and ŠWWi2 means there is guardianship at both times. How could it be that either of these latter could entail guardianship at neither time?

Finally, al-Kīlānī draws this all back together as a comprehensive dalīl for [3.1], backed up by a final subsidiary dalīl:

And when the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2] is realized—by assuming (ʿalā taqdīr) the shumūl of the guardianship [ŠWWi2], or by assuming the iftirāq between the two guardianships [WiB//WiT], without regard to the causality of the shumūl of the guardianship [i.e., assuming ¬(ŠWi2)I]—the causality of the shumūl of the guardianship [(ŠWi2)I] will not be a madār for the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2], in existence and in nonexistence, ‘in the thing as in itself it is’ (fī nafs al-amr). Otherwise, [the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence] would not have been realized without it [i.e., without (ŠWi2)I, the causality of the shumūl of the guardianship].68

Masʿūd, on the other hand, approaches the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s fourth dalīl more critically, peering through a more philosophical lens and finding fault with al-Samarqandī’s formulation in either of two possible interpretations. Having faithfully reproduced the fourth dalīl, he then says:

But this remains open to investigation (wa-fīhi baḥth), because if he [al-Samarqandī] intended by these words that the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2] in relation to the realization (taḥaqquq) and nonexistence (ʿadam) of the causality (ʿilliyya) [i.e., of (ŠWi2)I] is on equal footing in the purely intellective realm (ʿalā l-sawiyya ʿaqlan), then such is conceded (fa-musallam). However, such is of no benefit [as a dalīl] because purely intellective potentiality (al-iḥtimāl al-ʿaqlī) is something not considered in situations of causal justification (fī maqām al-taʿlīl). But if by [these words] he intended the equality of its relation in reality (fi l-wāqiʿ) and in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr), then such is denied (fa-mamnūʿ). Because it is allowed that both the shumūl of the existence [ŠWWi2] and the iftirāq [WiB//WiT] be in such a manner as does not separate from that causality (ʿilliyya) [i.e., from (ŠWi2)I], so the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2] is [also] not realized without it.69

6.6 Dalīl #3 (Second Premise)

We will assume our Ḥanafī sāʾil misses Masʿūd’s objection, however, and that the Shāfiʿī muʿallil proceeds to the second premise of his third dalīl. Having asserted in [3.1] that (ŠWi2)I is not a madār for ¬ŠAWi2, in existence and nonexistence, fī nafs al-amr, he now says: [3.2] such being the case, ¬ŠAWi2 necessarily ensues. The second premise may thus be rendered:

[3.2] (¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2])→¬ŠAWi2

Note that Masʿūd adds to the lemma of [3.2]: “also upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) the negation of the causality (ʿilliyya).”70 He is at pains, in other words, to remind us that the whole of the third and—according to the Shāfiʿī muʿallil—conclusive dalīl unfolds “upon assumption of” (ʿalā taqdīr)” ¬(ŠWi2)I. Having myself struggled to connect the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s eventual objection [X.1] (which is against this taqdīr-assumption) to a precise utterance of al-Samarqandī’s Shāfiʿī muʿallil, I would posit that Masʿūd recognized this difficulty as well, and was thus sure to provide pointers.

Al-Kīlānī’s approach, on the other hand is in fact to reformulate [3.2] in such a way as leads naturally into a series of subsidiary adilla, and so we will treat it after al-Samarqandī’s own subsidiary adilla #5 and #6.

6.7 Dalīl #5 (Supporting 3.2)

We may imagine the Ḥanafī sāʾil critiquing this second premise, saying, by way of simple objection (mujarrad al-manʿ): “We don’t concede [3.2] that when its causality is not a madār, the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence necessarily ensues. Why should it be so?”

What we have labelled the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s fifth dalīl would constitute his jawāb (response), which now takes the form of an enthymematic, complex, constructive dilemma—“complex,” that is, because the contradictory disjuncts’ consequents are not identical (though close), and the conclusion is itself therefore, technically a disjunct (though not actually treated as such in the argument).71 In short, the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence, i.e., ¬ŠAWi2, necessarily ensues when the causality, i.e., (ŠWi2)I, is not a madār because [5.1] when (ŠWi2)I is confirmed, ¬ŠAWi2 is confirmed; and [5.2] when (ŠWi2)I is absent, ¬ŠAWi2 is “confirmed overall” (fi l-jumla). That is, and introducing the convention “(X)J” as meaning “X is confirmed overall (fi l-jumla)”:

[5.1] (ŠWi2)I→¬ŠAWi2
[5.2] ¬(ŠWi2)I→(¬ŠAWi2)J
∴ [3.2] (¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2])→¬ŠAWi2

As for the meaning of “confirmed overall” (fi l-jumla), we are helped by al-Kīlānī’s commentary on an earlier section of the Risāla. In a discussion of the “remote cause” (ʿilla baʿīda), he says:

The remote cause is according to two divisions: [1] a division upon which the existence of the effect depends unceasingly (dāʾiman)—like the rising of the sun with the presence of daytime, [which is] the effect (maʿlūl) of the rays of the sun; and [2] a division upon which the existence of the effect is dependent overall (fi l-jumla)—like the existence of the grandfather to the existence of the son of the son, being that his causality in relation to the son of the son is also in this sense (maʿnā). And the dependency in the first division is readily apparent (ẓāhir). Likewise in the second division, because the existence of the effect without [the remote cause] does not preclude dependency overall (fi l-jumla). And in such a case, one does not engage in manʿ, due to the obligation (wujūb) of the dependency of the effect upon the remote cause, overall (fi l-jumla).72

In other words, the first type of remote cause, upon which the effect depends unceasingly (dāʾiman), is the sort that should it cease to exist, the effect must also cease to exist. Though a remote cause of the existence of daytime, removal of the sun from the sky necessitates nonexistence of daytime. And the second type of remote cause, upon which the effect depends overall (fi l-jumla), is the sort that should it cease to exist, the effect need not cease to exist at all. Though a remote cause of the existence of the son of the son, removal of the grandfather from existence (e.g., through dying) does not at all necessitate nonexistence of the son of the son. The remote causality of the grandfather is not unceasing (dāʾiman), but overall (fi l-jumla).

Thus, saying that [5.2] when (ŠWi2)I is absent, ¬ŠAWi2 is “confirmed overall” (fi l-jumla), is akin to labelling (ŠWi2)I a remote cause (ʿilla baʿīda), of the second variety, for ¬ŠAWi2. Like the grandfather, it can cease to exist without necessitating nonexistence of the effect, which remains “confirmed overall” (fi l-jumla). And in fact (ŠWi2)I can indeed be recognized as a remote cause, as we have already seen in premises [4.1–2] that both confirmation of shumūl of the existence of guardianship in the two times (ŠWWi2) and confirmation of iftirāq (WiB//WiT) entail more immediate confirmation of ¬ŠAWi2, whether or not (ŠWi2)I is realized. And understanding that ŠWWi2 can be a by-product of (ŠWi2)I, might allow us to recognize (ŠWi2)I as the remote cause (like the grandfather) and ŠWWi2 as the proximate (like the father).

6.8 Dalīl #6 (Supporting 5.2)

Although the Shāfiʿī muʿallil proceeds directly to justify the second premise of dalīl #5, we might imagine he was prompted by the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s simple objection: “We don’t concede that [5.2] upon the causality’s nonexistence, the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence must be confirmed overall (fi l-jumla). Why should it be so?”

And the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s jawāb (response) would be the sixth dalīl, this time in the form of a reductio.73 It must be that the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence (¬ŠAWi2) is confirmed overall, since [6.1] if it weren’t, the causality (ŠWi2)I would in fact be a madār for it in existence and in nonexistence; and [6.2] such would constitute a logical impossibility (khulf). And so dalīl #6 may be rendered thus:

[6.1] ¬(¬ŠAWi2)J→[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2]
[6.2] [(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2] ∧ ¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2] = khulf
∴ [5.2] ¬(ŠWi2)I→(¬ŠAWi2)J

Note that the effectiveness of this reductio depends upon the soundness of the implication expressed in premise [6.1]. And, although al-Samarqandī himself does not do so in this instance, Masʿūd takes up the task of justifying the implication (luzūm) between ¬ŠAWi2’s not being confirmed overall and (ŠWi2)I’s being a madār for it in existence and in nonexistence:74

An explanation of the implication (bayān al-luzūm) is that the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2] exists ‘upon assumption of’ (ʿalā taqdīr) the existence of the causality [(ŠWi2)I], as we stated before. And if it [¬ŠAWi2] ceases to exist upon assumption of its [(ŠWi2)I’s] nonexistence also, dawarān (concomitance) obtains, in existence and in nonexistence (wujūdan wa-ʿadaman), with absolute certainty (al-battata).75

Having accurately rendered and explained this sixth dalīl, Masʿūd—in the role of critical “verifier” commentator (muḥaqqiq)—proceeds to critique it:

But this situation also remains open to speculation (wa-fī hādhā l-maqām ayḍan naẓar), because we do not concede the concomitant causality (madāriyya)—neither in existence nor in nonexistence. As for in existence (wujūdan), because [principle premise F] absolute implication (muṭlaq al-luzūm) between two things does not of necessity entail dawarān (concomitance) between them, as we have already stated in the first half [of the commentary]. And as for in nonexistence (ʿadaman), because the real occurrence (wuqūʿ) of the nonexistence of the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [i.e., ¬(¬ŠAWi2)] is allowed upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) the nonexistence of the causality [i.e., ¬(ŠWi2)I], by chance occurrence (ittifāqiyyan)—not arising from dawarān (concomitance) vis-à-vis nonexistence—as it is with the rest of such nonexistent things as come together in real occurrence by chance (al-aʿdām al-mujtamaʿa fi l-wuqūʿ ittifāqan). Moreover, if this dalīl is sound (ṣaḥīḥ) in all its premises, there follows of necessity that the impossible by essence (mumtaniʿ bi-l-dhāt) be something possible in general (mumkin ʿāmm) in terms of existence, and such is absurd (muḥāl) by the most self-evident intellection (bi-badīhat al-ʿaql). As for an explanation of the implication (bayān al-luzūm), it is because we say: the impossible by essence (mumtaniʿ bi-l-dhāt) can only either be something possible (mumkin) via particular possibility (imkān khāṣṣ) or not be so. And if it is so, then such is the case because [principle-premise A] confirmation of the general (thubūt al-ʿāmm) is an implicatum (lāzim) of confirmation of the particular (thubūt al-khāṣṣ). And if it is not so, then likewise it must be possible of existence (mumkin al-wujūd). Otherwise, it necessarily follows that particular possibility (imkān khāṣṣ) be a madār for the general possibility (imkān ʿāmm) we mentioned, in existence and in nonexistence. This is a logical impossibility (hādhā khulf).76

Returning to our understanding of the second premise of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s third dalīl, we might now turn to al-Kīlānī’s commentary, noting that, though he begins by formulating the premise [3.2] somewhat differently, he roughly parallels what we have labelled the fifth and sixth adilla of the lemma:

And when it is confirmed that the causality of the shumūl of the guardianship [(ŠWi2)I] is not a madār for the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2], in existence and in nonexistence, in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr), then it can only be either that the causality of the shumūl of the guardianship [(ŠWi2)I] is realized, or that it is not.77 And if it is realized, then the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2] is realized. Because when its causality [(ŠWi2)I] is realized, one of the two guardianships is realized [(WiB ∨ WiT)], due to what we have explained.78 And when one of the two guardianships is realized, the shumūl of the nonexistence [ŠAWi2] is not realized—which is obvious (ẓāhir). So the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2] is realized.79

To this point, then, we may render al-Kīlānī’s support for premise [3.2] as follows:

[K1] (¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2])→[[(ŠWi2)I]R ∨ ¬[(ŠWi2)I]R]
[K2] [(ŠWi2)I]R→¬ŠAWi2
[K2.1] [(ŠWi2)I]R→(WiB ∨ WiT)
[K2.2] (WiB ∨ WiT)→¬(ŠAWi2)R [= ẓāhir]
∴ [K2] [(ŠWi2)I]R→¬ŠAWi2

Al-Kīlānī continues:

But even if [the causality of the shumūl of the guardianship: (ŠWi2)I] is not realized, it is also necessary that the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2] be realized, overall (fi l-jumla). Because if it were not realized by this assumption whatsoever, it would necessarily follow that the causality of the shumūl of the guardianship [(ŠWi2)I] is [indeed] a madār for the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2], in existence and in nonexistence, in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr). Because the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence is [in this case] something realized by assuming [that causality’s] realization, and something negated (muntafin) by assuming its negation. For by ‘concomitant causality in existence and in nonexistence’ (madāriyya wujūdan wa-ʿadaman) we mean nothing other than this; while what is assumed (muqaddar) is its contrary / contradictory (khilāfihi).80 This is a logical impossibility (khulf).81

And so the remainder of al-Kīlānī’s support for premise [3.2] may be rendered as follows:

[K3] ¬[(ŠWi2)I]R→(¬ŠAWi2)J

[K3.1] ¬(¬[(ŠWi2)I]R→(¬ŠAWi2)J)→[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2]

[K3.1.1] [(ŠWi2)I→¬ŠAWi2] ∧ [¬(ŠWi2)I→¬(¬ŠAWi2)]; nothing but this is meant by madāriyya in existence and nonexistence

[K3.2] [(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2]→khulf, because opening premise = [3.1] ¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2]

∴ [K3] ¬[(ŠWi2)I]R→(¬ŠAWi2)J

6.9 Dalīl #3 (Continued; Supporting [2.3])

At this point, with the first two premises supported with subsidiary adilla, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil is set to complete his third and purportedly conclusive dalīl. To review, he has already asserted that even when the (general) shumūl of the guardianship (ŠWi2) isn’t a cause (ʿilla) for the two (particular) shumūls [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2], we still wind up with one of the two guardianships (WiB ∨ WiT), because …

[3.1] … [upon assumption of ¬(ŠWi2)I] the causality [(ŠWi2)I] is not a madār for the contradictory of the universal inclusion of the nonexistence (¬ŠAWi2) in existence and in nonexistence, fī nafs al-amr. And …

[3.2] when (ŠWi2)I is not a madār for ¬ŠAWi2, then ¬ŠAWi2 nevertheless necessarily ensues.

With these secure, he now completes his dalīl, adding:

[3.3] And when ¬ŠAWi2 is confirmed, either ŠWi2 [meaning ŠWWi2] or iftirāq (WiB//WiT) is true. And …

[3.4 and 3.5] whichever one it is, one of the two guardianships (WiB ∨ WiT) necessarily follows, which is the sought-after conclusion (maṭlūb).

Again, the entire third dalīl is a constructive dilemma prefaced by a hypothetical sorites, on the pattern PQ; QR; RST; SU; TU; ∴ PU. And it may be rendered as follows:

[3.1] ¬(ŠWi2)I⇒¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2]
[3.2] (¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2])→¬ŠAWi2
[3.3] (¬ŠAWi2)→(ŠWi2 ∨ WiB//WiT)
[3.4] ŠWi2→(WiB ∨ WiT)
[3.5] WiB//WiT→(WiB ∨ WiT)
∴ [2.3] ¬(ŠWi2)I→(WiB ∨ WiT)

And with premise [2.3] thus proven, the second dalīl is secure, thus proving premise [1.1] WiB ∨ WiT, after which the first dalīl is secure, thus proving the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s thesis: [1.4] MWi, the father has absolute guardianship of compulsion (muṭlaq al-wilāya) with regard to the virgin major.

Al-Kīlānī wraps up his exposition on this third dalīl in roughly the same manner, though, once again, with a degree of reformulation. Having completed his extensive subsidiary proofs for premises [3.1] and [3.2], as we have seen them, he continues:

And thus it is confirmed that the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2] is something realized also by assuming the nonexistence of the causality of the shumūl of the guardianship [¬(ŠWi2)I]. And when it is realized by assuming [both] the causality of the shumūl of the guardianship [(ŠWi2)I] and its absence [¬(ŠWi2)I], then its realization is either via realization of the shumūl of the guardianship for the two moments [ŠWi2], or via realization of the iftirāq between the two guardianships [WiB//WiT]. And according to both assumptions there necessarily follows one of the two guardianships [WiB ∨ WiT]. And when one of the two guardianships is realized, absolute guardianship (muṭlaq al-wilāya) [MWi] is realized, in the context of [the ward’s] being a virgin major, which is what was claimed (al-muddaʿā). This, then, is an accurate rendering and explanation of this subtle problem (taqrīr al-nukta).82

Importantly, al-Kīlānī now engages fully in his role as a critically investigating, verifying commentator (muḥaqqiq), and perhaps reveals his own Ḥanafism in the process. As we have just seen, he references the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s argument for MWi as a nukta, or “subtle problem.” Now, in an extended discussion comprising the remainder of his treatment of this lemma (§§ 48.8–13), he proposes a ḥall, or “solution,” to this nukta, from four critical “approaches” (wujūh). “First of all,” he says:

we select that shumūl of the guardianship is not a cause for one of the two shumūls [i.e., ¬(ŠWi2)I]. [And against] his saying: ‘One of the two guardianships necessarily follows,’ we say: Denied (mamnūʿ), due to the allowance that the truth (ṣidq) of his declaring ‘shumūl of the guardianship is not a cause for one of the two shumūls’ [¬(ŠWi2)I] is via negation of the shumūl of the guardianship [i.e., ¬ŠWi2], not via its realization [ŠWi2] with negation of its causality [¬I]. And, in such a case, there does not necessarily follow a confirmation (thubūt) of one of the two guardianships.83

In other words, al-Kīlānī’s first critique is directed against the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s premise [2.3], whereby it is asserted that when shumūl of the guardianship is not a cause for one of the two shumūls, then one of the two guardianships necessarily follows: [2.3] ¬(ŠWi2)I→(WiB ∨ WiT). This premise of course assumes that ¬(ŠWi2)I is true, and al-Kīlānī’s argument is that the truth of ¬(ŠWi2)I might possibly result from ¬ŠWi2 being the case, not from ŠWi2 being realized but its ʿilliya (I) being negated. And if ¬ŠWi2 is indeed the case, then it can never come about that [3.4] ŠWi2→(WiB ∨ WiT). Thus by problematizing the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s interpretation of premise [2.3], al-Kīlānī is able to falsify his premise [3.4] and thus the whole of dalīl #3 as a proof for premise [2.3].

Moving on to the next critique, al-Kīlānī says:

Second of all, we do not concede that if the shumūl of the guardianship upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) the causality were not realized, then the iftirāq between the two guardianships would be realized [i.e., (ŠWi2)I⇒[¬(ŠWi2)R→(WiB//WiT)]]. Because the shumūl of the guardianship upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) the causality [(ŠWi2)I] is not allowed to be a cause (ʿilla) for the shumūl of the guardianship [meaning: ŠWWi2]. Otherwise, it necessarily follows that something be a cause for itself. And likewise it is not allowed to be a cause for the shumūl of the nonexistence of the guardianship [ŠAWi2]. Otherwise, it necessarily follows that something be a cause for that which negates it. So it must be that shumūl of the guardianship upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) the causality is only a cause for the aggregate of the two shumūls (majmūʿ al-shumūlayn) [i.e., (ŠWi2)I⇒[(ŠWi2)—[I]→[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]]. So when the shumūl of the guardianship is negated, the aggregate of the two shumūls is negated [i.e., ¬ŠWi2→¬[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]].84 And the negation of the aggregate of the two shumūls is allowed in [the form of] negation of the shumūl of the existence [and] not negation of the shumūl of the nonexistence [i.e., ¬ŠWWi2 ∧ ŠAWi2]. So iftirāq between the two guardianships [WiB//WiT] does not necessarily follow, and thus one of the two guardianships [WiB ∨ WiT] does not necessarily follow.85

This second critique is directed against the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s assertion that, assuming the causality of shumūl of the guardianship, if the shumūl of the guardianship is not realized, then iftirāq between the two guardianships would be. Understanding that iftirāq between the two guardianships (WiB//WiT) entails “one of the two guardianships” (WiB ∨ WiT) allows us to identify the target as the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s tanbīh premise [T1.2]: (ŠWi2)I⇒[¬(ŠWi2)R→(WiB ∨ WiT)].

But to understand al-Kīlānī’s following contentions, we must first recognize that ¬(ŠWi2)R→(WiB//WiT), as he formulates [T1.2], necessarily entails (ŠWi2)R→(ŠWWi2 ∨ ŠAWi2). That is, if the non-realization of the shumūl of the guardianship entails iftirāq between the two times, then (contradictory) realization of the shumūl of the guardianship must entail either shumūl of the existence of the guardianship (ŠWWi2) or shumūl of the nonexistence of the guardianship (ŠAWi2), due to the trichotomous relationship of iftirāq and these two particular shumūls.86

Such being the case, we can grasp al-Kīlānī’s argument that (1) shumūl of the guardianship can’t be a cause for shumūl of (the existence of) the guardianship, since [principle-premise G] it is not allowed that something be a cause for itself; (2) shumūl of the guardianship can’t be a cause for shumūl of the nonexistence of the guardianship, since [principle-premise H] it is not allowed that something be a cause for that which negates it; (3) therefore shumūl of the guardianship can only be a cause for the aggregate (majmūʿ) of the two shumūls—that is, it must be that (ŠWi2)I⇒[(ŠWi2)—[I]→[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]]; and thus (4) when the shumūl of the guardianship is negated, the aggregate of the two shumūls must be negated (since, presumably, [principle-premise C] negation of the cause [ʿilla] obliges negation of the effect [maʿlūl]).

So what al-Kīlānī has done, in effect, is to replace [T1.2] (ŠWi2)I⇒[¬(ŠWi2)R→(WiB ∨ WiT)] with (ŠWi2)I⇒[¬(ŠWi2)R→¬[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]]. And this accomplished, he proceeds to argue the possibility that negation of the aggregate of the two shumūls, or ¬[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2], manifest itself as only negation of the shumūl of the existence and not negation of the shumūl of the nonexistence. In other words, it is possible that ¬[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2] and ŠAWi2 be the case simultaneously; and so it does not necessarily follow from ¬[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2] that iftirāq (WiB//WiT) be the case, nor, consequently, that (WiB ∨ WiT) be the case. And in this way, al-Kīlānī disables the supporting tanbīh for the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s premise [2.2]. With his first critique having disabled the third dalīl, we can now say that the entire second dalīl is unsupported.

Moving on to the next critique, al-Kīlānī says:

Third of all, we do not concede that if the shumūl of the existence [ŠWWi2], or the iftirāq between the two guardianships [WiB//WiT], were realized, then the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2] would be realized, due to the allowance that the shumūl of the existence, or the iftirāq between the two guardianships, be absurd (muḥāl), and [thus] necessarily entail another absurdity: such being the shumūl of the nonexistence [ŠAWi2].87

This third critique appears aimed at the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s premises [4.1] and [4.2], that is: regardless of whether the causality of ŠWi2 is realized, if either shumūl of the existence of the guardianship (ŠWWi2) or iftirāq between the two (WiB//WiT) is the case, then the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence (¬ŠAWi2) is the case: [4.1] [(ŠWi2)I]R→[(ŠWWi2 ∨ WiB//WiT)→¬ŠAWi2]; [4.2] ¬[(ŠWi2)I]R→[(ŠWWi2 ∨ WiB//WiT)→¬ŠAWi2]. Al-Kīlānī concedes neither, citing the possibility that either ŠWWi2 or WiB//WiT be absurd (muḥāl) and thus entail the absurdity of ŠAWi2 being the case.

I am not perfectly clear as to how he proposes that the absurdity of either ŠWWi2 or WiB//WiT might come about. But my best guess is that, understanding the assertion of one entails the negation of the other (and of ŠAWi2),88 he has noticed that both ŠWWi2 and WiB//WiT are being asserted elsewhere (e.g., in premises [3.4] and [3.5]). So when, for example, WiB//WiT is asserted as antecedent in [3.5], it means that ŠWWi2 can’t be the case, and yet ŠWWi2 is asserted as a possibility in [4.1–2]. Thus ŠWWi2 is “allowed” to be absurd (muḥāl) in [4.1–2]. Likewise, when ŠWi2 (meaning: ŠWWi2) is asserted as antecedent in [3.4], it means that WiB//WiT can’t be the case, and yet WiB//WiT is asserted as a possibility in [4.1–2]. Thus ŠWWi2 is “allowed” to be absurd (muḥāl) in [4.1–2]. And so, since it is “allowed” that ŠWWi2 or WiB//WiT be absurd in [4.1–2], and [principle-premise E] the absurd is allowed to necessarily entail the absurd, we could wind up with the absurd consequent of shumūl of the nonexistence (ŠAWi2) in [4.1–2]; and ŠAWi2 is not only the contradictory of the desired consequent ¬ŠAWi2, but the contrary of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s own asserted thesis. At the very least, his fourth dalīl, and all support for premise [3.1], has been disabled.

Moving on to the final critique, al-Kīlānī says:

And fourth of all, we do not concede that if the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2] were negated upon negation of the causality [(ŠWi2)I], then the causality would be a madār for the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence, [both] in existence and in nonexistence [(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2]. Such would only follow necessarily were the causality [(ŠWi2)I] to possess a suitability of causality (ṣulūḥ ʿilliyya) for the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2]. But such is denied (mamnūʿ).89

Al-Kīlānī’s final critique thus comes as a rejection of the reductio premise [6.1] ¬(¬ŠAWi2)J→[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2], brought by the Shāfiʿī muʿallil to justify his premise [5.2] ¬(ŠWi2)I→(¬ŠAWi2)J. And his rejection is made on the basis that the consequent madāriyya, or concomitant causality, represented by [(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2], could only be entailed if its madār, or concomitant cause, being (ŠWi2)I, possessed ṣulūḥ al-ʿilliyya, or “suitability for causality,” for its purported dāʾir, or concomitant effect, such being ¬ŠAWi2.90 But this, al-Kīlānī tells us, is denied (mamnūʿ). And upon further consideration, one might wonder how it could it be otherwise, with (ŠWi2)I in fact meaning (ŠWi2—[I]→[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]). With the candidate madār (ŠWi2)I potentially productive of ŠAWi2, how could it ever really be a “suitable” ʿilla for the requisite dāʾir ¬ŠAWi2?

A final note regarding these four objections. Frequently throughout his Sharḥ, al-Kīlānī conveys critiques of al-Samarqandī’s claims or arguments and then counters them—he both reports and refutes potential problems in the Risāla. Here, however, he does no such thing. He argues directly against the Shāfiʿī position from four different perspectives, and does not so much as suggest a defensive response (jawāb) to any of them. This may be taken as an indicant of his holding the Ḥanafī position on this masʾala. Perhaps he felt it his duty to present these objections here, as a “solution” to the “subtle problem” posed by the Shāfiʿī muʿallil, before continuing on to the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s objection as formulated in the lemma, due to the fact that this latter, as we see, seems only lightly corrective—almost cosmetic—and easily countered.

In a final bid to grasp the workings of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s third dalīl before moving on, I would here attempt a brief summary explanation. First it is important to realize that the contradictory (naqīḍ) of universal inclusion of the nonexistence of the guardianship in the two times (¬ŠAWi2) is something the Shāfiʿī muʿallil needs to be true. It translates into one of two things. Either it is the case that there is universal inclusion of the existence of the guardianship in the two times (ŠWWi2), such being equivalent to his thesis, or it is the case that there is iftirāq, division between the two times (WiB//WiT); and this latter leads to [1.1] (WiB ∨ WiT), which is only one, presumably conceded, step away from his thesis. In fact, of the tripartite disjuncts of iftirāq, shumūl al-wujūd, and shumūl al-ʿadam, it is only the latter—ŠAWi2—which cannot be argued to lead to his thesis. In this sense, he is truly obliged to prove its contradictory: ¬ŠAWi2.

From the first and second adilla, it was argued that if the causality (ʿilliyya) of shumūl of the guardianship for the two times, i.e., (ŠWi2)I, is confirmed, then the Shāfiʿī muʿallil gets what he wants: shumūl wujūd al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn, universal inclusion of the existence of the guardianship in the two times, which is ŠWWi2, or (WiB ∧ WiT), and identical to his thesis MWi. But now in the third dalīl it is argued that if (ŠWi2)I is not confirmed, then the Shāfiʿī muʿallil still gets what he wants. Why?

The answer: [3.1] because (ŠWi2)I is not a madār for his requisite objective ¬ŠAWi2 anyway. That is, ¬ŠAWi2 can come about in some other way, in the absence of (ŠWi2)I. Namely, ¬ŠAWi2 can be brought about by confirmation of universal inclusion of the existence of the guardianship in the two times (ŠWWi2), or iftirāq-division (WiB//WiT), regardless of whether or not (ŠWi2)I is realized. In other words, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s objective ¬ŠAWi2 can exist in the absence of (ŠWi2)I, so the latter simply cannot be a “concomitant cause” (madār) for the former in existence and nonexistence.

It is then claimed [3.2] that although (ŠWi2)I is not a madār for ¬ŠAWi2, the latter is nevertheless confirmed. Why? Because: [5.1] when (ŠWi2)I is confirmed, then our objective ¬ŠAWi2 is confirmed. Presumably this is because it has already been confirmed in premise [2.2] that (ŠWi2)I→(WiB ∨ WiT), which consequent is a manifestation of ¬ŠAWi2. Confirmation of (ŠWi2)I also potentially entails that ŠWWi2, the other manifestation of ¬ŠAWi2, would be the case. In fact, it appears that (ŠWi2)I is to be treated as a “remote cause,” which would explain why it is then claimed that [5.2] when (ŠWi2)I doesn’t exist, it is nevertheless the case that ¬ŠAWi2 is confirmed “overall” (fi l-jumla). But why is this the case?

The answer (a reductio): [6.1] because if ¬ŠAWi2 wasn’t confirmed in the absence of (ŠWi2)I, then that would mean it is both (1) confirmed when (ŠWi2)I is confirmed (as we saw in [5.1]), and (2) not confirmed when (ŠWi2)I is not confirmed—and the consequence of this is that (ŠWi2)I would, after all, be a concomitant madār, in existence and nonexistence, for ¬ŠAWi2—even though the Shāfiʿī muʿallil has just gone to some length to prove it is not. Hence, he says: “Otherwise, the causality (ʿilliyya) would be a madār for it in existence and nonexistence, and such is khulf, logical impossibility.” So in the end we are left with the fact that ¬ŠAWi2 must be the case. And, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil says: “when the naqīḍ of shumūl al-ʿadam [¬ŠAWi2] is confirmed, then either shumūl al-wilāya [ŠWWi2] or iftirāq [WiB//WiT] is true, and whichever one it is there necessarily follows one of the two guardianships [WiB ∨ WiT], which is the sought-after objective (maṭlūb) [1.1].”

6.10 Ḥanafī Sāʾil: [Manʿ maʿa Mustanad]

Finally we hear the true, critical voice of the (assumedly Ḥanafī) sāʾil, as formulated by al-Samarqandī near the close of the masʾala. In fact, the Ḥanafī sāʾil opens with a concession: “We concede (sallamnā) that the causality [(ŠWi2)I] is not a madār in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr).” In other words, the Ḥanafī sāʾil accepts what might be called the “taqdīr-consequent,” the Y in the “assumptive determination” XY, which we have rendered as ¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2] in premise [3.1]. And on further reflection, this concession is not only justified by the evidently sound and presumably conceded fourth dalīl, but consonant to the Ḥanafī position (ŠAWi2); the Ḥanafī position should benefit from the failure of a dawarān which, unchecked, would have produced its contradictory (¬ŠAWi2).

But the Ḥanafī sāʾil objects to the “taqdīr-antecedent,” the X in the “assumptive determination” XY, asking: “But why did you say that the causality [(ŠWi2)I] was so [i.e., not a madār] by assuming (ʿalā taqdīr) the absence of causality of the shumūl of the guardianship [¬(ŠWi2)I], given the allowance that that assumption [¬(ŠWi2)I] is absurd (muḥāl), and [principle-premise E]: the absurd is allowed to necessarily entail the absurd?”

First, we should note this as an objection of the category manʿ maʿa mustanad, meaning “denial with corroboration,” such being the questioner’s objection not alone (as in mujarrad al-manʿ) but accompanied by some manner of counter-evidence. In the first part of the Risāla, al-Samarqandī only briefly defines mustanad (corroboration) as “that upon which the denial (manʿ) is built,”91 but he goes into more detail in his prescriptive discourse on the role of the questioner (sāʾil):

And if [the sāʾil] denies one of the premises of [the muʿallil’s] dalīl, he is either restrained to mere denial (mujarrad al-manʿ), or he is not. And if he is not restrained, he either states the mustanad [for his manʿ], or he does not state [it]. The mustanad is like when he says: ‘We don’t concede. Why can’t it be such-and-such?’ Or he says: ‘We don’t concede the necessary entailment (luzūm) of that. This would only necessarily follow if it were so-and-so.’ Or he says: ‘We don’t concede such-and-such. How can it be, when the situation is so-and-so?’92

In our case, the formulation of manʿ maʿa mustanad is somewhat different, being of the type: “But why did you say [X was the case], given the allowance that [Y], and [Z]?” The first half may be considered the manʿ proper, being equivalent to: “We do not concede that [X is the case],” and the second half is the mustanad. In effect, and having first conceded that the causality [(ŠWi2)I] is not a madār fī nafs al-amr, the Ḥanafī sāʾil has objected with the manʿ of “We do not concede, however, that (ŠWi2)I is not a madār fī nafs al-amr upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) [¬(ŠWi2)I],” and he has accompanied that manʿ with the mustanad of “since that taqdīr [¬(ŠWi2)I] can be absurd (muḥāl), and the absurd can entail the absurd.”

The end result is a variant type of reductio, on something like the pattern: P→(P)khulf; (P)khulf →(Q)khulf; ∴ ¬(PQ); i.e., if [¬(ŠWi2)I] is the case then [¬(ŠWi2)I] is absurd; and the consequent of absurd [¬(ŠWi2)I] is the absurd [(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2]; therefore it cannot be the case that if [¬(ŠWi2)I] then ¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2]. The consequent must come about by some other antecedent.

As for our commentators, Masʿūd’s expansion on the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s opening concession is noteworthy in that he adds “in reality and …” (fi l-wāqiʿ wa …) before “in the thing as in itself it is” (fī nafs al-amr); i.e., “We concede that the causality … is not a madār … in reality and in the thing as in itself it is (fi l-wāqiʿ wa-fī nafs al-amr).” And as for the manʿ-denial proper, he reports that it has a particular name: “And this manʿ is called, according to them,93 ‘denial against the assumption’ (al-manʿ ʿalā l-taqdīr), such being the denial of things confirmed in reality (umūr thābita fi l-wāqiʿ) upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) something impossible / inconceivable (amr mustaḥīl).” He then identifies its corroboration: “And its mustanad is what was stated of [the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s] assertion that the taqdīr [¬(ŠWi2)I] is absurd (muḥāl), and the absurd can entail the absurd.”94

Al-Kīlānī’s reformulation of the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s manʿ maʿa mustanad allows us to better identify the claimed absurdities. He renders the critique thus:

But why did you say that [(ŠWi2)I] is not a madār for the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence [¬ŠAWi2], upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) the nonexistence of its causality for one of the two shumūls [¬(ŠWi2)I], given the allowance that that assumption—I mean the assumption of the nonexistence of causality of the shumūl of the guardianship [¬(ŠWi2)I]—be absurd (muḥāl), and that absurdity is allowed to necessarily entail another absurdity, namely: the concomitant causality (madāriyya) of what is not a madār in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr)?95

From this we learn what the absurdity consequent to that associated with the taqdīr of non-causality [¬(ŠWi2)I] is: that the causality (ŠWi2)I would wind up, simultaneously, as both a madār and not a madār for the supposed dāʾir ¬ŠAWi2.

But why is it that the taqdīr of [¬(ŠWi2)I] can be absurd in the first place? Al-Kīlānī’s identification of the consequent-absurdity may have provided a clue to help us identify the antecedent-absurdity. The consequent-absurdity manifests as a coexistence of contradictories; and in fact if we trace backwards through the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s adilla, we find that he has already allowed—on more than one occasion—for the possibility that ŠWi2 is indeed a cause (ʿilla). Such being the case, his claiming now that it is not a cause generates the possible absurdity that it is at one and the same time a cause and not a cause, or [(ŠWi2)I ∧ ¬(ŠWi2)I)]. Thus the Ḥanafī sāʾil says: “given the allowance that that assumption (taqdīr) [¬(ŠWi2)I] be absurd.”

If this interpretation is correct, then the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s concession plus “denial with corroboration” (manʿ maʿa mustanad) might be rendered as:

We concede ¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2] …
But we don’t concede [3.1] ¬(ŠWi2)I⇒¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2] …
Because ¬(ŠWi2)I→[(ŠWi2)I ∧ ¬(ŠWi2)I)] …
And [(ŠWi2)I ∧ ¬(ŠWi2)I)]→[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2] ∧ ¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2] …
Therefore ¬(¬(ŠWi2)I⇒¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2]).

Before proceeding to the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s response (jawāb), which takes the form of a seventh and final dalīl, I would attempt another summary for the sake of clarity. To begin with, we should be careful to note that the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s manʿ-denial is directed at the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s premise [3.1] ¬(ŠWi2)I¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2], which heads the third dalīl aimed at supporting his premise [2.3] ¬(ŠWi2)I→(WiB ∨ WiT), whose antecedent ¬(ŠWi2)I is the second of the two disjuncts in [2.1] (ŠWi2)I ∨ ¬(ŠWi2)I. He first proved he can get what he needs from the first disjunct (ŠWi2)I with tanbīh #1, and all subsequent argument has aimed to prove he can also get what he needs from the second disjunct ¬(ŠWi2)I. And it is this second disjunct which is “assumed” at the start of premise [3.1], and the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s whole argument in dalīl #3 depends from that initial assumption (taqdīr), being the second disjunct, being ¬(ŠWi2)I. And it is precisely this dependence from that taqdīr ¬(ŠWi2)I that the Ḥanafī sāʾil critiques.

First, he concedes that (ŠWi2)I is not a madār for ¬ŠAWi2 fī nafs al-amr. But he then objects to this being the case “upon assumption of” (ʿalā taqdīr) its non-causality. Why? The answer, to begin with, is because the assumption that the (general) shumūl al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn, or “universal inclusion of the guardianship in the two times” (ŠWi2), is not a cause (ʿilla) for its more particular manifestations—meaning shumūl wujūd al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn, or “universal inclusion of the existence of the guardianship in the two times” (ŠWWi2), and shumūl ʿadam al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn, or “universal inclusion of the nonexistence of the guardianship in the two times” (ŠAWi2)—may in fact be absurd (muḥāl). And we have interpreted this antecedent absurdity as the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s pointing out: (1) the Shāfiʿī muʿallil has already allowed the possibility that ŠWi2 is an ʿilla, and (2) were such to be the case, then claiming it were not an ʿilla now would be absurd: [(ŠWi2)I ∧ ¬(ŠWi2)I]. Finally, the Ḥanafī sāʾil seals his critique with what we have labelled principle-premise E: “it is allowed that the absurd (muḥāl) entail the absurd;” and we have seen al-Kīlānī’s identification of this consequent-absurdity as “the concomitant causality (madāriyya) of what is not a concomitant cause (madār) in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr).” In other words, allowing the muḥāl [(ŠWi2)I ∧ ¬(ŠWi2)I)] allows entailment of another muḥāl: [(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2] ∧ ¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2].

And it may be worth noting that on the surface ¬(ŠWi2)I does indeed appear to be absurd—one would expect that realization of the general ŠWi2 would “cause” the realization of the sum total of its particulars [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2], by immediate necessity. And, of course, if its negation ¬(ŠWi2)I is thus rendered absurd, it may be that, upon assumption of the absurd ¬(ŠWi2)I, the premise that (ŠWi2)I is not a madār for ¬ŠAWi2 would also be absurd. However, we must recognize that the Ḥanafī sāʾil has in fact already conceded such a (potentially absurd) consequent: ¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2].

So what the Ḥanafī sāʾil has in effect done is only to critique the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s argument in dalīl #3 as a non-sequitur. He has not attempted to refute the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s thesis, or even the supporting conclusion that (ŠWi2)I is not a madār for ¬ŠAWi2. And we might mark this as evidence of an “argument tightening” function of dialectical disputation. It need not, after all, only be an attempt to destroy and supplant a thesis; but its probing, testing function can be employed to help strengthen and improve arguments.

And there are further signs that this manʿ maʿa mustanad was not intended by al-Samarqandī as a full refutation, but only a minor correction. There is the fact that the early commentator al-Kīlānī was obliged to himself provide a systematic refutation—or solution (ḥall)—to the Shāfiʿī position, as we have seen above. And there is the fact that the Shāfiʿī muʿallil, to whom we shall now turn, appears to deflect the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s objection with relative ease. Indeed, the questioner’s denial arrives so late, and so lightly, that we might even have interpreted this disputation as unfolding between two Shāfiʿīs, in quest of refining and sharpening the Shāfiʿī argument(s) for an age-old yet still unresolved masʾala of khilāf. As he maintains a Ḥanafī position, I have portrayed the sāʾil-opponent as a Ḥanafī; but this certainly need not have been the case in real disputation.

6.11 Dalīl #7

The Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s dialectical response (jawāb) to this “denial with corroboration” comes as a final enthymematic, complex, constructive dilemma—complex in that the consequents to its contradictory disjunct antecedents are not identical, and thus themselves constitute a disjunction.96 Note first that he begins by saying: “This manʿ does no harm to us (hādhā l-manʿ lā yaḍurrunā).” In fact, this simple phrase and its variants, as found elsewhere in the Risāla and commentaries, is a formula heralding a certain category of response. Al-Samarqandī treats that category directly in Part II of his Risāla, as a helpful pointer to the reader:

Nota Bene (Tanbīh): denial (manʿ) of the premise [might] not harm (lā yaḍurru) the muʿallil, in that negation of that premise [might be] something that necessarily entails his sought-after conclusion (maṭlūb). The proper response (jawāb) to that [type of manʿ] is that the muʿallil counter by saying: “If that premise is confirmed, what we’ve stated is concluded; but even if it is not, what [we] claimed (al-muddaʿā) [still] follows of necessity.97

Our Shāfiʿī muʿallil in fact follows that formula quite closely, saying: “This manʿ does no harm to us because [7.1] if that assumption (taqdīr) [¬(ŠWi2)I] were confirmed in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr), then what we’ve stated is concluded. But [7.2] even if it is not, the causality (ʿilliyya) [(ŠWi2)I] necessarily ensues, and by way of it the objective (maqṣūd) is obtained, as has passed [i.e., in dalīl #2 and tanbīh #1].”

Adding a last convention of “(X)NA,” meaning “X is confirmed (thābit) in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr),” the whole of the seventh and final dalīl may be rendered as follows:

[7.1] (¬(ŠWi2)I)NA→[3.1–5]; ∴ [2.3]; ∴ [1.1]; ∴ [1.4]
[7.2] ¬[(¬(ŠWi2)I)NA]→(ŠWi2)I; ∴ [2.2] ∴ [1.1]; ∴ [1.4]

In our attempt to grasp this response, we would do well to remember that the Ḥanafī sāʾil has conceded what might be called the taqdīr-consequent of [3.1] in something like its original formulation: (ŠWi2)I is not a madār for ¬ŠAWi2 “in the thing as in itself it is” (fī nafs al-amr). This underscoring repetition of fī nafs al-amr might help us make sense of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s reply when he says: “This manʿ does us no harm, because if that taqdīr [i.e., ¬(ŠWi2)I, the taqdīr-antecedent] were confirmed fī nafs al-amr, then what we’ve mentioned would be concluded.” In other words, since the Ḥanafī sāʾil conceded the taqdīr-consequent fī nafs al-amr, but critiqued its purported taqdīr-antecedent as possibly absurd, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil has made sure to clothe the first disjunct of his constructive dilemma in the same conceptual category, qualifying his taqdīr-antecedent as fī nafs al-amr as well, and linking the successful consequence of its confirmation back to his second dalīl with: “then what we’ve stated is concluded.”

Notably, Masʿūd expands on this response first by saying: “Because it can only be that that assumption (taqdīr) [¬(ŠWi2)I] is confirmed in reality (thābitan fi l-wāqiʿ) or not”—in effect supplying the unspoken disjunction-premise requisite to the constructive dilemma of dalīl #7: (¬(ŠWi2)I)NA ∨ ¬[(¬(ŠWi2)I)NA], but in terms of “reality” (al-wāqiʿ) rather than “thing as in itself it is” (nafs al-amr). He continues, however, by saying: “And in such a case, if that assumption (taqdīr) [¬(ŠWi2)I] were confirmed fī nafs al-amr, then what we’ve stated of the dalīl is concluded, safe from the mentioned manʿ-denial.”98 The effect is to draw an apparent equivalence between confirmation fi l-wāqiʿ and confirmation fī nafs al-amr.

In any case, the Shāfiʿī muʿallil completes his response (jawāb) by pointing out that if that taqdīr-antecedent ¬(ŠWi2)I in fact isn’t the case fī nafs al-amr, then its contradictory (ŠWi2)I necessarily ensues. That is, there would indeed be causality (ʿilliyya) attached to ŠWi2 which, we’ll note, is equivalent to the first disjunct in [2.1] from which the Shāfiʿī muʿallil has already successfully argued support for his thesis. Thus, he says: “If it is not confirmed, the ʿilliyya necessarily follows, and by way of it the maqṣūd is obtained, as has passed [in dalīl #2 and tanbīh #1].”

Masʿūd also expands on this premise [7.2], saying:

And if that taqdīr [¬(ŠWi2)I] is not confirmed fī nafs al-amr, there necessarily follows confirmation of the causality (ʿilliyya) [(ŠWi2)I]; otherwise, there follows of necessity ‘removal of both contradictories’ (irtifāʿ al-naqīḍayn) [i.e., neither ¬(ŠWi2)I nor (ŠWi2)I would be the case, which is impossible], and by way of it the objective is obtained, as has passed in the first half of the mentioned response (tardīd).99

In other words, Masʿūd argues first, and more simply, a manifestation of the law of excluded middle: confirmation of (ŠWi2)I is necessarily entailed by negation of ¬(ŠWi2)I, because the two are true contradictories, and cancelling them both (irtifāʿ al-naqīḍayn) would violate one of the fundamental rules of thought. So if not ¬(ŠWi2)I, it simply must be that (ŠWi2)I, and from there the remainder of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s argument (i.e., [2.2], then [1.1–4]). This concern with cancelling contradictories might be listed as yet another principle-premise [I]: cancelling both contradictories (irtifāʿ al-naqīḍayn) is impossible.

As for al-Kīlānī, he once again proceeds to explain through reformulating the lemma to some degree:

Then the muʿallil says: This manʿ does no harm to us, because it can only be [either] [1] that this assumption (taqdīr) is confirmed (thābit) in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr), or [2] that it is not. And if it is confirmed fī nafs al-amr, what we’ve stated is concluded, undamaged by the manʿ. Because when it is confirmed fī nafs al-amr, it is a possible thing (mumkin), and so does not necessarily entail the absurd (muḥāl).100

Note that al-Kīlānī, like Masʿūd, fills in the supressed premise requisite to dalīl #7’s nature as a constructive dilemma: (¬(ŠWi2)I)NA ∨ ¬[(¬(ŠWi2)I)NA], but he keeps it in terms of “thing as in itself it is” (nafs al-amr) rather than “reality” (al-wāqiʿ). More interestingly, he provides a more compelling answer as to why this fī nafs al-amr distinction is important in the first place. I would consider this another principle-premise [J]: what is confirmed fī nafs al-amr is a possible thing (mumkin). And al-Kīlānī points out that the causality (ŠWi2)I, confirmed fī nafs al-amr and thus a mumkin, no longer entails absurdity.

His next step, however—and perhaps not a surprising one, considering the apparent Ḥanafism of his previous, four-pronged critique of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s argument—is to bring a critique against this first premise [7.1] of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s response dalīl:

But this remains open to speculation (wa-fīhi naẓar), because the nonexistence of the First Intelligence (al-ʿaql al-awwal) is something ‘possible due to its essence’ (mumkin li-dhātihi), despite the fact that such necessarily entails an absurdity (muḥāl). Indeed, [only] were something possible via ‘occurrent possibility’ (imkān wuqūʿī), would it not necessarily entail the absurd.101

To make sense of this, we are helped by the fact that al-Kīlānī has, in a previous section, equated “occurrent possibility” (imkān wuqūʿī) with “predispositional possibility” (imkān istiʿdādī). And thus imkān wuqūʿī may be understood as that type of possibility “whose contradictory extreme is not necessary—neither by way of [its own] essence, nor by way of another—such that even if the occurrence of the congruent extreme were presumed, absurdity would not necessarily follow by any mode.”102

Premise [7.1] is thus at least problematized, if not refuted. But as for the second premise of the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s final dalīl, al-Kīlānī simply reformulates it as follows, drawing his Sharḥ to a close:

But even if that assumption (taqdīr) [¬(ŠWi2)I] is not confirmed fī nafs al-amr, the shumūl of the guardianship for the two moments [ŠWi2] is a necessitating cause (ʿilla mūjiba) for one of the two shumūls [ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]. And, at such a time, discussion (kalām) will revert to the first half of the response stated in the [above] rendering and explanation (taqrīr) of this subtle problem (nukta). And, by way of it, the aimed at conclusion (maqṣūd) will transpire.103

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Figure 2

Schema of al-Samarqandī’s Third Masʾala in adapted symbolic notation

Citation: Oriens 46, 1-2 (2018) ; 10.1163/18778372-04601003

7 Argument Summary of the Third Masʾala

On the foundation of our analyses and explanations, and with the schema in figure 2 (below) as our argument map, a proof-by-proof summary should allow us a comprehensive grasp of the third masʾala’s main species of dialectical moves, logical-philosophical contexts, and precisely interlinked argument structure.

Dalīl #1 is a simple constructive dilemma, directly supporting the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s thesis [1.4], on the pattern of PQ; PR; QR; ∴ R.104 That is, the first premise [1.1] is a disjunctive proposition, and its disjuncts are the antecedents / implicantia (malzūmāt) of the conditional propositions [1.2] and [1.3], with the identical consequents / implicata (lawāzim) of both being the argued thesis [1.4]. It is the initial premise [1.1]—the disjunctive opening of this dilemma—which may be considered the focus of critique, with dalīl #2 raised in its defense. And both al-Kīlānī and Masʿūd add principle-premise A to the mix, which may be considered a suppressed premise in al-Samarqandī’s presentation.

Dalīl #2 is also a simple constructive dilemma, directly supporting [1.1], on the variant pattern of P ∨ ¬P; PQ; ¬PQ; ∴ Q.105 That is, the first premise [2.1] is a disjunctive proposition whose disjuncts are contradictory (one being the negation of the other), and these contradicting disjuncts are the antecedents / implicantia (malzūmāt) of the conditional propositions [2.2] and [2.3], with the identical consequents / implicata (lawāzim) of both being the argued premise [1.1]. In this case, the initial, disjunctive opening of the dilemma is left alone. It is the conditional premises [2.2] and [2.3] which may be considered foci of critique, with tanbīh #1 justifying [2.2] and dalīl #3 justifying [2.3]. In dalīl #2 we are first introduced to the trichotomous relationship, or tripartite disjunction, between shumūl al-wujūd, shumūl al-ʿadam, and iftirāq. And we are also introduced to the idea of considering consequents muṭlaqan; i.e., treating them as an undifferentiated aggregate of consequents, not as individually differentiated consequents.

Tanbīh #1. Though introduced with the formula “fa-ẓāhir”—normally indicative of tanbīh, or drawing attention to what is self-evident (and thus not needing a dalīl)—tanbīh #1 is a somewhat more complex argument. It might be described as an enthymematic, implicative dilemma within an enthymematic, assumptive dilemma, on the pattern: [P⇒(Q ∨ ¬Q)] (unspoken); P⇒(QR); P⇒(¬QR); ∴ PR.106 That is to say, there is a suppressed premise [(ŠWi2)R ∨ ¬(ŠWi2)R] which, within the “assumptive determination” of (ŠWi2)I would be [(ŠWi2)I⇒(ŠWi2)R ∨ ¬(ŠWi2)R]. So it is a disjunctive proposition whose disjuncts are contradictory, and these disjuncts are the antecedents / implicantia (malzūmāt) of the taqdīr-consequent conditional propositions of the complex “assumptive determination” premises [T1.1] and [T1.2]; and the identical consequents / implicata (lawāzim) of the taqdīr-consequent conditionals become, by logical operation, themselves the taqdīr-consequent, with the whole converting into the (implicative) conditional premise [2.2].

As a tanbīh, and supposedly “obvious,” no further justification should be necessary. Al-Kīlānī, however, provides additional justifications [T1.1.1–2] for premise [T1.1] and an incredible six-premise hypothetical sorites interspersed with principle-premises (C&D) for [T1.2]. We are also introduced in tanbīh #1 to “assumptive determination,” which we know from elsewhere in al-Kīlānī’s Sharḥ to be a manifestation of mulāzama-implication—“everything that is confirmed by an assumption (taqdīr) of something is among its implicata (lawāzim).” We also encounter the self-evident principle-premise B (via al-Kīlānī and Masʿūd), which is probably why al-Samarqandī said fa-ẓāhir in the first place, just as we encounter principle-premises C and D (via al-Kīlānī).

Dalīl #3. The whole of dalīl #3 incorporates a simple constructive dilemma, but this time it is prefaced by a hypothetical sorites, on the pattern: PQ; QR; RST; SU; TU; ∴ PU, with three supporting adilla mixed in. That is to say, the first two premises [3.1–2] are conditional premises sharing a common term (the lack of madāriyya), and the second and third premises [3.2–3] are conditional premises sharing a common term (¬ŠAWi2), with the whole series of premises [3.1–3] thus forming a hypothetical sorites whose eventual consequent (ŠWi2 ∨ Wib//WiT) is the opening disjunctive proposition of a simple constructive dilemma. The contrary disjuncts of this dilemma are the antecedents / implicantia (malzūmāt) of the conditional propositions [3.4] and [3.5], with the identical consequents / implicata (lawāzim) of both being the consequent of the argued premise [2.3]—whose antecedent is of course the antecedent at the head of the hypothetical sorites, in premise [3.1].

As for dalīl #3 overall, two of its premises are foci of critique, with dalīl #4 justifying premise [3.1] and dalīl #5—a premise of which is itself supported by dalīl #6—justifying premise [3.2]; and the taqdīr-consequent of premise [3.1] is eventually conceded while its taqdīr-antecedent is attacked by the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s manʿ maʿa mustanad, then quickly justified by dalīl #7. Concerning ourselves only with premise [3.1] at this point, we are introduced to the concept / method of dawarān, which is one of the mainstays of the ādāb al-baḥth argument trio, along with mutual negation (tanāfin / munāfā) and implication (talāzum / mulāzama). We are also introduced to the conceptual category of fī nafs al-amr, which I have translated throughout as “in the thing as in itself it is;” and as we learn from al-Jurjānī it is a general form of farḍ ḥaqīqī (true positing [of a possibility]), outside the farḍ ʿaqlī (intellective positing [of a possibility]) and more general than “in the external” (fi l-khārij).107

Much further on, in the course of al-Kīlānī’s fourfold critique of the third dalīl, we learn that the following—though unrecognized as such in al-Samarqandī’s presentation—are sites of critique: premise [2.3]; tanbīh premise [T1.2]; premises [4.1] and [4.2]; and reductio premise [6.1]. And in his critique of tanbīh premise [T1.2], al-Kīlānī uses principle-premises G, H, and C; in his critique of premises [4.1–2] he uses principle-premise E; and in his critique of reductio premise [6.1] he returns to the concept of dawarān, focusing on the condition that the madār exhibit “suitability of causality” (ṣulūḥ al-ʿilliyya).

Dalīl #4 is an enthymematic, simple, constructive dilemma, on the pattern: [P ∨ ¬P] (unspoken); PQ; ¬PQ; ∴ Q.108 That is, an unspoken disjunctive proposition ([(ŠWi2)I]R ∨ ¬[(ŠWi2)I]R) opens the dilemma, with its contradictory disjuncts as antecedents / implicantia (malzūmāt) of the conditional premises [4.1] and [4.2], the identical consequents of which are themselves—with the aid of an unspoken principle-premise to the effect that entailment of Y in the absence of X entails that X is not the madār of Y—proofs that (ŠWi2)I is not a madār for ¬ŠAWi2. This latter, of course, is the argued taqdīr-consequent of premise [3.1], which dalīl #4 was set out to justify.

In this case, none of dalīl #4’s premises are the foci of critique as, in al-Samarqandī’s presentation, no additional adilla are summoned to justify them. However, Masʿūd shows us that the dalīl may be problematized at a more abstract level, by determining whether its contexts are purely intellective, in which case [principle-premise K] the dalīl can’t be used for taʿlīl, or “in reality” (fi l-wāqiʿ) and fī nafs al-amr, in which case the dalīl is invalidated anyway. This argument, incidentally, is something like a disjunctive antecedent reductio, in which a dalīl is considered in contradictory contexts, each of which entails an untenable consequence, and so the dalīl cannot be as formulated. With D representing the dalīl and A and B contradictory contexts, it would be on the pattern: (AB); (D)AQ [untenable]; (D)BR [untenable]; ∴ ¬D. Al-Kīlānī’s more complicated justification, with several subsidiary adilla, also employs principle-premise A, while Masʿūd’s critique contains another principle-premise K.

Dalīl #5 is an enthymematic, complex, constructive dilemma—“complex” in that, since the contradictory disjuncts’ consequents are not identical, the conclusion is itself, technically, a disjunct (though not treated as such in the argument). It is on the pattern: [P ∨ ¬P] (unspoken); PQ; ¬P→(Q)J; ∴ Q ∨ (Q)J.109 That is, an unspoken disjunctive proposition [(ŠWi2)I ∨ ¬(ŠWi2)I] opens the dilemma, with its contradictory disjuncts as antecedents / implicantia (malzūmāt) for the two conditional premises [5.1] and [5.2], the (nearly) identical consequents of which form the consequent to the argued premise [3.2]. And in the case of dalīl #5, the second premise [5.2] is a focus for critique, with dalīl #6 brought forward to justify it. We are also exposed to the concept of the “remote cause” (ʿilla baʿīda) in dalīl #5, via the qualification of the consequent of premise [5.2] as being confirmed fi l-jumla, or “overall.”

Dalīl #6 takes the form of a reductio, on the pattern of: PQ; Qkhulf (logical impossibility); ∴ ¬Q; ∴ ¬P. That is, the antecedent of the first premise [6.1] is the ad arguendo contradictory of the consequent of the argued premise [5.2] and must thus, if proven false, confirm that consequent in [5.2]. And in fact, in premise [6.2] it is shown that the consequent of [6.1] entails a logical impossibility (khulf). Thus the consequent of [6.1] is untenable, its antecedent therefore false, and the argued premise [5.2] is justified. No critique is aimed at dalīl #6 in al-Samarqandī’s presentation. Masʿūd, however, takes up the mulāzama-justification for premise [6.1], indicating that it could, or had, come under attack. This marks him as a true muḥaqqiq (verifying investigator-commentator)—for having patched up dalīl #6, he then launches a comprehensive critique. Here Masʿūd employs principle-premise F, introduces the concept of chance occurrence (ittifāq) as a counter to presumed dawarān, considers the states of particular and general possibility (imkān khāṣṣ / ʿāmm) and essential impossibility (imtināʿ bi-l-dhāt), and again utilizes principle-premise A.

Manʿ maʿa mustanad. In fact, the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s “denial with corroboration” constitutes a variant reductio on the pattern: P→(P)khulf; (P)khulf →(Q)khulf; ∴ ¬(PQ). That is, if P is the case, then P is absurd; and the necessary consequent of absurd P would be absurd Q; therefore it cannot be the case that if P then Q—the conceded Q must have come about by some other antecedent. Of course this “denial with corroboration” employs principle-premise E, and through it we also gain insight into the realm of dialectical theoretical categories and the particulars of this species of objection and its formulae. Masʿūd takes us further by identifying this particular manʿ as “denial against the assumption” (al-manʿ ʿalā l-taqdīr), thus linking it to that manifestation of mulāzama-implication called “assumptive determination.”

Dalīl #7, the dialectical response (jawāb) to the Ḥanafī sāʾil’s manʿ maʿa mustanad, is a final enthymematic, complex, constructive dilemma—complex in that the consequents to its contradictory disjunct antecedents are not identical, and thus themselves constitute a disjunction. It is on the pattern of: [P ∨ ¬P] (unspoken); PQ [and thus thesis]; ¬PR [and thus thesis]; ∴ QR [and thus thesis]. That is, an unspoken disjunctive proposition [(¬(ŠWi2)I)NA ∨ ¬[(¬(ŠWi2)I)NA]] opens the dilemma,110 with its contradictory disjuncts as antecedents / implicantia (malzūmāt) for the two conditional premises [7.1] and [7.2], the variant consequents of which themselves form a conjunction—in effect, ([2.3] ∨ [2.2])—in which confirmation of either disjunct leads back to confirm the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s thesis. Although al-Samarqandī closes the masʾala with this final dalīl and we are thus left to think it unassailable, al-Kīlānī brings us to realize that premise [7.1] can be a focus for critique.

In dalīl #7 we are again introduced to a category of dialectical move, the anti-objection jawāb-response heralded by the formula “this manʿ does no harm to us because ….” And we are again arguing within the category of fī nafs al-amr, with Masʿūd drawing an apparent equivalence between it and confirmation fi l-wāqiʿ (in reality). Masʿūd elsewhere employs principle-premise I, drawn from the fundamental rules of thought; while al-Kīlānī introduces principle-premise J in his own commentary, drawing a bridge between our conception of fī nafs al-amr and what it means to be a possible thing (mumkin). And in his critique of premise [7.1], al-Kīlānī even draws us into the realm of philosophical theology, with the First Intelligence (al-ʿaql al-awwal) itself as a counter-example in his argument from the contextual vantage point of “occurrent possibility” (imkān wuqūʿī).

8 Closing

Apart from the mostly dilemmatic character of argument in the third masʾala, along with its logical-philosophical categories and contexts of tripartite disjunction, dawarān, fī nafs al-amr, remote cause, etc., perhaps the most interesting feature is the abundance of “principle-premises.” As we have seen in both grundtext and commentary, appeals to logical axioms and theories are interwoven with the substantive assertions of adilla. And we should mark this as a natural symbiosis between the theory and practice of dialectic. The significance of this would be especially obvious were such premises themselves to become objects of dispute. And although this did not occur in the course of the third masʾala, instances can be observed elsewhere (e.g., in the referenced section of al-Kīlānī wherein “assumptive determination” is linked to mulāzama implication), and serve as key sites for witnessing logical and dialectical theories being shaped by the exigencies of logical disputation itself. A full listing of principle-premises we have encountered includes the following:

  1. confirmation of the particular (khāṣṣ) necessarily entails confirmation of the general (ʿāmm)

  2. realization of the aggregate (majmūʿ) of two things necessarily entails realization of one of those two via immediate necessity (bi-l-ḍarūra)

  3. negation of the cause (ʿilla) obliges negation of the effect (maʿlūl)

  4. negation of one of two things without differentiation (lā ʿalā l-taʿyīn) only comes about via negation of their aggregate (majmūʿ)

  5. the absurd (muḥāl) is allowed to necessarily entail the absurd

  6. absolute implication (muṭlaq al-luzūm) between two things does not of necessity entail dawarān ([causal] concomitance) between them

  7. it is not allowed that something be a cause for itself

  8. it is not allowed that something be a cause for that which negates it

  9. cancelling both contradictories (irtifāʿ al-naqīḍayn) is impossible

  10. what is confirmed in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr) is a possible thing (mumkin)

  11. purely intellective potentiality (al-iḥtimāl al-ʿaqlī) is something not considered in situations of causal justification (fī maqām al-taʿlīl)

More complete catalogs may no doubt be culled from further samples; and it would be a worthy project to trace these to similarly formulated principles in relevant disciplines (manṭiq, kalām, ḥikma, khilāf, uṣūl al-fiqh) of al-Samarqandī’s time and that of his more immediate predecessors. These might even be compiled into a handlist of the ādāb al-baḥth’s most commonly incorporated axioms.

By this point it is hoped the argumentative sophistication of this specimen of juridical khilāf governed by the ādāb al-baḥth has impressed itself upon the reader. But perhaps the most important questions with regard to this intensely syllogistic method of legal argument have yet to be asked. Certainly, we witness a high standard of logical precision and sustained complexity in such illustrative examples from theory treatises. But was this theory truly practiced outside the theoretical discipline of the ādāb al-baḥth, in the living world of juridical khilāf? And if so, by whom, and where? And in which sources do we find records or signs of this mode of dialectic put into the services of discovering God’s law, or of critiquing and defending juristic solutions within and between madhāhib, or of refining justifications and objections vis-à-vis longstanding masāʾil of khilāf?

We must acknowledge, of course, that the third masʾala is neither fully representative nor typologically comprehensive of the argument styles in juristic ādāb al-baḥth—there are other, evidently common, modes,111 and bound to be more pending discovery and analysis. But while further models are induced from theory sources like the Risāla and commentaries, I should think a tentative search for ādāb al-baḥth in practice in the juridical domain might safely get under way. And knowing something more of its syllogistic anatomy and axiomatic DNA, we can now hold up al-Samarqandī’s third masʾala as a compass and template to guide us in our assessment of post-Samarqandian khilāf.

9 Key to Symbols and Relationships

¬X

negation: “not-X;” “it is not the case that X

XY

conjunction: “X and Y;” “X is the case and Y is the case”

XY

disjunction: “either X or Y;” “either X is the case, or Y is the case”

X

conclusion: “therefore X;” “therefore X is the case”

XY

necessary implication (mulāzama [ʿāmma], talāzum): “Y (the implicatum, or lāzim) follows necessarily from X (the implicans, or malzūm);” “if X, then Y

XY

assumptive determination: “Y is occurring/confirmed (wāqiʿ/thābit) upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) X;” “assuming X, then Y

X–[I]→Y

causality (ʿilliyya): “X is the necessitating cause (ʿilla mūjiba) of Y

X–[M]→Y

concomitant causality (madāriyya): “X is the concomitant cause (madār) of Y, in existence and in nonexistence (wujūdan wa-ʿadaman), in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr)”

X//Y

division, separation (iftirāq): “X and Y are independent of each other;” “X or Y may be realized without the other” (i.e., there is no mulāzama between them)

[X, Y]

absolute, unrestricted application: “X and Y absolutely (muṭlaqan), without individual particularization (lā ʿalā l-taʿyīn)”

[X&Y]

aggregation: “X and Y as an aggregate (majmūʿ)”

ŠX

universal inclusion (shumūl) of X: “X is included in both (or all possible) instances”

ŠW

[= (XAXB)]

shumūl al-wujūd (universal inclusion of the existence): “it is the case that X exists in both A and B

ŠA

[= (¬XA ∧ ¬XB)]

shumūl al-ʿadam (universal inclusion of the nonexistence): “it is the case that X exists in neither A nor B

10 Key to Abbreviations

MWi

[= ŠWWi2]

[= (WiB ∧ WiT)]

the father has absolute guardianship of compulsion (muṭlaq al-wilāya) with regard to the virgin major

WiB

the father has guardianship of compulsion (wilāyat al-ijbār) BEFORE the compulsion

WiT

the father has guardianship of compulsion (wilāyat al-ijbār) at the TIME of the compulsion

ŠWi2

universal inclusion of the guardianship in the two times (shumūl al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn)

ŠWWi2

[= (WiB ∧ WiT)]

universal inclusion of the existence of the guardianship in the two times (shumūl wujūd al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn)

ŠAWi2

[= (¬WiB ∧ ¬WiT)]

universal inclusion of the nonexistence of the guardianship in the two times (shumūl ʿadam al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn)

(ŠWi2)I

[= ŠWi2—[I]→

[ŠWWi2, ŠAWi2]]

the causality (ʿilliyya) of universal inclusion of the guardianship in the two times (shumūl al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn) [ŠWi2] for universal inclusion of the existence of the guardianship in the two times (shumūl wujūd al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn) [ŠWWi2] and universal inclusion of the nonexistence of the guardianship in the two times (shumūl ʿadam al-wilāya li-l-waqtayn) [ŠAWi2], absolutely (muṭlaqan), without individual particularization (lā ʿalā l-taʿyīn)

(X)R

X is realized (mutaḥaqqaq) externally (fi l-khārij)

WiB//WiT

[= (WiB ∧ ¬WiT) ∨

(¬WiB ∧ WiT)]

[= (WiB ∨ WiT)]

there is division, separation (iftirāq) between guardianship in the two times; it is possible that there be guardianship before but not at the time of the ijbār, or at the time of the ijbār but not before

(X)J

X is confirmed overall (fi l-jumla)

(X)NA

X is confirmed (thābit) in the thing as in itself it is (fī nafs al-amr)

*

The critical editions and translations of Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (Risāla, ʿAyn al-Naẓar) and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Kīlānī (Sharḥ) upon which this research is based were produced during my time as (1) Research Officer with the ERC funded IMPAcT Project, 2014–2015, University of Oxford, Judith Pfeiffer, PI; (2) Visiting Fellow at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg: Dynamics in the History of Religions Between Asia and Europe, 2015–2016, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Volkhard Krech, PI; and (3) Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Alexander von Humboldt Kolleg for Islamicate Intellectual History, 2016–2017, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Judith Pfeiffer, PI. Walter Edward Young, Postdoctoral Researcher, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 3485 McTavish St., Montreal, Quebec H3A 0E1, Canada.

1

See, e.g., Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 137 ff.

2

See Larry Benjamin Miller, Islamic Disputation Theory: A Study of the Development of Dialectic in Islam from the Tenth Through Fourteenth Centuries (Ph.D. Diss., Princeton University, 1984), 142–195; and Dadkhah’s Persian intro. to Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, Science of the Cosmos and the Soul [= ʿIlm al-Āfāq wa-l-Anfus] (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2014), 42 ff. These and related contexts and trends will be reviewed and further explored in the introductory chapter to Walter Young, On the Protocol for Dialectical Inquiry (Ādāb al-Baḥth): A Critical Edition and Parallel Translation of the Sharḥ al-Risāla l-Samarqandiyya by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Kīlānī (fl. ca. 830/1427), Prefaced by a Critical Edition and Parallel Translation of its Grundtext: the Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth by Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 722/1322), [in preparation, forthcoming: 2018]—hereafter: Protocol—my edition-translations of al-Samarqandī’s Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Kīlānī’s commentary (sharḥ) on the same. Since this work is not yet published, whenever al-Samarqandī’s Risāla is here referenced, the appropriate page of the Manṣūrī printing of the Risāla (available online; see link in the bibliography) will be provided for the reader’s immediate reference (Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, Ādāb al-Ḥakīm Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī [= al-Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth], ed. Maḥmūd al-Imām al-Manṣūrī, in Majmūʿa Mushtamila ʿalā l-Ātī Bayānuhu: al-Awwal: al-Badr al-ʿIllāt fī Kashf Ghawāmiḍ al-Maqūlāt, wa-huwa Sharḥ al-ʿAllāma l-Muḥaqqiq … al-Shaykh ʿUmar al-mashhūr bi-Ibn al-Qarah Dāghī … ʿalā Risālat al-Maqūlāt li-l-ʿAllāma … Mullā ʿAlī l-Qiziljī; wa-talīhi … (etc.), (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿāda, 1353 [= 1934/5]), 125–32.). Unfortunately, however, I will not be able to provide an immediately accessible online manuscript source for al-Kīlānī’s Sharḥ. The only witness accessible online of which I am aware (Leipzig b. or. 247–02) not only remains disordered, but appears not to contain the final folia wherein the third masʾala would appear. I have instead provided references for the three oldest manuscript witnesses of al-Kīlānī’s Sharḥ known to me: Quṭb al-Dīn al-Kīlānī, Sharḥ ʿalā Ādāb al-Baḥth li-l-Samarqandī (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim 1043 [826 H]), foll. 1b–40b; idem, [Sharḥ al-Risāla l-Samarqandiyya fī Ādāb al-Baḥth] (MS Ankara, Milli Kütüphane, Samsun İl Halk 554 [833 H]), foll. 1b–15b and 62a–75a; idem, [Sharḥ al-Risāla l-Samarqandiyya fī Ādāb al-Baḥth] (MS Oxford, Bodleian Library, Laud Or. 192 [834 H]), foll. 17b–55b.

3

On the juridical dialectic of al-Shīrāzī and his students, see Miller, Islamic Disputation Theory, 87–141; and Walter Young, The Dialectical Forge: Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law (Dordrecht; New York: Springer, 2017), 85–188. As for the dialectic of al-Nasafī, see Necmettin Pehlivan’s edition of al-Nasafī’s Fuṣūl in his “Ādābu’l-Baḥs̱ Devrimine Doğru Son Evrim: Burhānuddīn en-Nesefī’nin el-Fuṣūl’ü,” Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 56, no. 2 (2015): 1–75 (at 41–75); Miller, Islamic Disputation Theory, 180–95; and relevant sections from Protocol, intro.

4

See Protocol, intro.; Miller, Islamic Disputation Theory, 196–239; Dadkhah, Pers. Intro. to al-Samarqandī, ʿIlm al-Āfāq, 44–5.

5

With ca. 55 derived works by my latest count (Protocol, intro.)

6

With ca. 34 by my latest count (Protocol, intro.)

7

With ca. 90 by my latest count (Protocol, intro.) For a sense of the expansive size of the ādāb al-baḥth literature (which, with only a few printings / editions, remains almost entirely in manuscript) see the works listed in Robert Wisnovsky, “The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical Commentary in Post-Classical (ca. 1100–1900 AD) Islamic Intellectual History: Some Preliminary Observations,” Bulletin of the Institute Of Classical Studies (University of London) 47 (2004): 169–70; Khaled El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 60–96; Protocol, intro.

8

See, e.g., the popular Ādāb al-Baḥth wa-l-Munāẓara of Muḥammad al-Amīn al-Shinqīṭī (ed. Saʿūd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-ʿArīfī [Mecca: Dār ʿAlam al-Fawāʾid, 2006]).

9

Protocol § 2; al-Manṣūrī ed., 125.

10

Masʾala (pl. masāʾil), a term whose conceptual history likely derives from the Aristotelian πρόβλημα (problēma), is a question, issue, or puzzle whose solution is sought within a given science. Al-Jurjānī provides a technical definition in his Taʿrīfāt under the plural form: “Masāʾil are the pursued problems (maṭālib) which are demonstrated (yubarhanu ʿalayhā) in a science, and cognition (maʿrifa) of which constitutes the goal of that science” (al-Sayyid al-Sharīf ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Jurjānī, Kitāb al-Taʿrīfāt, ed. Gustav Flügel [Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān, 1990 (= reprint of Flügel’s 1845 edition)], 225).

11

Islamic Intellectual History, 72.

12

Ibid., n. 40.

13

Of course my own understanding may be imperfect. A secondary aim is that this current research benefit from the critiques and insights of its readers, generating constructive dialog and, it is hoped, an increased interest in the broader field of Islamicate dialectics.

14

See, with its similar set of objectives and cited sources on the ādāb al-baḥth, Walter Young, “Mulāzama in Action in the Early Ādāb al-Baḥth,” Oriens 44, nos. 3–4 (2016) [Special Issue: Major Issues and Controversies of Arabic Logic]: 332–385. See also the forthcoming Protocol, intro.

15

This text is reproduced, minus its critical apparatus, from my forthcoming critical edition. See Protocol §§ 48–50; and the al-Manṣūrī ed. of al-Samarqandī’s Risāla, 131–2.

16

Protocol § 48; al-Manṣūrī ed., 131.

17

Protocol § 48.1; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 38b; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 73b; Laud Or. 192 fol. 53b.

18

As for wilāya (guardianship), al-Kīlānī’s probable contemporary al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) includes the legal definition in his Taʿrīfāt: “And wilāya in God’s Law (al-Sharʿ) is the execution of a decision (tanfīdh al-qawl) for another, whether that other wishes it, or rejects it” (Flügel ed., 275). And on the particular topic of “guardianship of compulsion” (wilāyat al-ijbār), see the extended overviews in: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, Kuwait, Al-Mawsūʿa l-Fiqhiyya (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1990), s.v. “‮نكاح‬‎,” esp. §§ 81–85 “‮النوع الأول—ولاية الإجبار‬‎,” vol. 41, pp. 259–67; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jazīrī, Kitāb al-Fiqh ʿalā l-Madhāhib al-Arbaʿa, (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2003 [reprint]), vol. 4, pp. 32–8; and Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer [= Bidāyat al-Mujtahid wa-Nihāyat al-Muqtaṣid], trans. Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee (Reading, UK: Centre for Muslim Contribution to Civilization: Garnet, 1994–1996), vol. 2, pp. 3–8. All of these sources include analyses of the Ḥanafī vs. Shāfiʿī khilāf at the core of this masʾala, though none hint at the syllogistic arguments employed here in al-Samarqandī’s third masʾala. Shorter overviews may be found in the EI2 (Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs [Brill Online, 2014 http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2]), s.v. “Nikāḥ” at § I.3; and Wael Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 274–6.

19

A note regarding my translation of the term ʿilla (pl. ʿilal) as “cause” in this article, rather than “occasioning factor,” or “ratio legis,” etc. There is of course a long-standing legal-theoretical distinction between “rational-intellectual causes” (ʿilal al-ʿaql) and “occasioning factors of God’s Law” (ʿilal al-Sharʿ); it was certainly well-established by the time theologian-jurists and dialecticians like Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) made reference to it. See, e.g., Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, Al-Kāfiya fi l-Jadal, ed. Fawqiya Ḥusayn Maḥmūd (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat ʿĪsā l-Bābī l-Ḥalabī, 1979), 9, 68; and Miller, Disputation Theory, 121. And indeed, the manner in which, e.g., the intoxicating quality of wine “occasions” the ḥukm of proscription, is not the same manner in which it “causes” the drinker to become drunk, although it may be called an ʿilla in both instances. Interestingly, however, and although the “post-classical” scholar al-Jurjānī’s initial definition of ʿilla (Taʿrīfāt, 159–60) distinguishes the ʿilla of God’s Law (Sharīʿa) from other types, his subsequent definitions are all more detailed explanations of the philosophical “cause.” Moreover, were we to judge solely by usage of the term ʿilla in al-Samarqandī’s Risāla and al-Kīlānī’s Sharḥ, it is not at all certain that any distinction whatsoever is being drawn between juristic “occasioning factor” and philosophical “cause” in this third, and distinctly juridical, masʾala. In fact, in al-Samarqandī’s ādāb al-baḥth, the philosophical “cause” seems wholly to have taken over, even in the juridical realm. This may certainly be evinced from his definitions in the first part of the Risāla, where we find: “That upon which the existence (wujūd) of a thing depends, if intrinsic to it, is called a rukn (constituent element). And if extrinsic: if it is a muʾaththir (effector) with regard to its existence, it is called an ʿilla (cause); otherwise, [it is called] a sharṭ (condition). The ʿilla tāmma (complete cause) is the sum total of that upon which the existence of a thing depends; and taʿlīl (causal justification) is the clarification (tabyīn) of the cause (ʿilla) of a thing” (Protocol §§ 7–9; al-Manṣūrī ed., 125).

20

Muʿallil, being the active participle of form two ʿallala, whose verbal noun is taʿlīl (justifying the ʿilla, or cause), conveys the sense of “the one doing taʿlīl,” i.e., the “causal-justifier, the one justifying the ʿilla.” It is sometimes translated as “respondent,” though this corresponds better with the Arabic mujīb. In short, the muʿallil is the dialectical proponent whose role is to defend the contended thesis against the probing and testing questions and objections of the sāʾil, or “questioner.” In the current masʾala, the muʿallil asserts and justifies the Shāfiʿī position, while the sāʾil raises objections from the contrary Ḥanafī position. Though it need not have been the case (e.g., in intra-madhhab disputation), I will for the sake of ease refer to the proponent of the Shāfiʿī position as “the Shāfiʿī muʿallil,” and the questioner as “the Ḥanafī sāʾil.”

21

The term dalīl (pl. adilla) is in my opinion best translated as “indicant,” even though in the ādāb al-baḥth such “indicants” invariably take a syllogistic form. Al-Samarqandī’s definition in the Risāla reads: “the dalīl is that from the knowledge of which there necessarily follows the knowledge of something else, which is the madlūl (indicated)” (Protocol § 5; al-Manṣūrī ed., 125.) In dialectic, the support brought to justify a thesis, or to support another justification, is called a dalīl; I have thus referred to the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s arguments as such, and attempted to give each a discrete reference number.

22

The maṭlūb being al-Shāfiʿī’s ruling: “The father possesses the right of compulsion, over the virgin major, to marriage.”

23

On the pattern: PQ; PR; QR; ∴ R.

24

Protocol § 48.2; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 38b; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 73b; Laud Or. 192 fol. 53b. With regard to the two instances of guardianship, Masʿūd also clarifies by insertion: “… such being either a guardianship existing / situated (kāʾina) before the compulsion (qabla l-ijbār), or a guardianship existing / situated at the time of the compulsion (ʿinda l-ijbār)” (Kamāl al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī, Sharḥ Ādāb al-Samarqandī [= al-Masʿūdī], ed. Adem Güney, in “Kemâlüddîn Mesʿûd B. Hüseyin Eşşirvânî’nin [905/1500] Şerhu Âdâbi’ssemerkandî Adli Eserinin Tahkik ve Değerlendirmesi” [MA Thesis, Sakarya Üniversitesi, 2010], 205).

25

Protocol § 48.2; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 38b; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 73b; Laud Or. 192 fol. 53b.

26

All eleven principle-premises (AK) identified in this section are again listed after the summary conclusion.

27

Al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī, Sharḥ Ādāb al-Samarqandī, 206.

28

For explanations of all abbreviations and adapted symbolic-logical notations employed in the argument schema and elsewhere, please see the “Key to Symbols and Relationships” and “Key to Abbreviations” at the end of the article, before the bibliography.

29

Protocol §§ 16, 19; al-Manṣūrī ed., 126. An example of manʿ maʿa mustanad prompts the Shāfiʿī muʿallil’s seventh and final dalīl-indicant at the end of our illustrative masʾala sequence.

30

On the variant pattern: P ∨ ¬P; PQ; ¬PQ; ∴ Q.

31

In the sense that his opponent is expected to accept it.

32

Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Samarqandī, Kitāb ʿAyn al-Naẓar fī ʿIlm al-Jadal, ed. and trans. Walter Edward Young, with TEI Infrastructure by Frederik Elwert [Digital critical edition collated from: MSS London, British Library, Or. 3730, foll. 72a–76a (completed 876 H) and Or. 3908, foll. 1a–5b (completed 1173 H); forthcoming online via the Center for Religious Studies (CERES), Ruhr-Universität Bochum website], §§ 25–6.

33

Meaning, such would be a malzūm for either iftirāq or shumūl of existence.

34

Protocol § 48.3; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 38b; Samsun İl Halk 554 foll. 73b–74a; Laud Or. 192 fol. 53b.

35

Taʿrīfāt, 100–1. Note that this conception of muṭlaqan is also in keeping with the usage we encounter in the opening to the above discussion of tripartite disjunction in the ʿAyn al-Naẓar, where al-Samarqandī says: “when that which is confirmed is one of three things, absolutely (muṭlaqan), it necessarily follows that the negation of each one of them … be a malzūm (implicans) for the realization of one of the other two things.” Note also that Masʿūd (Sharḥ Ādāb al-Samarqandī, 206), rather than with taʿyīn, continues to oppose “absolute guardianship” (muṭlaq al-wilāya) of both times with “particular guardianship” of only one time; he renders this second dalīl’s conclusion: “and whichever one it is, of causality (ʿilliyya) or nonexistence [of ʿilliyya], there necessarily follows one of the two particular guardianships (wilāyatayn khāṣṣatayn).”

36

Thanks to the inserted principle-premise (A): “confirmation of the khāṣṣ necessarily entails confirmation of the ʿāmm.”

37

Protocol § 26; al-Manṣūrī ed., 127. At the start of his discourse on the role of the respondent, al-Samarqandī says: “when [the questioner] denies one of the premises of his dalīl, then [the respondent] is obliged to rebut him—either by way of [another] dalīl or by a tanbīh (appeal to the self-evident), as when he says: ‘The world is a mutable thing, because we witness changes in it of various motions and effects.’ ”

38

See my explanation for this dalīl in the Summary, below. In short, I would tentatively label this an “enthymematic implicative dilemma within an enthymematic assumptive dilemma,” on the pattern: [P⇒(Q ∨ ¬Q)] (unspoken); P⇒(QR); P⇒(¬QR); ∴ PR.

39

See al-Jurjānī on the categories fi l-khārij and fī nafs al-amr, below.

40

Protocol § 48.4; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 38b; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 74a; Laud Or. 192 fol. 53b.

41

See my “Mulāzama in Action,” 340–2, 350, 352, passim, for further examples of “assumptive determination.”

42

See “Mulāzama in Action,” 342–3, 346 (derived from Protocol §§ 13.5–6). Both the introduction of this principle-premise and its proof occur in the context of a single dialectical sequence. The questioner objects, saying: “We don’t concede that what is confirmed by an assumption (taqdīr) [of something] is among its implicata (lawāzim)—there must be a dalīl for it.” The causal-justifier responds: “When something is confirmed by an assumption (taqdīr), its necessitating cause (ʿilla mūjiba) is also confirmed by this assumption. And when it is thus, its separation (infikāk) from this assumption is, at that time, impossible. Otherwise, there necessarily follows the disaccompaniment (takhalluf) of the effect (maʿlūl) from its necessitating cause (ʿilla mūjiba), and such is absurd (muḥāl).”

43

With XY meaning: “Y is confirmed upon assumption of (ʿalā taqdīr) X,” or “Assuming X, then Y.

44

Protocol § 48.5; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 38b; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 74a; Laud Or. 192 foll. 53b–54a.

45

al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī, Sharḥ Ādāb al-Samarqandī, 206.

46

As may be seen elsewhere in his Sharḥ (Protocol § 44.1), al-Kīlānī conceives of the iftirāq between two things as “the allowance of the realization (taḥaqquq) of one of them simultaneously with a lack of realization of the other.”

47

Protocol § 48.6; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 39a; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 74a; Laud Or. 192 fol. 54a.

48

al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī, Sharḥ Ādāb al-Samarqandī, 206.

49

See al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī, Sharḥ Ādāb al-Samarqandī, 206–7.

50

Note this as strictly in accordance with the rules outlined in the ʿAyn al-Naẓar, §§ 25–6, above.

51

That is, it is on the pattern: PQ; QR; RST; SU; TU; ∴ PU.

52

See, e.g., the relevant sections of the Muqaddima / Fuṣūl of al-Samarqandī’s teacher Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 687/1288), in Fuṣūl, Pehlivan ed., pp. 44–50. Of course, dawarān—understood as the co-presence (ṭard) of the ruling (ḥukm) with its occasioning factor (ʿilla), along with their co-absence (ʿaks)—has a long pedigree in uṣūl al-fiqh, as a (contended) method for determining the ʿilla (taʿlīl).

53

Protocol §§ 11–12; al-Manṣūrī ed., 126.

54

ʿAyn al-Naẓar, §§ 43–8.

55

Khaled El-Rouayheb, “Impossible Antecedents and Their Consequences: Some Thirteenth-Century Arabic Discussions,” History and Philosophy of Logic 30, no. 3 (2009): passim.

56

Ali Reza Bhojani, Moral Rationalism and Sharīʿa: Independent Rationality in Modern Shīʿī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, Culture and Civilization in the Middle East (Abingdon, Oxon [UK]; New York: Routledge, 2015), 63 ff.

57

A.I. Sabra, “Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islamic Theology. The Evidence of the Fourteenth Century,” Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften 9 (1994): 37.

58

Robert Morrison, “What was the Purpose of Astronomy in Ījī’s Kitāb al-Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām?” in Judith Pfeiffer ed. Politics, Patronage, and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th–15th Century Tabriz, Iran Studies, v. 8. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2014), 216 ff.

59

Wahid Amin, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and the Avicennan Tradition: Metaphysics and Mental Existence (Ph.D. Diss., University of Oxford, 2016), passim.

60

Al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, “Nefsu’l-emr Risaleleri: Seyyid Şerif Cürcânî’nin Nefsu’l-emr ve Nefsu’l-emrle Hâric Arasındaki Fark Risalesi” [= Risāla fī Taḥqīq Nafs al-Amr wa-l-Farq baynahu wa-bayn al-Khārij], ed. and transl. (Turkish) Recep Duran, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Araştırma Dergisi XIV (1992): 97–106. I owe knowledge of Duran’s edition to Ahmed El Azhary. It is also cited and partly translated / paraphrased by Morrison, “What was the Purpose of Astronomy,” 216, n. 60.

61

al-Jurjānī, Risāla fī Taḥqīq Nafs al-Amr, Duran ed., 102–3.

62

al-Jurjānī, Risāla fī Taḥqīq Nafs al-Amr, Duran ed., pp. 103.

63

Ibid.

64

On the pattern: [P ∨ ¬P] (unspoken); PQ; ¬PQ; ∴ Q.

65

Protocol § 49.1; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 39a; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 74a; Laud Or. 192 fol. 54a.

66

Ibid.

67

Protocol § 49.2; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 39a; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 74a; Laud Or. 192 fol. 54a.

68

Protocol § 49.3; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 39a; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 74a; Laud Or. 192 fol. 54a.

69

al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī, Sharḥ Ādāb al-Samarqandī, 208.

70

al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī, Sharḥ Ādāb al-Samarqandī, 208.

71

On the pattern: [P ∨ ¬P] (unspoken); PQ; ¬P→(Q)J; ∴ Q ∨ (Q)J.

72

Protocol § 8.12.

73

On the pattern of: PQ; Qkhulf (logical impossibility); ∴ ¬Q; ∴ ¬P.

74

For further instances of various mulāzama-justification strategies, see my “Mulāzama in Action.”

75

al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī, Sharḥ Ādāb al-Samarqandī, 208.

76

al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī, Sharḥ Ādāb al-Samarqandī, 208–9.

77

Thus he has reformulated premise [3.2] as (¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2])→[[(ŠWi2)I]R ∨ ¬[(ŠWi2)I]R], as opposed to the lemma’s (¬[(ŠWi2)I–[M]→¬ŠAWi2])→¬ŠAWi2.

78

That is, due to what has been explained for premise [2.2]. See Protocol §§ 48.4–6, above.

79

Protocol § 49.4–5; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 39b; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 74ab; Laud Or. 192 fol. 54ab.

80

Referring back to §§ 49.1–3, where it is demonstrated that the causality of the shumūl of the guardianship for the two moments is not a madār for the contradictory of the shumūl of the nonexistence.

81

Protocol § 49.6; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 39b; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 74b; Laud Or. 192 fol. 54b.

82

Protocol § 49.7; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 39b; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 74b; Laud Or. 192 fol. 54b.

83

Protocol §§ 49.8–9; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 39b; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 74b; Laud Or. 192 fol. 54b.

84

Presumably, due to what we have labelled principle-premise C: negation of the cause (ʿilla) obliges negation of the effect (maʿlūl).

85

Protocol § 49.10–11; Damad İbrahim 1043 foll. 39b–40a; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 74b; Laud Or. 192 foll. 54b–55a.

86

See above, ʿAyn al-Naẓar, §§ 25–6.

87

Protocol § 49.12; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 40a; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 74b; Laud Or. 192 fol. 55a.

88

Again, see the rules for the tripartite disjunction of shumūl al-wujūd, shumūl al-ʿadam, and iftirāq in the ʿAyn al-Naẓar, §§ 25–6, above.

89

Protocol § 49.13; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 40a; Samsun İl Halk 554 foll. 74b–75a; Laud Or. 192 fol. 55a.

90

Cf. the definitions of dawarān from al-Samarqandī’s Risāla and ʿAyn al-Naẓar in our discussion of dalīl #3, above.

91

Protocol § 16; al-Manṣūrī ed., 126.

92

Protocol § 19; al-Manṣūrī ed., 126.

93

Meaning, presumably, scholars of dialectic.

94

al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī, Sharḥ Ādāb al-Samarqandī, 209–10.

95

Protocol § 50.1; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 40a; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 75a; Laud Or. 192 fol. 55a.

96

On the pattern of: [P ∨ ¬P] (unspoken); PQ [and thus thesis]; ¬PR [and thus thesis]; ∴ QR [and thus thesis].

97

Protocol § 28; al-Manṣūrī ed., 127.

98

al-Shirwānī l-Rūmī, Sharḥ Ādāb al-Samarqandī, 210.

99

Ibid.

100

Protocol § 50.2; Damad İbrahim 1043 foll. 40ab; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 75a; Laud Or. 192 fol. 55a.

101

Protocol § 50.3; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 40b; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 75a; Laud Or. 192 fol. 55a.

102

Protocol § 34.3.

103

Protocol § 50.4–5; Damad İbrahim 1043 fol. 40b; Samsun İl Halk 554 fol. 75a; Laud Or. 192 fol. 55ab.

104

Cf. William T. Parry and Edward A. Hacker, Aristotelian Logic (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 396 (30A1).

105

Cf. Parry and Hacker, Aristotelian Logic, p. 400 (30A4).

106

Cf. Parry and Hacker, Aristotelian Logic, p. 400 (30A4). The authors speak of “the traditional dilemma in enthymematic form,” or “the virtual dilemma,” noting: “all disjunctive propositions of the form ‘p or not p’ or ‘not p or p’ must be true. Consequently, when the minor premiss of a dilemma is in either of these forms it is often omitted and the dilemma is stated enthymematically.”

107

The relationship between what is happening in terms of fī nafs al-amr in this third masʾala and the categories and relationships debated by post-Avicennan scholars in Khaled El-Rouayheb’s “Impossible Antecedents” should be pursued, and remains an inviting door for inquiry. This is especially so considering the fact that among the scholars surveyed by El-Rouayheb we find not only al-Samarqandī himself, in his Qisṭās, but Masʿūd al-Shirwānī al-Rūmī, in the very Sharḥ of the Ādāb al-Baḥth which we have referenced in this article; Masʿūd says, in consonance with the arguments of Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d. 646/1248), and in El-Rouayheb’s translation: “Between any two facts (amrayn), even contradictories, there is a partial implication. This has been shown by a proof in the third figure: Whenever the collective (majmūʿ) of two facts obtains then one of them obtains. Whenever the collective obtains the other obtains. This produces: It may be that if one of the two obtains the other obtains.”

108

Cf. Parry and Hacker, Aristotelian Logic, 400 (30A4).

109

Cf. Parry and Hacker, Aristotelian Logic, 396–7.

110

NB: as we saw, however, both al-Kīlānī and Masʿūd supply the suppressed disjunctive premise in their commentaries.

111

See, e.g., the juristic reductios analyzed in my “Mulāzama in action.”

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