Most countries in the world have an elected parliament. The power of elections is what gives them importance, and at the same time what makes them vulnerable. Authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes are all too eager to use elected parliaments as a source of legitimation. Where this is too obvious in authoritarian regimes, semi-authoritarian regimes take more risk by organising multiparty elections. Multiparty elections allow rulers to extend their grip on power, but at the same time give the opposition a chance, however difficult the circumstances, to overthrow that power without the use of force.1 It has already been reported how the PiS government in Poland controlled the Sejm, turning it into a chamber that used its parliamentary function to sustain semi-authoritarian government.2 Ewa Milczarek’s contribution in this issue shows the other side of the story, where she explains how the power of elections helped Poland to restore democracy and the rule of law, starting as soon as the opposition gained a majority in the Senate.
The Polish case teaches us that we should not underestimate the role of an elected parliament, nor should we rely on it too heavily. It is healthy for a democracy to trust Parliament, but not overly: some reluctance to trust Parliaments is a sign of critical citizenship that forces systems to be responsive.3 At the same time, Parliaments can only fulfil their role as key institutions in the system of organised trust that we call democracies, if a majority of citizens puts at least some trust in them. In this regard, the constant flow of data on trust in parliaments is quite alarming. According to the last Eurobarometer (Spring 2024), only in five out of 27 European Union countries – Austria, Finland, Luxemburg, Denmark and Sweden – does a majority of citizens trust their parliament, with figures ranging from 54 (Austria) to 68% (Sweden). In an equal number of EU member states the national parliament is trusted by less than a quarter of citizens, including established democracies such as France.
Trust refers to one’s expectations that another person, on whom one depends, will act favourable to one’s interests, or at least does not mean to harm them.4 It is a psychological state of mind that depends on the trustor’s individual attributes – some people are naturally more (dis)trustful than others, but also gender, education and their personal well-being play a role – on context – the level of corruption, for instance, or democratic governance – and attributes of the trustee, and in particular how trustworthy it appears to be. We have little impact on personal attributes and context. But as institutional engineers, we can work with the notion of trustworthiness of parliaments. So let’s say a few words on what makes a parliament trustworthy.
Trustworthiness is commonly analysed by using the so-called abi-model, concentrating on the concepts of ability, benevolence, and integrity.5 The contributions in this issue touch upon a wide set of topics on the organisation and operation of parliaments, in various contexts and circumstances, but in one way or the other, they all address one of these notions.
To understand ability, it is important to keep in mind that trust always relates to an object: trustor A relies on trustee B to do X.6 Ability means that it is within the power of the trustee to do X: the trustee has the required skills, competence and expertise. This brings us to the core of the function of parliament. What is it that we expect parliaments to do, and what are the skills and competences that this requires?
The activities that we have in mind most of all are enacting legislation, and supervising the government. In parliamentary systems, the latter also includes the formation of government. In presidential systems, the head of government has its own electoral representativity, making it a competitor and therefore changing the position of parliament. In this issue, Improta and Marzi advocate a new classification of governance systems, based on (real-life and proposed) experiments with hybrid systems, combining parliamentary systems with elected prime ministers. In Italy, such system was proposed, combined with a majority bonus to secure a stable majority for the elected prime minister. This would have potential impact on the role of parliament to enact legislation – with the expectation that more legislative powers are delegated to the government – and to form the government – with restrictions for parliament to consider coalitions that are not linked with the elected prime minister’s party. The question then is whether restricting the parliament’s room for manoeuvre would make it more or less trustworthy.
An institution can send out signals of ability through the way it is organised and the admission requirements it sets. In a democratic system, with not only a universal vote, but also an individual right to stand for elections, it is difficult to formulate admission requirements, other than those based on nationality, residence, age, and some sense of civic responsibility (i.e. not having acted in a way that led to the deprivation of political rights). This makes it all the more relevant how parliament is organised, and what tools are available to help them to function effectively.
Several contributions in this issue examine how parliament can be organised to this effect. Matêj Czinege discusses parliamentary questions as one of those tools. In particular, he develops a model to compare procedural rules for parliamentary questions, as these impact their effectiveness. Jörn von Lucke, Fotios Fitsilis and Stephane Gagnon point to Artificial Intelligence applications as another tool. A comparative study reveals that parliaments have very different priorities for the use of ai, but also that ai can be used, and is relevant, for a wide variety of functions. Techological developments also enable parliament to operate in difficult circumstances, as was the case during the Covid-19 pandemic. The case law discussed in Szentgáli-Tóth’s contribution shows that this enables remote discussions, but it also points out that we should not use this too quickly, as parliamentary debate is better served by physical presence.
Benevolence refers to the extent to which a trustee is believed to act with the trustee’s interests and needs in mind. To convince citizens that parliament takes their interests and needs into account, we want to be sure that they are aware of who we are, what needs and interests we have exactly.
Representation is what allows a parliament to gives signals of benevolence. Parliament is generally trusted more in societies with a proportionality system that leads to a better representation of the spread of opinion within a society and of diversity in that society.7 This makes it rather risky to experiment with majority bonuses that reduce the reflection of a spread of opinion, as the one discussed by Improta and Marzi in this issue. And it encourages us to consider tools that enhance the reflection of diversity.
In addition, parliaments can send out signals of benevolence by engaging citizens and listening to them, through transparent law-making and consultations. Engaging citizens is the topic of Ailsa Burn-Murdoch’s case study on the Scottish Parliament. She reminds us that “citizens see value in their views being heard in parliament, even if it does not lead to policy change”. In turn, in his report on Ukraine in this issue, Stanislav Ivasyk reminds us of the importance of transparency to raise trust, even in times of war.
Last but not least, integrity refers to the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of shared values and principles. Integrity is at stake when parliaments act in a way that jeopardises constitutional principles. Arguably, this also colours perceptions of ability and benevolence. It explains why increased levels of transparency do not necessarily lead to more citizen’s trust, and may even reduce it. For example, conflict of interest regulations and the publication of reports that establish violations of those regulations may even decrease the level of trust, where this raises or confirms suspicions about the member of parliament’s moral standards.8
Interestingly, Ondřej Preuss points to the parliament’s building as the expression of the values and identity of society, thereby considering it a signal of integrity. The author links the hidden location and the inconspicuous and intricate architecture of its building with deficient trust in the Czech Parliament. At the same time, he notices that this Parliament is in fact quite effective and influential, and the building’s attributes could in fact also symbolise its embedded position, protected from government and other external influences. Either way, if Parliament functions as well as is claimed, the puzzle remains why trust in the Czech Parliament – according to the Eurobarometer of Spring 2024 – is one of the lowest in the EU.
Importantly, the fact that trust occurs in a context of uncertainty does not mean it should be given blindly. Signals of trustworthy are among the factors that help people to give trust. Another factor that might be helpful, is control. Control can easily be seen as an expression of distrust, but scholarship suggests that it can also complement trust under certain conditions, in particular if it is part of a learning process that helps the trustee to grow, and to internalise shared values.9 In this issue, Szentgáli-Tóth shows how control by apex courts has contributed to the ability and integrity of Parliaments to function during the Covid-19 Pandemic.
It is not an obvious task for a Parliament to give convincing signals of ability, benevolence and integrity – at all times, but especially in times of crisis, polarisation, or populist uprise, in divided states, or backsliding regimes. Democratic theory, however, is built on the idea of (controlled) trust. This makes the ongoing search for tools, mechanisms and strategies that help Parliament to strengthen its trustworthiness, all the more important. The contributions in this issue, including the reports on two separate international conferences on parliamentary studies, are just a few examples that show how seriously scholarship on parliaments takes this role. And how important it is for this scholarship to have an outlet like the International Journal of Parliamentary Studies.
A. Schedler, ‘The Power of Elections’, The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (Oxford University Press 2013) 141–176.
W. Przybylski, ‘Explaining Eastern Europe: Can Poland’s Backsliding Be Stopped?’ [2018] in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 29, n. 3, 58.
P. Norris (ed.) Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government [Oxford University Press 1999].
R. M. Kramer, ‘Trust and Distrust in Organisations; Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Questions’, [1999]in Annu. Rev. Psychol. Vol. 50, 571; D. M. Rousseau, S. B? Sitkin, R. S. Burt and C. Camerer, ‘Not so Different after All: a Cross-Discipline View of Trust’, [1998] in The Academy of Management Review Vol. 23, n. 3, 395.
R.C Mayer, J.H. Davis and F.D. Schoorman, ‘An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust’ (1995) 20 The Academy of Management Review 709.
R. Hardin, ‘Conceptions and Explanations of Trust’, in K. Cook (ed.), Trust in Society (2001) Russel Sage Foundation, 8.
T. Van der Meer, ‘In what we trust? A multi-level study into trust in parliament as an evaluation of state characteristics’, (2010) 76 International Review of Administrative Sciences 528.
N. Bolleyer and V. Smirnova, ‘Parliamentary ethics regulation and trust in European democracies’, (2017) 40 West European Politics 1234.
F. Six, ‘Trust in Regulatory Relations’ (2013) 15 Public Management Review 174–179.