This article criticises Alvin Plantinga’s claim that ‘basic’ design beliefs, which arise without a conscious inference, have more positive epistemic status than non-basic ones and that we cannot evaluate the probabilities involved in inferential, inductive design arguments.
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This article criticises Alvin Plantinga’s claim that ‘basic’ design beliefs, which arise without a conscious inference, have more positive epistemic status than non-basic ones and that we cannot evaluate the probabilities involved in inferential, inductive design arguments.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 288 | 37 | 3 |
Full Text Views | 110 | 1 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 17 | 2 | 0 |