What do the Arguments in the Protagoras Amount to?
In: PhronesisAbstract
The main thesis of the paper is that, in the coda to the Protagoras (360e-end), Plato tells us why and with what justification he demands a definition of virtue: namely, in order to resolve a particular aporia. According to Plato’s assessment of the outcome of the arguments of the dialogue, the principal question, whether or not virtue can be taught, has, by the end of the dialogue, emerged as articulating an aporia, in that both protagonists, Socrates and Protagoras, have argued equally on both its sides. The first part of the paper provides an extensive analysis of the coda, with the aim of establishing the main thesis. The second part provides a comprehensive review of the arguments in the dialogue, with the aim of determining whether their outcome is what Plato says in the coda that it is. I undertake this review in three steps: on Plato’s conception of reasons (logoi); Socrates’ arguing on both sides; and Protagoras’ arguing on both sides.
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6)
Allen (2006) begins with the promising statement that ‘the aporetic note on which the dialogue ends is fully justified; Socrates’ call for further investigation is not an empty gesture’ (7-8). But he ends with the traditional view that Socrates’ final argument is meant to have established the conclusion that virtue is knowledge (28-31). How can this reading be consistent? Because, Allen concludes, ‘the aporetic note on which the dialogue ends warns us not to take that conception [the conception of human nature and action in Socrates’ final argument] as the last word on the subject’ (31). But this is far too weak a reading of the ‘aporetic note’ of the ending, which says not only that Socrates’ conclusion is not fully established, but that it is no more established than its opposite.
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19)
Some time ago Kerferd (1953) argued that, if there is one weakness in Protagoras’ extended argument for the teachability of virtue, and a weakness that Socrates immediately picks up on, it is that ‘Protagoras has not so far made clear what he means by virtue, and it is the regular Socratic position that it is impossible to tell whether virtue is teachable or not until its nature is first understood’ (45). Likewise Frede (1992). Manuwald (1999, 442) says that the ti esti question ‘war bisher [i.e. up to the ending] nicht ausdrücklich gestellt worden, doch war sie in Gestalt der Einheitsfrage stets gegenwärtig’. Forster (2006, 3 n. 4), writes: ‘in the Protagoras he [Plato] runs together the dialogue’s primary question about the unity of virtue with the definitional question of what virtue is (360e).’
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Abstract
The main thesis of the paper is that, in the coda to the Protagoras (360e-end), Plato tells us why and with what justification he demands a definition of virtue: namely, in order to resolve a particular aporia. According to Plato’s assessment of the outcome of the arguments of the dialogue, the principal question, whether or not virtue can be taught, has, by the end of the dialogue, emerged as articulating an aporia, in that both protagonists, Socrates and Protagoras, have argued equally on both its sides. The first part of the paper provides an extensive analysis of the coda, with the aim of establishing the main thesis. The second part provides a comprehensive review of the arguments in the dialogue, with the aim of determining whether their outcome is what Plato says in the coda that it is. I undertake this review in three steps: on Plato’s conception of reasons (logoi); Socrates’ arguing on both sides; and Protagoras’ arguing on both sides.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 429 | 101 | 3 |
| Full Text Views | 244 | 28 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 126 | 63 | 2 |