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Geometrical Objects as Properties of Sensibles: Aristotle’s Philosophy of Geometry

In: Phronesis
Author: Emily Katz1
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  • 1 Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University, 368 Farm Lane, Room 503, East LansingMI 48824, USA
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Abstract

There is little agreement about Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry, partly due to the textual evidence and partly part to disagreement over what constitutes a plausible view. I keep separate the questions ‘What is Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry?’ and ‘Is Aristotle right?’, and consider the textual evidence in the context of Greek geometrical practice, and show that, for Aristotle, plane geometry is about properties of certain sensible objects—specifically, dimensional continuity—and certain properties possessed by actual and potential compass-and-straightedge drawings qua quantitative and continuous. For their part, the objects of stereometry are potential sensible three-dimensional figures qua quantitative and continuous.

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