Abstract
In this essay, I argue for a new analysis of Porphyry’s argument for justice in On abstinence. I aim to show that (i) in addition to being an inner order of soul, justice is attributed to external actions and (ii) justice of actions consists in refraining from harming harmless living creatures, including animals and plants. The relevant harm, I argue, consists in taking the lives of living creatures and taking products from them by force or without care. I contend that Porphyry extends moral concern for others to all living creatures, but not merely on the basis of animal suffering. Finally, I argue that that the hierarchy of godlikeness in On abstinence does not support the subordination of moral concern for animals and plants to higher virtues of purity and theory.
1 Introduction
In his treatise on abstinence from animate creatures,1 Porphyry argues that philosophers aiming at the highest goal of human life, assimilation to god, must abstain from eating meat and killing animals. On abstinence (Abst.) is often regarded as a treatise on vegetarianism,2 and arguments about (not) eating meat are central in it. However, Porphyry’s concern extends beyond vegetarianism. At the end of book 3 (3.27.2 at 225.17–19),3 we learn that the greatest godlikeness requires refraining from harming not only animals but also plants. As I shall argue, this means that we must avoid killing animals and plants and illegitimately taking products from them as well as causing pain to animals.
The fact that Porphyry argues for vegetarianism is well-known among scholars, and On abstinence is often mentioned in histories of philosophical discussions on animal justice.4 The contribution I wish to make here consists in the following new points. (1) I articulate the claim that Porphyry attributes justice to actions,5 i.e., that justice is not merely or even primarily the inner order of soul in the treatise.6 I argue that (2) justice of actions consists in refraining from harming harmless animate creatures7 and (3) the animate creatures that must not be harmed include not only animals but also plants. I also aim to show that (4) the relevant harm that must be avoided is not merely killing and causing pain but also includes taking the lives of harmless living creatures including animals and plants and illegitimately taking products from them, that is, taking them without care or by force.
An important implication of my argument is that, as opposed to what some scholars have claimed,8 (5) Porphyry’s moral concern extends to non-human animals (and plants) in On abstinence. With respect to animals, this claim is not new as such, but my argument for it differs from those proposed by other scholars who base their claims on animal sentience9 or rationality.10 I argue, by contrast, that the central notion is that of causing harm as understood in (4) above. Finally, I aim to show that my analysis offers a more unified interpretation of Porphyry’s account than existing scholarly readings and integrates their findings.
An objection that arguments for ethics in late ancient Platonism often face is that moral concern for others in that context is not relevant11 or involves merely a lower virtue secondary to inner concerns of purity and theoretical contemplation. In On abstinence, Porphyry operates with a hierarchical notion of assimilation to god as the goal of human life (3.27.2 = T4 below), and similar objections have been raised with respect to his view.12 I shall argue in section 3 below that, as opposed to diminishing the significance of concern for others, Porphyry’s only criterion for distinguishing higher degrees of godlikeness from lower ones in On abstinence is how widely refraining from causing harm is extended. I contend that (6) Porphyry’s account and the hierarchy indicate that inner order of the soul is necessary, while refraining from harming harmless living creatures is both necessary and sufficient for justice.
My argument thus entails that even though concerns of purity, theoretical contemplation and self-sufficiency13 are important in On abstinence, they do not override the ethical significance of animals (or plants). In order to assess what role, on balance, human concern for philosophical development and moral concern for animals and plants play in On abstinence, we need an analysis of Porphyry’s own account of justice in the treatise. My aim in this essay is to offer exactly that.
2 Justice as Abstinence from Harming Harmless Animate Creatures
2.1 Porphyry’s Introduction of His Own Account
In the last two chapters of book 3 (26–27), Porphyry moves from polemics against adversaries towards his own account of justice by responding to one more Stoic objection (reported in Abst. 1.4.3), according to which extending justice to animals destroys it. Porphyry undermines the objection by clarifying first that the extension of justice he argues for does not exclude self-defence or restricting harmful animal populations, just as punishing human wrongdoers is compatible with avoiding harm to humans in general (3.26.2–3 at 222.12–17). Therefore, Porphyry’s view is not vulnerable to the objection that extending justice to animals is untenable because some animals are dangerous or harmful to humans.
Porphyry contrasts his account with that of the Stoics who ‘derive justice from appropriation (
(T1) … justice lies in refraining from and avoidance of harming everything14 that does not cause harm. This is how the just person is conceived,15 not that other [the Stoic] way; so justice, since it lies in abstinence from causing harm, extends as far as animate beings. (3.26.9 at 224.2–6; Clark’s translation modified)16
Therefore, according to Porphyry, justice ‘lies’ or consists in17 refraining from harming animals and plants.18
In my view, this passage expresses in a nutshell Porphyry’s account of justice as an attribute of actions (claims 1–2 above). As to claim (1), an important reason why justice cannot be the inner order of soul alone is that Porphyry repeatedly (as in T1)19 talks about extending justice to all animate creatures. It is difficult to see how soul’s inner order could be thus extended.20 By contrast, if understood as an attribute of actions and as consisting in refraining from causing harm as I argue, it makes sense to argue for such an extension of justice.
Scholars often ignore Porphyry’s inclusion of plants in justice or argue against it.21 It is true that animals are more prominent in the treatise because Porphyry responds to objections that are objections to extending justice to animals. However, some fifteen lines after (T1), Porphyry notes that obtaining nourishment from plants does not harm them if we gather fruits fallen from trees or harvest grain when it has already died (3.26.12 at 224.17–20). I take this to show that, according to Porphyry, it would harm trees and grain if we took fruits by force or harvested living grain. As I shall argue in more detail in 2.2 below, since for Porphyry justice requires refraining from causing harm and since plants can be harmed, justice requires us to avoid harming plants.
To support my claim that (T1) expresses Porphyry’s own view of justice, it is important to note first that the passage occurs after the polemics against the adversaries. Secondly, Porphyry says himself in (T1) that the just person must be understood as one who abstains from harming harmless animate creatures, not in the Stoic way. He also argues that his own account is superior to that of the Stoics, who, he claims, confuse justice with another virtue, a sort of love of human beings (
Porphyry insists that, contrary to the Stoic objection (Abst. 1.4.3, mentioned above), the extension strengthens our justice to human beings (3.26.6). He notes:
(T2) Surely it is obvious that justice is increased by abstinence? One who abstains from all animate creatures … will abstain all the more from harm to their own kind. (3.26.6 at 223.3–7; Clark’s translation slightly modified)
Therefore, Porphyry takes it as evident that the extension of justice increases it, while a person ‘who restricts justice to human beings is ready, like someone in a tight place, to jettison abstinence from injustice’ (3.26.7 at 223.12–14).
Porphyry does not argue for these claims. Given the general assumption in ancient and late ancient Platonic and Aristotelian ethics that becoming virtuous requires practice, this is understandable. To illustrate Porphyry’s argument, acquiring virtue can be compared to how we exercise a muscle: the more we train it to do something, the more we are able to do that very thing. In Porphyry’s case, the more widely we extend justice, the more occasions there are for practising it, while restricting justice to humans alone limits the chances for practice. In fact, Porphyry claims that extending justice to animals increases our justice to humans proportionately to how much larger the animal genus is than the human species (3.26.6 at 223.7–10). Therefore, the more creatures there are to which we must be just, the more we can strengthen our capacity to act with justice.
This general assumption also sheds light on Porphyry’s remark about someone in a tight spot: virtue is comparable to a skill and being just to humans is easier for us than being just to animals.24 Therefore, when one becomes skilled in abstaining from harming animals, being just to humans will become easier. By contrast, the skill of being just to humans on its own is unlikely to enable us to perform the more difficult task of being just to animals (let alone plants).
As I see it, Porphyry draws here a contrast between his notion of justice that is strengthened through practice and conceptions such as the Stoic one in which justice is based on goodwill. While Porphyry can plausibly maintain that his notion entails strengthening through extension, an account based on goodwill tends to assume justice to be a limited resource. As such, it is comparable to a pizza dough: when extended more widely, it inevitably becomes thinner and ultimately breaks down. This difference explains why Porphyry’s opponents can assume they have a better claim to justice towards humans, since, from their perspective, a more limited extension ‘thickens’ justice.
Porphyry does not accept this.25 He asserts that the opponents’ real motivation for arguing against the extension of justice to animals is not concern for humans but the desire for the pleasure of eating meat. According to Porphyry, those who object to justice towards animals by saying that it destroys justice ‘do not realize that they themselves are not preserving justice but increasing pleasure, which is the enemy of justice’ (3.26.5 at 222.25–223.2).26 For Porphyry, the objection shows that his opponents are motivated by pleasure that aggravates the injustice of killing animals.
2.2 Porphyry and Theophrastus: It Is Unjust to Harm Animate Creatures
Up to now, I have argued that (T1) contains in a nutshell Porphyry’s account of justice, according to which justice consists in refraining from causing harm and must be extended to all animate creatures. However, on its own, (T1) is brief and does not define the notion of harm. We need to ask whether the rest of the treatise sheds further light on the details of Porphyry’s view.
Let us first consider what kinds of actions harm animate creatures, according to Porphyry. First, (i) killing animals for nourishment is unjust (e.g., 3.26.4 = 222.19–24).27 We can avoid such injustice simply by not killing animals, because eating meat is not necessary for survival. By contrast, taking supplies that are necessary for survival does not harm plants if we (ii) gather fruits that trees let fall (3.26.12 at 224.17–19) and (iii) harvest grain that has already died (ibid. at 224.19–20). Similarly, (iv) taking wool from sheep is not unjust because rather than causing them harm shearing benefits them (ibid. at 224.20–21), and (v) taking some milk from sheep does not harm them if we take care of the sheep (ibid. at 224.21–2).
Porphyry’s formulations reflect an objection that he quotes in book 1. According to the objection, it is indefensible to maintain that killing animals is unjust because it renders using eggs, wool, milk and honey unjust as well (1.21.1 at 100.16–23). Since these products are necessary for human survival, eating meat must also be justified. Porphyry responds to the objection by claiming that although it is unjust to kill both animals and plants, this does not exclude using products that are necessary for survival. As to wool, (iv) is a straightforward denial of the objection, and (v) justifies the use of some milk on the condition that care is given to sheep.
Porphyry’s instructions for obtaining nourishment resemble the guidelines he quotes in book 2 from Theophrastus’ treatise On piety (
An important argument from Theophrastus (2.12.3–4 at 142.13–144.1) concludes that animals should not be sacrificed because sacrifice harms them (2.12.3 at 142.16–18). Causing harm is unjust, while sacrifice is something holy.29 What is holy must be just, i.e., must not cause harm (ibid., 142.13–14). ‘Sacrifice, more than anything, should be harmless to everyone’, Theophrastus claims (ibid., 142.14).
Theophrastus’ argument is based on a comparison between animal sacrifice and expressing piety by taking someone else’s possessions (2.12.4 at 142.22–3)—an example would be stealing the flowers one is about to offer to the gods from a neighbour’s garden. While Theophrastus assumes that this would commonly be judged to be wrong, the greater wrong of taking animal lives is not widely recognized. The argument is that illegitimately taking someone else’s possessions to show piety cannot be holy (assumed as commonly accepted). A fortiori, taking a greater good, life or soul (
When it comes to plants, Theophrastus responds to an objection similar to the one discussed above with respect to Porphyry. According to the objection Theophrastus is concerned with, a ban on animal sacrifice and eating meat is untenable because of the necessity of using plants to survive (2.13.1 at 143.3–4). For Theophrastus (as for Porphyry), the crucial difference between plants and animals is not that animals are subject to justice and plants are not. Rather, they both emphasize that some plant and animal products can be used without harming plants or animals. This distinguishes the use of such products from killing animals for food or sacrificing them to the gods. However, both acknowledge that there are ways of harming plants that amount to being unjust to them and must be avoided.
Theophrastus contrasts sacrificing animals with gathering fruits that have fallen to the ground, since the latter ‘is not from the unwilling’ (2.13.1 at 143.5). Since such fruits are, as it were, willingly given by trees, they can be gathered without harming the trees. According to Theophrastus, agricultural products can also be used with justice, since humans sow the seeds and take care of the growth, thus earning the right to harvest the crop (2.13.3 at 143.17–19). Similarly, bee-keepers take care of bees, and honey can legitimately be collected if the bees ‘suffer no harm’ and the honey is superfluous to them (2.13.2 at 143.12–15). While the argument ‘not from the unwilling’ does not apply to these cases, harvesting and collecting honey are compensated for by the work of care (ibid., 143.12).30
Therefore, Theophrastus and Porphyry agree that it is wrong to take animal lives. They also agree that this does not lead to the indefensible conclusion that using plant and animal products that are necessary for survival is also unjust, since the products that are necessary for survival can be obtained without injustice. Theophrastus and Porphyry both take this to apply to agricultural products as well, but their reasons for doing so are different. While the work of care compensates for harvesting living grain for Theophrastus, Porphyry takes justice to require us to only harvest grain when it has already died.31
As we saw above, Porphyry argues that taking some milk from sheep does not harm them if care is given to the sheep. Therefore, using milk differs from eating meat, since, according to Porphyry, even if meat eating were necessary for human survival, killing animals would still harm them.32 Such necessity would not make the killing right; it would render the injustice of the killing pardonable.33
Porphyry does not discuss animals’ capacity to feel pain in this context. While Plato granted sensation to plants in the Timaeus, there is no sign in On abstinence that Porphyry would take injustice to plants to consist in causing them pain.34 Although Porphyry quotes or adapts from Plutarch an argument according to which plants differ from animals since animals feel pain, we have seen above that he denies that we are justified in killing plants. Moreover, instead of suffering, Porphyry’s own considerations refer to the Platonic notion of pain as a rivet that ties the soul even more closely to the body.35 Therefore, for Porphyry, killing animals harms them in the further way of preventing their souls’ liberation from their bodies because of the pain they suffer when killed. In my view, this does not mean that Porphyry is impervious to animal suffering. His point is that the injustice of harming animate creatures does not merely consist in causing pain (or even in preventing animal souls from being liberated) but also includes harming animals and plants through killing and illegitimately taking products from them.
The above discussion enables us to see that all cases of injustice in obtaining nourishment can, in Porphyry’s account, be united under the notion of harm. He argues that, contrary to the objection (quoted in Abst. 1.21), what is necessary for survival can be obtained without harming animals and plants, provided that his instructions are followed. The notion of harm that is central in Porphyry’s account of justice refers to taking lives of harmless animate creatures and illegitimately taking products from them. On the whole, my analysis indicates that Porphyry’s notion of harm can be explained in terms of violating the integrity of a living organism. Animals and plants have their own unity or wholeness that is violated if something that belongs to them is taken from them by force, without care or without their consent. While animals can show their non-consent by running away, trees or bushes can show something analogous to consent by letting go of their fruits or berries.
In his explicit remarks, Porphyry limits the notion of harm to animate creatures. He probably assumes that damaging inanimate objects does not cause similar harm, since they do not have the same kind of wholeness or unity as living creatures do.36 However, in addition to god being harmless—a property to which we can assimilate ourselves through justice—he also describes god as protective and beneficent (3.26.11 = 224.13–17). Porphyry probably assumes that a virtuous person does not damage inanimate objects either, although that is not required by justice but possibly manifests protectiveness and/ or beneficence.
2.3 My Account Compared to Other Readings
Up to now, I have argued that justice in On abstinence consists in refraining from harming animate creatures and must be extended to all animals and plants provided that they are harmless to human beings. I shall argue next that my analysis is more unified than previous scholarly readings, while recognizing their findings.
Let us first consider the claim that Porphyry extends justice to animals because they are sentient.37 Evidence for it is found in a section that Porphyry quotes or adapts from a lost work by Plutarch.38 The relevant passage reads as follows:
(T3) [T]he comparison of plants with animals is obviously forced. It is the nature of animals to have perceptions, to feel distress, to be afraid, to be hurt, and therefore to be harmed. Plants have no perceptions, so nothing is alien or bad to them, nothing is harm or injustice: for perception is the origin of all appropriation … and the followers of Zeno make appropriation the origin of justice. (3.19.2 at 208.23–209.6; Clark’s translation slightly modified)
This passage seems to show that, as opposed to what Porphyry says elsewhere, plants are excluded from justice while animals are included in it because they can be harmed through suffering.
It is important to note that (T3) is a part of Porphyry’s polemics against the Stoics; Zeno and his followers are explicitly mentioned in the passage. In addition, (T3) is derived from Plutarch, who is unclear on whether plants should be included in justice. The status of plants is not discussed in the surviving parts of De esu carnium and is mentioned only briefly in De sollertia animalium (962f–963a, Hubert), while plants and animals are treated on a par in Solon’s speech in the Septem sapientium convivium 16 (159b10–c1, Babbitt).39
By contrast, as I have argued above, Porphyry includes plants in his account of justice (3.26.12). We shall also see in 3.1 below that the highest level of godlikeness in Porphyry’s account in On abstinence 3.27 (T4 below) is achieved when harm-avoidance is extended to plants. Therefore, if we assume (T3) to express the crux of Porphyry’s own argument, we must claim that he is seriously conflicted. Alternatively, we have to reject what Porphyry presents as his own view (in 3.26–7)40 in favour of a passage (T3) that he uses against the Stoics and that is derived from Plutarch.
However, I do not think that (T3) shows that Porphyry is conflicted about justice to plants. Rather, as I see it, his view is that plants are subject to justice and injustice because they can be harmed. Still, (T3) is important in the overall polemics of On abstinence, since it refutes the objection according to which the justification for using plants for nourishment justifies killing animals for food (quoted in 1.18). In the light of Porphyry’s own account, this refutation must be conditional: even if taking plant lives were justified, it would not justify killing animals because animals suffer.
Finally, if sentience were Porphyry’s criterion for extending justice to animals, he would have different grounds for extending justice to animals (suffering) and plants (life and integrity). By contrast, in my analysis Porphyry’s argument is based on the notion of harm that can be articulated as violating the integrity of living creatures, which also includes causing pain to animals.
Some scholars have argued that since Porphyry’s argument for animal justice is not based on animal suffering, he does not extend moral concern to them. Fay Edwards concludes, for instance, that Porphyry is not ‘particularly sympathetic toward the animals themselves’.41 It is not clear whether she means that Porphyry shows (a) no moral concern for animals or (b) no moral concern based on sympathy. If she means the latter, (b), I agree. Porphyry’s argument for animal justice is not based on sympathy. However, if she means the former, (a), I disagree.42 In my view, although suffering is not Porphyry’s criterion for determining the scope of justice, this does not exclude moral concern for animals and plants: the avoidance of causing harm to them is constitutive of justice in Porphyry’s account as I understand it.
My analysis also accommodates Catherine Osborne’s argument according to which Porphyry shuns meat eating as a form of luxury, i.e., as ‘surplus to requirements … chosen for pleasure rather than need, and … a mark of worldly prosperity’.43 However, while Osborne seems to understand excess as an independent reason for the injustice of killing animals for food, I take the crucial point in Porphyry’s discussion of excess and pleasure to be justice. As to pleasure, Porphyry indicates that his opponents’ real motivation for objecting to vegetarianism is not concern for justice to humans but the pleasure of eating meat that only aggravates the injustice of the killing (3.26.5 at 222.25–223.2).44 More remarkably, as previously noted, not even necessity for survival could make the injustice of killing animals right.45 It would still be unjust,46 although the necessity for survival would make the injustice pardonable.
A substantial part of On abstinence 3 consists in Porphyry’s response to the objection that animals are excluded from justice because they are not rational. Animal rationality is important in Porphyry’s polemics against the Stoics and the Epicureans, and he also mentions the Peripatetics, although there is no direct textual evidence of a Peripatetic argument to the effect that eating meat is justified because animals lack reason.47 The prominence of rationality in the discussion easily gives the impression that animal rationality is Porphyry’s own reason for arguing for animal justice.48 However, Porphyry’s assertion that justice must be extended to all animate creatures (T1) is based on the claim that justice consists in refraining from causing harm, and we have seen in section 2.2 above that the notion of harm in Porphyry’s analysis is not dependent on rationality but rather concerns violations of living creatures’ integrity. Therefore, I agree, broadly speaking, with Fay Edwards that Porphyry’s discussion on animal rationality is ‘dialectical’, i.e., directed at his adversaries.49
However, I take the polemical reading in a wider sense to apply not only to the Stoics but also to the Epicureans, for whom animals are excluded from justice by their incapacity, as non-rational creatures, to make agreements (1.12.6 at 95.22–23). It probably also includes the Peripatetics who operated with a similar notion of expressive utterance as the one Porphyry articulates in the context.50 Moreover, in my view, Porphyry’s argument against the Stoics is directed at their general claim about dissimilarity between human beings and other animals (3.1.4 at 187.12–14).51 This entails that rather than providing independent reasons for Porphyry to argue for animal justice,52 similarities between human beings and other animals,53 along with similarities in what Stoics take to be instances of logos as rationality or expressive communication, belong to Porphyry’s polemics against the Stoics.
Up to now, I have argued that Porphyry takes justice of actions to consist in abstinence from harming harmless animate creatures and that his notion of harm refers to taking lives and illegitimately taking products from animals and plants. I have also aimed at showing that my analysis accommodates other scholarly readings by integrating them into Porphyry’s own account or his polemics against others. Let us now turn to his discussion of higher virtues.
3 Assimilation to God
3.1 The Hierarchy of Godlikeness in On Abstinence
As previously mentioned, Porphyry takes the highest goal of humans to consist in assimilation to god, insofar as it is possible in bodily life, and introduces a hierarchy of godlikeness at the end of On abstinence 3 (3.27.2). Since he also presents a hierarchy of virtue in Sentence 32 in his systematization of central Plotinian tenets possibly for beginners,54 we need to ask how the two hierarchies are related. In particular, it has been argued that because of the hierarchy of Sentence 32, moral concern for other creatures should, also in On abstinence, be subordinated to purely internal virtues of purification and theory.55 I shall argue next that the evidence does not support this claim for On abstinence.
Much of Porphyry’s discussion of the versatile notion of godlikeness56 in On abstinence centres on the question in Plato’s Theaetetus (176b) of how to avoid evil in bodily life. The notion of godlikeness indicates that, in a sense, we transcend the human condition if we manage to live according to the ideal. In my view, this does not mean that we propel ourselves to some other-worldly dimension, i.e., become entirely detached from the concerns of life in the sensible realm with other bodily creatures.57 Rather, it means that we minimize the potentially harmful ethical implications of an embodiment that requires us to obtain products from other creatures to survive.
The important question for our present purposes is whether the hierarchy of godlikeness in On abstinence 3.27.2 shows that Porphyry subordinates moral concern to animals and plants to higher virtues of a purely internal nature. In what follows, I argue to the contrary that the only criterion by which Porphyry distinguishes the higher degrees of godlikeness from the lower ones is the extension of harm-avoidance to animals and plants (i.e., justice in (T1)).
Let us first consider Porphyry’s hierarchy of godlikeness in On abstinence. People who (a) abstain from harming their nearest and dearest (wife and children) but act with contempt and greed towards everyone else are found on the first level (3.27.2 at 225.7–11). By contrast,
(T4) (b) Those who are led by reason abstain from harming fellow-citizens too, and further still strangers and all human beings; they keep irrationality subjected and are more rational than the others and thereby also more divine (
θειότερος ). Thus (c) someone who does not restrict to human beings the avoidance of causing harm, but extends it also to the other animals, is more like god (μᾶλλον ὅμοιος θεῷ ); and (d) if the extension to plants is possible, [the person] preserves the likeness even more (ἔτι μᾶλλον σῴζει τὴν εἰκόνα ). (3.27.2 at 225.12–19; Clark’s translation modified)
Porphyry describes here an ascending order of godlikeness in which higher levels are achieved by refraining from harming wider groups of creatures. While (a) someone who is unharming merely towards family members is not said to be like god, (b) a person who has obtained inner harmony of the soul and abstains from harming all human beings is more divine (
The remarkable aspect of the hierarchy in (T4) is that godlikeness increases through the extension of something that remains the same on all levels: refraining from causing harm to others, in which Porphyry takes justice to consist (T1). Although this is in accordance with Porphyry’s account of justice in (T1), the hierarchy creates the following difficulty. While the hierarchy indicates that godlikeness is increased through the extension of justice to animals and plants, in (T1) Porphyry states that the very nature of justice requires it to be extended to all animate creatures (3.26.9 at 224.6). There is no indication in (T1) that the extension would only apply to some higher degrees of justice. This raises the question of whether the person whose soul is in order and who is unharming to all humans (level (b) in T4) is just in the sense of (T1).
Increasing godlikeness through extending justice
Citation: Phronesis 69, 3 (2024) ; 10.1163/15685284-bja10088
Further confusion is created by the fact that immediately after (T1) Porphyry notes:
(IOS) That is why the essence (
οὐσία ) of justice is that the rational rules over the irrational, and the irrational follows. (3.26.10 at 224.6–8)
Therefore, on the one hand, justice consists in refraining from harming all harmless animate creatures (T1). On the other hand, it is soul’s inner order (IOS).
Some scholars have argued that (IOS) shows that refraining from harming animals should be subordinated to the inner order of the soul, justice and moderation as discussed in Plato’s Republic 4 and that, therefore, Porphyry does not extend moral concern to animals in On abstinence.58 However, as we have just seen, in the hierarchy of godlikeness (T4) the inner order of soul is already found on level (b), while abstinence from harming animals and plants only belongs to the higher levels, (c) and (d). In my view, this makes it highly unlikely that refraining from harming animals could be required merely for the sake of something on a lower level of the hierarchy: soul’s inner order (IOS). First, since the inner order has already been achieved, abstinence is not needed for its sake. Secondly, as I will explain shortly below, the order of soul is comparable to a lesser skill than the one that enables us to refrain from harming animals and plants.
One rather simple solution to the tension would be to take (T1) to refer to justice as an attribute of actions, while (IOS) applies to the inner order of soul. However, this does not explain why inner order of soul together with avoiding harm to all humans belongs to a lower level of godlikeness (b) in (T4), while the higher levels (c) and (d) require the extension of justice of actions to animals and plants. In a word, if the inner order of soul is the essence of justice (as (IOS) above would seem to imply), such order should supposedly be both necessary and sufficient for it. However, (T1) shows that inner order of soul alone is not sufficient for justice, and (T4) entails that it is not sufficient for higher degrees of godlikeness.
In my view, the inner order of soul is best understood in On abstinence as being necessary but not sufficient for justice. In order to be able to manifest justice in external action, one has to be able to control one’s desires. However, merely having one’s soul in order is not sufficient for justice, since (T4) shows that it yields avoidance of harm merely to all human beings. Justice of actions, by contrast, consists in abstinence from harming all harmless creatures including animals and plants (T1).
The relation between the inner order of soul (reason leading unreason) and justice of actions can be explained by the analogy with skills articulated in section 2.1 above: having reason lead unreason in the soul produces the kind of skill that allows us to abstain from harming any human. By contrast, the skills achieved on the higher levels of godlikeness that enable us to refrain from harming animals and plants are not achieved merely through such inner order of soul and refraining from harming humans. From an inner perspective, the higher skills probably require greater detachment from bodily concerns and possibly also more elaborate knowledge about what justice requires. From the viewpoint of action, they require extending harm-avoidance to animals and plants. The higher degrees of godlikeness are thus comparable to more advanced skills that are not achieved merely by obtaining the skill of having one’s soul in order and of refraining from harming human beings specifically.
I take it that when Porphyry says that the
Therefore, in my view, (IOS) is plausibly understood as a claim about the being of justice in the sense that the inner order of soul must be there, i.e., that it is necessary for a person to be godlike and just. However, since (T1) makes it clear that justice as refraining from harming others must be extended outside humanity, the inner order of soul (which in the hierarchy of (T4) above is sufficient for not harming any human) is not sufficient for justice. Therefore, I do not think the evidence supports the claim that (IOS) expresses the true essence of justice and cancels the ethical significance of other animate creatures in On abstinence.
3.2 Grades of Virtue in Sentence 32
As previously mentioned, Porphyry also presents a hierarchy of virtues in Sentence 32, and this raises the question of a possible connection between the two hierarchies. In Sentence 32, the lowest kind of ‘political’ justice is said to consist in the inner order of soul and to require refraining from harming others (32.6–10; 13–14, Lamberz). By contrast, on the higher levels of virtue, purification and theory, the definitions of justice make no reference to refraining from harming others but are given in wholly internal terms. In Sentence 32, justice as purification means following reason and intellect (32.15–18; 28–9) and, as a theoretical virtue, it consists in the soul’s parts fulfilling their role in focusing on intellect (ibid., 58–60).
[The crucial difference between On abstinence 3.27.2 and Sentence 32 is that in Sentence 32 the definition of justice varies from one level to the other. By contrast, as we saw above, in On abstinence 3.27.2 (T4), what constitutes godlikeness remains the same on all levels: refraining from causing harm to others in which justice consists, as Porphyry also says in (T1). This means that if we want to combine the two hierarchies, we need to assume that the whole hierarchy of On abstinence 3.27.2 belongs to the lowest level in Sentence 32, since only on that level is justice defined in terms of refraining from harming others. However, there is no clear evidence in Sentence 32 that justice so understood would extend outside the human species60 or that the grade of ‘political’ virtue could contain an inner hierarchy. Moreover, justice as it is defined on the level of ‘political’ virtue in Sentence 32, as the inner order of the soul, is found on level (b) in (T4), while refraining from harming animals and plants belongs to the higher levels of the hierarchy ((c) and (d)). Therefore, I do not think that the hierarchies can be reconciled by squeezing the whole hierarchy of On abstinence 3.27.2 (T4) into the level of ‘political’ virtue in Sentence 32.
Higher virtues focusing on inner concerns
Citation: Phronesis 69, 3 (2024) ; 10.1163/15685284-bja10088
Moreover, as to theoretical virtue, there is evidence in On abstinence that rather than rendering concern for animals and plants insignificant, it includes justice of actions with respect to food.61 Porphyry stresses that a life of intellect does not consist in learning arguments or doctrines (
Concerns of purity are also important in On abstinence (2.44–6; 2.50; 4.20). However, rather than a higher grade of virtue that diminishes the significance of justice as refraining from harming others, purity is, in these contexts, a different virtue required in different situations. In book 4, Porphyry explains contamination as the mixture of two opposite principles and takes this to entail that eating meat contaminates in two different ways: the life in the animal gets mixed with death and similarly with sentience and lack of sentience (4.20.1). Contrary to what one might expect, the mixture is not one in which the animal’s death and lack of sentience are mixed with the life and sentience of the person eating the meat. Rather, the animal itself gets contaminated when its life is mixed with death and its capacity to sense is mixed with lack of sentience when it is killed. Since purity requires avoiding contamination, it requires abstinence from eating animals doubly contaminated in this way.62 Porphyry’s account of contamination also explains why he claims that we must refrain from eating animals that died without injustice. Although their deaths do not violate justice, they become contaminated when they die, which means that eating their meat conflicts with purity.
It would, Porphyry maintains, be better if we did not need nourishment at all (4.20.13)63 and lived as non-incarnated souls or intellects. However, our mortal bodily nature needs nourishment, and philosophers living a life of intellect must not starve themselves to death.64 Nourishment must, therefore, be obtained without harming animate creatures, and we have seen in section 2.2 above that Porphyry’s guidelines explain how we can do that.
3.3 Supererogation of Abstinence?
Porphyry notes a few times in On abstinence that abstinence is required from philosophers aiming at the greatest possible godlikeness (1.27.1; 2.4.3). This has been taken to entail that vegetarianism is supererogatory in Porphyry’s analysis, i.e., good but not strictly speaking morally required.65 In On abstinence, supererogation would probably mean that abstinence from harming animals and plants belongs to higher degrees of godlikeness but is not required by justice. However, as we have seen in 2.1 above, for Porphyry, it is precisely the claim that justice consists in refraining from causing harm that requires it to be extended to all animate creatures (T1). This makes the supererogation claim implausible.
In my view, the hierarchy of godlikeness (T4) is better explained by an objectivist account of justice in which abstinence from harming harmless living creatures is required by the nature of justice, but the degree to which people act in accordance with it varies. The fact that Porphyry directs his argument at philosophers probably indicates that living in accordance with justice requires understanding what justice entails, and such understanding can be expected to emerge through deep engagement in philosophy.66 Therefore, rather than an ideal of supererogation, I think assimilation to god in On abstinence is better understood as an objective normative standard for evaluating what actions the best human life requires.
The standard of justice implied by the goal is thus the same for all, and the degree to which individuals act in accordance with it corresponds to their degree of godlikeness. Different individuals acquire godlikeness to differing degrees, but such variation does not change the standard: it has the same normative force independently of whether and to what extent it is followed. Therefore, I do not think that the hierarchy of godlikeness constitutes evidence for the claim that abstinence from harming animals and plants is not required by justice in On abstinence.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued in section 2 that in On abstinence Porphyry defends a notion of justice that, in addition to requiring the inner order of soul, is attributed to external actions and, as a property of actions, consists in refraining from harming harmless animate creatures. I have also aimed at showing that the relevant notion of harm in Porphyry’s analysis amounts to violations of integrity: taking the lives of animals and plants and illegitimately taking products from them. Causing pain to animals also harms them, but the relevant harm in Porphyry’s account is not merely a matter of animal suffering.
In section 3, I have shown that in Porphyry’s hierarchy of godlikeness in On abstinence refraining from harming animals and plants cannot plausibly be subordinated to the inner order of an embodied tripartite soul. This is because inner order of soul together with harm-avoidance to all human beings merely yields a lower degree of godlikeness than the one obtained by extending harm-avoidance to animals and plants as well. Neither is it plausible to claim that moral concern for animals (and plants) is overridden or diminished by higher virtues of purity and theory as they are described in Sentence 32. While Porphyry defines such higher grades of virtue in purely internal terms in the Sentences, the definition of justice (refraining from harming others) remains the same on all the levels of the hierarchy of godlikeness in On abstinence (T4). In On abstinence, the higher degrees of godlikeness differ from the lower ones solely by extending such justice to animals and plants. On the basis of Porphyry’s account of justice and the hierarchy, I have argued that inner order of soul is necessary for justice in the treatise, while refraining from harming animals and plants is sufficient both for justice and for higher degrees of godlikeness.67
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In the text,
See, e.g., Osborne 1995; Dombrowski 1984 and 1987; Edwards 2018.
The section is not quoted in other sources; see Bouffartigue and Patillon 2003, vol. 2, 138.
See, for example, Beauchamp and Frey 2011. Often, however, it is claimed that the discussion has been scattered (e.g., Beauchamp’s introduction, ibid., 3) or that the question of the moral status of animals has not been taken seriously (e.g., Gruen 2011).
Those scholarly readings that take animal suffering to be Porphyry’s criterion for extending justice to animals (e.g., Dombrowski 1987 and Marechal, forthcoming) assume a similar conception in this respect; see also Press 2020.
See Edwards 2018, 44 for the claim that justice is the inner order of soul in On abstinence.
Others had maintained before Porphyry that refraining from harming others is central for justice. However, in my view, Porphyry and Theophrastus, whom Porphyry quotes, focus on it in a new way; see 2.2 below. For the Stoics on the requirement not to harm, see Seneca, who also connects it to vegetarianism in Epistle 108.21, Reynolds; for Epicureans, see Kuriai doxai 31, Arrighetti. A similar claim is found already in the sophist Antiphon, fr. 44c P. Oxy. 1797 in Pendrick 2002, 184–7.
Edwards 2018, 53–5; cf. Goldin 2001.
See, e.g., Marechal, forthcoming. Others, such as Richard Sorabji 1993, 103; 156; 182; 184 claim that Porphyry has multiple reasons for extending justice to animals, including sentience and general similarity to humans.
For Sorabji 1993, 156, animal rationality is one of Porphyry’s reasons for extending justice to animals.
For such an objection to Plotinus’ ethics, see Dillon 1996.
Edwards 2016; 2018, 44.
Edwards 2018, 46 and 50.
The ‘everything’ here is confined to creatures with soul, as the end of the quotation shows.
I have revised Clark’s translation ‘the just man thinks’ here (224.4). A translation corresponding to the medio-passive
This is how Lorente (‘consiste’, 1985, 80) and Sodano (‘consiste’, 2005, 285) translate
Clark 2001, 43 and Sorabji 1993, 99 claim that Porphyry denies that plants have souls; see also Marechal, forthcoming, for the claim that plants are not subject to justice in On abstinence. It is true that Porphyry sometimes uses ‘animate’ for animals as opposed to plants (e.g., ‘inanimate food’ in reference to a vegetarian diet; 3.26.8 at 223.17–19). I argue for the inclusion of plants in justice in the main text below.
See also, e.g., 3.26.5 at 222.25. On the terminology of extension in Porphyry, see Martins 2018, 165–81.
In Plato’s Republic 4, justice is attributed to a city because of the structural isomorphism between the city and the soul. However, that is not the same as extending justice to all other humans, let alone to animals and plants.
See note 18 above.
The virtue of loving humans was typically reserved to gods; Bouffartigue and Patillon 2003, vol. 2, 253 n. 5 ad p. 188. ‘A sort of love’ possibly indicates that something similar can be achieved by humans.
Quoted by Stobaeus, 4.27.23.5–53, Wachsmuth and Hense.
Since the objections are objections to extending justice to animals, plants are not relevant here.
In fact, the Stoics as described by Hierocles are also committed to the practice model of extending justice through appropriation (
The contrast between pleasure and justice connects Porphyry’s response to a Stoic debate on ends, for which see Algra 1997, 110; Cicero, Lucullus 138 = SVF III 21 also quoted in Algra, ibid. 109; Lucullus 140 in Algra ibid. 115; De finibus 2.44 = SVF III 22; Annas 2007, 204. I am grateful to Julia Annas for drawing my attention to the Stoic debate.
Porphyry does not explicitly mention the notion of harm when stating that it is unjust to kill animals. He probably assumes that it is obvious or relies on arguments quoted in book 2 from Theophrastus, who clarifies that killing animals causes them great harm (2.12.3 at 142.17–18).
Porphyry is our only source for the treatise, which raises the question of his reliability. Porphyry is generally reliable for sources that we know from elsewhere, but he sometimes makes changes and omits passages. I find no reason to doubt Porphyry’s reliability as to Theophrastus with the qualifications just made; see also Bouffartigue and Patillon, vol. 2, 17–29; for the quotations as fragments of Theophrastus see Fortenbaugh et al. 1992, 404–33.
There is a wordplay (142.18–9) on the superficial similarity between the words for ‘holy’ (
Theophrastus need not assume that everyone must grow their own grain and keep their own bees. If such products are earned through work and fairly purchased, nothing is illegitimately taken from others.
Porphyry’s account thus seems to preclude using parts of plant organisms such as lettuce from the garden, while for Theophrastus that could be justified by the work of care.
I agree with Catherine Osborne (2007, 231) on this point. For my divergences from her view, see 2.3 and 3 below.
Cf. 3.18.5 at 208.9–13 derived from Plutarch. The point there is that god pardons those who harm plants, use oxen for labour and shear and milk sheep for survival, while killing animals for pleasure is a great injustice. As we have seen, Porphyry claims that plants and sheep are not harmed if one follows his instructions.
For Plato, see Timaeus 64b; 77b, Burnet; Carpenter 2010. Plotinus denied perception in plants (Enneads 4.4.22.33; 1.4.1.21–3, Henry and Schwyzer). In Ad Gaurum 4 (Kalbfleisch), Porphyry argues that embryos are more like plants than animals, since they receive nourishment through the placenta and cannot move around freely. However, while embryos are a kind of plant with sensation, this does not entail that all plants are embryos, i.e., that all plants have sensation.
Abst. 2.47.2; see also Plato, Phaedo 83d.
At one point he notes that inner order of soul necessitates refraining from harming ‘anything whatever’ (3.26.10 at 224.8–9). However, this remark occurs immediately after (T1) in which justice is extended to all ensouled creatures (224.5–6). Therefore, rather than referring to absolutely everything, the ‘anything whatever’ (three lines later) is most probably restricted to all creatures with soul.
According to Sorabji, 1993, 103; 156; 182; 184, sentience is one reason among many; see also Girgenti 2001, 76–7. Marechal, forthcoming, argues that animal sentience is Porphyry’s main reason for including animals in justice in On abstinence. Daniel Dombrowski contends (1987, 776–7; 1984) that because Porphyry’s argument is based on animal sentience, it is a forerunner of ‘the argument from marginal cases’. For general criticism of the argument from marginal cases, see Kittay 2009.
See Bouffartigue and Patillon 2003, vol. 2, 144–5.
I am grateful to Liisa Kaski for a discussion on this point.
Here his discussion is not based on quotations. See Bouffartigue and Patillon, 2003, vol. 2, 138.
Edwards 2018, 27, also claiming this about Plutarch.
The claim could also be taken to be that (c) real moral concern can only be based on sympathy (that (b) entails (a)), or that (d) sympathy and moral concern are equivalent. However, against (d), it is possible to extend sympathy to something without assuming rightful claims of justice, for instance, by saying ‘I am sympathetic to their concerns but I do not think they need to be treated with justice’. Conversely, and this also applies to (c) and (a), moral concern need not be based on sympathy.
Osborne 2007, 226. I agree with Edwards 2018, 49, that the relevant argument refers to kinds of foods, not to single ingredients. As I see it, prosperity is connected to Porphyry’s polemics against the Epicureans, who argue for frugality. According to Porphyry, abstinence supports frugality and the Epicureans should argue for it as well (1.48.3–51.7).
This, I take it, is the reason for his claim that killing animals for food would be doubly unjust (3.26.4 at 222.21–4).
Porphyry quotes or adapts a response to the objection that eating meat is necessary for survival from Plutarch (3.18.3) according to which nature accommodates some harm for the necessity of survival, while killing animals for pleasure is ‘total savagery and injustice’ (ibid. at 207.12–13); for the origin of the passage, see Bouffartigue and Patillon 2003, vol. 2, 132–3.
As previously mentioned, I agree on this point with Osborne 2007, 231.
The Peripatetics are mentioned as the target of arguments quoted from Plutarch (3.24.6 at 220.14). Porphyry gives a general definition of expressive speech or communication (3.3.2 at 188.17–20) that resembles what Aristotle says about statements in De interpretatione 16a2–3, Minio-Paluello; cf. ibid., 17a23, possibly indicating that this is why Peripatetics are included among the adversaries.
For the claim that rationality is one (but not the only) reason for Porphyry to include animals in justice, see Sorabji 1993, 156 and Girgenti 2001, 76–7. Thus, the claim by Edwards 2014; 2016, 265 according to which it is the majority view that rationality is Porphyry’s reason for including animals in justice seems exaggerated.
Edwards 2014; 2016. Riin Sirkel 2021 argues against Edwards that, although arguments for animal rationality are quoted from other sources, Porphyry can accept a similar view. Edwards 2016 need not disagree with Sirkel on this, since she takes Porphyry to grant that if animals are capable of perception and memory, they can be assumed to be rational in this restricted sense (Edwards’ reading of 3.1.4 at 187.14–17). However, this does not mean full Platonic rationality that requires cognition of Platonic forms that Porphyry himself endorses in his commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics 14.25–6; 15.5–6, Barker. See also Chiaradonna 2007, 229 n. 71; Chase 2010.
See note 47 above.
For the dissimilarity claim in Stoic sources, see Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7.129.6–8 (Long).
As Sorabji 1993, 156 has argued.
Consider also similarities in soul in Abst. 3.8 and in bodies in Abst. 3.7.
On the hierarchy in Plotinus, Enn. 1.2 [19] on which Porphyry elaborates, see O’Meara 2019, 78–86.
Edwards 2018, 44. Osborne 2007, 227 does not reject moral concern for animals altogether but takes it to be subordinated to Porphyry’s primary concern for the agent’s moral and intellectual health, both of which are negatively affected by indulgence in bodily pleasures and violations of justice. Cf. Goldin 2001.
On the various developments of the ideal and for more references, see Torri 2019, 233. For problems in the ideal, see Annas 1999, 56–71.
Baltzly 2004, 297 suspects that the ideal of godlikeness explains why there has not been a modern development of Platonic virtue ethics. For the claim that the goal is not other-worldly, see also, e.g., Sedley 1999, 309–10; Baltzly 2004, 297–8; Armstrong 2004. The claim that Plotinus formulates an ethical stance that is ‘distinctly self-centered and other-worldly’ has been made by Dillon 1996, 320.
Edwards 2016; 2018, 46; 50; 53.
Porphyry says that Aristotle claims this ‘somewhere’. The reference is usually taken to be to History of Animals 588a18–31. However, in that passage, Aristotle does not say that the difference in reason is one in degree. I cannot pursue this point in further detail in this context.
Porphyry mentions refraining from harming one’s neighbour (
For the general difficulty in reconciling theoretical virtue with virtues of external action, see Baltzly 2004, 301–3. He talks about the tension between the ‘spiritual’ and the ‘ethical’ ideal in Plotinus and Proclus’ solution to it (ibid., 306–19). Of Porphyry’s works, Baltzly, ibid., 303–5, discusses the Sentences but not On abstinence. Torri 2019 argues against such a tension in middle Platonism. For a seminal discussion, see Annas 1999, 56–71.
This is why eating plants is not equally contaminating; they do not involve contamination through mixture of sentience and its opposite.
The passage is also mentioned by Osborne 2007, 227.
On the ban on taking our own lives, see Abst. 1.38.2 and 2.47.1. It would probably be unjust to ourselves as well; cf. 3.26.13.
Dombrowski 1987.
Pradeau (2003, 123) perhaps means something similar with respect to Plotinus on assimilation when he refers to the soul’s unification with the Intellect as our goal. For arguments that Porphyry does not require abstinence from harming animals from philosophers only, see Marechal, forthcoming.
Many people have read or heard earlier versions of the paper, and I would like to extend my gratitude to all. I would especially like to thank Julia Annas, Dominic O’Meara and Ashton Green, as well as the editors and anonymous referees for comments, criticism and support, and Johannes Nyström for the arrows. All shortcomings are obviously my own.
