Abstract
This article provides an analysis of the COVID-19 discourse within six European populist parties from Spain, Germany, and France, with the aim of shedding light on the diverse interpretations and presentations of the pandemic by these parties. While most studies focus on right-wing or far-right populism, this study looks at both right and left ideologies paired with populism. By applying the discourse-historical approach of critical discourse studies, we highlight similarities and differences across the right-left political spectrum, as well as variations within and between different countries. The study contributes thus to the existing literature on populism and extends our understanding of the relationship between populist parties and the pandemic beyond right-wing populist parties only. Results, consistent with previous research, show that the host ideology decisively shapes parties’ discourses about COVID-19 and the need to consider alternative perspectives in populism research.
1 Introduction
In today’s globalised world, the effects of crises spread like wildfire across national borders. International crises, therefore, offer a unique opportunity to compare how exogenous shocks are dealt with in different political contexts. As populist parties in particular thrive, if not even depend, on crises,1 the link between populism and various aspects of the recent COVID-19 crisis is of great interest to social scientists.2 Early on in the pandemic there was speculation about the reaction and response of populists to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was quickly followed by various scientific studies.3 Because populist political discourses can have an impact on societies and might indirectly influence policies, they are particularly relevant in the pandemic context. Populist parties are known to gain influence not only through formal political power but also by shaping narratives that clearly bear the mark of their political agenda.4 Studies on populist discourses about the pandemic, however, mainly focus on right-wing or far-right actors,5 while left-wing parties6 are rarely analysed. Moreover, to the authors’ knowledge, no study compares patterns of discourse on COVID-19 of both left-wing and right-wing populist parties in different European countries – a research gap this study aims to fill by addressing the following research question: How do right-wing and left-wing populist parties in Spain, Germany, and France frame the COVID-19 pandemic? The case selection of six populist parties – one right-wing and one left-wing in each of the European countries studied – during the first year of the pandemic allowed the comparison not only of different types of populism, but also the role of the national context. The discourse-historical approach (DHA) of critical discourse studies (CDS) is chosen for this study, because it enables the identification and analysis of discursive strategies (e.g. argumentation), integrates historical contextualisation, allows for an examination of power dynamics, and promotes a critical understanding of societal issues by examining how language impacts and constructs social phenomena. We focused on online communication of left-wing and right-wing populist parties. Based on the existing literature presented below,7 populist communication is expected to reflect populist ideology and the contextual heterogeneity of the contemporary right-wing and left-wing political spectrum. The study contributes thus to existing literature on populism and extends our understanding of the relationship between populist parties and the pandemic beyond right-wing populist parties only.8 Moreover, our study contributes to the empirical literature on the ideational approach to populism by highlighting distinctions and commonalities in the discourse of left- and right-wing populist parties across three distinct European nations.
After a short overview of the concept of populism and current literature findings, the data and methods employed in the study are outlined, followed by the presentation of the results. Finally, a discussion will interpret the discourse on COVID-19, comparing argumentation strategies within and across party families and national contexts.
2 Theoretical Approach and State of the Art
2.1 Defining the Concept of Populism
Populism is a term that has been defined and interpreted differently in the literature, leading to a wide array of categorizations regarding whether a political actor can be labelled as populist. We base our case selection on the classification scheme to 66 parties in 33 countries elaborated by Zulianello.9 He applies the ideational approach which is based on Mudde’s definition of populism10 as a thin-centred ideology ‘that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’. As posited by the ideational approach, populism is fundamentally grounded in two central tenets: ‘anti-elitism’ and ‘people-centrism’.11 The former entails a critical view of ‘the elite’ class, typically characterized as being corrupt and malevolent, while the latter centers on the glorification of populist leaders as the authentic representatives of ‘the people’. Additionally, popular sovereignty is seen ‘as the only legitimate source of political power’.12 Therefore, even though populism as a thin-centred ideology has been criticised as a barrier to understanding the complexities of populism in its various manifestations or as being limited in its concept’s applicability to the far-right in Europe,13 it is one of the dominating concepts in the literature. In addition, it is useful especially for the comparison of left- and right-wing populist parties.
Against this background the concepts of ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ are often described as empty vessels,14 thus, populism is typically attached to a host ideology that provides central references on policy positions and how ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’ are constructed.15 In general, the categories of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ are elastic and can shift in relation to what politicians use them for and they could be described as ‘imagined entities’.16 Therefore, populism manifests itself on both sides of the political spectrum as it is not tied to specific ideological positions.17 The differentiation between left-wing and right-wing is a key classification criterion in the literature.18 Both right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) and left-wing populist parties (LWPPs) claim to restore democracy, with the latter favouring international cooperation and the former focusing on national sovereignty and rejecting supranational institutions.19 A unifying feature of both right- and left-wing populism is the vertical delineation (‘us’ versus ‘the elite’) as well as the enemy images of globalisation or Americanisation (e.g. in Europe). The horizontal delineation (‘us’ versus ‘the other’) toward immigrants and minorities is exclusively a characteristic of RWPPs,20 who typically exclude immigrants and minorities from the concept of ‘the people’, defining it primarily in cultural terms and following a nativist concept. In contrast, in line with left-wing ideology, LWPPs take an inclusive approach to ‘the people’ (e.g., including immigrants and minorities), mostly relying on class terms and advocating for state intervention in the economy and redistribution of wealth.21
2.2 Populist Communication about COVID-19 in Europe
Leading populist actors such as former US President Donald Trump and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro famously downplayed the dramatic nature of the pandemic, presenting easy solutions to its management,22 and publicly doubting science regarding the spread and danger of COVID-19.23 However, current literature suggests that downplaying the issue was not always the norm,24 as many European RWPPs reacted to the outbreak of the pandemic with alarmism. The literature suggests that a relevant factor regarding the differences in the responses and framing of the crisis is whether populists were right-wing, left-wing, in power or in opposition.25 However, different assessments have been conducted and generalised statements seem very difficult,26 also because the argumentations were not always consistent. Indeed, far-right parties in opposition loudly accused national governments of responding with measures that were too weak, too late or too slow, while at the same time they heavily criticised anti-COVID-19 measures such as lockdowns as threats to democracy.27
Wondreys and Mudde illustrate various topics raised by RWPPs in their discourses about the pandemic.28 Several parties highlighted the foreign origin of COVID-19 through openly anti-Chinese rhetoric, framed immigration as one of the main causes of the pandemic, attacked minority groups for endangering the ‘native’ population,29 used war or religious metaphors, blamed the governments for being anti-democratic, or accused the European Union (EU) of instrumentalising the pandemic to undermine national sovereignty. As posited by Bobba and Hubé, RWPPs in Europe have identified novel lines of conflict, such as the dichotomy of ‘us, the national people’ not only pitted against the EU, but also in opposition to other member states.30 At the same time, old lines of conflict were re-emphasised, such as the dualism between us (‘we’) and them (‘the others, the immigrants’),31 where the latter are often depicted as scapegoats spreading the disease.32 Or some actors used this (and other crises) to delegitimise ‘incompetent elites who harm the economy and the sovereignty of the nation’.33 Both the rhetoric and its content focusing on threats and attacks on ‘elites’ are feeding nativism and can be ultimately traced back to the us/them dichotomy.34 LWPPs attracted less scholarly investigations,35 however Bobba and Hubé noted that these had a stronger focus on protesting against the lack of public investment in national healthcare systems and the disastrous consequences of EU neoliberalism.36
In sum, a common trait of populist parties across the political spectrum is that they tried to politicise the pandemic to strengthen their positions by building social antagonism and depicting themselves as the only ones capable of dealing with the crisis.37 Indeed, political opportunism seems often to be key here. In most cases, populist parties tried to link the COVID-19 crisis to their existing narratives of grievances, by deepening conflicts and polarisation, or even by attacking and undermining liberal and democratic institutions.38 As populists’ responses and discourses about the pandemic varied according to the context they operated in, and empirical research is scarce, especially when it comes to comparing parties across the political spectrum,39 this paper contributes to this research by focusing on both right-wing and left-wing populist parties in different national contexts in Europe.
3 Materials and Methods
To compare right-wing and left-wing populist parties within and across countries, we concentrated on three Western European countries that have parties on both sides of the political spectrum as inclusion criterium.40 Our data corpus comprises two types of documents, namely (1) social media posts and (2) press releases from the parties’ official websites. This selection reflects our aim to achieve a deeper understanding of each party’s external communication and discourse about COVID-19. To cover the first year of the pandemic in Europe, our analysis was restricted to the timeframe spanning from February 2020 to February 2021.
Spain (Vox and Podemos), Germany (Alternative for Germany, henceforth AfD, and The Left), and France (National Rally, henceforth RN, and La France Insoumise, henceforth LFI) were selected for analysis. It is worth mentioning that, with the exception of Podemos, all analysed parties were in the opposition during this period. The three RWPPs (Vox, AfD, and RN) can also be considered radical-right parties, while the LWPPs (Podemos, The Left, and LFI) combine populism with different forms of socialism.41 Exclusion criteria were linked to the absence of either one of the two categories (i.e., RWPPs or LWPPs) (e.g., Austria, and Ireland), to limited data availability (e.g. Italy, where individual populist politicians show a high presence in social media, but often not much is posted on the official party Facebook page), or to limited language skills as well as restricted knowledge of the context situation by the authors (e.g. Greece).
First, we downloaded Facebook posts between 01.02.2020 and 01.02.2021 containing the keywords ‘Coronavirus, COVID-19, virus, pandemic, Corona’ in the respective languages from the parties’ official Facebook pages via CrowdTangle, a public insights tool owned and operated by Facebook.42 For each party, we identified the two months with the highest frequency of posts. Subsequently, according to the highest number of interactions, a maximum of 25 posts were selected for each of these months. Second, we collected press releases containing the same keywords from each party’s official webpage and randomly selected two press releases (if possible) for each month between February 2020 and February 2021 for each party. Table 1 reports the text corpus for each party. The exception is the Spanish Podemos, where only one press release could be found on the website for the period under review.43 For this party, therefore, a total of 83 Facebook posts (published throughout the year of investigation) were analysed in addition to the single press release.
Text corpus for the discourse analysis
Citation: Populism 6, 2 (2023) ; 10.1163/25888072-bja10049
As a main methodological tool, we adopted the discourse-historical approach (DHA) by following a classical two-step analysis.44 The DHA was considered the most fitting to address our research question, as it considers how social power relations are carried out through language use, as well as how discourse-based distinctions between us and them are actualised.45 In line with the literature, we regard ‘(a) macro-topic relatedness (here, the discourse about the pandemic), (b) pluri-perspectivity (sceptics of COVID-19 measures and those accepting the suggestions of scientists concerning the pandemic) and (c) argumentativity (these various viewpoints providing justifications for their positions) as constitutive elements of discourse’.46 We adopted this framework throughout the analysis of contributions to the discourse about COVID-19 by RWPPs and LWPPs. DHA allowed us to delve beyond the immediate language or text and consider inter-textual relationships. Through individual case investigations and a comparative perspective, we gained insights into the similarities and differences by utilizing contextual information. DHA enabled us to understand the significance of these contributions within their specific socio-historical contexts.
In the first step we focused on what is referred to as topic analysis within the DHA.47 Using QSR Nvivo®, we employed an inductive coding process to identify and code the macro topics that were addressed in the posts and press releases, considering the quantitative salience of such codes, e.g., ‘critique of the government’, ‘immigration’ or ‘health care system’. Coding was done by three authors and two research assistants with joint discussions being held regularly. Subsequently, our study undertook an in-depth analysis of how these topics were debated by concentrating specifically on the discursive strategy of argumentation.48 This relates to the content-related argumentation schemes used in the discourse about COVID-19, specifically the use of so called topoi (singular topos).49 Topoi link a premise (data) to the assertion that best describes the argument, thus are compiled by conclusion rules outlined in an ‘if-then’ form.50 This way we could identify key argumentation schemes underlying the parties’ communication about the pandemic.51 The focus of the analysis was the comparison of the argumentation patterns between the different political parties of the same ideological category as well as between left-wing and right-wing populism. In other words, our aim was to identify similarities as well as differences between parties across and within national contexts.
4 Analysis
4.1 Right-Wing Populist Parties
Figure 1 presents a first overview of the presence of COVID-19 in the social media communication of the three RWPPs. The figure shows that the Spanish party Vox posted most content on the topic in the early months of the pandemic in March and April 2020, and then continuously less, with almost no posts from 2021 onwards. Regarding the social media presence of the studied right-wing populist parties, one can see that the AfD posted predominantly during the initial stages of the pandemic in March 2020, followed by a relatively quiet period throughout the summer of 2020. However, the topic’s prominence exhibited a marked increase during the early stages of 2021. Notably, the French RN party’s social media activity stood out, with a comparatively small total number of Facebook posts when compared to Vox and AfD. The party’s highest number of posts was recorded in April 2020, with a limited number or absence of posts concerning COVID-19 during the remainder of 2021.
Absolute number of Facebook posts containing the keywords ‘Coronavirus, COVID-19, virus, pandemic, Corona’ of Vox, AfD, and RN
Citation: Populism 6, 2 (2023) ; 10.1163/25888072-bja10049
4.1.1 Vox
Table 2 reveals both the variety of topics that Vox addressed in its discourse about COVID-19 and the fierce criticism that characterised it. Vox focussed on underlying issues, problems, and the negative aspects of the health crisis management. In particular, the first topic ‘critique of the government’, which includes many different aspects, is by far the main topic of Vox. It often accuses the government of mistakes in the management of the health crisis and speaks for instance of ‘Shamelessness, helplessness, mismanagement and lack of coordination’ (Press release (hereafter PR), 21/05/20).52 In addition to the government, other actors – such as experts, politicians, and the left – as well as concrete COVID-19 containment measures, or lack thereof, were criticised. The issue of immigration, much discussed by RWPPs, also played a prominent role in Vox’s COVID-19 discourse.
Topics and their weighting in the analysed texts from Vox about the macro-topic of COVID-19. ‘Frequencies’ indicate the total number of times the respective topic was raised in the texts
Citation: Populism 6, 2 (2023) ; 10.1163/25888072-bja10049
Against this background, which offers a broad overview of Vox’s discourse about COVID-19, we now move on to the in-depth analysis, where we mainly focused on the analysis of discursive strategy of argumentation, i.e., topoi (see section 3). The most recurring argument in Vox’s discourse about COVID-19 is the topos of the inability of the government (‘if the government is not able to manage the pandemic, then the people are in danger’), which is strongly connected to the discourse topic ‘critique of the government’ and claims that by mismanaging the pandemic, the government seriously damaged Spaniards’ health and finances. Vox wrote ‘this government is incapable of protecting Spaniards. No adequate protective equipment. No masks or gloves for all citizens. No massive tests for the population. Thus, we will be unable to get out of confinement!’ (Facebook, 21/04/20).53
The topos of comparison (‘if other countries show less infection/death rates, then the Spanish government mismanaged the pandemic’) underlines, through comparisons with other countries, that Spain has the highest number of deaths per inhabitant and, above all, that people working in the healthcare sector have been infected. Moreover, the government and its experts are criticised for frequently changing their stance on the use of masks. The topos different anti-COVID-19 measures (‘if different anti-COVID-19 measures were implemented, Spain would fare better’) is very present and it is used to criticise both too many and too few measures; it complains about the alarm state, but calls for additional measures, such as better control of airports, massive PCR testing, and protection of sick and vulnerable people. With the topos of fake numbers (‘if the numbers of infections/dead published are fake, the government has shaken off its responsibility’) the government was accused of instrumentalising fake news and the tool of the state of alarm to hide information and to preserve its own power (see e.g., PR, 31/07/20).54 Lastly, with the topos of immigration (‘if immigration is not managed better/limited, immigrants will bring COVID-19’), Vox labelled the immigrants as COVID-19 carriers to Spain, and also criticised the incoherence of a government that takes measures for Spaniards but not ‘for those who resist the law’, i.e., in their view, immigrants (see PR, 21/09/20).55
4.1.2 Alternative for Germany
The AfD stands out for the length of its posts (measured in the number of words), which by far surpass those of the other parties. Table 3 gives an overview of the most frequent topics the AfD used in their discourse about COVID-19.
Our analysis of the AfD indicated a marked inclination towards criticizing the prevailing political situation and the COVID-19 containment measures, with comments frequently centering on the alleged mismanagement of the crisis, delayed responses, or ineffective measures. The criticism extended beyond the handling of the pandemic, with the government often personified through the former Chancellor, Angela Merkel (2005–2021), receiving broader criticism. Additionally, topics concerning personal freedom during lockdowns and the state of the German healthcare system also emerged as salient issues. The AfD included the topic of vaccinations as well as a critique on immigration, while claiming that other countries fared better than Germany.
Topics and their weighting in the analysed texts from the AfD about the macro-topic of COVID-19. ‘Frequencies’ indicate the total number of times the respective topic was raised in the texts
Citation: Populism 6, 2 (2023) ; 10.1163/25888072-bja10049
The topos of the inadequacy of the government (‘if the government is not able to manage the pandemic, then people are in danger’) is the most prominent. From the AfD’s perspective, the government put Germany’s economy and society at risk: ‘Angela Merkel and the whole federal government are detrimental to our society. They are ruining our country!’ (PR, 20/04/2020).56 The topos of crisis by restrictions (‘if the restriction measures weren’t this harsh, the crisis would not be as big’) is also very well represented in the text corpus. The AfD criticised the imposed restrictions as damaging the people more than the virus itself. A party politician put it as follows: ‘What bothers me is that so many people in positions of responsibility in politics obviously think that it is permissible to impose pretty much any restrictions in times of a pandemic’ (Facebook, 23/01/2021).57
Even though on some rare occasions the AfD criticised the government for downplaying the pandemic, complaints about the government imposing too many restrictions were far more widespread. This contradiction was pointed out also by other studies,58 which illustrated that while during the very first months of the crisis the AfD pleaded for stricter measures to curb the pandemic, by late April 2020 it had widely started criticising the government for enforcing those same measures, claiming that they would disregard civil rights and endanger the economy. Connected to this is the topos of individual freedom (‘if the government imposes strict containment measurements, everyone loses their personal freedom’), and the AfD even defended those who actively demonstrated for a ‘protection of freedom’, because ‘we are not subjects’ (Facebook, 23/01/2021)59 and democracy was at risk. With the topos of destruction of the economy (‘if the government restricts its people, the effects on the economy are vicious’) the AfD’s argumentation emphasised that the measures weighed too heavily on the economy and on society, especially on small and family businesses, and that the aid promised by the government was not reaching them (Facebook, 22/03/2021).60 The topos of falling behind (‘if the crisis is managed in the current way, Germany loses its competitiveness compared to other European countries’) underlines that Germany is economically falling behind other countries, and that its coping mechanisms against the pandemic are among the worst.
4.1.3 National Rally
RN’s discourse topics (Table 4) are characterised by harsh criticism of the government, economic, and political patriotism, as well as migration restriction and nationalism. In fact, radical criticism of the government’s pandemic mismanagement can be identified, while the topos of sovereignty (‘if France was a sovereign country, many problems would be easily solvable/not exist’) emerges transversally throughout all topics. The notion of ‘sanitary sovereignty’, which is, in RN’s view, a national goal to pursue, is mostly related to in-home production of medical supplies and health services. With the topos of public health and safety (‘if the government continues its poor pandemic management, public health is at risk’) RN accused the government of putting individual’s lives and the country’s health at risk: the measures implemented, such as testing stations, vaccine provision or mask availability, were considered insufficient. Similarly, with the topos of severity (‘if we want to get out of the pandemic, we need stricter measures’) RN positioned itself, in a rhetoric of war, as the defender of state safety, demanding a more offensive strategy against COVID-19.
Topics and their weighting in analysed texts from RN about the macro-topic of COVID-19. ‘Frequencies’ indicate the total number of times the respective topic was raised in the texts
Citation: Populism 6, 2 (2023) ; 10.1163/25888072-bja10049
Furthermore, through the topos of freedom of movement (‘if prisoners and migrants are released, French people should have the right to get out as well’), the party sharply criticised measures such as the release of prisoners and open national borders, stressing the inequality of freedom of movement between the French and immigrants during the lockdown. Moreover, the health crisis was downplayed in the face of larger perceived societal crises including migration and religion. This can be summed up by the topos of Islamisation (‘if we do not stop immigration, Europe will be Islamised’) and the topos of social crisis (‘if we do not close our borders, our society will be in danger of extinction’).
Patriotism emerged on several occasions in RN’s discourses. The topos of anti-globalisation (‘if we do not stop globalisation, France and Frenchness will be destroyed’), is accompanied by the topos of national worker support (‘if we support the working class, France will be more just’). Special support and solidarity for ‘simple and traditional’ professions such as farmers, fishermen and car-assembly workers were demanded quite frequently. However, the main focus was on healthcare professionals, which, according to the RN, the government failed to protect, e.g., because of mask shortages. Moreover, the topos of the EU (‘if France was not in the EU, it would be better off’) provides another antagonist to consolidate RN’s nationalist political program as, according to RN, the EU is to blame for the crisis. However, shutdown of global economic supply chains and the closing of borders were also considered a possible trigger for de-globalising the country and viewed as a means for France to gain a more sovereign standing, resulting in the topos of re-nationalisation (‘if globalisation is reversed, France will profit’).
4.2 Left-Wing Populist Parties
Figure 2 depicts a notable disparity in the quantity of Facebook posts concerning COVID-19 among the three analysed LWPPs. As this figure reveals and like its right-wing counterpart, the Spanish party Podemos had the highest number of posts during the initial months of the pandemic until September 2020, after which the number of posts gradually decreased until February 2021. In comparison, the Germany party The Left had an average of 20 posts per month in April, May, October, and December 2020, and fewer in the remaining months. The French LFI, like RN, posted the least, with a continuous decrease from March until July and a small increase around the turn of the year.
Absolute number of Facebook posts containing the keywords ‘Coronavirus, COVID-19, virus, pandemic, Corona’ of the analysed left-wing populist parties
Citation: Populism 6, 2 (2023) ; 10.1163/25888072-bja10049
4.2.1 Podemos
Podemos, Spain’s LWPP, frequently criticised the People’s Party (PP, a centre-right party in opposition) and its member Isabel Díaz Ayuso, for mismanaging the pandemic in the capital. It also criticized Vox for inventing hoaxes and downplaying the seriousness of COVID-19. Podemos pointed out that the health crisis further widened inequalities, particularly related to work and employment.
The first topos identified in the in-depth analysis is the topos of fake news (‘if fake news about the pandemic is spread, this will harm democracy and the government’): Podemos claimed that far-right (e.g. Vox) and right-wing (e.g. PP) parties spread lies and fake news to harm the government and endanger democracy. The topos of social justice (‘if social justice is in force, the pandemic can be managed better’) recognises that the pandemic has reinforced existing inequalities, but also presents an opportunity to emerge stronger by addressing these issues. The topos of learning (‘if we strengthen the public health system, then we have learned something from the pandemic’) goes in a similar direction, as Podemos pointed to the urgent need to invest in public healthcare. Two main aspects were addressed: the staff and their working conditions, which should be improved, and the public healthcare services, which need to be strengthened. Lastly, the topos of privatisation (‘if public services are privatised, it will have negative consequences for the common good’) goes in a similar direction, as Podemos argued that the pandemic illustrated that privatisation of public services such as healthcare is not in the general interest, as only a strong public system guarantees healthcare for all.
Topics and their weighting in analysed texts from Podemos about the macro-topic of COVID-19. ‘Frequencies’ indicate the total number of times the respective topic was raised in the texts
Citation: Populism 6, 2 (2023) ; 10.1163/25888072-bja10049
4.2.2 The Left
As shown in Table 6, The Left most prominently blamed the current government and its COVID-19 containment measures. More specifically, the party frequently discussed economic effects on individuals and small businesses, wages/income of workers in the social sector, and reforms in the healthcare sector to mitigate future pandemics. They also addressed social issues and called for changes and solutions.
Topics and their weighting in analysed texts from the Left about the macro-topic of COVID-19. ‘Frequencies’ indicate the total number of times the respective topic was raised in the texts
Citation: Populism 6, 2 (2023) ; 10.1163/25888072-bja10049
Most prominent is the topos of healthcare heroines and heroes (‘if healthcare workers are appreciated more, health crises can be mitigated better’), where it was argued that greater appreciation of healthcare professionals is needed to handle current and future health crises, and this should be accompanied by higher wages to incentivise people to work in healthcare and feel valued by society.
Through the topos of resilience (‘if we want to be prepared for other crises, we need societal/structural change’), The Left called for systematic and structural change to prevent and mitigate similar events. Germany ‘needs social security above all! Everything must be cushioned socially’ (Facebook, 30/04/2020).61 The Left also used the topos of wrong emphasis (‘if we don’t help the right people/institutions, the aid is not working’) to underline that the government’s aid was misdirected: instead of helping everyone, it focused on supporting big companies, at the expenses, e.g., of social services. It even called the reaction to the crisis ‘class politics’ (Facebook, 30/04/2020).62
4.2.3 La France Insoumise
LFI’s discourse was characterised by four main topics (see Table 7), ranging from critique of the government to a very strong citizen mobilisation and to many proposals of concrete measures against the pandemic, entangling a profound and harsh critique of the French government and other actors of economic liberalism, such as the EU and the pharmaceutical industry.
Topics and their weighting in analysed texts from LFI about the macro-topic of COVID-19. ‘Frequencies’ indicate the total number of times the respective topic was raised in the texts
Citation: Populism 6, 2 (2023) ; 10.1163/25888072-bja10049
Following in-depth analysis, the topos of solidarity (‘if we are in solidarity with each other, we will be able to get out of the pandemic’) emerged in light of the recurrence of two major campaigns launched by LFI during the COVID-19 pandemic: namely the hashtag ‘#PlusJamaisCa’ (Never again),63 entailing a public call for low-threshold support, solidarity amongst citizens and collective mobilisation against the pandemic. The topos of solidarity appears multiple times, both generally as the main response to the crisis, as well as more specifically directed to healthcare workers. Finally, solidarity was also considered the antidote to Macron’s ‘nationalist’ rhetoric of war utilised during the first year of the pandemic. By adopting such an approach, LFI presented itself as solution-oriented and collective-minded. In fact, within the topos of solutions (‘if we apply our measures, we can handle the pandemic’), LFI put forth a list of eleven specific measures to address the pandemic, which included economic, social, environmental, cultural, and rights-related points.64 Moreover, the party demanded public health and protection investments, a nationwide ban on employee dismissals, as well as financial measures to safeguard the poor.
The topos of revolution (‘if we reach a critical mass, we can change the system’) shows LFI’s engagement-focus and calls for local, regional, and national citizen action through various associations, trade unions, and political groups. Thereby, inclusion, participation and involvement of all people were stressed, expressing a strong will for institutional and social change. In fact, the topos of alternative society (‘if we change the system, our society will be more just’) depicts a more just and equal world after COVID-19 where economic liberalism is overthrown. Indeed, the topos of anti-capitalism (‘if we end capitalism, wellbeing for all will be possible’) is rhetorically directed against austerity policies as well as against the EU and the French government: both were criticised for not supporting the poor and the workers enough during the pandemic. Additionally, a fear of a loss of social rights because of COVID-19 restrictions and a general preoccupation with precarity is noticeable under the topos of social preoccupation (‘if the government continues this way, individual rights may be restricted and social precarity will spread’). Indeed, LFI embedded the COVID-19 crisis into a wider socio-economic crisis focusing especially on poverty, unemployment, and the struggles of disadvantaged families. In this case, LFI included notions of the climate crisis as well as democratic decline into its topos of multiple crises (‘if we do not act, multiple crises will put society in danger’).
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this article we addressed how LWPPs and RWPPs in Spain, Germany, and France framed the pandemic and how discourses varied across countries and across the right-left political spectrum. We argue that there are substantial heterogeneities in populists’ discourses about COVID-19 which can be linked to the host ideology (left-wing and right-wing) and to some extent to the COVID-19 situation in the respective countries. Just as Resende65 argues, populists are known to fuel social antagonism and tend to position themselves as those knowing how to solve critical situations best. This was observable among all parties in opposition, which repeatedly criticised the government, undermining its capacity to manage the pandemic. RWPPs widely attacked governments’ COVID-19 containment measures without proposing alternative solutions, while although spreading criticism, LWPPs tended to also suggest alternative measures, targeting in particular social aspects, and including workers’ perspectives and needs. The only exception was Podemos, in power during the period in question, which criticised the opposition for its COVID-19 measures at the local level.
Overall, results demonstrate that the host ideology decisively shapes parties’ discourses about COVID-19, aligning with existing literature on the interplay between populism and host ideology.66 The three RWPPs consistently incorporated their far-right agenda into their discussions, often highlighting immigrants as an additional threat. Conversely, all three LWPPs placed greater emphasis on social, equality, and healthcare issues in their communication, advocating systemic changes to enhance resilience against similar future crises, which is in line with results from previous studies.67 In sum, regardless of some differences in identifying specific vulnerable groups, all parties recognized the need to protect vulnerable segments of society through appropriate COVID-19 measures.
We observed that the communication of COVID-19 by the six parties appeared to be mostly superficial. Indeed, the DHA suggested that some of the arguments were rather weak and that it was challenging to identify a performative element in these discourses. There could be several reasons behind this, such as the novelty of the topic, the general unfamiliarity with the pandemic, and the numerous uncertainties that affected society, particularly during the analyzed period. Moreover, our reliance on social media data, along with press releases, may have contributed to the occasional perception of shallow communication by the parties. However, we want to tie in here and turn possible limitation into an opportunity and leverages to improve future populism research. We argue that the ideational approach of populism – focusing especially on the definition of the ‘true people’ for the division of left-wing and right-wing parties – has restrictive characteristics. The ‘true people’ are characteristically different for RWPPs and LWPPs, which might limit the validity of the role of populism versus the role of the host ideology. Populism has distinctive elements in all six cases presented here, which include exclusionism, economic nationalism, ‘my nation first’ arguments which might further develop and strengthen. In line with Schroeder, we argue that the exclusion of populism as a lasting ideology, i.e., taking it ‘seriously’ only in connection with a host ideology, hinders an open discussion on the role, influence, and discourses of populism.68 In line with previous research, our findings reveal that both Vox and Podemos in Spain strongly criticised political opponents, accusing them, among other things, of mismanagement and misinformation. Both parties expressed support for vulnerable groups. Vox had a strong focus on Spaniards’ welfare and called for stronger measures to contain the perceived threat posed by immigrants. Podemos, with a more tempered populist rhetoric, strived to achieve labour protection, social justice, and equality, with a focus on healthcare. Apart from ideological divergences, differences in discourse between the two parties could also be attributed to the parties’ contrasting positions of power, with Podemos serving in the government and Vox in opposition.69
Both the AfD and the Left in Germany criticised the government, however with significant differences. The AfD decisively contested the government for its antidemocratic and ‘authoritarian’ pandemic management,70 with a focus on the national economy. The Left, despite some criticism of the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 containment measures and pressure to, for example, focus more on workers’ wages, especially in the healthcare sector, did not accuse the government of threatening civil freedom.71 The 2022 regional elections in Germany showed significant setbacks for the AfD, confirming Forchtner and Özvatan’s claim that the party’s communication strategies about the pandemic did not seem to resonate with their voters.72
In France, RN stands out for including party stances in their communication about the pandemic through the topoi of sovereignty, of Islamisation, of anti-globalisation, of the EU, and of re-nationalisation. Froio argues that the RN’s lack of an immediate response to COVID-19 resulted in a loss in consensus.73 However, the outcomes of the April 2022 presidential elections in France, where RN finished only slightly behind Macron’s party,74 hints that the pandemic has not curbed populists’ popularity, as RN managed to reach a broader audience beyond its ideological bubble. Both RN and LFI pled for more support for workers (especially in the healthcare sector) and referred to multiple crises and concerns (end-of-world rhetoric) in an anti-globalisation, anti-EU, and anti-Macron direction. Notably, RN avoided disparaging experts and scientists, and rather focused on the government’s inability to follow their advice.75 Both parties, however, raised distinct contentions. While LFI strived for inclusion and identified the ecological crisis, democratic decline and people’s impoverishment as further crises, the RN focused instead on Frenchness and tradition, threatened by the crises of Islamisation and immigration.
This study provides empirical evidence that both left and right-wing populist parties strategically shape their discourses about COVID-19 for ideological purposes. These findings support the hypothesis that populism will have a significant impact on post-pandemic dynamics in Europe.76 Despite variations among countries, populist parties leverage the uncertainties generated by the pandemic to polarize and mobilize citizens. Common features observed across populist parties include criticism of the government, support for the working class, apocalyptic rhetoric, and strong anti-globalization sentiments. However, while LWPPs tend to adopt a rather solution-oriented approach and promote socially inclusivity, RWPPs exploit the pandemic to amplify antagonism and promote discrimination. Moreover, whereas long-established populist parties such as RN present concrete argumentation strategies, younger parties such as Vox or the AfD exhibit broader and less specific positions.
Although the individual parties differ fundamentally in their arguments, the comparison of RWPPs and LWPPs also shows the similarities and coherences within each group, especially with regard to their definition of ‘the people’. Whether this alone is enough to challenge the ideational approach of populism is debatable, but it does provide a point of discussion for future research on the connection between host ideology and populism as ideology.
The study’s scope was restricted to three European countries and relied on the analysis of Facebook and press releases using predefined keywords, which may limit its coverage. Nevertheless, the study offers valuable qualitative insights into the rationale and tactics employed by populist parties amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the imminent and potential future crises of geopolitical and climate change origins, investigating the discourses of populist parties during challenging periods becomes increasingly pertinent. This research provides an opportunity to comprehend how ideological messages are constructed and disseminated to citizens across the political spectrum.
Declaration of Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgments
We thank Johanna Mölgg and Alessandra Volgger for their invaluable technical research assistance and Anita Mancini for her literature research.
Author Biography
Mirjam Gruber, a political scientist affiliated with Eurac Research (Italy), specializes in the study of populism and critical discourse studies.
Giulia Isetti holds a PhD in Classics and an MBA, and is a senior researcher at Eurac Research (Italy).
Linda Ghirardello studied political and cultural sciences.
Maximilian Walder is a sociologist at Eurac Research (Italy) with a focus on media, discourses, and sport.
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E.g., Simon Bradford and F.J. Cullen, ‘The Advantages of Chaos: Myth-Making and COVID-19 in Hungary’, Populism 5, no. 2 (6 September 2022): 157–83, https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-bja10037.
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Gianpietro Mazzoleni and Roberta Bracciale, ‘Socially Mediated Populism: The Communicative Strategies of Political Leaders on Facebook’, Palgrave Communications 4, no. 1 (24 April 2018): 1–10, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0104-x; see also Kostiantyn Yanchenko, ‘Conceptualizing a Populist Narrative: Rationales, Attributes, Implications’, Populism 4, no. 2 (14 September 2021): 199–220, https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-bja10024.
Laura Cervi, Fernando García, and Carles Marín-Lladó, ‘Populism, Twitter, and COVID-19: Narrative, Fantasies, and Desires’, Social Sciences 10, no. 8 (August 2021): 294, https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10080294; Christian Lamour and Paul Carls, ‘When COVID-19 Circulates in Right-Wing Populist Discourse: The Contribution of a Global Crisis to European Meta- Populism at the Cross-Border Regional Scale’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 0, no. 0 (13 March 2022): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2022.2051001; Pola Lehmann and Lisa Zehnter, ‘The Self-Proclaimed Defender of Freedom: The AfD and the Pandemic’, Government and Opposition, 30 March 2022, 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2022.5; Jakub Wondreys and Cas Mudde, ‘Victims of the Pandemic? European Far-Right Parties and COVID-19’, Nationalities Papers 50, no. 1 (January 2022): 86–103, https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.93.
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Lehmann and Zehnter, ‘The Self-Proclaimed Defender of Freedom’; Wondreys and Mudde, ‘Victims of the Pandemic?’; Caterina Froio, ‘The Rassemblement National and COVID-19: How Nativism, Authoritarianism and Expert Populism Did Not Pay Off during the Pandemic’, Government and Opposition, 30 March 2022, 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2022.12; Bernhard Forchtner and Özgür Özvatan, ‘De/Legitimising EUrope through the
Performance of Crises: The Far-Right Alternative for Germany on “Climate Hysteria” and “Corona Hysteria”’, Journal of Language and Politics 21, no. 2 (8 March 2022): 208–32, https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.21064.for.
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‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, 543.
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Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America’, Government and Opposition 48, no. 2 (April 2013): 151, https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2012.11.
Carlos de la Torre and Oscar Mazzoleni, ‘Do We Need a Minimum Definition of Populism? An Appraisal of Mudde’s Conceptualization’, Populism 2, no. 1 (7 May 2019): 79–95, https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-02011021.
See e.g., Robert A. Huber et al., ‘Is Populism a Challenge to European Energy and Climate Policy? Empirical Evidence across Varieties of Populism’, Journal of European Public Policy 28, no. 7 (3 July 2021): 998–1017, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1918214.
Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
See e.g., Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London/New York: Verso Books, 1983).
Agnes Akkerman, Andrej Zaslove, and Bram Spruyt, ‘“We the People” or “We the Peoples”? A Comparison of Support for the Populist Radical Right and Populist Radical Left in the Netherlands’, Swiss Political Science Review 23, no. 4 (2017): 377–403, https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12275.
Luke March, ‘Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, no. 2 (1 May 2017): 282–303, https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117701753; Mudde and Kaltwasser, ‘Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism’.
March, ‘Left and Right Populism Compared’.
Mudde and Kaltwasser, ‘Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism’.
Jonathan Hopkin and Mark Blyth, ‘The Global Economics of European Populism: Growth Regimes and Party System Change in Europe (The Government and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro Lecture 2017)’, Government and Opposition 54, no. 2 (April 2019): 193–225, https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.43; March, ‘Left and Right Populism Compared’; Mudde and Kaltwasser, ‘Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism’.
Aline Burni and Eduardo Tamaki, ‘Populist Communication During the Covid-19 Pandemic: The Case of Brazi’s President Bolsonaro’, Partecipazione e Conflitto 14, no. 1 (24 June 2021): 113–31, https://doi.org/10.1285/i20356609v14i1p113; Kumanan Wilson, Sam Halabi, and Lawrence O. Gostin, ‘The International Health Regulations (2005), the Threat of Populism and the COVID-19 Pandemic’, Globalization and Health 16, no. 1 (28 July 2020): 70, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-020-00600-4; Lasco, ‘Medical Populism and the COVID-19 Pandemic’.
Rogers Brubaker, ‘Paradoxes of Populism during the Pandemic’, Intersections-East European Journal of Society and Politics 7, no. 3 (2021): 7–20, https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v7i3.974.
Wondreys and Mudde, ‘Victims of the Pandemic?’; Brett Meyer, ‘Pandemic Populism: An Analysis of Populist Leaders’ Responses to Covid-19’ (Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, August 2020), https://institute.global/policy/pandemic-populism-analysis-populist-leaders-responses-covid-19; Ringe and Rennó, Populists and the Pandemic. How Populists Around the World Responded to COVID-19.
Giuliano Bobba and Nicolas Hubé, ‘Between Mitigation and Dramatization: The Effect of the COVID-19 Crisis on Populists’ Discourses and Strategies’, in Populism and the Politicization of the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe, ed. Giuliano Bobba and Nicolas Hubé (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 131–44, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66011-6_10; Ringe and Rennó, Populists and the Pandemic. How Populists Around the World Responded to COVID-19.
Meyer, ‘Pandemic Populism’.
Wondreys and Mudde, ‘Victims of the Pandemic?’.
Wondreys and Mudde, ‘Victims of the Pandemic?’.
Wondreys and Mudde, 89.
‘Between Mitigation and Dramatization’, 137.
Eunjung Lee and Marjorie Johnstone, ‘Resisting Politics of Authoritarian Populism during COVID-19, Reclaiming Democracy and Narrative Justice: Centering Critical Thinking in Social Work’, International Social Work 64, no. 5 (1 September 2021): 716–30, https://doi.org/10.1177/00208728211011627.
Hakan Ergin, ‘Crisis upon Crisis: Refugees and COVID-19’, International Higher Education, no. 102 (30 April 2020): 9–10.
Forchtner and Özvatan, ‘De/Legitimising EUrope through the Performance of Crises’, 227.
Anna Casaglia and Raffaella Coletti, ‘Territorializing Threats in Nationalist Populist Narratives: An Italian Perspective on the Migration and Covid-19 Crises’, Space and Polity 0, no. 0 (20 October 2021): 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2021.1991783.
Cas Mudde, Populism: An Ideational Approach, The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.1.
Bobba and Hubé, ‘Between Mitigation and Dramatization’.
Erica Simone Almeida Resende, ‘Pandemics as Crisis Performance: How Populists Tried to Take Ownership of the Covid-19 Pandemic’, Mezinárodní Vztahy 56, no. 4 (1 December 2021): 147–57, https://doi.org/10.32422/mv-cjir.1822.
Ringe and Rennó, Populists and the Pandemic. How Populists Around the World Responded to COVID-19.
Bobba and Hubé, ‘Between Mitigation and Dramatization’; Resende, ‘Pandemics as Crisis Performance’.
Zulianello, ‘Varieties of Populist Parties and Party Systems in Europe’.
Zulianello, 329.
The party did not react to our request to provide access to further press releases for the investigated time period.
Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, ‘The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)’, in Methods of Critical Discourse Studies (London: Sage, 2016), 23–61; see e.g., Michał Krzyżanowski, The Discursive Construction of European Identities (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010).
Bernhard Forchtner, ‘Articulations of Climate Change by the Austrian Far Right: A Discourse-Historical Perspective on What Is “Allegedly Manmade”’, in “Europe at the Cross-Road”: Confronting Populist, Nationalist and Global Challenges (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2019), 166; Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, ‘The Discourse-Historical Approach’, in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (London: Sage, 2009), 87–122.
Reisigl and Wodak, ‘The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)’, 27.
Bernhard Forchtner and Özgür Özvatan, ‘Beyond the “German Forest”: Environmental Communication by the Far Right in Germany’, in The Far Right and the Environment (Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2019).
Martin Reisigl, The Discourse-Historical Approach (London: Routledge Handbooks Online, 2017), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315739342.ch3.
See Forchtner, ‘Articulations of Climate Change by the Austrian Far Right: A Discourse- Historical Perspective on What Is “Allegedly Manmade.”’
Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, Discourse and Discrimination. Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), https://www.routledge.com/Discourse-and-Discrimination-Rhetorics-of-Racism-and-Antisemitism/Reisigl-Wodak/p/book/9780415231503.
See Reisigl and Wodak, ‘The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)’; Ruth Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean (55 City Road, London, 2015), https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446270073.
PR, Vox (21/05/20). https://www.voxespana.es/actualidad/vox-reprocha-al-gobierno-los-errores-durante-la-crisis-del-coronavirus-desverguenza-desamparo-desgobierno-y-descoordinacion-20200521 [05/05/2022].
Facebook, Vox (21/04/2020). https://www.facebook.com/467127060059387/posts/2549456345159771 [05/05/2022].
PR, Vox (31/07/20). https://www.voxespana.es/actualidad/el-gobierno-mintio-a-los-espanoles-jamas-existio-un-comite-de-expertos-20200731 [03/03/2022].
PR, Vox (21/09/20). https://www.voxespana.es/actualidad/vox-reprocha-al-gobierno-los-errores-durante-la-crisis-del-coronavirus-desverguenza-desamparo-desgobierno-y-descoordinacion-20200521 [04/05/2022].
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Lehmann and Zehnter, ‘The Self-Proclaimed Defender of Freedom’; Polina Zavershinskaia, ‘Appropriating the Civil Sphere: The Construction of German Collective Identity by Right- Wing Populist Actors during the Covid-19 Pandemic’, American Journal of Cultural Sociology, 4 March 2023, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41290-023-00189-2.
Facebook, AfD (23/01/2021). https://www.facebook.com/540404695989874/posts/395599180443112912/04/2022 [04/05/20220].
Facebook, AfD (22/03/2021). https://www.facebook.com/540404695989874/posts/3068704599826525 [12/04/2022].
Facebook, The Left (20/10/2020). https://www.facebook.com/47694585682/posts/10157189020700683 [16.04.2022].
Facebook, The Left (30/04/2020). https://www.facebook.com/47694585682/posts/10156745660230683 [16.04.2022].
The hashtag’s website launched by LFI Accueil - #PlusJamaisCaas well as the related online demonstration held on 04/04/2020: https://www.facebook.com/events/651474695427272?ref=newsfeed [05/04/2022].
The measures proposed by LFI presented on 20/03/2020: https://lafranceinsoumise.fr/2020/03/20/coronavirus-11-mesures-durgence/?msclkid=a2ff0872c48e11ecb339641002576544 [05/04/2022].
Resende, ‘Pandemics as Crisis Performance’.
Huber et al., ‘Is Populism a Challenge to European Energy and Climate Policy?’; Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism; March, ‘Left and Right Populism Compared’; Anne Küppers, ‘“Climate-Soviets,” “Alarmism,” and “Eco-Dictatorship”: The Framing of Climate Change Scepticism by the Populist Radical Right Alternative for Germany’, German Politics (29 March 2022): 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2022.2056596; Kirsti M. Jylhä and Kahl Hellmer, ‘Right-Wing Populism and Climate Change Denial: The Roles of Exclusionary and Anti-Egalitarian Preferences, Conservative Ideology, and Antiestablishment Attitudes’, Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 20, no. 1 (2020): 315–35, https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12203.
Bobba and Hubé, ‘Between Mitigation and Dramatization’.
Ralph Schroeder, ‘The Dangerous Myth of Populism as a Thin Ideology’, Populism 3, no. 1 (14 February 2020): 13–28, https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-02021042.
See also Carolina Plaza-Colodro and Nicolaz Miranda Olivares, ‘Spain. Different Populist Responses with Similar (and Limited) Outcomes’, in Populists and the Pandemic. How Populists Around the World Responded to COVID-19, Routledge (London, 2022), 79–91.
Zavershinskaia, ‘Appropriating the Civil Sphere’.
See also Marcel Lewandowsky, Christoph Leonhardt, and Andreas Blätte, ‘Germany. The Alternative for Germany in the COVID-19 Pandemic’, in Populists and the Pandemic. How Populists Around the World Responded to COVID-19 (London: Routledge, 2022), 237–49.
Forchtner and Özvatan, ‘De/Legitimising EUrope through the Performance of Crises’.
Froio, ‘The Rassemblement National and COVID-19’.
Le Monde, 25/04/2022. Outcomes of the presidential elections in France: https://www.lemonde.fr/resultats-presidentielle-2022/.
See also Froio, ‘The Rassemblement National and COVID-19’; Marta Lorimer and Ethan vanderWilden, ‘France. Balancing Respectability and Radicalization in a Pandemic’, in Populists and the Pandemic. How Populists Around the World Responded to COVID-19 (Routledge, 2022), 228–36.
See Gilles Ivaldi, ‘Les Inquiétudes Économiques Liées à La Crise Sanitaire Peuvent-Elles Nourrir Le Populisme?’ (Doctoral dissertation, Science Po Paris, 2021).
