What Shifts Epistemic Standards? DeRose on Contextualism, Safety, and Sensitivity

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
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  • McGill University

In The Appearance of Ignorance, Keith DeRose develops a version of epistemic contextualism that combines aspects of both safety and sensitivity theories of knowledge. This paper discusses some potential problems for DeRose’s account stemming from his Rule of Sensitivity, which is meant to model upwards shifts in epistemic standards.

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  • DeRose Keith . 2009. The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  • DeRose Keith . 2017. The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  • Lewis David 1996. “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 549567.

  • Williamson Timothy . 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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