Author: Peter Baumann
View More View Less
  • Swarthmore College

This article discusses Keith DeRose’s treatment of the lottery problem in Chapter 5 of his recent The Appearance of Ignorance. I agree with a lot of it but also raise some critical points and questions and make some friendly proposals. I discuss different ways to set up the problem, go into the difference (quite relevant here) between knowing and ending inquiry, propose to distinguish between two different kinds of lotteries, add to the defense of the idea that one can know lottery propositions, give a critical discussion of DeRose’s contextualist solution to the problem, and support his defense against an absurdity objection with additional arguments.

  • Adler Jonathan E. 1986. “Knowing, Betting and Cohering,” Philosophical Topics 14: 243257.

  • Baumann Peter . 2011. “Epistemic Closure.” In Bernecker Sven & Pritchard Duncan (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, 597608. London: Routledge.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Baumann Peter . 2016. Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Baumann Peter. MS . “Remarks on Stakes.”

  • Bondy Patrick . 2013. “How to Understand and Solve the Lottery Paradox,” Logos & Episteme 4: 283292.

  • Brown Jessica . 2008. “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning,” Noûs 42: 167189.

  • Brueckner Anthony . 2012. “Roush on Knowledge: Tracking Redux?” In Becker Kelly & Black Tim (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, 229241. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Cohen Stewart . 1988. “How to Be a Fallibilist,” Philosophical Perspectives 2: 91123.

  • Collins John . 2006. “Lotteries and the Close Shave Principle.” In Hetherington Stephen (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Epistemological Essays, 8396. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • DeRose Keith . 1995. “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” The Philosophical Review 104: 152.

  • DeRose Keith . 1996. “Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 568580.

  • DeRose Keith . 2017. The Appearance of Ignorance. Knowledge, Skepticism and Context, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Douven Igor . 2007. “A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox,” Philosophy and Phenomenlogical Research 74: 326345.

  • Dudman V.H. 1992. “Probability and Assertion,” Analysis 52: 204211.

  • Ebert Philip A. , Smith Martin & Durbach Ian . 2018. “Lottery Judgments: A Philosophical and Experimental Study,” Philosophical Psychology 31: 110138.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Fischer John M. & Ravizza Mark 1992. “Thomson and the Trolley,” Journal of Social Philosophy 23: 6487.

  • Gettier Edmund L. 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” Analysis 23: 121123.

  • Goldman Alan . 2008. “Knowledge, Explanation, and Lotteries,” Noûs 42: 466481.

  • Goldman Alvin I. 1992. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.” In his Liaisons. Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, 85103. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Greco John . 2003. “Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.” In DePaul Michael & Zagzebski Linda (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, 111134. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Greco John . 2004. “A Different Sort of Contextualism,” Erkenntnis 61: 383400.

  • Harman Gilbert . 1968. “Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation,” American Philosophical Quarterly 5: 164173.

  • Harman Gilbert . 1973. Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  • Harman Gilbert & Sherman Brett . 2004. “Knowledge, Assumptions, Lotteries,” Philosophical Issues 14: 492500.

  • Hawthorne John . 2002. “Lewis, the Lottery, and the Preface,” Analysis 62: 242251.

  • Hawthorne John . 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  • Henry E. Kyburg Jr. 1961. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.

  • Lasonen-Aarnio Maria . 2008. “Single Premise Deduction and Risk,” Philosophical Studies 141: 157173.

  • Lewis David . 1996. “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 549567.

  • Makinson D.C. 1965. “The Paradox of the Preface,” Analysis 25: 205207.

  • McKinnon Rachel . 2013. “Lotteries, Knowledge, and Irrelevant Alternatives,” Dialogue 52: 523549.

  • Mills Eugene . 2012. “Lotteries, Quasi-Lotteries, and Scepticism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90: 335352.

  • Nagel Jennifer . 2011. “The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox,” Philosophers’ Imprint 11.5: 128.

  • Nelkin Dana K. 2000. “The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality,” The Philosophical Review 109: 373409.

  • Olen Jeffrey . 1977. “Knowledge, Probability, and Nomic Connections,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 15: 521526.

  • Olin Doris . 2003. Paradox. Chesham Bucks: Acumen.

  • Olin Doris . 2005. “A Case against Closure,” Veritas 50: 235247.

  • Roush Sherrilyn . 2005. Tracking Truth. Knowledge, Evidence, and Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  • Roush Sherrilyn . 2012. “Sensitivity and Closure.” In Becker Kelly & Black Tim (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, 242268. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Ryan Sharon 1996. “The Epistemic Virtue of Consistency,” Synthese 109: 121140.

  • Stemmer Nathan . 1982. “A Solution to the Lottery Paradox,” Synthese 51: 339353.

  • Timmerman Travis . 2013. “The Persistent Problem of the Lottery Paradox and its Unwelcome Consequences for Contextualism,” Logos & Episteme 4: 85100.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Turri John & Friedman Ori . 2014. “Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries.” In Beebe James R. (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology, 4569. London: Bloomsbury.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Vogel Jonathan 1990. “Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?” In Roth Michael D. & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting. Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism: 1327. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Weintraub Ruth 2001. “The Lottery: A Paradox Regained and Resolved,” Synthese 129: 439449.

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 91 91 48
Full Text Views 7 7 2
PDF Downloads 4 4 2