Scepticism and Self-Detachment

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
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  • 1 University of California, Department of Philosophy, Irvine, United States

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Abstract

This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic faces a dilemma: either he is more detached from himself than the non-Sceptic or he is vulnerable to a non-standard version of the apraxia objection.

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