How not to Argue from Science to Skepticism

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
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For at least several decades, and arguably since the time of Descartes, it has been fashionable to offer scientific or quasi-scientific arguments for skepticism about human knowledge. I critique five attempts to argue for skeptical conclusions from the findings of science and scientifically informed common sense.

How not to Argue from Science to Skepticism

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism



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  • 6

     See also Brueckner (2005). I thank an anonymous referee for alerting me to this article.

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