Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Random Demon Hypothesis

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
View More View Less
  • 1 United States

Login via Institution

According to epistemological disjunctivism I can claim to know facts about the world around me on the basis of my perceptual experience. My possession of such knowledge is incompatible with a number of familiar skeptical scenarios (for example, that I am currently being deceived by an evil demon). So a paradigmatic epistemological disjunctivist perceptual experience should allow me to rule out such incompatible skeptical scenarios. In this paper, I consider skeptical scenarios which both cast doubt on my conviction that I can trust my purported perceptual experiences and appear to be compatible with my enjoying a veridical perceptual experience of my environment. Such skeptical scenarios draw attention to a significant difference between McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism and Pritchard’s. McDowellian epistemological disjunctivism has the resources to rule out such skeptical scenarios but Pritchard’s does not. This is because the Pritchardian epistemological disjunctivist does not, unlike McDowell, insist on the idea that perception is a fallible capacity, self-consciously exercised and possessed, for knowledge.

  • Conant J. (2012). “Two Varieties of Skepticism.” In Abel G. and Conant J. (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology, Volume 2, 173. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Johnston M. (2004). “That Obscure Object of Hallucination,” Philosophical Studies 120: 113183.

  • McDowell J. (2009). “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument.” In his The Engaged Intellect. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • McDowell J. (2010). “Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism,” Philosophical Explorations 13: 243255.

  • McDowell J. (2011). Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge. Milwaukee, WI : Marquette University Press.

  • Neta R. (2008). “In Defence of Disjunctivism.” In Haddock A. and Macpherson F. (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, 311329. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Pritchard D. (2012). Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Pritchard D. (2015). Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our Believing . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 147 40 0
Full Text Views 212 8 0
PDF Downloads 21 4 0