Why Not Persuade the Skeptic? A Critique of Unambitious Epistemology

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Michael Veber
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  • Department of Philosophy, East Carolina University

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What constitutes a solution to the problem of skepticism? It has been traditionally held that one must produce an argument that would rationally persuade skeptical philosophers that they are mistaken. But there is a trend in recent epistemology toward the idea that we can solve the problem without giving skeptics any good reason to change their minds. This is what I call unambitious epistemology. This paper is a critique of that project.

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