Abstract
Similar to other commodities, US sport horses have increasingly been outsourced. The sport horse commodity chain is a long process involving many actors. The data presented document a shift away from US-born horses to those born in Europe. Since the 1980s, the American sport horse market has become a global market. Over $300 million dollars in horses are imported into the United States, and over a third comes from Germany. These foreign horses have uprooted the domestic supply of sport horses, who were US-born ex-racehorses. This research relies on import data to document the transition from a domestic market to a global market. This transformation has wide-reaching implications for the equestrian industry in the US. Through analysis of import statistics, content analysis, and participant observation, data are presented that illustrate how equestrian show jumping changed as a result of the dependence on European supplies of horses.
Nonhuman animals have been traded globally for a variety of reasons since transatlantic transportation became readily available. Horses are some of the animals who were traded, some for sport and some for slaughter. The data presented in this paper illuminate the outsourcing of American show jumpers to Europe that occurred from the 1980s to the present. During this time, the American sport horse market has gone from a regional market to a global market. In 2013, $328,840,914 worth of horses were brought to the United States from foreign sources, and $119,185,046 came solely from Germany.
The figures represent a shift away from domestic sources. The supply of American show jumpers used to be retired thoroughbred race horses born in the United States, but that supply has been uprooted by a steady stream of European horses. This outsourcing is consequential for the sport of show jumping. Despite a steady supply of former race horses, today exorbitant prices are paid for imported European horses. American import data are compiled/analyzed from the 1980s to the present to show that the American sport horse market in the United States has become a global market. The paper relies on the import statistics to show the transition from a regional horse market to a global horse market where outsourcing has grown as it has in other industries. This transition has also caused widespread changes in the horse show-jumping industry in the United States. In addition to import statistics, content analysis and participant observation are used to document how the show jumping-industry changed as a result of the dependence on European supplies of horses.
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986) indicate that there is widespread agreement that there was an “organizing capitalist world-economy” during the 19th and 20th centuries. Many commodities are traded internationally. Live horses are included in this flow of commodities, as many horses are imported into the United States from all over the world. They are brought to the United States as sport horses: horses specifically bred and trained to participate in sports such as dressage, eventing, driving, and show jumping. They are commodities bought and sold just as steel, wood, and gold are sold. However, unlike manufacturing that seems to link core markets with periphery production of goods (Gereffi 1999), sport horses are produced in core countries to be sold to wealthy consumers in core countries. The sport horse commodity chain takes substantially longer to complete than most commodities, as the production of a sport horse may take 8 years and to be a grand prix horse, the process may take even longer.
The following explores the growth of the global commodity chain of sport horses imported into the United States, with a special focus on show jumping. The analysis begins in the early 1980s, an important time for show jumping in the United States, as the 1984 Olympics occurred in Los Angeles, California. Americans won the team gold, and two Americans won gold and silver individual medals in show jumping. The gold went to Joe Fargis and his American-bred thoroughbred mare Touch of Class, and the silver went to Conrad Homfeld and his Canadian-bred Trakehner stallion Abdullah. Since that time, the world of show jumping has completely changed into a different sport as a result of the outsourcing of the breeding and training of sport horses used in America.
At the time of the 1984 Olympics, most United States riders rode American-born horses, mostly retired thoroughbred racehorses. Now, most United States and international riders have horses imported from Europe. Sorge (2011) points out that in 2011, there was not one US-bred horse who made the list of the top 25 grand prix horses in the United States. This article is about this transition and what it means for show jumping and other disciplines reliant on sport horses.
This study is a sociological approach to the transnational horse market of show jumpers in the United States. The research addresses a fundamental change that has occurred within the show-jumping world: a transition from the use of US-born thoroughbreds bred for racing to horses imported from Europe. This transition has fundamentally changed the show-jumping industry in the United States. Although the study is about horses, the horses represent the tastes of the American consumers. Sport horses are expensive animals, so their consumption represents an elite market. As a luxury commodity, consumers of such horses are less constrained by economic considerations. In 2013, the average horse imported from Germany cost roughly $65,000.
The fact that many of the horses used in show jumping in the United States were imported from Europe also suggests something about global markets, where products come from all around the globe. It also represents an outsourcing of the training of the horses, where fewer Americans are training horses for show jumping, instead purchasing them from Europe and spending more time showing. The training model where US-born horses were trained to jump has been replaced by a model where older, more experienced horses are brought over from Europe. The implications for the sport will be discussed.
It is necessary to apply sociological theories to the horse global horse trade, as there is much sociological theory that pertains to this market. Studies about animals in general take a much different approach from what is presented here. Studies on animals either take a scientific approach that focuses on health outcomes of animals or more humanistic approaches that focus on animal welfare. However, the study of sport horses is somewhat of a new endeavor, as analyses of such horses are typically conducted within the veterinary science journals. One might be tempted to use a sociology of animals approach, but much of that literature appears to focus on the abuse of animals. Clearly, animal abuse is widespread within the sport.
For example, one scandal in the show-jumping industry involved insurance fraud where expensive show-jumping horses were killed by hit men for insurance money. The scandal involved some very successful trainers. Some members of the community were imprisoned and/or banned for life from competition for their role in such fraud. Additionally, the widespread slaughter of horses is another example of abuse of horses. The data do highlight the magnitude of the slaughter market, but horse slaughter, which will be indirectly addressed, is not the focus of this research. There are many more examples of abuse within the industry. However, the importation of elite horses is best analyzed within a global perspective, particularly a commodity chain analysis.
As a result of the largescale importation of horses from Europe, the show-jumping world has become a transnational arena. Buying a horse in the United States is a risky endeavor, with perfect examples of how agents withhold information to sell horses for large sums of money despite imperfections. A recent well-known example of this risk involved an actor named Tom Selleck who was purchasing a horse for his daughter Hannah, a grand prix rider. Tom won a lawsuit against the agents who in collaboration with a veterinarian sold a lame horse to Tom. People buying horses from Europe will rely on an agent and their social contacts to gather information about the horses they are purchasing, as buyers often purchase horses without traveling to Europe to see them. As a result of the distance and expense of buying European horses, buyers are forced to rely on agents to reduce the risks of these transactions.
The study of global horse markets has important sociological significance. Jerolmack (2013) pointed out that animals are not usually considered part of the social realm. Similarly, Kruse (2002) points out that sociologists are supposed to study people and not other creatures, even though animals play an important role in human’s lives. Jerolmack shows how pigeons in New York allow pigeon raisers to define themselves and to interact with other city dwellers. Jerolmack points out that the birds bring pride to the raisers who attempt to create an animal who is consistent with the tastes and standards of their peers. Global horse markets are economically viable, as there were $328,840,914 worth of horses imported into the United States in 2013. Although the size of the market is significant, the horses are representative of the tastes of the elites who express their power by relying on a global market for fine horses. Americans buying horses in Europe express their tastes through their purchases, and these purchases have in turn restructured the sport of show jumping in the United States.
Theory
Vashistha and Vashistha (2006) wrote The Offshore Nation, which is a textbook for companies wishing to outsource. They note that the obvious reason corporations outsource is to lower the cost of production. The authors compare the various countries where companies outsource, listing the advantages and disadvantages. Some of these countries are English speaking, so this is a major draw for companies in English-speaking countries. However, these countries do not offer the lowest wages. The authors point towards many reasons to outsource, but the major reason is to reach countries with low-wage labor sources. I refer to the importation of sport horses into the United States from Europe as outsourcing, but clearly the European countries sending horses to the United States do not offer low wages. Some argue that it is cheaper to produce horses in Europe, but there are other reasons to outsource which have nothing to do with lowering the cost of production.
Elite show jumping horses represent the taste of the elite. Bourdieu (1984) points out that taste represents class status, as having specific tastes indicates group membership. The elite have the ability to exhibit class status in many different ways, but purchasing horses from Europe allows them to display their cultural competence regarding horses. Do you have a horse imported from Europe? Did your horse have elite breeding? In some respects, differences between US-born horses and imported horses are small, but with the proper cultural competence, it is easy to discern such fine details. When confronted with the fact that outsourcing horse supplies does not necessarily lower the cost of production, it is important to point out that the elite are not constrained by the same economic factors as most consumers. Purchasing imported horses provides buyers distinction or an expression of class status. Thayer (2013) writes about how class impacts the sport of greyhound racing. In many respects, this research addresses an infusion of wealth into show jumping, from an environment where riders did the difficult job of training a horse to jump to a market where wealthier riders merely purchased pre-trained horses to pursue their sport of show jumping.
Transnational theory presents a perspective for understanding the global market in sport horses. According to Alarcon (1995) and Vertovic (1999), transnationalism involves the exchange of humans, goods, services, and capital. As a result of this exchange, humans create social networks spanning multiple countries, which provide special opportunities unavailable to people without such networks. This research is not a test of transnational theory, but the horse trade exists within a transnational arena. It offers a description of a global market that has grown dramatically through time, starting in the 1980s. The change has had profound implications for horse jumping that may affect the future of show jumping in the United States.
This study applies theories that have typically been applied to human beings to the global horse trade. Although the horses do not decide to make transnational moves, buyers, trainers, agents, and riders all make decisions within a transnational arena. Horses represent the actions and motivations of these actors who exist within a transnational sphere. Coulter (2016) outlines the interests of owners (caregivers), animals, and other parties. In the current research on the global horse market, horses are not brought to the United States to benefit them, but they are brought to benefit owners, trainers, and others in the horse market.
Global vs. International
Gereffi (1999) points toward the distinction between international and global. International trade existed for a long time, while the development of the global market is much more recent. According to Gereffi, globalization “implies the functional integration and coordination of internationally dispersed activities” (p. 41). The rise of the global horse trade, as opposed to the international horse trade, will be analyzed within the last 35 years, which is roughly when experts indicate that the activity commenced.
Global Horse Markets as a Commodity Chain
The study of global horse markets can be analyzed using a commodity chain. A commodity chain was defined as a “network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity” (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1986, p. 159). Similarly, Gereffi (1999) defined it as “the whole range of activities involved in the design, production, and marketing of a product” (p. 38). Within the United States horse market, a horse can be bred, raised, and trained to jump in the United States. It is a long process to get a horse into the show arena, with some starting their show careers when they are 4 to 6 years old, so there is definitely incentive to bypass the years of time and expenses that come before they enter the show arena. In order to understand this process, it is important to recognize the multiple actors who are involved in the process who all have distinct interest. There is the wealthy owner/rider who merely wants to compete and the trainer/agent who makes money off of sales and commissions. For both actors, the value of a horse is greatest when the horse is competition ready. There are multiple actors whose decisions and interests are distinct, including the wealthy rider/owner and the trainer/agent. For a horse trainer, there is little value in training a horse for competition when the wealthy owner can be convinced to pay exorbitant amounts of money to purchase pre-trained horses from Europe. In general, purchase prices are greater for the horses from Europe which means that the commissions are greater for the trainers/agents. Wealthy owners/riders are not constrained by economic considerations, so they can pay higher prices for imported horses.
Through time, equestrian sports have become a more expensive game. With wealthier clients, the sport has changed. There was an older system of producing show jumpers in the United States that has been overtaken by the outsourcing of this long process. There is a large supply of former race horses who are sold at slaughter prices that used to be popular in the show arena. Using ex-racehorses reduced the process of breeding show-jumping horses, as the horses were purchased after they had been bred and were broke to ride, but they still needed training to make it into the show arena which would give them economic value. Perhaps 3 years were shaved from a 5-year process.
Although some former thoroughbred race horses make it into the show arena, now most of the show horses at the upper levels are warmbloods, many brought over from Europe. A division of labor that once was mostly performed in the United States now is mostly performed in Europe. Without an outlet for the ex-racehorses, most are probably sent to slaughter in Mexico which took over the slaughter market after it ended in 2007 in the United States.
Commodity chains are closely related to world systems analysis. The horse market studied in this research is global in nature, but the core versus periphery distinctions do not apply to these horse markets with regard to the horses imported from Europe into the United States; the horses are brought over from core countries to a core country. The expensive tastes of the buyers dictate a product produced in a country rich in knowledge about how to breed and train fine horses. Bair (2009) points out that the model is typically used to link up consumers in the core with workers in the periphery. The periphery does play a role in the horse commodity chain through the export of horses to Mexico for slaughter, but this study focuses on the transnational core-to-core movement of horses. Perhaps the wealth of the buyers and the exorbitant costs of the sport horses provide for a different relationship between the foreign sellers and the United States buyers. The wealth of a buyer willing to spend $65,000 on a horse perhaps suggests that they are not worried about lowering the cost of production, but they are worried about the status and distinction associated with such horses.
The world systems approach to commodity chains is the best way to evaluate the global horse trade, even if it is a core-to-core transfer. Bair (2009) outlines the three core characteristics of the world systems tradition of commodity chains. First, world systems analysis focuses on the global division of labor and integration into the global economy through time. Second, it seeks to understand the unequal distribution of rewards for activities within the global division of labor. Third, the location and social organization of links to changes in the global economy are examined. For the purposes of this research, the second characteristic is helpful, as the theory proposes that highly rewarded activities are usually located within the core and controlled by a few producers.
Although the wealthy clientele purchasing the expensive show horses are not concerned with the cost of production, the brokers who market the horses do work within an economic logic where costs are reduced through outsourcing or offshoring, which would actually be a more accurate term. It is a time-intensive prepare a horse for market. For trainers/agents, it is more lucrative to sell finished horses than to train young horses. Below is a commodity chain of show horses illustrating the process of preparing a horse for market. The whole process may take up to 8 to 9 years, but horses can also be sold at younger ages. A horse might start jumping at 4, which means that the owner/breeder will have invested 5 years into the horse before the horse can really jump. Then the horse will need to be trained. Trainers who purchase horses 4 years or older bypass a major expense, as there are costs to maintaining a horse related to upkeep, medical treatment, and training. Instead, they can spend time selling older horses or competing horses, a profitable endeavor for horse trainers.
Given the period of production of a show horse, there are incentives to shortening this process. As the expense of buying a horse from Germany on average was $65,000 in 2013 and the cost of transportation was roughly $10,000, United States buyers tend to buy older, trained horses to ensure that the horse possesses the requisite skills to compete in the show arena. Although selling more expensive horses makes economic sense for a trainer/agent, the owners are spending vast amounts of money to get these sport horses while they could purchase similar horses in the United States for far less money. Most buyers will not pay such prices for an unproven horse. Below is a timeline of the production process.
Horse Commodity Chain
-
Mare is bred to a stallion
-
Mare carries foal for 11 months
-
Foal grows up
-
Horse broke at 2-3 years old
-
Horse jumps at 3-4 years old
-
Competitions start at 4 years old
-
Horse sold/exported
Some equestrians believe that the outsourcing of American sport horses is driven by the desire to acquire the most superior horses for competition. This argument may plausibly explain the transition from the American thoroughbred to the European warmblood. However, there is a healthy breeding program of warmbloods in the United States that hasn’t replaced the horses being outsourced from Europe. When the animals are brought to the United States, it is quite possible to replicate the breeding system from Europe whether it be through horses brought from Europe of artificial insemination. If a horse born in the United States has the same genetics as an imported horse, what would be the advantage of buying an imported horse? The point is that the wealthy elite seek the status associated with imported horses and only have an interest in participating in the end of the commodity chain involving competition.
Relying on foreign supplies of horses is a form of outsourcing, a practice where businesses rely on goods or services produced outside of the businesses (Brown & Wilson 2005). Outsourcing can be reliant on a domestic or foreign source. When the source is foreign, the transaction is more appropriately called offshoring (Apray, 2010; Davis-Blake & Broschak, 2009). Although outsourcing has been around for a long time (Stinchcombe, 1985), Davis-Blake and Broschak (2009) suggest that it has become more common since the 1980s. Aspray (2010) found that United States companies began to rely on outsourcing during the 1980s. A key distinction in outsourcing the horse trade is related to the elite nature of the market. The horses are a luxury product, and rather than lowering the cost of production, the elite who purchase such horses are buying class status through their animals.
Materials and Methods
The global horse market is different from most outsourcing, as horses are more expensive products purchased by wealthier consumers. A significant cultural shift in the equestrian community has occurred as a result of the large-scale importation of European horses. This study documents the shift from U.S.-born horses imported from Europe from 1981 to 2013. During this time period, there were many changes in how the data regarding imports into the United States were collected. The data from this study come from the UN. The data are publicly available at
In this study, I focus on horses imported into the United States. There is no way to distinguish which discipline in which the horses were used, so these horses came for dressage, driving, eventing, and show jumping. Measuring imports of horses is clouded by changing definitions of how a horse is defined. In the time-periods studied, it wasn’t always possible to distinguish between horses and other equines. Between 1981 and 1990, there was a category that included Equine Species, Live. During 1989 and 1990, a category of imports existed that distinguished between horses and other equines or Horses Live. Between 1991 and 2001, it was possible to measure the number and value of horses, both live purebred and others. Between 1991 and 2013, there was broad category that included live horses/asses/mules/hinnies. Between 2012 and 2013, it was possible to focus on purebred horses and others. Clearly, the changing definition of what was imported has the potential to impede this study, but analysis presented next will provide evidence that most of this research is about horses.
Given the changing measurement of imports into the United States, it is necessary to address whether the data are suitable to measure the number and value of horses imported there. One methodological problem that this study confronts is that the numbers/values of horses are sometimes combined with other animals such as asses, mules, and hinnies. If the number of non-horses included in the combined category were large, the numbers presented in this research might not fully represent imports of horses into the United States. This problem is especially of concern between 1981 and 1988 and 2002 and 2011. However, there are some years where both a separate category and a combined category are available, so it is possible to determine how many non-horse animals make up the combined category.
Between 1989 and 1990, there is a category that includes Horses Live and another category Equine Species Live, so it is possible to determine at least for 1989 and 1990 exactly the number of horses that constituted the Equine Species category. If we look at animals imported from Germany, for 1989 and 1990, all of the Equines from Germany were horses. If we look at all animals imported into the United States from throughout the world in 1989 and 1990, there were only 14 non-horses brought to the United States from other countries for each of these years out of 10,772 in 1989 and 11,094 in 1990. Clearly, few non-horse equines were brought into the United States during those years. If the numbers are similar for other years, this changing categorization is a small problem.
The research is driven by a quantitative analysis of the horse trade that is descriptive, but is largely informed by the qualitative analysis of show jumping. The quantitative analysis is designed to show how the supply of show horses from dressage, driving, eventing, and show jumping in the United States has changed between 1981 and 2013. The idea that there has been a change to document comes largely from a broader discussion within the show community, which is often referred to by top riders and trainers. This information is easily obtained through interviews with leaders in the American show-jumping world, which are widely available through magazines and social media. Participant observation, content analysis, and ethnographic methods are also utilized to uncover participants’ understanding of what happened. Much of the data for this research are quantitative in nature, but the interpretation of the data is largely informed by qualitative methodologies.
Results
Imports to the United States: 1981-2013
The following section provides the import statistics for horses brought to the United States from 1981 to 2013. The data are aggregated by various countries. They are presented as the total amount of the value of the horses imported per year and the number imported; sometimes it is possible to separate horses brought for slaughter from other horses.
Figure 1 shows the total value of horses imported into the United States between 1981 and 2013. All dollar amounts have been converted into 2013 dollars to account for inflation using the 2013 Current Price Index. In some respects, the amount of value of horses being imported into the United States is the same now as it was in 1981. Since 1981, the dollar amount of horses imported into the United States has gone from a low of 105 million in 1991 to a high of 546 million in 2000. Although importation of horses is not much higher than what it was in 1981, today the horses come from different countries and for different reasons.
Imports to the United States from Canada: 1980-2013
In 1981, to import a horse to the United States meant something different than importing a horse to the United States today. Figure 2 illustrates the horses imported from Canada to the United States. The country sending the largest number of horses to the United States in 1981 was Canada, which accounted for 44% of all horses imported into the United States in 1981. Importing horses within North America is easier and cheaper than importing horses from Europe, as horses can be driven from Canada into the United States. Horses were brought to the United States from Europe in 1981, but not to the degree they are now. For example, England accounted for 18% of all horses imported into the United States in 1981. Of course, Americans wanting to bring horses over from Europe at least share a language with the English, which would have made such transactions easier. Through time, Canada’s contribution to horses in the United States declined, and in 2013, horses from Canada accounted for only 9% of the horses brought to the United States.
Imports to the United States from Europe: 1980-2013
It is clear in Figures 3 and 4 that importation of horses to the United States from Europe is not new. The fact that the horse trade with the United States has shifted from a North American market to a European market shouldn’t detract from the fact that in the 1980s, horses came in sizeable numbers from England and Ireland. It seems England and Ireland were the first European countries to send horses to the United States in sizeable numbers. In 1981, horses from the United Kingdom accounted for 18% of all horses brought to the US, and horses from Ireland accounted for about 4%. Indeed, horses came from English-speaking European countries. It appears that the United Kingdom and Ireland have continued to supply horses to the United States, although the share of horses from the United Kingdom has been cut in half.
Figures 5 to 7 show the dollar amounts of horses imported to the United States from Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium from 1981 to 2013.1 The figures display a fairly steady growth of horse imports to the United States from these three countries. Back in 1981, there really wasn’t a sizeable amount of horses coming to the United States from these countries, but by 2013, these three countries accounted for 63% of all horses imported into the United States.
Tracking the flow of horses into the United States from the 1980s until the present shows that there were many changes through time in where horses originated. At the start of the analysis, many horses came from North America, with some coming from English-speaking European countries. Through time, the horses began to come from European countries such as Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium.
Figure 8 shows the value of horses imported into the United States from North America. The vast majority of the horses from North America come from Canada. The chart shows that there was a steep decline in the annual value of horses imported into the United States from North America. The chart captures a dramatic decline in horses brought to the United States from Canada who never fully recovered. This decline occurred at about the same time that there was a huge growth in horses imported from Europe, detailed in Figures 5 to 7.
The previous figures focused on the annual dollar value of horses imported into the United States. One of the main reasons for focusing on the dollar amount instead of the number is that the number of horses imported into the United States is unavailable for the period. From 1989 to 2013, the actual number was available, with exception of 2008 when the number was calculated as the mean of 2007 and 2009. Interestingly, the total weight of horses brought to the United States was collected instead of the number, which suggests something about why the horses were being brought to the United States. This change in terms of how horses were categorized points toward a decline in horse slaughter in the United States, which eventually stopped in 2007. Figure 9 illustrates the total number of horses imported into the United States from 1989 to 2013. The figure shows that the total number of horses imported fluctuated during this time period, but there is no clear pattern.
Figure 10 distinguishes between horses brought to the United States for slaughter and for other purposes. Information about the number of horses brought to the United States for slaughter is only available for a 10-year period; but during this period, a dramatic transition occurred in terms of the types of horses who were imported. The chart shows that up until 1995, many of the horses brought to the United States were bound for slaughterhouses. After 1995, there was a growth in the number of horses brought to the United States for purposes other than slaughter. This figure suggests that there has been a transition from the United States importing horses for slaughter to importing horses for other reasons.
In 1981, the United States was importing a large amount of horses from Canada, but these horses are distinct from the horses brought to the United States today. Figure 11 illustrates the number of horses from Canada for slaughter, as compared to other horses. A large portion of these horses were slaughter bound. Due to the outsourcing of horse slaughter to Mexico, these numbers have declined.
Figure 12 shows the average value of horses from Canada between 1989 and 2013. The figure shows that the value of horses from Canada fluctuated from a high of nearly $6,000 to a low of nearly a $1,000. Interestingly, the price of horses from Canada started increasing at a time when horse slaughter stopped in the United States. At any rate, the horses from Canada are not particularly valuable, which is probably related to the fact that about half of them up until 2007 were going to slaughterhouses in the United States.
The new wave of horses who have been imported from European countries are distinct from the horses brought from North America. Figure 13 provides the average value of horses from Germany from 1989 until 2013. Figure 13 shows average values in 2013 dollars, as inflation would make it difficult to compare different years. The prices of horses have steadily increased from about $15,000 a horse in 1989 to nearly $60,000 in 2013. These horses are expensive and used for sports such as dressage, driving, eventing, and showing jumping.
Discussion
There are several interesting findings that should be highlighted. The actual number of horses brought to the United States has not dramatically increased through time, as horse importation is not new. However, the reason for the importation has changed, which is reflected in the value of the horses and their origins. The quality of horses from Canada is quite different from those from Europe, partially because the majority of the horses from Canada up until 2007 were bound for slaughterhouses in the United States. This difference in reason for importation into the United States is not specified in the data, but the distinction is quite clear in the value of each animal brought to the United States. Horses from Europe are quite expensive, whereas the horses from Canada are inexpensive.
The study focused on the source of horses used for sports such as driving, dressage, eventing, and show jumping in the United States, with a special focus on show jumping. The outsourcing of show jumping was studied using import statistics documenting the transition and participant observation of show jumping. The shift away from domestic sport horses may have started in the late 70s, and now most of the horses used for show jumping are European sourced. The data used for this analysis started in the early 1980s, so there was some left-hand censorship. This outsourcing appears to have grown at the same time as outsourcing became a way for capitalists throughout the broader economy to lower the cost of production, but the global horse market is a luxury product that is quite distinct from other commodities.
The analysis relies on a global commodity chain approach which helps to explain the outsourcing of sport horses in the United States. I have outlined how outsourcing has shortened the production process of show jumpers, which has allowed wealthy Americans to focus on competition rather than training. Typically outsourcing involves lowering the cost of production. There is an argument within the show-jumping world that outsourcing did lower the cost of production. However, the consumers of elite show-jumping horses are quite wealthy, and they appear to pay substantial amounts of money for these horses, much more than they would pay if they bought domestic or North American horses. So this particular commodity differs from most commodities, where the reason for outsourcing is to lower the cost of production, but sport horses are a luxury commodity.
Economic logic does not fully account for this large purchase. Although the wealthy elite are probably guided by economic principles of supply and demand, those who purchase such expensive horses are also concerned about distinction, as described by Bourdieu (1984). Buying elite sport horses is one way in which the elite can exhibit their class status. According to Coulter (2014), it becomes a capital where more horses or higher quality horses mean that you have more horse capital. Wealthy elite can exhibit class status through ownership of a sport horse, but today more is needed to display class position. What provides the distinction is the breeding and where the horse came from.
The transition away from domestic sources to European sources has been consequential. The ex-race horses who used to be used as the domestic source of horses for show jumping prior to outsourcing are now exported for slaughter in Canada and Mexico after their careers end as racehorses. Additionally, United States riders focus their energies on showing and spend little time training horses. The role of the horse trainer has shifted away from the production of show horses to horse dealers who teach riders how to ride horses trained in Europe. Some believe that this transition has separated United States riders from horsemanship, where United States riders are losing a competitive advantage by having a more distant connection to their horses. That United States riders do not gain as strong a bond with their horses as those riders who train their own mounts suggests that the United States riders may be at a competitive disadvantage.
The outsourcing has also helped to grow transnational social networks among the show-jumping world. Through the transnational sales and competitions, riders have become acquainted with other riders/dealers internationally. These transnational transactions have lead to many opportunities. Some United States riders have gone to Europe to train with some of the best trainers in the world. They have also gained access to a richer pool of horses. It has also meant that many foreign riders have come to compete in the United States. Some have established barns in this country where they stay during their United States competitions. Other foreign riders have been sponsored by United States sponsors. For the sport of show jumping, having international riders compete in the United States has increased the level of competition, which should mean that United States riders improve.
Conclusion
Outsourcing has completely altered the way in which business is conducted within the horse community. Horse trainers became horse brokers. Riders developed transnational connections. Riders developed a more distant connection to their horses, as they acquired them when they were already trained. Riders do not have a bond with the horse until the horse is 5 or 6 years old. The horse trainers became people trainers. The skill of training a green horse has been in decline. The price of show horses has dramatically increased, essentially pushing some riders out of the market. The institution of show jumping has become more elite, given the greater costs associated with horse ownership.
References
Alarcón, R. (1995). Transnational communities, regional development, and the future of Mexican immigration. Berkeley Planning Journal, 10, 1036-1056.
Aspray, W. (2010). IT offshoring and American labor. American Behavioral Scientist, 53(7), 962-982.
Bair, J. (2009). Frontiers of commodity chain research. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Brown, D., & Wilson, S. (2005). The black book of outsourcing: How to manage the changes, challenges, and opportunities. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Coulter, K. (2014). Herds, hierarchies, class, and the social construction of horses in equestrian culture. Society & Animals, 22, 135-152.
Coulter, K. (2016). Animals, work, and the promise of interspecies solidarity. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Davis-Blake, A., & Broschak, J. P. (2009). Outsourcing and the changing nature of work. Annual Review of Sociology, 35, 321-340.
Gereffi, G. (1999). International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain. Journal of International Economics, 48, 37-70.
Hopkins, T. K., & Wallerstein, I. (1986). Commodity chains in the world-economy prior to 1800. Review, 10(1), 157-170.
Jerolmack, C. (2013). The global pigeon. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kruse, C. R. (2002). Social animals: Animal studies and sociology. Society & Animals, 10, 375-379.
Sorge, M. (2011). The future of U.S. show jumping, part 3: We need to stop outsourcing our horse supply. The Chronicle of the Horse. Available at: http://www.chronofhorse.com/article/future-us-show-jumping-part-3-we-need-stop-outsourcing-our-horse-supply.
Stinchcombe, A. L., & Heimer, C. A. (1985). Organization theory and project management: Administering uncertainty in Norwegian offshore oil. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
Thayer, G. A. (2013). Going to the dogs: Greyhound racing, animal activism, and American popular culture. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
Vashomtha, A., & Vashintha, A. (2006). The offshore nation: Strategies for success in global outsourcing and offshoring. NY: McGraw-Hill.
Vertovic, S. (1999). Conceiving and researching transnationalism. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22, 447-462.
It was necessary to adjust the # of horses brought over from the Netherlands in 2000. I used the average of 1999 and 2001, as the number for 2000 was clearly in error. After speaking with the census staff, it was discovered that the raw data were no longer accessible, as these data are disposed of after three years.