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The Early Qing Compilation of the Ming History in Manchu: The Contexts, Contents, and Significance of the Ming gurun i suduri

In: T'oung Pao
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Shoufu Yin University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC Canada

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Abstract

The Qing court produced an extensive history of the Ming empire in the Manchu language, which has survived in manuscript form in the Palace Museum under the title Ming gurun i suduri (History of the Ming State). Based on a close reading of this manuscript and scrutiny of related archival documents, this article elaborates on three observations. First, the Ming gurun i suduri resulted from the earliest stage (1645–1669) of the Qing compilation of the Ming history. With a primary focus on producing a chronicle in Manchu, it exemplifies the mid-seventeenth-century development of Inner Asian historiography. Second, it recounts Ming history by juxtaposing and connecting translated extracts from the Ming shilu 明實錄 (Ming Veritable Records) whenever it exists. This approach that combines compiling and translating, in effect, offers a reassessment of key political events and figures. Third, in light of the Ming gurun i suduri thus contextualized, the 1739 Ming shi 明史 (Ming History) is best seen as a product of a century-long history of negotiation (1645–1739) during which the ideological agenda and intellectual achievements of the early Qing court gradually sank into oblivion.

Résumé

La cour des Qing a produit une vaste histoire de l’empire Ming en langue mandchoue, qui a survécu sous forme manuscrite au Musée du Palais sous le titre Ming gurun i suduri (Histoire de l’État Ming). Sur la base d’une lecture attentive de ce manuscrit et d’un examen minutieux de documents d’archives, cet article développe trois observations. Premièrement, le Ming gurun i suduri est le résultat de la première phase (1645–1669) de la compilation de l’histoire des Ming par les Qing. L’objectif principal étant de produire une chronique en mandchou, il illustre le développement de l’historiographie de l’Asie intérieure au milieu du xviie siècle. Deuxièmement, il relate l’histoire des Ming en juxtaposant et en reliant des extraits traduits du Ming shilu 明實錄 lorsque les passages pertinents existent. Cette approche, qui combine la compilation et la traduction, permet de réévaluer les événements et les personnages politiques clés. Troisièmement, à la lumière du Ming gurun i suduri ainsi contextualisé, le Ming shi 明史 de 1739 apparaît comme le produit d’une négociation longue d’un siècle (1645–1739) au cours de laquelle le programme idéologique et les réalisations intellectuelles du début des Qing ont progressivement sombré dans l’oubli.

摘要

清廷曾以滿文編成一部九十七卷的《明國史》(Ming gurun i suduri ),寫本現藏北京故宮博物院。基於對這一寫本的細讀以及相關檔案的考察,本文提出三點觀察。首先,就其編纂時間而言,這部滿文《明國史》應形成於清修明史的第一階段(1645–1669 )。當時目的之一即是以滿文編寫一部編年體明史,其本身也體現出內亞史學的發展。其二,就其編纂方式而言,寫本從《明實錄》中選取片段,翻譯後加以綴連(於建文朝則從中晚明的材料中選取片段);以這種譯纂結合的方式,這部滿文《明國史》不僅重新講述了重要的歷史事件,也對當時人物給出了自己的評價。其三,對比十七世紀中葉的滿文《明國史》, 1739 年修成的漢文《明史》在很多意義上回到了晚明形成的明史書寫的框架;由此,清初滿文《明國史》所承載的觀念與思想,則漸漸為人所遺忘。

It is well known that in 1739 the Manchu Qing (1636/1644–1911) court published the Ming shi 明史 (Ming History), the standard history in literary Chinese that documents the three centuries of Ming rule (1368–1644).1 What remains largely unknown is that the early Qing court had produced an extensive history of the Ming empire in the Manchu language, which has survived in manuscript form under the title Ming gurun i suduri (History of the Ming State). This Manchu manuscript is a chronicle. It starts with the birth of Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 (1328–1398), the founding emperor of the Ming, and ends in 1626, right before the last Ming emperor ascended the throne.2 Originally belonging to the Manchu emperors’ collection within the Forbidden City, the Ming gurun i suduri now resides in the library of the Palace Museum in Beijing.3 In its current form, it comprises ninety-seven string-bound books stored in twenty-two boxes (han 函).4

This manuscript first came to the attention of modern scholars following the transformation of the Imperial Palace into the Palace Museum in 1925. In 1932, Walter Fuchs published the first note on the subject, following his 1930 survey in Beijing. He suggested that it is likely based on “some historical compilations that dated back to Ming times” (auf eine der Geschichtskompilationen für die Ming-Zeit zurück).5 In a more detailed bibliographical entry published in 1936, he dated the manuscript to 1645 and identified several potential translators.6 Simultaneously, in the 1933 catalog of the Manchu books and manuscripts housed at the recently established Palace Museum, Li Deqi 李德啓 referred to this manuscript as the Ming shi benji 明史本紀 (Basic Annals of the Ming History). He discerned that its content is “closer to” the Ming shilu 明實錄 (Ming Veritable Records) than the 1739 Ming shi, suggesting that the Manchu compilation may have been produced during the Kangxi period (1662–1722). He stressed that these observations “require future research” to test their validity.7 Ever since the 1930s, however, few scholars have been able to access this manuscript.8 Critically, the current bibliographical information provided by the Palace Museum titles it as Ming shi benji, but describes it as an eighteenth-century translation of the 1739 Ming shi.9 Given the discrepancies in existing catalogs, there remains substantial confusion about what this book is about, when it was compiled, and how it might be important.

This article constitutes the first of a series of articles that I plan to publish on this manuscript.10 Combining close reading of its content and scrutiny of related archival documents, I have come to the tentative conclusion that its content embodies the intellectual outputs of the earliest stage of the Qing compilation of the Ming history that spans from 1645 to 1669 (see my periodization below).11 The Ming gurun i suduri uses the Ming shilu as its source whenever the latter existed, as Li has suggested. For the reign of Jianwen (1399–1402), of which no “veritable record” (shilu) has ever been produced, it draws information from mid- and late Ming prints including Jianwen chaoye huibian 建文朝野彙編. Combining translations from the Ming shilu (and other Ming materials in the case of Jianwen) with assorted interpretative interventions, as I shall argue, the Manchu manuscript presents a compelling narrative that in effect offers reassessments of key political events and figures.

These observations demonstrate first and foremost that the Manchu intellectual culture of the mid-seventeenth century was even richer than previously assumed. Already, scholars have demonstrated that the Manchu court of the mid-seventeenth century not only produced sophisticated records of its own rise but also translated various parts of the Ming veritable records and Chinese standard histories into Manchu.12 Nevertheless, the belief persists that due to the considerable difficulty involved in the production of an official history of a Chinese dynasty, “the entire Shunzhi reign [1644–1661] had failed to accomplish anything related to the Ming-history compilation” (整個順治朝在明史纂修上…… 無成績可言), not to mention in Manchu.13 Scrutiny of the Ming gurun i suduri not only debunks this assertion but also suggests that the Manchu narrative produced from the 1640s to 1660s had probably influenced the Chinese-language drafts of Ming history presented to the court around the 1680s. It was from the 1690s that ethnic Han scholars began to challenge the Manchu assessment of the Ming and eventually reshaped the 1739 Ming shi based on their visions of the past. In other words, the 1739 Ming shi, far from being merely “subservient to the interests and interpretations” of the Manchu rulers,14 is a product of a century-long history of negotiation (1645–1739) during which the ideological agenda and intellectual achievements of the early Qing court gradually sank into oblivion. In brief, the Ming gurun i suduri is of pivotal importance for understanding the development of the Manchu and Chinese historiographies, as well as their productive interactions, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The sections below focus in turn on the context, content, and significance of the Ming gurun i suduri. I start with a new periodization of the Qing compilation of the Ming history, which lays a historical foundation for reading the Ming gurun i suduri. Then, comparing the Manchu narrative to the Ming shi and its drafts, I elaborate on my argument that the contents of the Ming gurun i suduri must predate the 1670s. Finally, I offer a case study of how this Manchu chronicle redescribed the fall of Mongol rule of China, foregrounding its unique contributions against the broader context of Ming-history writing from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.

The Qing Compilation of the Ming History: Toward a New Periodization

The Qing compilation of the Ming history is by no means a terra incognita. Over the past decades, many scholars have traced this century-long process in depth.15 Despite the importance of these well-researched studies, the archives of the Qing government have remained underutilized. Integrating archival documents with insights that recent researchers have advanced, this section offers a revisionist narrative of the Qing compilation of the Ming history from 1645 to 1789. This new periodization will offer key evidence, showing that the contents of the Ming gurun i suduri date back to the mid-seventeenth century.

I divide the compilation into three stages. The first stage is from 1645 to 1669. During this period, the writing of Ming history formed a part of the Manchu empire’s effort to produce a comprehensive narrative of Manchuria and East Eurasia in Manchu. The second stage is from 1679 to the mid-1690s when the Qing court revitalized the project and restructured the personnel. The last stage runs from the mid-1690s to 1739/1789, during which time the court’s goal shifted from producing a comprehensive historical narrative for the Manchu-reading elites to constructing an account able to convince the Han Chinese elites at large.16 While elaborating on this periodization, I expose the existent drafts stemming from these stages.

From 1645 to 1669

In 1644, Manchu Qing (1636–1911) troops seized Beijing, the capital of the Ming empire (1368–1644/1662).17 In the following year, the regent Dorgon 多爾袞 (1612–1650) formally commissioned the compilation of an official history of the Ming dynasty in Manchu.18 By then, compilers-in-chief included officials well experienced in Chinese-Manchu translation, including Garin 剛林 (?–1651), Kicungge 祁充格 (?–1651), Ning Wanwo 寧完我 (1593–1665), and Tuhai 圖海 (?–1681).19 In addition, ten “copyists of Manchu scripts” (manzi tengluguan 滿字謄錄官) were enlisted alongside thirty-six copyists of Chinese characters.20

Many officials who worked on the Ming-history compilation had been involved in two other historiographical projects. First, in 1636, the court commissioned scholars to translate from Chinese into Manchu and Mongolian the basic annals of the standard histories of the Kitan Liao (907–1125), Jurchen Jin (1115–1234), and Mongol Yuan (1215/1271–1368). While the drafts seemed to have been completed in 1639, revisions continued until they were published in 1646.21 Garin and Ning Wanwo, two of the compilers-in-chief of the Ming history project, were also responsible for proofreading the Manchu and Mongolian translations.22 Second, no later than the 1620s, the Manchu court had also been compiling its own veritable records. Participants of the Ming-history project were also commissioned, at different stages of their career, to produce the veritable records of the early Qing emperors.23 In this sense, the Ming-history compilation in the 1640s formed a constitutive part of the broader historiographical vision of the rising Manchu empire, one that sought to retell the history of Manchuria and the known world from the tenth century (the Liao), if not earlier, to the present.24

The Manchu court of the 1630s and 1640s had a clear preference for chronicles that detailed events in years, months, and days, a format shared by Tibetan “histories” (deb ther དེབ་ཐེར་), Mongolian “summaries” (tobči ᠲᠣᠪᠴᠢ), and Chinese “comprehensive mirrors” (tongjian 通鑒).25 Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that Ming-history compilers of the mid-seventeenth century used the Ming shilu, the official record in days and months, as their sources. Few Han scholar-officials, however, shared this strong predilection toward chronicles. For them, the chronicle is only one of multiple genres in which history could be compiled. Even more importantly, they castigated the approach of using veritable records alone. For instance, Fu Weilin 傅維鱗 (1608–1667), a young official who participated in the compilation of the Ming history, noted that the compilers “only divide the contents from the [Ming] shilu into categories. They do not use other works [as reference]” 止類編實錄不旁采.26 Decades later, Yang Chun 楊椿 (1676–1753) even asserted that, concerning the Manchu translation of the Ming veritable records, “no more than a dozen juan” 未數十卷 had been produced, and it was soon abandoned because compilers were assigned to produce the Qing veritable records.27

Fu’s and Yang’s remarks exemplify two typical approaches by which Han scholar-officials of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries downplayed the early Qing compilation of the Ming history. They advocated their belief that the effort to produce a Ming history in Manchu had failed, and part of the reason lay in the fact that the early Qing court, having been overly reliant on Chinese-Manchu translators instead of Han literati scholars, had not adopted proper historical methods. Since the mid-eighteenth century, the observations that Fu, Yang, and their colleagues published became increasingly influential. As a result, most modern and contemporary historians cited Fu’s and/or Yang’s words, claiming that the compilation of the Ming history in Manchu never resulted in any substantial outcome.28 It was not until 1999 that Ho Koon Piu 何冠彪 cast serious doubts on this. Using the Qing veritable records, he inferred that the early Qing court had probably produced a chronicle of the Ming history in Manchu.29 In the 2010s, Lin Shih-Hsuan 林士鉉 and Uran Cimeg 烏蘭其木格 have respectively identified memorials in archives in Taipei and Beijing, all of which supports Ho’s observations.30 Here I analyze three archival documents of 1651, 1655, and 1666 to further clarify what the early Qing compilers had actually accomplished.

In 1650, Dorgon died.31 A year later, on the 29th of the eleventh month of 1651, the lead academician issued an order organizing the division of labor among the scholars:

The lead academician orders: the three commissions should be ordered the compilation [of the veritable records], the [arrangement] of memorials from the six departments, and [the compilation of] Ming history. Concerning these three commissions …

中堂諭公議得三差次序以纂修編纂六曹章奏明史三差 [sic.]32

This order then specified the personnel arrangement for each commission. Five associate compilers-in-chief and twenty compilers would be responsible for the Ming history project, under the leadership of Cheng Kegong 成克鞏 (1608–1691). Accordingly, the more pressing task of compiling the veritable records for the deceased emperor did not deprive the Ming history project of the much-needed personnel; instead, it required Qing academicians to adopt a clearer division of labor among themselves.

In the following years, the Shunzhi emperor who had seized power swiped Dorgon’s political influence. For the academicians who had worked under Dorgon, uncertainty haunted their political careers. In the first month of 1655, this young emperor with a keen interest in history commissioned the compilation of the Grand Admonition (Shunzhi daxun 順治大訓), comprising histories of exemplary figures of the past.33 Within a month, he received the whole draft of the Ming history in Manchu. Cheng Kegong, the lead compiler in 1651, submitted it together with a memorial explaining what it was:

In the second year of Shunzhi, [the court] commissioned official historians to compile the history of the Ming state. At that time, I was in the position of inspector, succeeding the many [previous] Manchu and Han official historians. After years of compilation, we have compiled the translated work according to the model of tongjian [the chronicle “comprehensive mirror”], [covering the period] from Hongwu [1368–1399] to Wanli [1563–1620]. Please send down an edict to each official of the bureau, letting them meet to reexamine the previous book, finalize the book draft, and make it [a title] alongside the historical chronicles of all previous dynasties.

ijishūn dasan i jai aniya.
hesei suduri hafasa be. ming gurun i suduri be arabure de tere fonde.
amban bi giyan too tušan de bafi. manju nikan i geren suduri hafasa i
amala dahafi. siran siran i udu aniya. banjibume arafi tongjiyan i aniya
kooli songkoi. hūng wu ci wan li de isitala ubaliyambume bithe banjibuha..
yamun i geren hafasa de
hesei wasimbufi. nenehe bithe be dahūme kimcime acabufi. toktobufi bithe banjibufi.
jalan jalan i suduri tongjiyan de suwaliyame arara de belheburao..34

Cheng’s words deserve close attention for multiple reasons. First, it confirms that Cheng and his colleagues had already produced a chronicle about “ming gurun i suduri” (history of the Ming state).35 This work was presented to the throne, and the vermilion rescript confirmed that it had been received.36 Second, in this document, Cheng highlighted the methodology of their history compilation: they translated the primary source, and then produced their work (ubaliyambume bithe banjibuha). The vermilion rescript, similarly, refers to the manuscript as “[the Ming history] that has been translated in compiling” (banjibume ubaliyambuha).37 Both the memorial and rescript consider compiling and translating as two sides of the same activity, which provides a provocative methodological starting point when I turn to read the Ming gurun i suduri in the following sections.

Third, although Cheng stressed the cooperation between Manchu and Han officials in producing the book draft, he made no mention of the corresponding draft in Chinese, if it existed at all. It seems most likely that Fu Weilin and other Han scholars copied excerpts from the Ming shilu, and divided them into categories (with dozens of copyists of Chinese characters assisting them); and then, officials well versed in Manchu would use these materials to produce a narrative in Manchu. This is probably why the Chinese excerpts or sketches struck Fu and other observers as preliminary and were later abandoned. In any case, the Manchu version alone constitutes the draft presented to the throne for imperial review. Last but not least, by the end of the memorial, Cheng suggested that this draft, once revised and finalized, could be put “alongside” other Manchu-language chronicles, forming a part of the comprehensive history or chronicle in Manchu.

In submitting the memorial in 1655, Cheng, who had been demoted in 1652, hoped that Shunzhi might reappoint him to a key post.38 Shunzhi, who prioritized the production of the Grand Admonition, showed no interest in sponsoring the revision of the Ming history in Manchu in the 1650s.39 It is only after Shunzhi’s death in 1661 that Oboi 鰲拜 (1600–1669), the new regent, decided to continue Dorgon’s policies. In 1665, Oboi commissioned thirty scholars to translate and revise the draft Ming history in Manchu.40 In the third month of the following year, the leader of the project, Gioroi Itu 覺羅伊圖 (?–1677), submitted a memorial to Oboi. In this previously overlooked document, Itu first explained to Oboi the critical differences between two historiographical genres, standard histories comprising basic annals, biographies, and other components, on the one hand, and tongjian (comprehensive mirror) chronicle, on the other.41 Then, he raised his question:

For now, we have checked the Ming history that was previously translated; it extracts and summarizes the contents of the Ming shilu. In terms of genre, it resembles tongjian [that is, in chronological order]. Now we have received the decree to fully translate the Ming shilu and compile [a book in Manchu]. Either, this book can follow the genre of the previously compiled work [that is, chronicle]; thus, in places that have been omitted and skipped, we add and produce new materials. Or, alternatively, we can follow the genre of standard histories of previous dynasties, break the veritable record into different parts, and compile a different work. Humbly, we wait for the imperial decision.

今查前譯過明史,將實錄內刪畧編年紀事,其體與通鑑相類。今奉旨將明朝實錄全譯纂修,其書或照前纂過體裁,將缺畧之處增添纂修;或照歷代史書體裁,將實錄分晰款項另行纂修。伏候上裁。42

Itu and his colleagues had identified the completed draft in Manchu that Cheng Kegong submitted in 1655, and suggested that this could be the base text for Oboi’s ambitious project of turning the entire Ming shilu into a historical work in Manchu.43 Interestingly, for the compilers in 1666, the chronicle was no longer the default genre as in the 1640s and 1650s, and genre instead became a question awaiting a decision. It is rather unfortunate that the imperial response remains to be identified, if it was ever issued. Even if it was issued, with the fall of Oboi the entire project of translating the Ming shilu into Manchu was abandoned.

To recapitulate, using previously understudied memorials, I have offered a new take on the earliest stage of the Qing compilation of the Ming history. The Qing court under the Dorgon regency commissioned an official history qua chronicle of the Ming empire, and no later than 1655, officials including Cheng Kegong had managed to produce an extensive Manchu-language draft. It is not clear, as noted above, whether a corresponding version in Chinese had ever been compiled; what can be ascertained, however, is that the Manchu version alone defined the starting point for further revision in 1655 and 1666. In this sense, the primary language of the first-stage Ming history compilation, accordingly, is Manchu instead of Chinese. Most critically, the content of the 1655 draft, as Cheng Kegong described it, agrees with the Ming gurun i suduri at the Palace Museum: a chronicle from the founding of the Ming to the 1620s. It would be hasty to assume that the very copy Cheng submitted to Shunzhi has survived; nevertheless, later analysis will show that the content of the Ming gurun i suduri does result from the intellectual outputs of mid-seventeenth century.

From 1679 to the 1690s

Having executed Oboi and seized power, the Kangxi emperor (1678–1723) initiated a series of new policies to consolidate Qing rule in both China and Inner Asia.44 The compilation of the Ming history did not become a part of the emperor’s agenda until 1679. It is well known that in this year Kangxi (re-)established the Ming History Compilation Office (Ming shi guan 明史館) and offered the special “examination of erudition” (boxue hongci 博學鴻詞) to recruit scholars at large, inviting them to join the office.45 Also in 1679, Kangxi appointed Xu Yuanwen 徐元文 (1634–1691) as the “supervising compiler-in-chief” (jianxiu zongcai guan 監修總裁官), as if he would entrust the project to Han Chinese officials.46 Much overlooked, however, is the fact that Kangxi restructured the leadership of the Ming History Compilation Office in 1682. Lekdehun 勒德洪 (1624–1697) and Mingju 明珠 (1635–1708), two top-tier Manchu ministers, were appointed as supervising compilers-in-chief on top of Xu. Further, Kangxi added seven compilers-in-chief, four of whom were well-versed in Manchu intellectual culture.47

In 1683, when Kangxi checked the progress of Ming-history compilation, he singled out three officials: Nionio 牛紐 (1648–1686), Zhang Yushu 張玉書 (1642–1711), and Tang Bin 湯斌 (1627–1687).48 Their educational background and expertise commands close attention. Nionio was the first ethnic Manchu to pass the jinshi examination held in classical Chinese; well-versed in Chinese literary culture, he received intensive training on Manchu writing at the Hanlin Academy from 1670 to 1672.49 Similarly, as early as 1661, the court had required Zhang Yushu to take the same curriculum through which one “learned and practiced Manchu writing” (jiaoxi manyu 教習滿語).50 Even earlier, in 1652, right after he received his jinshi degree, Tang Bin was selected as “shujishi trainee [specializing in] Qing [Manchu] script” (Qingshu shujishi 清書庶吉士).51 Overall, all of them were jinshi degree holders who had successfully completed Manchu training at the Hanlin Academy. In other words, in the 1680s, although a number of Han scholars had joined the compilation of the Ming history, the project was under the leadership of scholar-officials who had extensive experience working with Manchu.52

In contrast to the first stage of the Ming history compilation from which no outcome in Chinese has survived, we have a variety of Chinese drafts stemming from later stages (see Table 1). Tang Bin published his drafts of the Ming history that he produced from 1679 to 1684—that is, item (1) or Tang (1679/1688) in Table 1.53 The comparison between the Ming gurun i suduri and Tang (1679/1688) will eventually suggest that around the 1680s, the compilers who were experts in Manchu writing may have made extensive use of the Manchu chronicle produced by the court in the early 1650s.

From the 1690s to 1739/1789

In 1687, Xu Yuanwen and his colleagues submitted to Kangxi their drafts of the Ming shi—a version that embodies further revisions based on Tang (1679/1688). Four years later, when Xu passed away, Kangxi forwarded these manuscripts to another Han scholar-official, Xiong Cilü 熊賜履, asking Xiong for his comments.54 Xiong soon presented extensive criticism and refutation. No later than 1697, Kangxi formally appointed him as one of the supervising compilers-in-chief.55

Table 1

Qing compilation of the Ming shi: surviving drafts and final outcomes56

Abbreviation (index year)

Bibliographical information

Background information

(1)

Tang (1679/1688)

Tang Bin 湯斌, Qian’an xiansheng ni Ming shi gao 潛菴先生擬明史稿, printed edition prefaced in 1688, held at Peking University Library.57

(2)

Wan (1702)

Ming shi jizhuan 明史紀傳, 313 juan (309 juan existent) manuscript, held at the National Library of China.58

Bibliographers have shown that this version is based on Wan Sitong’s 萬斯同 work from 1679 to 1702, and it predates (3).59

(3)

Wan/Xiong (1702)

Ming shi 明史, 416 juan manuscript, held at the National Library of China.60

In 1702, Xiong Cilü 熊賜履 submitted a draft of 416 juan to the court. Although some scholars proposed that (3) is the very draft that Xiong submitted to Kangxi in 1723, more recent studies suggest that (3) is likely a later (early Yongzheng period) copy of the 1702 draft.61

(4)

Wan/Xiong (SL)

Ming shi benji 明史本紀, 10 juan manuscript, held at the Shanghai Library.

This is copied from (3).

(5)

Wan/Wang (1723)

Wang Hongxu 王鴻緒, Hengyun shanren ji Ming shigao 橫雲山人集明史藁, 310 juan, Qing Yongzheng (1723–1735), printed edition held at the National Library of China.62

In 1723, Wang Hongxu submitted the full draft of 310 juan. Although the work is largely derived from Wan Sitong’s contributions, Wang published it as a part of his authorial collection.

(6)

Ming shi (1739)

Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 et al., Ming shi 明史, 1739 (Wuying Dian 武英殿) printed edition.

The Qing court finalized it in 1735 and printed it in 1739.

(7)

Mingji gangmu (1746/1782)

Mingji gangmu 明紀綱目, manuscript copy in Siku quanshu 四庫全書.63

The Qing court finalized it in 1746. Emperor Qianlong ordered a revision in 1775, and a revised version was completed in 1782.

(8)

Ming shi benji (1782)

Ming shi benji 明史本紀, reprinted edition held at the Shanghai Library.

(9)

Ming shi (1789)

Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 et al., Ming shi 明史, manuscript copy in Siku quanshu.

Emperor Qianlong ordered a revision of (6), and this is the outcome.

Xiong’s rise in the Ming History Compilation Office marks a critical yet much overlooked moment of discontinuity in the Qing compilation of the Ming history. As early as 1689, Kangxi was aware that Tang Bin was not on good terms with Xiong, and their intellectual rivalry, or even enmity, was well known to the Han literati community.64 As mentioned, Tang was a model student of Manchu writings in the 1650s. By contrast, a stain of Xiong’s early career was precisely his failure to familiarize himself with Manchu. In 1658, he failed the Manchu examination at the Hanlin Academy—the one that Nionio, Zhang Yushu, and Tang Bin had passed. As a result, Xiong Cilü was fined one year’s salary.65 Clearly, during the mid-1690s, a perfect record in Manchu studies was no longer a prerequisite for taking a leadership position in the Ming history compilation. If the goal of Ming history compilation in the 1640s and 1650s was to produce a chronicle for Manchu elites who preferred to read in Manchu, it was no longer so in the 1690s.

Thus, Kangxi supported Xiong’s plan to substantially rewrite the Ming history for three reasons. First, Kangxi emphasized that having read the Ming shilu, he was aware of its limitations. In the 1690s, Kangxi had agreed with his Han officials that an official history should widely consult sources of different kinds.66 More importantly, Kangxi was no longer interested in producing a Manchu/Chinese bilingual version of the Ming history, the Manchu part of which would fulfill the comprehensive chronicle in Manchu. In Kangxi’s own words, the Qing compilation of the Ming shi would eventually be subject to the “public opinion” (gonglun 公論) of the Han literati scholars, some of whom had already joined the Ming History Compilation Office.67 As Kangxi reiterated in 1704, “Ming shi is of pivotal importance. It is good only if it makes men of later generations yield by heart” (xinfu 心服).68 Lastly, Kangxi believed that Xiong enjoyed good relations with those working in the Ming History Compilation Office; “over half of the officials of the Office are his disciples … I appoint Xiong the Supervising Compiler-in-Chief, requiring him to finalize it quickly.”69

Xiong made the critical decision to turn to the drafts that Wan Sitong 萬斯同 (1638–1702) had been producing on his own, using Wan’s version as the base text. Positioning himself as a Ming loyalist, Wan Sitong refused to accept any Qing appointment, including any post in the Ming History Compilation Office.70 Nevertheless, in 1679 he decided to contribute to this project as a scholar at large, so as to “reciprocate his old state by undertaking the compilation of its history” 以任故國之史事報故國.71 The message behind this move, as we shall see, cannot have been clearer: for Wan, the Manchus had conquered the Ming but would not be able to dominate the writing of its history—because he was there to defend it.

Bibliographers and historians have so far identified a variety of Ming shi drafts, which are derived from Wan’s works.72 For the present study, I take the five most relevant ones into consideration—that is, items (2) to (5) in Table 1. Notably, in 1702, Xiong Cilü submitted a 406 juan draft to Kangxi, which was, as previous scholars have shown, based on Wan’s work. Utilizing or rather misappropriating the drafts that Wan had compiled, in 1723, Wang Hongxu 王鴻緒 (1645–1723)—another key leader of the Ming History Compilation Office in the 1690s and 1700s—submitted a 310 juan version to the court and soon published it under his own name.

Thus, from 1702 to 1723, Wan Sitong’s works replaced the earlier drafts that Cheng Kegong, Tang Bin, and their colleagues had produced; the focus of compiling the Ming shi gradually shifted to revising Wan’s drafts. In 1723, Kangxi’s successor, the Yongzheng emperor (1678–1735), appointed a new group of officials headed by Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 (1672–1755) to make improvements. Under this team, the Ming shi was finalized in 1735 and published in 1739. This edition is item (6) in Table 1.

The publication of the Ming shi in 1739 did not mark the end of the Qing compilations of Ming official history. Based on item (6) in Table 1, the court produced (7), a work intended as a sequel to the Zizhi tongjian gangmu 資治通鑑綱目 (Outlines and Details of the Comprehensive Mirror). In 1780, the Qianlong emperor (1711–1799) required his scholars to revise (6), using the new system of rendering Kitan, Jurchen, and Mongol names that he had promulgated.73 In 1782, the court produced Ming shi benji 明史本紀—item (8) in Table 1, which is a revised edition of the basic annals of (6). Applying the same revision method to the entire Ming shi, the court finalized (9), and added it to the Siku quanshu 四庫全書 (Complete Libraries in Four Branches) in 1789.74 As we shall see in the next section, a comparison between the contents of the Ming gurun i suduri and the Ming histories that the Qing court produced in Chinese will shed light on when the former was compiled.

In sum, it is often claimed that the Qing compilation of the Ming history served the goal of “legitimating the newly established political and moral order.”75 This section complicates this observation. I have argued that different Qing decision-makers used the cultural form of official history to achieve different goals. For Dorgon and Oboi, a definitive history of the Ming in Manchu was a part of a comprehensive history in Manchu. Behind it was the early Manchu state’s ambition to produce a history that was not inferior to the Mongolian, Tibetan, or even Chinese counterparts. Kangxi, and his successors following him, saw the project differently. An official history of the Ming should convince the Han elites that this is the definite version of the history of their previous regime. This reperiodization, reconstructed out of previously underutilized archival documents, will offer the context for situating the content of the Ming gurun i suduri.

Content of the Ming gurun i suduri: An Analysis of Its Sources

This section compares the content of the Ming gurun i suduri to the Chinese compilations produced from the 1670s to 1789 (see Table 1). I confirm that the former differs substantially from the latter and must predate any items of the latter—an observation that Fuchs first proposed.76 The clearest evidence comes from the fact that the Manchu chronicle draws information from the Ming sources—the Ming shilu whenever it exists—that is not found in the Ming shi or its drafts, as Li Deqi has suggested in his brief bibliographical note. Here, given the scope of a single article, I shall confine myself to an example to illustrate how the Ming gurun i suduri uses translations from Ming shilu to retell history. This example concerns how Zhu Yuanzhang built his first army in 1352. When relating this event, the Ming shi and its drafts state in merely nine to thirty-one character passages that “using strategy,” Zhu gained a troop of three thousand men (Table 2).

Table 2

Zhu Yuanzhang subduing a battalion in Chinese versions of Ming histories that the Qing court produced

Original Text

Translation

(1) Tang (1679/1688)

有民兵號驢牌砦,孤軍無所屬,太祖命費聚等以討降之,得壯士三千人而東。77

There is a militia called Donkey-Badge Fortress; isolated, it does not belong to anyone. Taizu ordered Fei Ju and others to attack and subdue it; he gained three thousand warriors and marched east.

(2) Wan (1702)

有驢牌寨者,聚眾無所屬,太祖請於子興,扶病單騎往,以計撫之,降三千人。

There is a Donkey-Badge Fortress, where a multitude gathered and lacked leadership. Taizu asked [Guo] Zixing to allow him to go there alone despite his sickness; he pacified the battalion with strategy, subduing three thousand men.

(3) Wan/Xiong (1702)

(4) Wan/Xiong (1702) & (SL)

少間,請於子興,往招驢牌寨,降其兵三千人。

After a short while, Zhu asked [Guo] Zixing to allow him to summon the [troop] of the Donkey-Badge Fortress, and subdued three thousand soldiers there.

(5) Wan/Wang (1723)

以計撫驢牌寨之眾三千。

[Zhu,] using strategy, pacified the multitude of three thousand of the Donkey-Badge Fortress.

(6) Ming shi (1739)

計降驢牌寨民三千,與俱東。

Using strategy, [Zhu] subdued the three thousand men of the Fortress, and headed toward the east with them.

(7) Mingji gangmu (1746/1782)

降驢牌寨民兵三千。

[Zhu] subdued the three thousand militia of the Fortress.

(8) Ming shi benji (1782)

(9) Ming shi (1789)

計降驢牌寨民兵三千,與俱東。

Using strategy, [Zhu] subdued the three thousand militia of the Fortress, and headed toward the east with them.

The Ming gurun i suduri—comprising 131 words in Manchu—offers a far more detailed account, which I translate below:

Speaking to the leader of the battalion [i.e., the Donkey-Badge Fortress], [Zhu Yuanzhang] subdued [this troop]. When Zhu Yuanzhang was about to return, he realized that [to surrender] was not the real intention [of the leader]. He left his companion Fei Ju to oversee them. On the third day, Fei Ju returned to report that the situation was that these people sought to go to another place. [Zhu] took three hundred men and went to the battalion to remedy [the situation]; he selected a brave and strong man and dispatched him to deceive the leader by saying “let’s meet”; as such, Zhu Yuanzhang set up the secret plan. After the leader of the battalion came, when [Zhu and the leader] met each other, Zhu—having seized him, tied him up, and selected fifty strong men [to hold the leader]—took [the leader back to camp] by pushing him repeatedly. He sent out a man, informing the troop within the battalion of the following order, which says: “I have taken your leader. You shall come to follow my troop.” The troop within the battalion came out and burnt their fortress. The troop all surrendered. Zhu Yuanzhang thus gained three thousand good men of this battalion.

ing i ejen i baru gisureme dahabufi.. ju yuwan jang bedereme jidere de. terei yargiyan akū be serefi. ini gucu fei jioi be tuwaša seme werihe.. ilaci inenggi. fei jioi jifi alame. tesei arbun gūwa bade geneki. sembi.. ju yuwan jang. ilan tanggū niyalma be gaifi. jai dasame genefi. baturu hūsungge niyalma be tucibufi. ing ni ejen be acanjio seme geodebume ganabufi dorgideri buttui [*butui] arga toktobuha.. ing ni ejen jiha manggi.. ishunde acambi sere de uthai jafafi huthufi hūsungge susai niyalma be tucibufi anatame gamaha.. niyalma takūrafi. ing ni dorgi geren de gisun selgiyeme hendume.. suweni ejen be gamambi.. suwe meni cooha be baime ici acambi sehe manggi.. ing ni dorgi cooha tucifi šancin be tuwa sindafi. geren gemu dahaha. ju yuwan jang. terei sain haha ilan mingga be gaifi..78

This narrative, while far more detailed than Ming shi and its drafts in Chinese, is itself a summary of the Ming shilu, translated in Appendix 1. Three distinctive features of the Manchu narrative may command particular attention. First, in contrast to the Ming shilu, which refers to Zhu Yuanzhang, who had not declared himself as emperor yet, with the honorific term shang 上 (the superior or his majesty), the Ming gurun i suduri used his name “ju yuwan jang”—a practice consistent with early seventeenth-century Manchu compilations.79 Second, while the Ming shilu employed over a hundred characters to detail how Zhu tried to persuade the leader of the battalion and, after he failed, gave orders to all his three hundred soldiers to ambush him, the Manchu chronicle skipped these details entirely; its rendition summarizes Zhu’s settled plan as one of four parts (grammatically marked by four converbs): having led (gaifi) three hundred men, having gone (genefi) to remedy the situation; having selected (tucibufi) a brave man, and having sent (ganabufi) him to lure the leader. Third, it is the Manchu narrative alone that closes the episode by summarizing what happened in the end: “the troop [within the battalion] all surrendered.” By contrast, the Ming shilu uses two separate phrases, that “all soldiers within the battalion came out” and that “[Zhu] forced all of them to come back with him.” In brief, the Ming gurun i suduri offers an account that is tighter and, in some ways, clearer than its source, the Ming shilu.

The fact that the Ming gurun i suduri uses the Ming shilu as its main—if not only—source offers another piece of evidence that the content of the former dates back to the mid-seventeenth century, a period when the court compilation of the Ming history used the Ming shilu as its sole source. As detailed above, no later than the early 1680s, the basic annals of Emperor Taizu (Zhu Yuanzhang) that Tang Bin compiled (i.e., Tang, 1679/1688) were already stored at the Ming History Compilation Office. In 1702, Wan/Xiong (1702) was further submitted to the court, and from 1723, Wan/Wang (1723) became the base text from which the Ming shi (1739) was produced.80 Had the Ming gurun i suduri been compiled after 1679/1702/1723/1739/1789, it would be rather unlikely that whoever produced it set aside the Chinese versions that the court itself had commissioned and went back to work with the Ming shilu.81

In the next section, I shall show that the Manchu rendition, besides its narrative virtuosity, is loaded with rich understandings of the governance and violence of the early Ming. Here, it is worth stressing that the Ming shilu does not cover every year of the Ming empire. In particular, although Emperor Jianwen ruled from 1398 to 1402, his uncle Emperor Yongle usurped the throne and refused to recognize Jianwen as a legitimate monarch of the dynasty. As a result, the Ming court never compiled a “veritable record” for the Jianwen reign per se. One of the ninety-seven volumes of the Ming gurun i suduri—volume 16—is devoted to the four years of Jianwen’s reign (1398 to 1402).82 What kinds of sources the Ming gurun i suduri uses for the Jianwen reign is of critical importance for understanding the compilation of this manuscript.

A key challenge lies in the fact that from about 1500 to 1800, hundreds of titles were compiled including narratives of the Jianwen reign.83 While many of them have survived, they often used materials from previous prints, borrowing or rather pasting passages and lines from other titles. With each title being a “patchwork” narrative, to borrow Shang Wei’s term, together they form a complicated web of knowledge through which the content of each book overlaps, to some extent, with others.84 A clue of how to confront this challenge lies in a distinctive feature of the Ming gurun i suduri, that is, it does not translate the honorific titles from Chinese to Manchu, but transcribes its pronunciation. Take the following two sentences from the Ming gurun i suduri as an example:

[In 1399, Jianwen] endowed the posthumous [title] yi wen huang taizi [懿文皇太子] xingzong xiaokang huangdi [興宗孝康皇帝] to his father; and made his mother yi wen huang taizi fei [懿文皇太子妃] xiaokang huanghou [孝康皇后].

ama. i wen hūwang taidz be amcame. sing dzong siyoo k’ang hūwangdi. eme i wen hūwang taidz i fei siyoo k’ang hūangho obuha.85

Critically, one can discern that the Manchu chronicle adopted a particular set of historical knowledge. Accordingly, the posthumous title that Jianwen’s mother, Lady Chang, received before 1399 is yi wen huang taizi fei 懿文皇太子妃; then, in 1399, Jianwen made her xiaokang huanghou 孝康皇后. Not all writings in Chinese converge on these details. For instance, the Ming shi (1739/1789) emphasizes that her posthumous title before 1399 is jing yi huang taizi fei 敬懿皇太子妃. The critical difference between yi wen (wise and cultural), on the one hand, and jing yi (wise and venerated), on the other, shows that the base sources of the two compilations diverge.

Starting from this observation, one may perceive the Ming gurun i suduri as composed of a string of constitutive narrative units, which transmit information with key proper names transliterated instead of translated. In the current example, I see that Jianwen conferred a posthumous title upon his father and then upon his mother as two distinct narratological units, each containing two key proper names. This approach has two advantages. It allows me to run a keyword search in the databases that contain all surviving writings about Jianwen, compiled and/or published from about 1500 to 1800. Second, it enables me to compare the similarities between a large number of historical writings in different languages.

I apply this method to a larger sample of 237 words in Manchu, covering the first three months of 1399. I divide the Manchu narrative into twenty-five narrative units, using a set of ten key proper names to carry out the search.86 And then to run the keyword search, I use the large database Diaolong, a platform that covers Siku quanshu 四庫全書, Quan siku cunmu 全四庫存目, Siku jinshui shu 四庫禁毀書, Siku weishou shu 四庫未收書, and Xuxiu siku quanshu 續修四庫全書. This allows me to compare the Manchu rendition to a wide range of writings that cover the Jianwen reign.

The result (shown in Appendix 2) is straightforward. As far as the early months of the Jianwen reign are concerned, the Ming gurun i suduri differs radically from the Ming shi and its drafts that the Qing court had received or produced during the eighteenth century—Tang (1679/1688) does not include a basic annal of the Jianwen reign and for this reason, is not taken into consideration here. Instead, the Ming gurun i suduri largely overlaps with at least five books published during the mid- and late Ming times: Wuxue bian 吾學編 (1567), Jianwen chaoye huibian 建文朝野彙編 (1598), Huang Ming dazheng ji 皇明大政紀 (1602), Jianwen shufa ni 建文書法儗, and Huang Ming congxin lu 皇明從信錄 (1640). How exactly the Ming gurun i suduri utilizes materials from these Ming prints on Jianwen will be the subject of a future article. What can be ascertained here is that whoever compiled the Ming gurun i suduri did not consult any versions that the Qing court produced from 1702 to 1789 but utilized Ming sources published before 1644. The only plausible explanation is that the creation of the content of the Ming gurun i suduri, in this case, predates 1702.

In sum, this section debunks the previous assumption that the Ming gurun i suduri is the Manchu translation of the Ming shi published in 1739; instead, the manuscript uses Ming shilu whenever it exists, and resorts to various Ming prints when narrating the Jianwen reign. My analysis here is not sufficient to date when the manuscript qua object that now resides in the Palace Museum of Beijing was produced; nevertheless, it offers strong evidence that its content predates 1679, and results from the intellectual output from 1645 to 1669.

The Significance of the Ming gurun i suduri: A Case Study

In what follows, I present a case study focusing on two critical months of 1352 during which Zhu Yuanzhang decided to join rebel troops against Mongol rule—that is, right before Zhu recruited the three thousand soldiers in the episode cited above. In contrast to previous examples where the Ming gurun i suduri tightened the narrative of the Ming sources (either Ming shilu or the various late Ming prints), here we shall see a concrete example of how the Manchu manuscript advocated a distinctive narrative that differs from known Chinese versions compiled during the Ming and Qing periods in critical ways. Ultimately, the Manchu take on the fall of the Mongols and the founding of the Ming offers an interesting perspective on the continuity and discontinuity of the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties.

It will be helpful, accordingly, to further dive into the historical context of the 1350s. As the Ming gurun i suduri presents it, a major challenge to Mongol rule in China appeared in 1343, when an unexpected “famine plus pandemic” (yuyumbime harkasi) struck the realm.87 Many commoners in China died, including the parents and elder brothers of a peasant named Zhu Yuanzhang, a native of Haozhou 濠州. This desperate peasant then entered the Huangjue temple 皇覺寺, hoping to make a living there. The temple, lacking provisions, sent Zhu away. Thus, from 1349, Zhu was “begging everywhere” (jergi bade giohame yabufi), until he returned to the Huangjue temple in 1352.88 In the second month of this year, however, Guo Zixing 郭子興, one of the rebel leaders, seized this region. After two months of deliberation and hesitation, Zhu joined Guo’s troops. Table 3 details how the Ming shilu documents the events of the two months between Guo’s taking up arms and Zhu reaching his decision to join the rebels. I divide the narrative into eight distinct units, from (a) to (h).

Table 3

Ming shilu on the events in months 2 and 3, 1352

Unit

Summary

Original text

Translation

(a)

(day 1, month 2) Guo Zixing took up arms and occupied Haozhou.

壬辰春二月乙亥朔,定遠人郭子興孫德崖及俞某魯某潘某等起兵自稱元帥攻拔濠州據其城守之。

On the first day (day yihai) of the second month of Renchen Year [1352], Guo Zixing, a man from Dingyuan, took up arms with Sun Deya, a Lu, and a Pan. Guo declared himself the chief commander. He attacked and seized Haozhou, and then occupied and defended it.

(b)

(day 27, month 2) Guo’s troops burned the Huangjue temple.

辛丑,亂兵焚皇覺寺,寺僧皆逃散。

On the twenty-seventh day (day xinchou), rebellious soldiers burned the Huangjue temple. All the monks scattered and fled.

(c)

Zhu fled.

上亦出避兵。

His majesty also left the temple to seek shelter from the fighting.

(d)

Zhu divined about what he should do and waited to decide where to go.

269 words in Ming shilu, not cited here

[I have skipped this part mainly because the details yield nothing of significance in terms of the present comparison.]

(e)

Che-li Bu-hua (Čerik Buqa) led troops to attack Hao.

就是時,元將徹里不花率兵欲來復濠城。

At this time, the Yuan general Che-li Bu-hua (Čerik Buqa) led troops, seeking to recover the city of Hao.

(f)

Not daring to attack the city, he pillaged the area.

憚不敢進,惟日掠良民為盜以徼賞。

Fearing [the rebels,] he did not dare to advance. Every day, he captured innocent commoners, declaring them as bandits and thus claiming rewards.

(g)

The civilians were frightened, while rumors circulated.

民皆恟恟,相扇動不自安。

The commoners were deeply terrified; inciting each other [to rebellion], they were in a panic.

(h)

(day 1, intercalary month 3) Zhu decided to go to Haozhou, joining Guo Zixing’s troop.

上以四境逼迫,訛言日甚,不獲已,乃以閏三月甲戌朔旦抵濠城入門。89

His majesty, having realized that the troops were pressing from four directions and rumors increasingly circulating, had no other solution; he arrived in the city of Hao and entered the gate on the first day (day jiaxu) of the third intercalary month.

At first glance, the Ming gurun i suduri follows the Ming shilu. Close scrutiny, however, reveals critical differences between these two compilations.

(a)* The person named Guo Zixing, [native] of Dinyuan, together with his band including Sun Deya and others, took up arms. Elevating himself, he named himself the chief commander and seized the place of Haoliang [Haozhou]; as such, he created disorder. (b) Because of the pillaging and robbing, (c) Zhu Yuanzhang had no place to escape to. (d) Zhu divined [details of which I skip.] At that time, while the Yuan general Ce-li Bu-hūwa [Čerik Buqa] led armies, seeking to recover the city of Haoliang, (g) the people were confused. Rumors were becoming more numerous everyday. (h) Thus, on the first day of the third intercalary month, Zhu Yuanzhang arrived at Haoliang.

(a)* ding yuwan i g’o dzi sing gebungge niyalma ini hoki sun de ai sei emgi cooha ilifi. beye be tukiyeme. yuwan šuwai seme gebulefi hoo liang ni babe gaifi facuhūrambi (b)* durime cuwangname yabure jakade.. (c) ju yuwan jang jailara ba akū ofi.. [(d), which I skip] (e) tere fonde yuwan gurun i jiyanggiyūn. ce li bu hūwa cooha gaifi. hoo liyang ni hecen be dahūme gaiki sere de. (g) irgen mujilen toktohon akū.. urkilere gisun inenggi deri ambula oho be ju yuwan jang sefi. (h) anagan i ilan biyai ice inenggi hoo liyang de geneci.

Most importantly, the compilers of the Manchu chronicle deliberately deleted (f). This narrative unit emphasizes that the Mongol general Čerik Buqa was a coward, and his troops were pillaging the region, as a result of which the lives of innocent commoners were jeopardized. Simultaneously, the Manchu version rewrites (a) and (b) in a subtle yet significant way. The Ming shilu does acknowledge that Guo forcefully “occupied” (ju 據) the city of Haozhou, but that is the end of the sentence. The Manchu rendition uses the key verb facuhūrambi (causing disorder) to lead all converbs describing Guo’s acts: claiming himself commander and seizing the city. As such, it makes the judgment that Guo’s taking up arms is the direct cause of the chaos. The Ming shilu, having described Guo’s rise in Haozhou (i.e., (a)), shifts to report that some “undisciplined soldiers” (luanbing 亂兵) burned Huangjue temple. In no way, however, does the Ming shilu claim that these “undisciplined soldiers” belonged to Guo Zixing; and the seven-day gap, as the Ming shilu features, narratively distances Guo’s rising and the soldiers’ unruly behavior. The Manchu rendition employs a different approach. Even though it leaves the subject of the “pillaging and robbing” (durime cuwangname) unstated, it places these violent acts right after the judgment that Guo created chaos, and it reinforces the argument—in ways that the Ming shilu does not—that the rebels were accountable for the violence. As such, compared to its source the Ming shilu, the Manchu version skips the misconduct of the Mongol troops and highlights the “disorder” that Guo had created.

To fully appreciate the significance of the Ming gurun i suduri’s narrative, it will be helpful to compare it not only with the Ming shilu, but also with the Ming shi drafts produced by/for the Qing court as well as other Ming histories published or compiled during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Table 4 lists ten influential ones. Particularly important is (i) Huang Ming qiyun 皇明啟運 (1522). As Devin Fitzgerald and other scholars have pointed out, this was the first “in a compilation boom of Ming chronicles.”90 It heralded a wave of commercially printed Ming histories, and from 1522 to 1644, more than twenty-one printed titles based their content on it.91

Table 4

Compilations of Ming histories in Chinese, ca. 1550–1680

Abbreviation

(index year)

Bibliographical information

(i)

Huang Ming qiyun (1522)

Chen Jian 陳建, Huang Ming qiyun lu 皇明啟運錄, printed edition prefaced in 1522, held at the Nanjing Library. Republished under a variety of titles including Huang Ming tongji 皇明通紀.92

(ii)

Xianzhang lu (1574)

Xue Yingzhan 薛應旃, Xianzhang lu 憲章錄, printed in 1574 (prefaced in 1573), in Siku quanshu cunmu congshu 四庫全書存目叢書, vol. shibu 11.

(iii)

Dazheng ji (1602)

Lei Li 雷禮, Huang Ming dazheng ji 皇明大政記, printed edition prefaced in 1602, in Siku quanshu cunmu congshu, vol. shibu 7.

(iv)

Huang Ming shu (1606)

Deng Yuanxi 鄧元錫, Huang Ming shu 皇明書, printed edition prefaced in 1606, held at the Nanjing Library, see also Xuxiu siku quanshu, vol. shibu 315.

(v)

Dazheng ji (1630)

Zhu Guozhen 朱國禎, Huang Ming dazheng ji 皇明大政記, printed edition prefaced in 1630, in Yuan Guoli Beiping tushuguan jiaku shanben congshu 原國立北平圖書館甲庫善本叢書, vol. 116.

(vi)

Mingshan cang (1640)

He Qiaoyuan 何喬遠, Mingshan cang 名山藏, printed edition prefaced in 1640, in Xuxiu siku quanshu, vol. shibu 425.

(vii)

Guo que (1626/1653)

Tan Qian 談遷, Guo que 國榷, manuscript copy prefaced in 1626 and 1630, held at the Nanjing Library.93

(viii)

Shikui shu (1655)

Zhang Dai 張岱, Shikui shu 石匱書, manuscript copies of the early Qing period held at the Nanjing Library.

(ix)

Mingji bian nian (1660)

Zhong Xing 鍾惺, Mingji biannian 明紀編年, printed edition prefaced in 1660, in Siku jinhui shu congkan 四庫禁燬書叢刋, vol. shibu 35.

(x)

Ming shu (1667/1695)

Fu Weilin 傅維鱗, Ming shu 明書, printed edition prefaced in 1695, in Siku quanshu cunmu congshu, vol. shibu 38.

(Fu was among the scholars who participated in the Qing compilation of Ming history in 1647. Unsatisfied with the court’s approach, he compiled Ming shu himself. While he died in 1667, his manuscript was printed in 1695.)

Table 5 then compares how twenty-one books narrated the same event of Zhu Yuanzhang deciding to join the rebels. It is clear that (i) Huang Ming qiyun (1522) initiated a narrative revolution against the Ming shilu. It places (d), the episode in which Zhu Yuanzhang had to seek safety, after (e), (f), and (g), which describe the Mongol troops pillaging the surrounding areas. In other words, in the Ming shilu, Guo Zixing and his rebel troops were at least partially responsible for the breakdown of public order, as a result of which Zhu Yuanzhang and his fellow monks had to flee—a narrative order that the Ming gurun i suduri follows pretty closely. According to Huang Ming qiyun (1522), Mongol troops were responsible for all the violence alone, which then drove Zhu Yuanzhang to take up arms.

In this sense, the Ming gurun i suduri and Huang Ming qiyun (1522) represent two extremes of a political spectrum. In the former, as discussed above, the rebels had created chaos, and thus the Mongol court sent troops, of which no misbehaviors were reported, to reestablish order. In the latter, the rebels were righteous from the outset, and the misgovernance of the Mongols, plus the brutality that their field commander committed, turned Zhu Yuanzhang into a leader of resistance.

At this point, it is plausible and productive to see the Qing compilation of the Ming history as a process during which the two distinct philosophies competed to dominate the final narrative. Only Tang Bin (1679/1688), as Table 5 shows, follows the Manchu chronicle. This is not surprising if one recalls that Tang was first and foremost a disciple of Cheng Kegong, who submitted the Manchu version of the Ming history to Shunzhi in 1655.94 Given Tang’s expertise in Manchu, it is most likely that he had consulted the Manchu draft, an argument that I shall make elsewhere.95 Nevertheless, Tang incorporated into his version (f), the key episode featuring the Mongol general as a coward, which the Ming gurun i suduri deliberately deleted. Once Xiong Cilü assumed a leadership position at the Ming History Compilation Office, he adopted the manuscript that Wan Sitong had prepared, and Wan, clearly, stood with Huang Ming qiyun (1522). In other words, thanks to Wan (and the intermediate roles that Xiong Cilü and Wang Hongxu played), the very knowledge that the mid- and late Ming print culture (re)produced replaced the narrative that early Qing compilers had reinvented in Manchu.96

Table 5

Comparison of the renditions of the events of months 2 and 3, 1352 (see appendix 3 for the texts and translations)

Abbreviation

(index year)

Narrative flow

Ming shilu (1418)97

(a)     -(b) -(c)-(d)-(e)-(f)-(g) -(h)

(i)

Huang Ming qiyun (1522)

(a) -(e)-(f)-(g) -(d)-(h)

(ii)

Xianzhang lu (1574)

(a) -(e)-(f)-(g) -(d)-(h)

(iii)

Dazheng ji (1602)

(a) -(!)-(d) -(h)

(iv)

Huang Ming shu (1606)

(a) -(e)-(f)-(g) -(d)-(h)

(v)

Dazheng ji (1630)

(a)     -(b) -(c)-(d)-(e)-(f) -(h)

(vi)

Mingshan cang (1640)

(a) -(e)-(f)-(g)-(c)-(d)-(h)

(vii)

Guo que (1653)

(a)     -(b) -(c)-(d)-(e)-(f)-(g)             -(h)

(viii)

Shikui shu (1655)

(a) -(h)

(ix)

Mingji bian nian (1660)

(a)            -(c)-(d) -(h)

(x)

Ming shu (1667/1695)

(a) -(!)-(d) -(h)

Ming gurun i suduri

(a)*-(b)*-(c)-(d)-(e) -(g)             -(h)

(1)

Tang (1679)

(a) -(b)*-(c)-(d)-(e)-(f)                  -(h)

(2)

Wan (1702)

(a)            -(c)-(d)-(e)-(f) -(h)

(3) & (4)

Wan/Xiong (1702) & (SL)

(a) -(e)-(f)-(g)-(c)-(d)-(h)

(5)

Wan/Wang (1723)

(a) -(e)-(f) -(d)-(h)

(6)

Ming shi (1739)

(a) -(e)-(f) -(c)-(d)-(h)

(7)

Mingji gangmu (1746/1782)

(a) -(h)

(8)

Ming shi benji (1982)

(a) -(e)-(f) -(c)-(d)-(h)

(9)

Ming shi (1789)

(a) -(e)-(f) -(c)-(d)-(h)

In sum, this section has zoomed in on a concrete example, showing how the Ming gurun i suduri retold a violent episode in ways that differ from its counterparts in Chinese. This case study demonstrates that the Manchu chronicle not only used the materials from the Ming shilu to offer a clear and compelling narrative, as shown in the previous section, but also advocated a distinctive political or even ideological agenda, which refuses to cast the Mongol general in negative terms. While further study of this Manchu manuscript will provide more examples about the Manchu take on the Yuan-Ming transition, it suffices to note here that the Ming gurun i suduri also allows us to appreciate the achievements of its critics, including Wan Sitong and Xiong Cilü. As far as the episode of Zhu’s uprising is concerned, the 1739 Ming shi is more a product of the Ming loyalists who followed the late Ming prints in denouncing the Mongols.

Conclusion

So far I have reported my observations concerning what the Ming gurun i suduri is and why it is important. I proposed that the content of this manuscript dates back to the mid-seventeenth century, and offered evidence from three perspectives. First, based on close scrutiny of archival documents, I showed that it is only during 1645 to 1669 that the Qing court was committed to producing a Ming chronicle in Manchu. Even more importantly, as early as 1655, compilers had already submitted a completed Manchu-language draft to the emperor. In other words, while Fuchs’ and Li Deqi’s bibliographical notes surmise that the production of the manuscript was either in 1645 or after 1665, the archival materials suggest that the period in between is most critical to its production.

Second, by examining the contents of the Ming gurun i suduri, I confirmed that whoever compiled this book did not consult the finalized Ming shi or any drafts that the Ming History Compilation Office had produced from 1679 to 1789. Instead, they used the Ming shilu for the periods for which it was available, and turned to mid- and late Ming prints for the Jianwen reign for which no veritable records have ever been produced.

Third, by focusing on how the Ming gurun i suduri redescribed the rebellions against Mongol rule in 1352, I argued that this Manchu book advances a distinctive narrative significantly different from other writings published or finalized during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. In addition, I have suggested that Tang Bin, when compiling his draft of Ming shi around 1680, had followed the Manchu narrative and early Qing ideological agenda when narrating the late Yuan rule and the rise of Zhu Yuanzhang.

If these observations are correct the Ming gurun i suduri that is now stored in the Palace Museum in Beijing embodies the historical knowledge that the early Qing court produced in Manchu, which, despite its importance up to the 1680s, had gradually sunk into oblivion after the court adopted the narrative crafted by scholars epitomized by Wan Sitong. In brief, this manuscript, which offers unique access to the interaction and confrontation between the Manchu and Chinese historiographical and political thought, constitutes a rich site for further studies.

Acknowledgments

The project would have been impossible without the Mingshi reading group chaired by Wen-hsin Ye, and the support of Chunhua and Hong Ye. I am particularly grateful to Mark Elliott for his encouragement, criticism, and support, not to mention his detailed comments. Sean Cronan, Zijing Fan, Matthew Mosca, Michael Nylan, and Timothy Brook provided me with detailed, prompt, and constructive feedback on various drafts. In particular, Zijing has shared her expertise on this subject throughout the process. I have been fortunate enough to receive guidance from Brian Baumann, Bettine Birge, Charles Hartman, Bian He, Lang Chao (Sektu), Nicolas Tackett, Eric Schluessel, Sarah Schneewind, Sophie Volpp, Matthew Mosca, Iguro Shinobu, Iiyama Tomoyasu, and Zhang Yichi at different stages. First drafted during the month-long quarantine of the COVID-19 pandemic, I must thank everyone who has shared PDF s and other electronic resources with me. I extend my gratitude to Shen Liyun, He Jianye, Wu Ching Kit, and Lu Chuxu for their assistance in various ways, and the anonymous reviewers for their kind help. All errors are mine alone.

Appendix 1: Ming shilu on Zhu Yuanzhang Taking a Battalion with Strategy

Underlined are details that are omitted from the Manchu rendition in the Ming gurun i suduri, as translated and analyzed above.

His majesty was about to return, but worried that [the leader of the battalion] was not sincere; thus, he left Fei Ju to oversee [the leader]. After three days, Fei returned and reported: “It will not work; he seeks to go to other places.” The emperor immediately led three hundred soldiers and arrived at the battalion’s location again, telling the leader what follows: “You have been bullied by others, and you have not taken revenge yet; now you follow me to go north, I am afraid that you will not forgive that person. I will assist you with troops, and you can take your revenge.” The leader promised with reservation, and defended his battalion with care. His majesty, having seen the situation as such, realized that it was impossible to convince [the leader] with words, and thought about taking it by force. It happened that a man of force of the same district was in Zhu’s troop. His majesty asked: “I want to employ you. Can you [accept a mission]?” [He] said: “So long as it is your order, I’ll follow.” Thus, Zhu told him his secret plan, sending him to lure the leader to come. In secret, Zhu also ordered our troops: “Once that person comes, then you gather to watch him; once you gather, spread out; do this three times. We shall capture [the leader] among the multitude.” Afterwards, the leader came; the multitude followed the order, and thus tied up the leader. [Zhu] ordered fifty strong persons to carry him forward. Those within the battalion did not know about it yet. Once they had marched over ten li, Zhu sent out a person, informing those within the battalion: “Your leader has left to take a tour over to [our] camp. You can move your troops to join us.” Thus, all soldiers within the battalion came out, and burned their camp immediately. [Zhu] forced all of them to come back with him, and gained three thousand warriors.

上將還,慮其不誠,留費聚伺之。後三日,聚還告曰:事不諧矣,彼且欲他往。上即率兵三百人,復抵其營謂之曰:汝為人所凌怨,尚未復。今從我而北,恐不能釋憾于彼。我助汝兵,可以報之。帥且諾且疑,然設備甚至。上觀其情狀,非可以言諭,謀以計取之。適里人有勇力者在行,上謂曰:吾欲用爾,能乎?曰:惟命是聼。乃宻告以計,使往誘其帥來會。潛約我衆,俟其至則聚而觀之,既聚復開,如是者三,即於衆中縛之。既而其帥至,衆如約,遂縛之。令壯士五十人擁之以行,其營中不知也。行十餘里乃遣人喻其營中曰:爾帥已往觀營地,可移軍來就。于是營中兵皆出,即焚其營壘。悉驅其衆以還,得壯士三千人。

Appendix 2: Narrative Analysis of the Beginning of the First Year of Jianwen

Here, ● means that the Chinese source provides the same information as the narrative unit in Manchu. It counts 1 toward the total weight (measuring textual overlap). ○ indicates that the Chinese source presents the very same narrative unit in an alternative way; in other words, there is key information in the Manchu chronicle that does not appear in its counterpart in Chinese. It counts 0.5 toward the total weight. The limitations of this approach are more or less obvious: it does not allow researchers to delve into the nuances between the Ming gurun i suduri and any Chinese title. Nevertheless, it has its unique advantage as a starting point. It efficiently highlights the relationship between a large number of narratives in different languages.

Narrative unit based on Ming gurun i suduri

Wuxue bian (1567)

Jianwen chaoye huibian (1598)

Huang Ming da-zheng ji (1602)

Jianwen shufa ni (1620)

Huang Ming Congxin lu (1640)

Wan (1723)

Wan/Xiong (1702)

Wan/Wang (1723)

Ming shi (1739/1782/1789)

Mingji gang-mu (1746)

1. Jianwen offered sacrifices in the south, juxtaposing Emperor Taizu [with Heaven].

2. Jianwen issued the decree to take care of the elders,

(after 10)

(after 10)

(after 10)

(after 10)

(after 7)

3. Giving them clothes.

(after 10)

(after 10)

(after 10)

(after 10)

(after 7)

4. Jianwen ordered the government to redeem the sons sold in previous years,

(after 10)

5. Exempting the taxes of the families involved.

(after 10)

6. Jianwen ordered the compilation of the veritable records of Emperor Gaozu [Zhu Yuanzhang].

(after 1)

(after 1)

(after 1)

(after 1)

7. Jianwen conferred the posthumous title xiaokang huangdi to his father, yi wen huangtaizi.

(after 3)

(after 3)

(after 3)

(after 6)

8. and the title xiaokang huanghou to his mother, yi wen huangtaizi fei.

(after 3)

(after 3)

(after 3)

(after 6)

9. Jianwen endowed a title to his wife.

10. Jianwen declared his heir.

(after 11)

(after 11)

11. Jianwen endowed prince titles to his brothers

12. Jianwen reformed the imperial government.

13. This month, Prince Yan came to pay homage.

14. Prince Yan took the imperial path, refusing to show respect.

15. Censor Zeng Fengshao impeached Prince Yan.

16. Zhuo Jing also memorialized,

17. suggesting that Jianwen remove Prince Yan to Nanchang to eradicate the harm.

18. Jianwen decreed, making him not submit further words.

19. Jianwen went to guwe ze jiyan (the State Academy),

20. offering sacrifice to Confucius.

21. Jianwen went to Yi lun tang (Hall of Constant Norms),

22. Visiting teachers and awarding them silk

23. With differences according to their ranks.

24. Tang Zong memorialized that Chen Ying had taken bribes from Prince Yan; there must be rebellious plans.

25. Then, Jianwen sent Chen Ying to Guangxi as a punishment.

Total count

22/25

(88 %)

23.5/25

(90 %)

22/25

(88 %)

23.5/25

(94 %)

21.5/25

(86 %)

6.5/25

(26 %)

6/25

(24 %)

6.5/25

(26 %)

6/25

(24 %)

9.5/25

(38 %)

Appendix 3: Rewriting Months 2–3, 1352

Original text

Translation

Huang Ming qiyun (1522)

(a) 二月,郭子興等起兵,據濠州。子興見徐、穎起兵,列郡騷動,遂與其黨孫德崖等舉兵,自稱元帥,攻拔濠州,据之。 (e) 元將徹里不花率兵欲復濠城, (f) 憚不敢進,惟日掠良民為盜以邀賞。 (g) 由是民益汹汹不安,其豪傑咸投入城以自保。 (b) 時我太祖高皇帝潛龍在野,託身濠之皇覺寺。及是大亂,僧皆散去。 [(d), which I skip] (h) 乃以閏三月朔入濠城避兵。98

(a) On the second month, Guo Zixing took up arms and occupied Haozhou. Zixing, seeing that many had taken up arms in Xu and Ying, and many regions were tumultuous, raised troops with his follower Sun Deya and others. He declared himself as the Chief Commander, took Haozhou, and occupied it. (e) The Yuan general Che-li Bu-hua [Čerik Buqa] sought to recover Hao. Fearing [the rebels], he did not dare to advance. Every day, he captured innocent commoners to claim rewards. (g) Thus, the commoners were increasingly restless and unsettled. (b) At this time, our August Emperor Taizu was the dragon dwelling in the countryside. He temporarily made a living at the Huangjue temple. At the moment of grand chaos, all monks left. [(d) He divined, details of which I skip.] (h) He entered the city of Hao to evade warfare on the first day of the intercalary third month.

Xianzhang lu (1574)

(a) 定遠人郭子興起兵,攻拔濠州。 (e) 元將徹里不花 (f) 憚不敢進,惟日掠良民以邀元主之賞。 (g) 人無生路。 [(d), which I skip] (h) 閏三月朔遂入濠。99

(a) Guo Zixing from Dingyuan took up arms. He attacked and took Haozhou. (e) The Yuan general Che-li Bu-hua, (f) fearing [the rebels,] did not dare to advance. (f) Every day he only pillaged innocent commoners to claim rewards from the Yuan emperor. (g) The commoners had no way to survive. [(d) Zhu divined, details of which I skip.] (h) He entered the city of Hao on the first day of the intercalary third month.

Dazheng ji (1602)

(a) 定遠人元帥郭子興拔濠州據之。(!) 帝憫四海分崩,生民陷溺,欲起而拯之 [(d), which I skip] (h) 遂入濠。100

(a) Chief Commander Guo Zixing, a man from Dingyuan, seized Haozhou and occupied it. (!) The emperor pitied the living commoners who had fallen into and been drowned in the chaos ever since the order within the four seas collapsed. He wanted to stand out and save [the people]. [(d) He divined, details of which I skip.] (h) Thus, he entered Hao.

Huang Ming shu (1606)

(a) 定遠人郭子興起兵據濠州。 (e) 元將徹里不花者來攻, (f) 憚慴不敢前,而掠良民以絳帛繫其首,獻為俘, (g) 民莫必其命。 [(d), which I skip] (h) 往詣濠。101

(a) Guo Zixing from Dingyuan took up arms and occupied Haozhou. (e) The Yuan general Che-li Bu-hua [Čerik Buqa] came to attack Hao. (f) Fearing [the rebels], he did not dare to advance. Instead, he captured innocent commoners and tied their heads with red turbans. Thus, he presented them as captives [of the Red Turban bandits]. (g) The commoners were not able to survive. [(d) Zhu divined, details of which I skip.] (h) He went to the city of Hao.

Dazheng ji (1630)

(a) 二月郭子興據濠州。 (b) 寺為亂兵所焚燒。 (c) 上出避。 [(d), which I skip] (e) 元將徹里不花攻濠, (f) 憚不敢進,日掠良民邀賞。 (h) 上不獲已,閏三月甲戌朔抵濠門。102

(a) By the second month, Guo Zixing occupied Haozhou. (b) The temple was burned by rebellious soldiers. (c) His majesty left [the temple] to seek shelter from the fighting. [(d) Zhu divined, details of which I skip.] (e) The Yuan general Che-li Bu-hua [Čerik Buqa] came to attack Hao. (f) Fearing [the rebels], he did not dare to advance. Every day, he captured innocent civilians to claim for rewards. (h) His majesty had no place to go. On the first day (day jiaxu) of the intercalary third month, he arrived at the gate of the city of Hao.

Ming-shan cang (1640)

(a) 定遠人郭子興與其黨孫德崖率賓客子弟閉濠守之。 (e) …… 脫脫則使其將攻子興, (f) 將掠俘良民絳其首。 (g) 民驚恐奔入濠。 (c) 帝在皇覺寺欲出,從將慮絳以俘,不則紅巾入傷命。 [(d), which I skip] (h) 乃扣濠求入。103

(a) Guo Zixing from Dingyuan and his follower Sun Deya, leading their guests and men, closed the gate of Hao and defend it. (e) … Toqto’a then sent his general to attack Zixing, (f) ready to capture innocent commoners and make their heads red [as the Red Turban rebels]. (g) The terrified villagers entered Hao. (c) The Emperor [i.e., Zhu] was at Huangjue temple, thinking he was about to leave. If so, the worry was one would be captured and declared as rebels; otherwise, the Red Turbans would enter and kill. [(d) Zhu divined, details of which I skip.] (h) Thus, [the emperor] arrived at Hao, pleading to enter the city.

Guo que (1653)

(a) 二月乙亥朔,定遠人郭子興孫德崖俞 魯 潘 等起兵自稱元帥攻拔濠州據其城守之。自稱元帥……(b) 辛丑,亂兵焚皇覺寺。 (c) 上出避。 [(d), which I skip] (e) 三月…… 元將徹里不花率三千人討濠城。 (f) 不即進,妄殺掠報級,村里為墟。 (g) 人無固志。……(h) 閏三月甲戌朔,上入濠城。104

(a) On the first day (day yihai) of the second month of Renchen Year [1352], Guo Zixing, a man from Dingyuan, took up arms with Sun Deya, a Lu, a Pan, and others. He attacked and took Haozhou, and then seized and defended it. He declared himself Chief Commander. [Further background of Guo Zixing] (b) On day xinchou (twenty-seventh), the soldiers burned the Huangjue temple. (c) His majesty left the temple to seek shelter. [(d) Zhu divined, details of which I skip.] (e) On the third month, [Yuan troops advanced], and the Yuan general Che-li Bu-hua (Čerik Buqa) commanded three thousand soldiers to attack Haozhou. (f) He did not advance, slaughtering and pillaging civilians arbitrarily, and he [took the heads of civilians] to claim merits. (g) The commoners did not have a fixed intention …. (h) On the first day (day jiaxu) of the intercalary third month, his majesty entered the city of Hao.

Shikui shu (1655)

(a) 子興據濠,(h) 乃扣濠求入門。105

(a) [Guo] Zixing occupied Hao, and (h) [Zhu] thus visited Hao, pleading to enter the gate [of the city].

Mingji bian nian (1660)

(a) 定遠人郭子興據濠。 (c) 上欲入濠城。 [(d), which I skip] (h) 遂往。106

(a) Guo Zixing from Dingyuan occupied Hao. (c) His majesty sought to enter the city of Hao. [(d) He divined, details of which I skip.] (h) He thus went to Hao.

Ming shu (1667/1695)

(a) 定遠郭子興拔濠州據之。(!) 上憫四海分崩,生民陷溺, [(d), which I skip] (h) 遂入濠。107

(a) Guo Zixing from Dingyuan seized Haozhou and occupied it. (!) His majesty pitied the living commoners who had fallen into and been drowned in the chaos ever since the order of within the four seas collapsed. [(d) Zhu divined, details of which I skip.] (h) Thus, he entered Hao.

Tang (1679/1688)

(a) 定遠人郭子興據濠州, (b) 焚皇覺寺, (c) 太祖諸伽藍卜出避。 [(d) omitted] (e) 會元將徹里不花攻濠, (f) 俘其民。 (h) 太祖懼,乃以閏三月朔入濠。108

(a) Guo Zixing from Dingyuan occupied Haozhou. (b) He burned the Huangjue temple. (c) Taizu and other monks had to leave to hide. [(d) Zhu divined, details of which I skip.] (e) It happened that the Yuan general Che-li Bu-hua [Čerik Buqa] was attacking Hao, (f) capturing the commoners. (h) Taizu, frightened, entered Hao on the first day of the intercalary third month.

Wan (1702)

(a) 定遠人郭子興與其黨孫德崖等起兵據濠州, (c) 太祖謀避兵。 [(d) omitted] (e) 會元將徹里不花來攻濠, (f) 日事俘掠。 (h) 太祖奔入城門。

(a) Guo Zixing from Dingyuan and his follower Sun Deya occupied Haozhou. (c) Taizu was seeking shelter from the fighting. [(d) Zhu divined, details of which I skip.] (e) It happened that the Yuan general Che-li Bu-hua [Čerik Buqa] was attacking Hao. (f) Every day he was only devoted to pillaging. (h) Taizu then rushed to the gate [of Hao].

Wan/Xiong (1702)

Wan/Xiong (SL)

(a) 定遠人郭子興與其黨孫德崖等起兵據濠州。 (e) 元將徹里不花來攻, (f) 怯不敢進,日俘良民以邀賞, (g) 人不聊生, (c) 太祖謀避兵。 [(d) omitted] (h) 遂以閏三月朔入濠。

(a) Guo Zixing from Dingyuan and his follower Sun Deya took up arms and occupied Haozhou. (e) The Yuan general Čerik Buqa came to attack. (f) He was timid and did not dare to advance. Every day he captured innocent commoners to claim rewards. (g) People could not survive. Taizu was seeking shelter from the fighting. [(d) He divined, details of which I skip.] (h) Thus, he entered Hao on the first day (day jiaxu) of the intercalary third month.

Wan/Wang (1723)

(a) 定遠人郭子興與其黨孫德崖等起兵據濠州。 (e) 元將徹里不花 (f) 憚不敢攻,而日俘良民以邀賞。 [(d) omitted] (h) 遂入濠門。

(a) Guo Zixing from Dingyuan and his follower Sun Deya took up arms and occupied Haozhou. (e) The Yuan general Che-li Bu-hua [Čerik Buqa], (f) fearing [the rebels], did not dare to attack. Every day he captured innocent commoners to ask for rewards. [(d) Zhu Yuanzhang divined, details of which I skip.] (h) Taizu entered the gate of the Hao city.

Ming shi (1739)

(a) 定遠人郭子興與其黨孫德崖等起兵濠州。 (e) 元將徹里不花 (f) 憚不敢攻,而日俘良民以邀賞。 (c) 太祖時年二十四,謀避兵。 [(d) omitted] (h) 遂以閏三月朔入濠。

(a) Guo Zixing from Dingyuan and his follower Sun Deya took up arms in Haozhou. (e) The Yuan general Che-li Bu-hua [Čerik Buqa], (f) fearing [the rebels], did not dare to attack. Every day he captured innocent commoners to ask for rewards. (c) By then Taizu was twenty-five. He was seeking shelter from the fighting. [(d) Zhu divined, details of which I skip.] (h) Thus, he entered Hao on the first day (day jiaxu) of the intercalary third month.

Mingji gangmu (1746)

(a) 定遠人郭子興等起兵濠州, (h) 朱元璋謁之。

(a) Guo Zixing from Dingyuan and his followers took up arms in Haozhou. (h) Zhu Yuanzhang visited them.

Ming shi benji (1782/1789)

(a) 定遠人郭子興與其黨孫德崖等起兵濠州。 (e) 元將徹爾布哈 (f) 憚不敢攻,而日俘良民以邀賞。 (c) 太祖時年二十四,謀避兵。 [(d) omitted] (g) 遂以閏三月朔入濠。

(a) Guo Zixing from Dingyuan and his follower Sun Deya took up arms in Haozhou. (e) The Yuan general Che-er Bu-ha [Čerik Buqa], (f) fearing [the rebels], did not dare to attack. Every day he captured innocent commoners to ask for rewards. (c) By then Taizu was twenty-five. He was seeking shelter from the fighting. [(d) Zhu divined, details of which I skip.] (h) Thus, he entered Hao on the first day (day jiaxu) of the intercalary third month.

1

For previous studies on the compilation of Ming shi, see especially Li Jinhua 李晉華, Ming shi zuanxiu kao 明史纂修考 (Beijing: Hafo yanjin, 1933), esp. 1–9; Harold L. Kahn, Monarchy in the Emperor’s Eyes: Image and Reality in the Ch’ien-lung Reign (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), 12–46; Lawrence D. Kessler, K’ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule, 1661–1684 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1976), 137–66; Thomas Wilson, “Confucian Sectarianism and the Compilation of the Ming History,” Late Imperial China 15.2 (1994): 53–84; Ho Koon Piu 何冠彪, “Shunzhi chao zuanxiu Ming shi kao” 順治朝纂修明史考, Dalu zazhi 99.2 (1999): 1–22; Ho Koon Piu 何冠彪, “Ming shi bianzuan zakao” 明史編纂雜考, Mingdai shi yanjiu 27.4 (1999): 21–35; Yi Ruolan 衣若蘭, “Jiuti Wan Sitong 416 juan ben Ming shi lienüzhuan yanxi” 舊題萬斯同 416 卷本明史列女傳研析, Hanxue yanjiu 28.1 (2010): 263–93; Lin Shih-hsuan 林士鉉, “Neige daku dang’an manwenben Ming taizong xuanzong shilu gao yizhu daolun” 內閣大庫檔案滿文本明太宗宣宗實錄稿譯註導論, Danjiang shixue 23 (2011): 15–31; Su Xunbo 蘇循波, “Cong nigao dao buzuanben: Ming shi benji bianzuan yanjiu” 從擬稿到補纂本: 明史本紀編纂研究 (Ph.D. diss., Nankai Univ., 2013); Qiao Zhizhong 喬治忠, Zengbian Qingchao guanfang shixue zhi yanjiu 增編清朝官方史學之研究 (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 2018); Devin Fitzgerald, “The Ming Open Archive and the Global Reading of Early Modern China” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard Univ., 2020); Fan Zijing 范子靖, “The Triumph of ‘Wild History’: Methodologies of Historical Narratives in Late Imperial China” (M.A. thesis, Univ. of California Berkeley, 2020).

2

For its current description on the website of the Palace Museum, Beijing, see “Ming shi benji 明史本紀” (https://www.dpm.org.cn/ancient/nation/159621.html?hl=%E9%92%A6%E5%AE%9A%E6%98%8E%E5%8F%B2%E6%9C%AC%E7%BA%AA), last accessed 19 June 2021.

3

In addition, previous scholars have identified Manchu translations of Ming shilu at three different places: (1) the National Library of China, (2) the First Historical Archives, and (3) the Archives of the Grand Secretariat (Neige daku dang’an). See Beijing diqu manwen tushu zongmu 北京地區滿文圖書總目 (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2008), 102–3. For an overview of (3), see Lin Shih-hsuan, “Neige daku dang’an manwenben.” I have only accessed (3), which is an earlier draft of the Ming gurun i suduri. Further research is needed to compare (1), (2), and (3) with the Ming gurun i suduri.

4

I use volume in the sense of a series of sheets bound in a book form. I use juan (literally, scroll) to refer to the traditional Chinese way of conceptualizing a certain part of a book.

5

Walter Fuchs, “Neues Material zur mandjurischen Literatur aus Pekinger Bibliotheken,” Asia Major 7 (1932): 469–82. I am particularly grateful to Charles Hartman for his suggestion.

6

Walter Fuchs, Beiträge zur mandjurischen Bibliographie und Literatur (Tokyo: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, 1936), 81.

7

Li Deqi 李德啓, Gugong bowuyuan tushuguan manwen shuji lianhe mulu 故宮博物院圖書館滿文書籍聯合目錄 (Beijing, 1933), 40.

8

A blueprint reprint (shaiyin ben 晒印本) has been produced based on this manuscript, although I have not been able to locate and access it. See Li Deqi, Gugong bowuyuan tushuguan manwen shuji lianhe mulu, 40; Beijing diqu manwen tushu zongmu, 102; Fu Li 富麗, Shijie manwen wenxian mulu chubian 世界滿文文獻目錄初編 (Beijing: Zhongguo minzu guwenzi yanjiuhui, 1983), 158.

9

See note 2.

10

In other words, many fascinating themes exceed the scope of this article, including the book’s material features, marginalia pattern, and copyists’ writing habits, to name a few.

11

I should note that due to strict regulations, I have only managed to read the first twenty-one volumes (ce 冊). Because no photocopying is allowed, I have hand-copied all materials that I cite in this article. In other words, all of my observations in this article should be qualified with “as far as the first twenty-one volumes are concerned.” The starting date of each volume is as follows:

  • Box 1: volume 1: 1328/1343; volume 2: 1360; volume 3: 1363; volume 4: 1368;

  • Box 2: volume 5: 1379; volume 6: 1372; volume 7: 1373; volume 8: 1376;

  • Box 3: volume 9: 1379; volume 10: 1382; volume 11: 1385; volume 12: 1388;

  • Box 4: volume 13: 1391; volume 14: 1393; volume 15: 1396; Volume 16: 1399;

  • Box 5: volume 17: 1402; volume 18: 1405; volume 19: 1409; volume 20: 1413; volume 21: 1419.

12

See Giovanni Stary, Selected Manchu Studies, ed. Hartmut Walravens (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000); Tatiana A. Pang and Giovanni Stary, New Light on Manchu Historiography and Literature (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998); Frederick Wakeman, The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-century China (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1985); Iguro Shinobu 井黑忍, “Manyaku seishi no kisoteki kentō” 満訳正史の基礎的検討, Manzokushi kenkyū 3 (2004): 112–30; Mark C. Elliott, “Whose Empire Shall It Be? Manchu Figurations of Historical Process in the Early Seventeenth Century,” in Time, Temporality, and Imperial Transition: East Asia from Ming to Qing, ed. Lynn A. Struve (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai‘i Press, 2005), 31–72; Bian He, “Of Wounded Bodies and the Old Manchu Archive: Documenting Personnel Management in the Early Manchu State,” Saksaha: A Journal of Manchu Studies 16 (2019): 1–29.

13

Qiao, Zengbian Qingchao guanfang shixue zhi yanjiu, 91.

14

See Kahn, Monarchy in the Emperor’s Eyes, 12.

15

See note 1.

16

Thus, this differs from the currently standard three-stage narrative: first, 1645 to the 1650s; second, 1679 to 1723; and finally, 1723 until its completion in 1739. See Li, Ming shi zuanxiu kao, 25–37.

17

For an overview of the Qing conquest of China, see Wakeman, The Great Enterprise; Lynn A. Struve, The Southern Ming, 1644–1662 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1984); Gu Cheng 顧誠, Nan Ming shi 南明史 (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 2011), 1–29.

18

When citing Ming and Qing veritable records (Ming shilu, Qing shilu), I use the digitized edition of the Academia Sinica (http://hanchi.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/). I provide the year, month, and day, followed by the juan number and page number. Qing shilu, 1645/4/11, 15:135.2.

19

Qing shilu, 1645/5/2, 16:142.1.

20

Ibid.

21

See Elliott, “Whose Empire Shall it Be?”; Iguro, “Manyaku seishi no kisoteki kentō.”

22

See Uran Cimeg 烏蘭其木格, Qingdai guanxiu minzu wenzi wenxian bianzuan yanjiu 清代官修民族文字文獻編纂研究 (Shenyang: Liaoning minzhu chubanshe, 2010), 248.

23

For instance, Garin, Kicungge, and Ning Wanwo were also among the compilers-in-chief of the veritable records of Hong Taiji. See Qing shilu, 1649/1/8, 336.1.

24

All these compilations combined advanced the claim that “the beginnings of the Manchu imperial enterprise” of ruling China “lay in the Liao, Jin, and Yuan periods,” as Mark Elliott has notably pointed out. See Elliott, “Whose Empire Shall it Be?”, 59. On how the Qianlong emperor viewed the beginning of the Manchu enterprise, see Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Manzhou yuanliu kao and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage,” Journal of Asian Studies 4 (1987): 761–90. The Qing court continued compiling and publishing comprehensive histories in Manchu in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. See Nicolas Standaert, The Intercultural Weaving of Historical Texts (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 15–93.

25

Concerning how the early Manchu state perceived historical temporality, see Elliott, “Whose Empire Shall it Be?” See also Pamela Kyle Crossley, “The Historical Writing of Qing Imperial Expansion,” in The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 3: 1400–1800, ed. José Rabasa et al. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), 43–59. For chronicles in the Tibetan and Mongolian historiographical tradition, see Helmut Hoffmann, “Tibetan Historiography and the Approach of the Tibetans to History,” Journal of Asian History 4 (1970): 169–77; Shagdaryn Bira, Mongolian Historical Writing from 1200–1700 (Bellingham: Western Washington Univ., 2002), 169–99.

26

Fu Weilin 傅維鱗, Ming shu 明書 (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1936), 171.3379. On how the Manchu translations of the Ming veritable records are back translated into Chinese, see Zhou Zhongliang 周中梁, “Liaoningsheng dang’an guan cang Ming taizu shilu xieben xingzhi kaolun” 遼寧省檔案館藏明太祖實錄寫本性質考論, Lantai shijie 19 (2016): 13–18.

27

Yang Chun 楊椿, Menglin tang wenchao 孟鄰堂文鈔, in Xuxiu siku quanshu 續修四庫全書, vol. jibu 1423 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1995), 2.12b; see also Qiao, Zengbian Qingchao guanfang shixue zhi yanjiu, 263.

28

See for instance Qiao, Zengbian Qingchao guanfang shixue zhi yanjiu.

29

Ho Koon Piu, “Shunzhi chao zuanxiu Ming shi kao;” Ho Koon Piu, “Ming shi bianzuan zakao.” I thank Wong Ting Cheung 黃庭彰 for making copies of these two articles for me. Because Ho’s articles are not digitized, many scholars have not consulted them at all. For instance, Zhu Duanqiang 朱端強 repeated some of the conjectures that Ho had advanced. See Zhu’s “Qing Shunzhi chao Ming shi xiuzuan shishi kaolun” 清順治朝明史修纂史事考論, Yunnan minzu daxue xuebao 2006.5: 153–58.

30

Lin Shih-Hsuan, “Neige daku dang’an manwenben,” 21; Uran Cimeg, Qingdai guanxiu minzu wenzi wenxian bianzuan yanjiu, 48–49.

31

For the political background, see Robert B. Oxnam, Ruling from Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 1661–1669 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1975).

32

Neige daku dang’an 內閣大庫檔案 (the Archives of the Grand Secretariat), no. 161146-001. The alteration of this document interestingly reveals that whoever copied it was translating it from Manchu. He wrote 三差次序 first because this would appear early in the Manchu word order, but soon he realized that it would not work in Chinese; he deleted it and then retranslated it. For this kind of translingual working experience, see Carla Nappi, Translating Early Modern China: Illegible Cities (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2020), 97.

33

Qing shilu, 1655/1/26, 88:696.1.

34

Neige daku dang’an, no. 119992-001. The memorial is in both Manchu and Chinese. I cite the Manchu version here because the vermilion rescript was first written in Manchu and then translated into Chinese characters based on the Manchu word order.

35

I do not italicize this phrase because it seems that Cheng used it to refer to the content instead of the title of the book.

36

Neige daku dang’an, no. 119992-001.

37

Neige daku dang’an, no. 119992-001. In the rescript, banjibumbi (literally, to make, to produce, or to compile) is the converb that modifies ubaliyambumbi (to translate), while in the memorial banjibumbi is the main verb.

38

Qing shilu, 1652/4/20, 64:504.1.

39

Qing shilu, 1655/1/26, 88:696.1.

40

See Neige daku dang’an, no. 06104. Lin Shih-Hsuan dated it to around 1666. A Manchu memorial of the same content has survived in the First Historical Archive. See Uran Cimeg, Qingdai guanxiu minzu wenzi wenxian bianzuan yanjiu, 49. I thank Zhang Yichi 張一弛 and Juxuanya 橘玄雅 for their generous help.

41

Neige daku dang’an, no. 091337. I thank Matthew Mosca for suggesting this memorial.

42

Neige daku dang’an, no. 091337.

43

Part of the Manchu translation of the Ming shilu has survived in the Neige daku dang’an. See Lin Shih-Hsuan, “Neige daku dang’an manwenben,” 24–28; Zhou Zhongliang, “Liaoning sheng dang’an guan cang Ming Taizu shilu.”

44

For a narrative, see for instance Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2010), 133–73.

45

Qing shilu, 1678/1/23, 71:910.1.

46

Qing shilu, 1679/5/26, 81:1035.2.

47

Among them, Arantai 阿蘭泰 and Nionio 牛紐 were prominent Manchu scholars. Wang Guo’an 王國安 (1642–1701) was among the compilers of the Manchu version of the veritable records of Shunzhi (Qing shilu, 1667/9/5, 24:328.1). Sun Zaifeng 孫在豐 was a teacher of bachelors 庶吉士 of the Hanlin Academy and the associate compiler-in-chief of the Kangxi compilation of veritable records of Nurhaci; he was well-versed in Manchu (Taizu gaohuangdi shilu, preface 3:8.2).

48

Qing shilu, 1683/8/28, 103:39.1.

49

Qing shilu, 1670/4/29, 33:443.2. Under normal circumstances, Han Chinese had to pass this examination on the Confucian classics and document writings to receive official appointments.

50

Qing shilu, 1661/6/9, 3:70.2.

51

Qing shilu, 1652/7/24, 66:519.1.

52

Many of these (supervising) chief compilers—Lekdehun, Mingju, Li Wei, Wang Xi, Zhang Yushu, and Nionio—were simultaneously commissioned to compile the Pingding sanni fanglüe 平定三逆方略 (Planned Strategies of Pacifying the Three Rebels).

53

See Meng Yanning 孟燕寧, “Tang Bin yu Ming shi zuanxiu” 湯斌與明史纂修, Zijincheng 1991.3: 12–13. See also Jonathan Spence, Ts’ao Yin and the Kang-Hsi Emperor: Bondservant and Master (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1988), 67.

54

See in particular Wang Xuanbiao 王宣標, “Xiong Cilü yu Ming shi xiuzuan” 熊賜履與明史修纂, Shixueshi yanjiu 2014.1: 33–40.

55

Ibid.

56

I have also consulted two other manuscripts attributed to Wan Sitong 萬斯同: the Ming shi gao 明史稿 held at Tianyi ge 天一閣 and the Ming shi liezhuan gao 明史列傳稿 held at Fudan University. I have not listed these drafts here because they lack the specific parts that I shall compare with the Manchu Ming gurun i suduri.

57

See Siku weishou shu jikan 四庫未收書輯刊 (Beijing: Beijing guji chubanshe, 1997), sixth series, vol. 5.

58

The National Library of China has digitized this item.

59

For an overview of related scholarship, see Su Xunbo, “Cong nigao dao buzuanben,” esp. 78–79.

60

Reprinted in Xuxiu siku quanshu, vol. shibu 323.

61

See Qin Li 秦麗, “Guojia tushuguan cang 416 juanben Ming shi xinkao” 國家圖書舘藏 416 卷本明史新考, Zhongguo dianji yu wenhua (2016): 62–69.

62

This edition is also available as Wang Hongxu 王鴻緖, Ming shi gao 明史稿, at the Harvard University Library, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:428231609$4i, last accessed 10 March 2021.

63

For citations from Siku quanshu, see Beijing Airusheng shuzihua jishu yanjiu zhongxin 北京愛如生數字化技術研究中心, Wenyuan ge Siku quanshu dianziban 文淵閣四庫全書電子版.

64

Qingdai qijuzhuce. Kangxi chao 清代起居注冊. 康熙朝 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2009), 2:1901.

65

Qing shilu, 1658/12/7, 122:94.2.

66

Qingdai qijuzhuce. Kangxi chao, 9:4923.

67

Ibid.

68

Qing shilu, 1704/11/26, 218:205.2.

69

Qingdai qijuzhuce. Kangxi chao, 9:4924. See also Wang Xuanbiao, “Xiong Cilü yu Ming shi xiuzuan.”

70

See, for instance, Bai Limin, “Shaping the World of Scholars: The Soft Power of Emperor Kangxi (1661–1722),” Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies 1 (2020): 19–57.

71

Quan Zuwang 全祖望, Jieqi ting ji 鮚埼亭集 (Taipei: Huanshi chubanshe, 1977), 28.355.

72

See for instance Yi Ruolan, “Jiuti Wan Sitong 416 juan ben Ming shi lienü zhuan yanxi.”

73

Qing shilu, 1780/11/21, 997:335.2.

74

For Siku quanshu, see R. Kent Guy, The Emperor’s Four Treasures: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch’ien-lung Era (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Asia Center, 1987).

75

Wilson, “Confucian Sectarianism and the Compilation of the Ming History,” 53. Cynical readers might even assert that the Qing started compiling the Ming history in 1645 to delegitimatize the Southern Ming regimes that the Manchus had not yet quashed.

76

Fuchs, “Neues Material zur mandjurischen Literatur aus Pekinger Bibliotheken.”

77

See Table 1 for citations.

78

Ming gurun i suduri, box 1, volume 1, page 14 (line 1) to page 15 (line 5).

79

Pang and Stary, New Light on Manchu Historiography and Literature, 9.

80

Li Jinhua, Ming shi zuanxiu kao, 25–47.

81

To anticipate some of the discussions below, many of my interlocutors have asked if it could be possible that the Qianlong Emperor, very much disappointed by the finalized Ming shi (1739 or 1789) in Chinese commissioned scholars to recompile one in Manchu. The seeming plausibility of this theory relies on the fact that Qianlong initiated the project of compiling (8) and his well-known determination to (re-)promote Manchu literary culture. However, it is easy to rule out this possibility simply because whoever compiled the Ming gurun i suduri totally ignored the revised ways of translating Mongol terms that Qianlong promulgated, as we shall see in Appendix 3.

82

As such, it differs radically from the Manchu translations of the Fengtian jingnan shiji 奉天靖難事蹟 (Records of Following Heaven and Pacifying the Disaster) (Neige daku dang’an, no. 167160).

83

See in particular He Xingzhen 何幸真, Shanghun hegui. Mingdai de Jianwen chao lishi jiyi 殤魂何歸明代的建文朝歷史記憶 (Taipei: Zhongyanyuan jinshisuo, 2015).

84

See Shang Wei, “ ‘Jing Ping Mei’ and Late Ming Print Culture,” in Writing and Materiality in China, ed. Lydia H. Liu (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 187.

85

Ming gurun i suduri, box 4, volume 4, page 15 (line 8) to page 16 (line 1).

86

They are 懿文太子, 孝康皇帝, 孝康皇后, 懿文太子妃, 國子監, 彝倫堂, 曾鳳韶, 卓敬, 湯宗, 陳瑛.

87

Ming gurun i suduri, box 1, volume 1, page 6 (line 7).

88

Ming gurun i suduri, box 1, volume 1, page 7 (line 2). Here, the term “giohame yabufi” does not appear in Ming shilu; the two Manchu words seem to have come from Qing Taizu Nurhaci’s “proclamation” against the Ming (dated around 1623), which describes Zhu as “giohame yabume” (going out begging). See Tatjana Pang and Giovanni Stary, Manchu Versus Ming: Qing Taizu Nurhaci’s “Proclamation” to the Ming Dynasty (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 48.

89

Ming shilu, 1352/2/27, 1:4.

90

Fitzgerald, “The Ming Open Archive,” 99.

91

Zhuang Xingliang 莊興亮, “Mingdai shijia Chen Jian de xueshu shengping jiqi Huang Ming tongji yanjiu shuping” 明代史家陳建的學術生平及其皇明通紀研究述評, Shixue shi yanjiu 2013.4: 33.

92

For the 1522 edition, see the copy held in Nanjing Library. For relationships between Huang Ming qiyun and Huang Ming tongji, see Chen Jian, Huang Ming tongji 皇明通紀 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2008), 3.

93

See also Tan Qian 談遷, Guo que 國榷 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1958), 3.

94

Qing shi gao 清史稿 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), 238.9499.

95

That Tang Bin consulted the Manchu version is also evident in the example of Zhu Yuanzhang taking a battalion with strategy (cf. Table 2 and Appendix 1). From the Ming shilu, the Ming gurun i suduri singles out Zhu’s decision that “left his companion Fei Ju to oversee” the battalion; Tang, while offering a much more succinct version, still states that “Taizu ordered Fei Ju and others to attack and subdue” the battalion. As shown in Table 2, Tang (1679/1688) is the only Chinese version that mentions Fei Ju’s role in the entire process.

96

For the process through which imperially commissioned knowledge lost its authority, see notably Fan Zijing, “The Triumph of ‘Wild History.’ ”

97

I have not included Ming benji (early Ming), supposedly a draft of veritable records that predates Ming shilu. Its narrative is (b)–(h) and is less relevant for the current discussion. See Ming benji jiaozhu 明本紀校註 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2017), 2.

98

Chen Jian 陳建, Huang Ming qiyun lu 皇明啟運錄 (printed, prefaced in 1522), held in Nanjing Library, 1.1b; see also Chen Jian, Huang Ming tongji, 2–3.

99

Xue Yingzhan 薛應旃, Xianzhang lu 憲章錄, in Siku quanshu cunmu congshu 四庫全書存目叢刊 (Jinan: Qilu chubanshe, 1996), vol. shibu 11, 1.1b.

100

Lei Li 雷禮, Huang Ming dazheng ji 皇明大政記, in Siku quanshu cunmu congshu, vol. shibu 7, 1.1b.

101

Deng Yuanxi 鄧元錫, Huang Ming shu 皇明書 (printed, prefaced in 1506), held in Nanjing Library, 1.1b; see also Xuxiu siku quanshu, vol. shibu 315, 1.1b.

102

Zhu Guozhen, Huang Ming dazhengji, juan 1, in Yuan Guoli Beiping Tushuguan jiaku shanben congshu 原國立北平圖書館甲庫善本叢書 (Beijing: Guojia tushuguan chubanshe, 2013), vol. 116, 1.1b.

103

Mingshan cang, in Xuxiu siku quanshu, vol. shibu 425, 1.2b.

104

Tan Qian, Guo que 國榷, manuscript held in Nanjing Library (#112565), page 0017; see also Tan Qian, Guo que (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1958), 261.

105

Zhang Dai 張岱, Shikui shu 石匱書, manuscript held in Nanjing Library, 1.2b; see also Xuxiu siku quanshu, vol. shibu 318, 1.2b.

106

Zhong Xing 鍾惺, Ming ji biannian 明紀編年, in Siku jinhui shu congkan 四庫禁燬書叢刋 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1997), vol. shibu 35, 1.1b.

107

Fu Weilin 傅維鱗, Ming shu 明書, in Siku quanshu cunmu congshu, vol. shibu 38, 1.1b.

108

See Table 1 for the references for the entries below.

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