Abstract
This article examines James of Viterbo’s theory of seminal reasons as inchoate forms (inchoationes formarum). James intends this theory to explain how the eduction (eductio) of substantial forms from the potency of matter does not entail that such forms are created ex nihilo. Substantial forms that come to be in generation preexist in matter as forms in potency. The form in potency is an inchoation of, or aptitude or propensity for, the form that comes to be in act. Generation is thus understood by James to be a modal change, for the form in potency and the form in act are one and the same thing (res); they differ only with regard to their mode of being. James’s theory of inchoate forms is a development of Bonaventure’s theory of seminal reasons, but reformulated with the help of Simplicius and Averroes.
1 Introduction*
Although the notion of seminal reasons (rationes seminales) has its distant origins in the λόγοι σπερµατικοὶ of the Stoics, it was primarily Augustine (354–430) who bequeathed the theory to the Latin Middle Ages. Augustine made use of seminal reasons to explain a theological problem of biblical exegesis, namely, how to reconcile the instantaneous creation of all things by God with the account of a six-day creation in Genesis.1 In the thirteenth century some thinkers will appeal to seminal reasons to solve a purely philosophical problem that derives from Aristotle, namely, how substantial forms come to be in the process of generation. It is with this philosophical problem that we shall be concerned in this article.
In the first book of the Physics, Aristotle explained that all change involves three principles. There is a subject (matter) that undergoes the change, and two contraries (form, privation) that serve as the termini of the change. In the process of generation, matter acquires a new substantial form. However, where did this form come from? What is its source? Two extreme solutions were routinely rejected.2 One consists in simply denying that there is any source for the new substantial form; it comes to be ex nihilo by the power of the generator. Medieval thinkers found this to be unacceptable, as it would entail either that created agents had the power to create or that created agents had no causal role to play in generation. The other solution asserts that the substantial forms that come to be in generation preexist in matter in a state of actuality, though they are hidden from our senses, like a painting that is shrouded by a cloth. The task of the generator would be simply to unveil them. This view, which the medievals associated with Anaxagoras’s notion of a latitatio formarum, was regarded to be unacceptable, as it seemed to deny the reality of generation, which should result in something new coming into being. Most medieval thinkers, therefore, were content to follow Aristotle, who held that substantial forms are educed from the potentiality of matter.
However, the manner of this eduction is somewhat mysterious. Since matter and form are heterogenous, such that the essence of form is distinct from the essence of matter, it is hard to understand how the one could be educed from the other. The great worry is that the eduction of form from the potency of matter would entail that substantial form comes to be ex nihilo, and then generation would reduce to creation. It was to avoid this consequence that some thinkers, inspired by Augustine’s theory of seminal reasons, defended the view that there preexists in matter an inchoation of the form (inchoatio formae) from which substantial form comes to be in generation. This inchoate form is present in matter not actually, but potentially; it is the essence in potency of the form, which passes from potency to act by the action of the external generative cause. By means of these inchoate forms matter possesses an active power, whereby it cooperates in the generation of substantial forms. One finds the rudiments of this theory in Albert the Great (c. 1200–1280),3 but it is developed in a particularly vivid manner by Bonaventure (1221–1274):
And this position posits that in matter are the truths (veritates) of all the forms to be produced naturally. When [a form] is produced, no quiddity, no truth of the essence is induced de novo, but there is given to it a new disposition, so that what was in potency comes to be in act. For act and potency differ, because they denote not diverse quiddities, but diverse dispositions of the same thing … And this position among all the aforesaid seems to be most intelligible and closest to the truth.4
For Bonaventure, therefore, matter is endowed by God with all of the forms that will be drawn from it by secondary agents. These forms do not exist actually, but rather potentially. In the process of generation, an efficient cause brings to actuality what is present potentially in matter. There is no worry that natural agents are creative, for in educing substantial forms they do not create something out of nothing; rather they impart a new mode of being to something already present in matter. The seminal reason and the actualized form are one and the same thing; they differ in that one is imperfect, and the other perfect. Under the influence of Bonaventure, the theory of inchoate forms became a standard position for many thirteenth-century Franciscans.5
Outside of the Franciscan school, however, the theory of inchoate forms encountered considerable opposition. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), for example, rejected the notion that there are inchoate forms preexisting in matter that function as active principles in generation, on the grounds that nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. Thus, if inchoate forms were active principles, they would have to be present in matter actually; but this is precisely what is asserted by the theory of latitatio formarum. Moreover, form does not act upon its subject by changing it, for it is not form that acts, but rather the composite. According to Thomas, the potentiality of matter is not active, but merely passive. Matter contributes to generation, not by acting, but simply by receiving the action of the generator.6 After Aquinas’s death, the theory of inchoatio formarum was rejected by Henry of Ghent (c. 1217–1293), Giles of Rome (d. 1316), and Godfrey of Fontaines (d. 1306), all prominent masters at the University of Paris.7
Nevertheless, there were some in the late thirteenth century – outside of the Franciscan school – who attempted a defense of the theory of inchoate forms. In this article I wish to consider the arguments of one such thinker, the Augustinian master James of Viterbo (1255–1308).8 This article is divided into two parts. In section 2, I present a textual reconstruction of James’s argument to establish the existence of inchoate forms in matter. In section 3, I consider how James responds to some of the objections that could be made against his theory.
2 James’s Defense of Seminal Reasons as Inchoate Forms
James’s most important discussion of seminal reasons as inchoate forms is found in Quodlibet II, q. 5 (1294–1295).9 There James was asked whether there are seminal reasons in matter. His reply begins with a concise overview of the main positions on seminal reasons adopted by his contemporaries. Then he works out the definition of a ratio seminalis. In one sense, James tells us, a seminal reason is a beginning (exordium) or an inchoation (inchoatio) of the form that is educed through generation; in another sense, it is the active principle in the proximate efficient cause that completes the process of generation by educing form from the potentiality of matter.10 James then undertakes to show that in both of these senses it is necessary to affirm that there are seminal reasons in matter.
James begins by examining a problem that is at the center of the controversy, namely, what precisely is the potentiality of matter, and how is potency related to the essence of matter. He approaches these questions by considering what looks to be a contradiction in the texts of Averroes.11 In his Physics commentary, Averroes (d. 1198) argued that potentiality is distinct from the essence of matter for two reasons. First, the essence of matter is not corrupted with the arrival of substantial form though its potentiality is, for when matter is actually perfected by form it ceases to be in potency. Second, potentiality expresses a relation because it involves a reference to act (in this case, a reference to a substantial form), but matter is something absolute (ens absolutum), since it is a principle or part of a substance. However, in his De substantia orbis, Averroes appears to assert the contrary view, namely, that potentiality is the substance of matter. There he says that matter is sustained by potency (materia substantiatur per posse), and that potency is its substantial difference.12 James then observes that some – most likely he has in mind Giles of Rome – have tried to resolve this textual problem by distinguishing two kinds of potentiality: one which is the essence of matter, in the sense that, as form is essentially act, so matter is essentially potency; and another which indicates a relation founded upon the substance of matter.13 James, however, rejects this distinction, for he thinks that the notion of potentiality can never be divorced from that of relation. Thus, when one speaks of the potentiality of matter, one does not mean to talk about the nature of matter considered in itself (secundum se); rather, one has in mind either a relation that matter has to an actuality, or matter together with that relation.14 Consequently, James would appear to deny the claim that potentiality constitutes the essence of matter.
Moreover, James thinks that this is also the teaching of Averroes. Returning to the text of the De substantia orbis, James observes that when Averroes said that matter is sustained by potency, and that potency is its substantial difference, he did not mean to assert that potentiality is the essence of matter considered in itself. Indeed, if he had he would have immediately contradicted himself, since a few lines later Averroes observes:
The potentiality (posse) by which this subject is sustained differs from the nature of the subject that is sustained by this potency in this respect, that potency is said in relation to form, but the subject is one of the beings that exist per se … the substance of which is in potency.15
Here James takes Averroes to be drawing a distinction between potentiality and the nature of matter, for potency by its nature is something relative, while matter belongs to the category of substance. As for Averroes’s claim that potency is the substantial difference of matter, James reminds us that we can say that anything by which something is known and specified can take the place of an essential difference. What James has in mind is something like this. An essential difference serves to distinguish one kind of thing from another, and it is predicated essentially of that thing. For example, ‘rational’ is the essential difference of ‘man’, and it is predicated essentially of him. However, we can substitute some other feature of a thing – even if it cannot be predicated essentially of it – in place of an essential difference, provided that that feature allows us to recognize and to distinguish that thing from other sorts of thing. According to James, this is the case with a subject in regard to its accidents. An accident is known and specified by its proper subject, and for this reason the latter is posited in the definition of the accident in place of a difference. This is also the case with acts and habits; since these are known and specified by their objects, the latter serve as differentiae in their definition. Similarly, matter is known and specified by means of its relation to form. Since a relation to form is precisely what is meant by the term ‘potentiality’, one may say that potentiality is the essential difference of matter. Therefore, if one wishes to define matter (to the extent that this is possible), one would say that it is substance in potency. In such a definition, potency takes the place of a differentia; however, unlike a genuine differentia, it is not essentially predicated of matter.16
James also identifies a second way of understanding how potentiality is the substantial difference of matter. One may regard it as a property following inseparably upon the substance of matter and predicated of matter in the second mode of per se predication.17 In other words, potentiality may be regarded as an essential attribute of matter, not in the sense that potentiality is an element in the definition of matter, but rather that the definition of potentiality includes matter as a proper subject. In a similar manner, having the capacity to laugh is a property of human beings. It does not enter into the definition of a human being, but it is a feature that follows inseparably upon the essence of a human being. Thus, a human being is the proper subject of the capacity for laughter.18
Having established that potentiality is not the substance of matter in itself, but rather a relation of matter to form or matter itself with this relation, James turns next to consider the foundation for this relation. What does it mean to say that matter is in potency to form? Why does matter have this relation? One answer would be to say that matter is in potency merely because it lacks form. Thus the potency of matter is its passive capacity to receive form. Since a thing can receive only what it does not possess, the potency of matter would then be merely privative; it would consist in a lack (carentia) of form. James, however, does not find this answer to be satisfying, since the mere fact that one thing lacks another does not entail that the one is in potency to the other. For example, a stone does not have actual vision, but we do not say that a stone is in potency to the act of seeing. Therefore, a lack of form is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the potentiality of matter. In order for matter to be in potency to form, James thinks that matter also needs to possess an aptitude (aptitudo) and a propensity (idoneitas) for the form, that is, matter needs to have an ability to receive it.19
Some thinkers, James notes, try to account for this aptitude by appealing to certain accidents or passive qualities in matter, which would prepare or dispose matter to receive a substantial form. For example, matter that is dry or oily is apt to receive the form of fire. These thinkers also explain the aptitude of matter by invoking the order found among substantial forms in the process of generation.20 Matter that is under one substantial form is not naturally capable of receiving just any new form, but rather it is ordered immediately to one form and mediately to others. For example, the matter that is soil (terra) cannot immediately receive the form of flesh; presumably it must first undergo a series of substantial changes before it can become flesh. Thus, while it is true that matter is simultaneously in potency to all forms, one must distinguish between proximate and remote potentiality. Matter is in proximate potentiality to only one substantial form; it is in remote potentiality to others.21 While James does not deny that accidents and the order found among substantial forms have a role to play, he does not regard these as sufficient to explain the aptitude of matter.22 As we shall see, he also thinks that it is necessary to posit in matter a beginning (exordium) and an inchoation (inchoatio) of the substantial form that is to be acquired in the process of generation.
This inchoation is understood by James to be the substantial form in its potential being. According to James, any form is capable of having two modes of being, namely, being in potency and being in act. Potency and act are not diverse things (res) or essences, but rather diverse modes of being (modi essendi) of one and the same thing. Being in potency implies imperfection, indetermination, and a lack of form, while being in act expresses perfection, determination, and form. James cautions that form possesses these modes of being not in itself, but as it exists in matter. Since the compound of matter and form primarily (principaliter) has being through the form, one may distinguish a twofold being of the composite. There is an actual composite (a compound of matter and form in act), which is produced in the process of generation, and a potential composite (a compound of matter and form in potency), from which generation begins.23 The form in potency is a beginning and an inchoation of the form to be produced in actuality, since first the form exists under an imperfect mode of being (sub esse imperfecto) and later under complete being (sub esse perfecto). James insists that these inchoate forms are really distinct from matter: matter and the form in potency are two things (duae res) or essences that constitute the potential composite, just as matter and form in act are two things that make up the actual composite. The form in potency, James tells us, is an aptitude (aptitudo), a preparation (praeparatio), an ability for (habilitas), or a way to (via) the form in act. Moreover, since potency is a principle of act, and it is predicated in relation to act, the form in potency may rightly be described as a natural potency (potentia naturalis), pertaining to the second species of quality.24 Thus, it is the inchoate form that explains why matter is in potency to substantial form; in the absence of such a form, generation could not occur.
James offers several arguments to prove that there must exist inchoate forms in matter. One argument is that this is precisely the view of Aristotle. The latter taught that in the process of generation a substantial form is educed from the potentiality of matter. This means, according to James, that the generator acts upon the inchoate form, and draws it from a state of potential being to one of actual being. James believes that he has explicit confirmation for this claim in Averroes. He quotes with approval Averroes’s dictum that the reduction from potentiality to actuality does not bestow multitude but perfection in being. James interprets Averroes to mean that when something is brought by a cause from potency to act, it does not acquire any new reality (nova res), but only a new mode of being. Evidently if generation were to result in some new thing (res) coming into being, then the reduction from potency to act would bestow multitude, since at the end of the change there would be more res than before the change.25 Thus, generation would seem to be a kind of modal change: a transformation of one mode of being (being in potency) into another (being in act).
However, the central philosophical argument for inchoate forms is the need to distinguish generation from creation. If substantial forms are not produced ex nihilo, then they must come from something. James rejects the possibility that they could migrate from the generator into the thing generated.26 Thus, substantial forms must have the source of their coming-to-be from within the composite that is generated. However, if matter alone preexists, then substantial form would be generated ex nihilo, since the essence of form is distinct from the essence of matter. According to James, one does not avoid this consequence by appealing to the order that matter has to form, since an order or relation is neither the form nor a part of the form. Nor is it sufficient to assert that form presupposes matter in which it is received (and hence it will not come to be ex nihilo), since it is also the case that the rational soul presupposes a body, yet it does come to be ex nihilo. Nor can one avoid a creation of form ex nihilo by claiming that form comes to be through the transmutation of matter. For this transmutation of matter is either a movement of matter according to its accidents, which are dispositions to form, or an introduction of the form itself. If the former, then, since those accidents are completely outside the essence of the form, it cannot be said that because of them form does not come to be ex nihilo. But if this transmutation of matter is simply the introduction of the form itself, then it is clear that the same problem remains, for it has not yet been explained why in the process of generation form is not created ex nihilo.27
Nevertheless, one might still wonder whether there really is a need to posit inchoate forms to avoid the consequence that form comes to be ex nihilo in generation. Many of James’s colleagues did not think so. They invoked the Aristotelian dictum that it is not form that comes to be, but the composite.28 In generation the composite is not created; rather, it comes to be from the matter (hence not ex nihilo) that is a part of it. Thus, the generation of the composite is simply the eduction of form from the potency of matter; matter which is in potency to form becomes actual under that form.29 James, however, remains unconvinced:
It is not sufficient to say that the form is not de nihilo, because the form does not come to be but the composite. For although form does not come to be per se – just as it does not exist per se – but it comes to be in matter, [and] this is the coming-into-being (fieri) of the composite, still because [the form] is a reality (res), and a reality distinct from matter, it is necessary to assign a source from which it has its being (entitas). For it does not have it from matter, which is diverse from it, nor does it have it from its efficient cause, because the latter induces nothing from outside, nor creates it. From these things it is concluded that form itself according to its essence preexists in matter, though not in act but in potency; and in generation it is extracted by an efficient cause from potency to act. In this way it can be verified that what comes to be is not the form, but the composite. For because the whole composite preexists, the whole is said to come to be, not because some new reality (nova res) is added, but because the same whole comes to be in act which preexisted in potency.30
James acknowledges that it is the composite that comes to be; however, the problem of explaining the eduction of form still remains. If form is not to come to be ex nihilo, then there must be some reality (res) preexisting in matter that serves as a starting point for generation. In James’s view, this is precisely the role of inchoate forms.
However, inchoate forms explain more than just the potentiality of matter for substantial form; they also serve as active principles in generation. In Quodlibet II, q. 5, James distinguishes two sorts of active principles. One acts by way of transmutation (per modum transmutationis). By this he means an external agent that brings about an eduction of form from potentiality to actuality. A second kind of active principle acts by way of inclination (per modum cuiusdam inclinationis). An inchoate form is an active principle of this kind, since it acts upon matter by inclining it towards the form that will be acquired in generation. This inclination may be thought of as a tendency or an active striving for the form in act. This is what James has in mind when he describes inchoate forms as aptitudes and propensities (idoneitates).
James borrows the word “propensity” (ἐπιτηδειότης, idoneitas) from Simplicius (c. 490–550), who used it to explain what Aristotle meant by an inborn ability (δύναµις φυσική), which he identified as the second species of quality in Categories 8.31 Aristotle likens this inborn ability to that by virtue of which we call a man a “good boxer” or a “good runner,” not because he is a trained boxer or runner, but because he shows the talent of becoming one. Simplicius comments:
But we say people have an aptitude for running or boxing even when they do not yet have these skills fully in their possession, but only a propensity which has been already developed to some extent and makes it likely that they will possess them.32
Although any individual has the capacity, simply by virtue of being human, of becoming a boxer or a musician, not everyone has a knack or a talent for acquiring these skills. A propensity, therefore, is something that is intermediate between a bare capacity and a full actuality. Simplicius maintains that propensities are at work in all movements from potentiality to actuality:
Broadly speaking, it is the general characteristic found in all things that reach completion in any way at all. For there is nothing at all that moves from incompleteness to completeness without the presence of some intermediate capacity which brings the defective to fulfilment while deriving completion from what is most complete. It bridges the gap between the extremities and points the way from deficiency to betterment; it produces a predisposition and a starting point on the way to fulfilment; it receives a sort of advance payment from the actualisation, and is, as it were, an enlightenment from the completed essence and state.33
James fully accepts this idea, and makes it his own. Whenever a potency is brought to actuality, there is a need for a propensity, which serves as a medium to link or connect a bare potentiality with its actuality. In generation, prime matter is perfected (or actualized) by substantial form. Thus, one must posit in prime matter a propensity (namely, the form in potency) that serves as a bridge between what is wholly imperfect (matter as it is devoid of all form) and its completion or perfection (matter as it possesses form in act).34
One might wonder whether the presence of propensities in matter reduces the role that external efficient causes play in natural generation. Some have suggested that James regards the subject of change to be the principal cause of generation.35 To understand James’s thinking on this point it is helpful to turn to Quodlibet III, q. 4, where he explains more fully the differences between transmutation and inclination. Transmutation, James tells us, is an action that consists in bringing something from a state of potency to one of actuality. In such an action the agent does not insert something into a subject from without, either by creating or producing some new reality (nova res) that did not preexist in the potency of the subject; rather, the agent causes the subject to be in a different way (alio modo) than it did before. In other words, the agent makes that which was in potency come to be in act.36 Inclination, on the other hand, is a mode of action in which a potency or a habit functions as an active principle of its act; such a potency elicits the act because it inclines its subject to that act.37 Transmutation is a transient action, and so it involves a corresponding passion in the thing that is acted upon by the agent; thus it implies a distinction between that which moves, and that which is moved. However, inclination is an immanent action; it does not have a passion corresponding to it, nor does it entail a distinction between mover and moved. James thinks that, strictly speaking, what acts by inclination does not move itself; rather, it moves by itself (a se) or of itself (ex se), because it is inclined of itself (ex se) to move.38
One can get a sense of what James has in mind by considering one of his preferred examples of such actions, namely the downward motion of a heavy body. By virtue of its heaviness (gravitas) a material object has a tendency or an inclination to move downward. James would not want us to say that the heavy object moves itself downwards, since in this motion there is no distinction between that which moves and that which is moved. By saying that a rock moves downward “of itself” or “by itself,” James wishes to stress that the rock’s movement is not violent, but that the source of the movement is within the rock. This is so, not merely because the rock has a passive potentiality to undergo a change in its spatial location, but because the rock has a characteristic (heaviness) that urges it towards or inclines it for this motion.
James acknowledges, however, that because transmutation is better known to us than inclination, we often adopt the language of transmutation when we speak of inclination. Thus one says that a heavy object “moves itself” downward by means of its heaviness.39 Similarly, one may adapt this way of speaking to generation:
In this way too the potency which is in matter, namely, form as it is in potency, is a principle inclining [matter] to act, namely, to form as it is in act. And in this way matter is said to move itself, not because it transmutes itself to actuality, but because it is inclined of itself to act. Now I say “of itself,” not because it is inclined through its own bare essence (which is a principle of no inclination), but because it is inclined through something that is added to its essence. And this is not so much a relation, because a relation is not a principle of inclination, but it is the form in its potential being.40
James goes on to observe that sometimes transmutation and inclination concur in the same motion; at other times, the one is found without the other. In the case of violent motions, there is transmutation but no inclination, for the thing that is moved contributes nothing to the motion. In the movement of light and heavy bodies towards their natural places, there is inclination without a simultaneous transmutation, though James concedes that such actions do not occur without a preceding transmutation, for if such bodies are to move to their natural place, they must first have been generated, and any impediment to their movement must be removed, which requires a transmutation. However, in natural generation there is both transmutation and inclination. Generation requires both an external agent that transmutes and educes the form from potency to act and also an inchoate form that inclines matter for the form in act.41
In sum, the presence of propensities in matter does not reduce the role that external efficient causes play in natural generation. For James the principal cause of natural generation would seem to be the external efficient cause (the generator), which brings matter from a state of potency (as it is subject to a form in potency) to one of actuality. Nevertheless, one cannot dispense with the need for some inclining principles in generation. The presence of inchoate forms in matter underwrites the claim that generation is a natural, and not a violent, change. In the case of violent motions, the principle of the action is found solely in the external agent, and what is moved contributes nothing to the action. By virtue of the inchoate forms that it possesses, matter cooperates with the generator in the coming-to-be of substantial form, thereby ensuring that generation is a natural change.
3 James’s Discussion of Some Difficulties
James is not unaware of the controversial nature of the theory of inchoationes formarum, and in Quodlibet II, q. 5, he discusses some of the difficulties (dubitationes) that his theory seems to imply. One problem concerns his description of inchoate forms as belonging to the second species of quality. As we have seen, James regards inchoate forms to be aptitudes and propensities (idoneitates). However, if the form that preexists in the potency of matter is the same thing (res) as the form that is actually present after generation occurs, then it has to be regarded as a substantial form. But then it would seem paradoxical to regard such a form as belonging to the second species of quality, for then one would have to admit that one and the same thing belongs to different categories of being. Moreover, if the form in potency is a quality, this would seem to make generation an accidental change rather than a substantial one.
James extricates himself from this problem by appealing to a distinction between things and modes. A substantial form is in the category of substance with respect to the thing (res) that it is or its nature; however, with respect to one of the modes that it possesses, it is in the category of quality. By ‘modes’ James evidently has in mind modes of being: it is not inappropriate, he tells us, for one and the same thing to belong to diverse categories, because of a diversity in the modes of being that it can possess.42
James has more to say about this in Quodlibet II, q. 2. There he distinguishes two ways in which something can belong to diverse categories of being. In one way, this occurs because one and the same being has within itself a diversity of things (secundum diversitatem rerum). For example, a concrete individual such as Socrates could be regarded as a substance because of his substantial form, and a quantity and a quality by virtue of the accidental forms that he possesses. In this example, however, James points out that Socrates is a quantity or a quality only in a restricted sense (secundum quid); simply and absolutely, he should be regarded as a substance. This is so, because whenever there are many forms or natures in a supposit, it is necessary for one nature to have primacy, and it is this that primarily constitutes the supposit.43
In a second way, something can belong to diverse categories because there is within it a diversity of thing and mode (secundum diversitatem rei et modi). Here James distinguishes two different ways of talking about modes. In one way, a mode specifies the being of a thing and functions as a quasi-definition of it. Each of the ten categories, James thinks, has its own proper mode or way of being. For example, per se esse is the mode of being proper to substances, while in alio esse is the mode of being proper to accidents. But in a second way, a mode is outside the nature of a thing and is a quasi-accident of it. It is in this sense that one can speak of a diversity of thing and mode. For example, knowledge (scientia) by virtue of its nature or essence (res) is a quality. However, because knowledge is always knowledge of an object, James thinks that knowledge possesses a relative mode that is a quasi-accident of it. Thus, by virtue of its nature (res), knowledge is in the category of quality, but by virtue of its mode it is a relation. Similarly, a substantial form is in the category of substance by reason of the thing or nature it signifies. However, a substantial form also implies a limitation or boundary (terminatio) and distinction (distinctio). By reason of these accidental modes, one may say that substantial form is in the category of quantity or quality.44 In these examples, James seems to understand a mode to be a manner or way of being. Each of the categories has its own distinctive way of being, which in some sense defines that category and distinguishes it from other categories. Something is actually a member of a category by virtue of its nature or essence. However, a thing belonging to one category can assume the mode of being of another category; in this case it acts like it is a member of a different category. Thus knowledge (scientia) is actually a quality, but it can behave like a relation (and thereby we can describe it as a relation), since it is ordered to an object. So, a thing (res) can belong to multiple categories, because of the modes that it possesses.
Although one and the same thing can belong to diverse categories, James notes that, since thing (res) enjoys greater ontological primacy than modes – presumably because modes are determinations of things – one should say that knowledge simply (simpliciter) is in the category of quality, and only in a restricted sense (secundum quid) is it in the category of relation. Accordingly, substantial form belongs simply to the category of substance, and in a restricted sense to the categories of quantity and quality. Although something may belong to a category merely in a qualified sense, it is still the case that it truly and really (secundum esse) belongs to that category.45
Strictly speaking, therefore, a seminal reason understood as an inchoate form should be regarded as belonging to the category of substance. The form in potency is the same thing (res) as the form in act. However, the form in potency possesses a qualitative mode, for it is an aptitude or preparation, or beginning of the form in act. Precisely because it is a potency for actual form, James thinks it appropriate to describe it as belonging to the second species of quality. Nevertheless, he would insist that the form in potency is a quality only in a restricted sense; simply and absolutely, it belongs to the category of substance.46
If one grants to James that an inchoate form can be regarded in a meaningful sense as both a substance and a quality, one might still wonder whether James can maintain that generation is really a substantial change. On James’s view of generation, a form in potency becomes a form in act. Since no res is acquired in this process, it would seem that generation is merely a modal change. But if so, then generation seems to be nothing more than an accidental change. This was a criticism of Godfrey of Fontaines.47 James concedes that generation is modal change.48 But he never explains why this modal change should be regarded as a substantial change.
Another difficulty that seems to confront James concerns the potentiality of prime matter. As we have seen, James regards potency to be distinct from the essence of matter. However, if the potency of matter is merely the form itself in its potential being, then it would appear that matter is not in potency of itself, but by something added to it. But this seems problematic, since potency denotes imperfection and an absence of form (informitas), and so just as matter is of itself imperfect and lacking in form, so by virtue of its own nature it is being in potency. To put this somewhat differently, the very fact that inchoate form is received in matter would seem to imply that matter of itself is in potency to this form. Since an infinite regress of forms in potency is unacceptable, it would seem necessary to concede that potency belongs to the nature of matter.
James resolves this problem by distinguishing two sorts of potentialities that matter possesses. The ground of this distinction is the notion of potency itself. Since potency implies an imperfection, it includes in its own nature the notion of deprivation (carentia). But James distinguishes two sorts of deprivations in matter: one is rooted in the very nature of matter, and this involves a lack of all form, whether in potency or in act; the other belongs to matter by virtue of something added to it, namely an aptitude or form in its potential being, and this consists of a deprivation of a form in its actual being. Thus, when one speaks of the formlessness (informitas) of matter, one could mean that matter lacks all form – both actual form and inchoate form – or merely that matter lacks actual form but not inchoate forms. This leads James to distinguish a twofold potentiality of matter. There is a potentiality that belongs to matter of itself and not by something added to its nature, by means of which matter is capable of receiving forms in potency and forms in act. This type of potentiality is merely privative; it indicates that matter is devoid of form but has a general aptitude for it. By contrast, the other potentiality of matter is something positive (it is a res); it is something added to matter, which renders matter capable of receiving this or that form in act. This second potentiality is precisely the form in potency; it is a necessary condition for natural generation because of the limited power of secondary efficient causes.49 Here James follows in the footsteps of Simplicius, who distinguished between the natural potency (naturalis potentia) of matter, which he called a prefiguration of the form (praeimpressio speciei), and the potency of matter (potentia materiae), which is a privation and not yet a propensity (privatio et nondum idoneitas).50
Another worry for James’s theory concerns the actuality of prime matter. Since form is commonly regarded as a principle of actuality, it would seem that matter as it possesses inchoate forms would be actualized by them. But if this were so, it would follow that the subject of generation would exist in act, which would contradict a key tenet of Aristotle’s natural philosophy.
James meets this challenge by denying a strict identity between being and actuality. The form in potency possesses some being (entitas) outside of the being of matter, yet it has no actuality (actualitas). According to James, act and potency should be thought of as properties of being (in this case, disjunctive transcendentals); they are general modes that follow upon being as being. Thus, while every being must be either in act or in potency, it is not the case that something has to be in act to count as a being. The form in potency is a thing (res) and a being (ens) merely because it is something in potency, but it is not an act. Therefore, since inchoate forms exist only potentially, they do not confer any actuality upon matter; matter as it possesses inchoate form is the subject of generation, yet from this it does not follow that the subject of generation is in some way actual.51
Although James has explained why his theory does not violate Aristotle’s rule that the subject of generation is being in potency, a difficulty still remains. Since James has described the inchoate form as a thing (res) distinct from matter, he would appear to be contradicting Aristotle’s claim that matter alone is the subject of generation. James is not unaware of this difficulty, and he tries to address it by appealing to the principle that it is act which distinguishes. Although matter and the form in potency are distinct in essence, and they can be described as two things (duae res), yet when we consider the form in potency with regard to its mode of being, it is not distinct from matter:
It is act which distinguishes; therefore, form as it is in act is numerically distinct from matter, because they are two principles of the composite. But form in potency in one way is numerically distinct from matter, inasmuch as it denotes a thing (res) distinct from matter, but in another way it is not numerically distinct from matter, on account of its potential mode of being, because of which it agrees with matter and coincides with it.52
However, it is not at all evident that James is successful in preserving the Aristotelian claim that matter alone is the subject of generation. His description of the form in potency as a thing (res) and his commitment to Averroes’s dictum that the transfer from potentiality to actuality does not bestow multitude but perfection in being, would seem to require him to stress the distinction between matter and the form in potency. For just as at the conclusion of the process of generation there are two distinct things, namely matter and a form in act, so prior to generation there also should be present two distinct things, matter and a form in potency, lest generation result in an increase in the number of things. James wants to say that matter and the form in potency are in some way distinct and in some way not distinct. But one could ask whether they are simply distinct or simply indistinct. Given James’s teaching on the ontological primacy of things to modes, one would expect him to say that matter and the form in potency are simply (simpliciter) distinct (by virtue of their res) and indistinct only in a qualified sense (secundum quid). But if so, then it is hard to see how he can maintain the Aristotelian teaching that prime matter is the subject of generation.
4 Conclusion
The theory of inchoationes formarum is meant to explain how substantial forms are educed from the potentiality of matter in the process of generation. James has two primary motivations for this theory. First, he wants to distinguish generation from creation. If substantial forms are not produced ex nihilo, then they must come from something. For James this requirement is met only by positing inchoate forms (or forms in potency) in matter. Matter is in potency to the actual forms that it acquires in generation because it is endowed with these same forms in their potential mode of being. Generation thus becomes a modal change: it is a transfer of a thing (res) from one mode of being to another. A second motive for positing inchoate forms is to ensure that generation is a natural change, rather than a violent one. This means that matter must cooperate with the external efficient cause in the eduction of substantial form. The inchoate forms that are present in matter satisfy this requirement, since they are active principles that incline matter to receive an actual form in the process of generation.
James’s theory of inchoate forms is basically a development of the position of Bonaventure. The latter taught that the essence of the form to be produced in generation already enjoys an inchoative existence in matter, and in the process of generation it receives a new disposition, so that what was in potency comes to be in act. James retains this vision and, drawing upon Averroes and Simplicius, he articulates it as the authentic position of Aristotle. From Averroes James derives the key notion that potency is distinct from the essence of matter. For James potentiality is a relation that matter has to form, a relation that matter has by virtue of the inchoate forms with which it is endowed. This is further nuanced with Simplicius’s distinction between the potency of matter and the natural potency of matter. The former is purely privative, and indicates that matter lacks both potential and actual forms; the latter is what James identifies as an inchoate form, and it signifies an ability or aptitude in matter to receive actual form. From Averroes James also derives the key principle that the reduction from potentiality to actuality does not bestow multitude but perfection in being. Since the terminus of generation is a compound of two things (matter and form in act), the starting point of a generation must also be a compound of two things (matter and form in potency). From Simplicius James borrows the notion of a propensity (idoneitas). Whenever there is a reduction from potency to actuality, a propensity is involved. In generation, the inchoate form is a propensity that inclines matter to a form in act. These propensities serve as a bridge to explain how prime matter as it is devoid of all form can acquire actual forms in generation.
For all its ingenuity, however, James’s theory of inchoate forms did not appear to win many converts. It received a harsh critique at the hands of Godfrey of Fontaines in the latter’s Quodlibet XIV, q. 5. One of Godfrey’s chief complaints is that James has deviated too far from the principles of Aristotle. It is difficult not to be sympathetic to Godfrey’s criticisms. James’s theory requires that one distinguish between form and actuality (just as one has to distinguish between matter and potentiality). The essence of the form preexists in matter without conferring actuality upon matter. Form in potency and matter are two things (duae res), just as matter and form in act are two things. A thorough going Aristotelian is not going to be very receptive to these claims. One can imagine that in the eyes of James’s contemporaries, any explanatory power that his theory possesses is undermined by the problems that result from the peculiar ontological status of his inchoate forms.
References
Authors before ca. 1500
Albert the Great, Super secundum Sententiarum, ed. A. Borgnet. Opera omnia 27 (Paris, 1894).
Averroes, De substantia orbis. Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis 9 (Venice, 1562; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1962).
Averroes, In Metaphysicam. Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis 8 (Venice, 1562; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1962).
Averroes, In Physicam. Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis 4 (Venice, 1562; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1962).
Bonaventure, In secundum librum Sententiarum, eds. PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura. Opera omnia 2 (Quaracchi, 1885).
Giles of Rome, Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (Venice 1502; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968).
Giles of Rome, Quodlibeta (Leuven, 1646; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1966).
Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet II. In Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, eds. M. De Wulf and A. Pelzer (Leuven, 1904), 45–155.
Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet IX. In Le huitième Quodlibet, Le neuvième Quodlibet, le dixième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans (Leuven, 1924–1931), 181–293.
Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XIV. In Les Quodlibets treize et quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans (Leuven, 1935), 303–432.
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IV, eds. G. A. Wilson and G. J. Etzkorn. Opera omnia 8 (Leuven, 2011).
James of Viterbo, Disputatio secunda de quolibet, ed. E. Ypma (Rome, 1969).
James of Viterbo, Disputatio tertia de quolibet, ed. E. Ypma (Würzburg, 1973).
Siger of Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, Cambridge version, ed. A. Maurer (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983), 23–394.
Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories d’Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, 2, eds. A. Pattin, W. Stuyven and C. Steel (Leiden, 1975).
Simplicius, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarius, ed. C. Kalbfleisch (Berlin, 1907).
Simplicius, On Aristotle Categories 7–8, trans. B. Fleet (Ithaca, NY, 2002).
Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, eds. Fratres Praedicatores. Opera omnia 2 (Rome, 1884).
Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, eds. M.-R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Turin, 1964).
Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, 2/1: Qq. 8–12, eds. Fratres Praedicatores. Opera omnia 22 (Rome, 1970).
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super secundum librum Sententiarum, ed. R. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929).
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, qq. 50–119, eds. Fratres Praedicatores. Opera omnia 5 (Rome, 1889).
Authors after ca. 1500
Adams, M. M. Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist: Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham (Oxford, 2010).
Brady, J. M. “St. Augustine’s Theory of Seminal Reasons.” The New Scholasticism 38 (1964), 141–158.
Cȏté, A. “Simplicius and James of Viterbo on Propensities.” Vivarium 47 (2009), 24–53.
Cross, R. “Theology.” In A Companion to Giles of Rome, eds. C. F. Briggs and P. S. Eardley (Leiden, 2016), 34–72.
Dumont, S. D. “James of Viterbo on the Will.” In A Companion to James of Viterbo, eds. A. Côté and M. Pickavé (Leiden, 2018), 249–305.
Gilson, É. Introduction à l’étude de saint Augustin, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1943).
Hauer, M. “The Notion of ἐπιτηδειότης in Simplicius’ Discussion of Quality.” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 27 (2016), 65–83.
Mazzarella, P. Controversie Medievali: unità e pluralità delle forme (Naples, 1978).
Nardi, B. Studi di filosofia medievale (Rome, 1960).
Pérez Estévez, A. La materia de Avicena a la escuela franciscana (Avicena, Averroes, Tomás de Aquino, Buenaventura, Pecham, Marston, Olivo, Mediavilla, Duns Escoto) (Maracaibo, 1998).
Phelps, M. “The Theory of Seminal Reasons in James of Viterbo.” Augustiniana 30 (1980), 271–283.
Pickavé, M., and A. Côté. “James of Viterbo’s Philosophy of Nature.” In A Companion to James of Viterbo, eds. A. Côté and M. Pickavé (Leiden, 2018), 127–167.
Rodolfi, A. Il concetto di materia nell’opera di Alberto Magno (Florence, 2004).
Rodolfi, A. “Matière, forme et génération: la discussion entre Henri de Gand et Roger Marston autour des raisons séminales.” In Materia: nouvelles perspectives de recherche dans la pensée et la culture médiévales (XIIe–XVIe siècles), eds. T. Suarez-Nani and A. Paravicini Bagliani (Florence, 2017), 57–74.
Saak, E. L. “The Life and Works of James of Viterbo.” In A Companion to James of Viterbo, eds. A. Côté and M. Pickavé (Leiden, 2018), 11–32.
Solère, J.-L. “James of Viterbo’s Innatist Theory of Cognition.” In A Companion to James of Viterbo, eds. A. Côté and M. Pickavé (Leiden, 2018), 168–217.
Trapp, D. “Aegidii Romani de doctrina modorum.” Angelicum 12 (1935), 449–501.
Wippel, J. F. The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy (Washington, DC, 1981).
I would like to thank Can Laurens Löwe and the two reviewers for Vivarium for their many helpful comments on this article.
For some discussions of this problem in Augustine, see Mazzarella, Controversie, 233–245; Brady, “St. Augustine’s Theory”; Gilson, Introduction, 256–274.
Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 11, a. 1, 349195–350258: “Quidam enim dixerunt formas omnes sensibiles esse ab agente extrinseco, quod est substantia vel forma separata, quam appellant datorem formarum vel intelligentiam agentem, et quod omnia inferiora agentia naturalia non sunt nisi sicut praeparantia materiam ad formae susceptionem … Quidam vero e contrario opinati sunt, scilicet quod omnia ista rebus essent indita, nec ab exteriori causam haberent sed solummodo quod per exteriorem actionem manifestantur: posuerunt enim quidam quod omnes formae naturales erant actu in materia latentes et quod agens naturale nihil aliud facit quam extrahere eas de occulto in manifestum … Utraque autem istarum opinionum est absque ratione: prima enim opinio excludit causas propinquas dum effectus omnes in inferioribus provenientes solis causis primis attribuit, in quo derogatur ordini universi qui ordine et connexione causarum contexitur dum prima causa ex eminentia bonitatis suae rebus aliis confert non solum quod sint sed et quod causae sint; secunda etiam opinio in idem quasi inconveniens redit: cum enim removens prohibens non sit nisi movens per accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physicorum, si inferiora agentia nihil aliud faciunt quam producere de occulto in manifestum removendo impedimenta … sequetur quod omnia inferiora agentia non agant nisi per accidens. Et ideo secundum doctrinam Aristotilis via media inter has duas tenenda est in omnibus praedictis: formae enim naturales praeexistunt quidem in materia, non in actu, ut alii dicebant, sed in potentia solum de qua in actum reducuntur per agens extrinsecum proximum, non solum per agens primum, ut alia opinio ponebat.” Cf. Albert the Great, Super II Sent., d. 1, a. 12, 33–34; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, 196a–199b; Giles of Rome, Quodlibet II, q. 12, 79b–83b; Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XIV, q. 5, at 405–406.
For Albert’s theory of seminal reasons, see Rodolfi, Il concetto di materia, 110–125, and Nardi, Studi, 69–102 (“La dottrina d’Alberto Magno sull’‘inchoatio formae’”).
Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, 198b: “Et ista positio ponit, quod in materia sint veritates omnium formarum producendarum naturaliter; et cum producitur, nulla quidditas, nulla veritas essentiae inducitur de novo, sed datur ei nova dispositio, ut quod erat in potentia fiat in actu. Differunt enim actus et potentia, non quia dicant diversas quidditates, sed dispositiones diversas eiusdem … Et haec positio inter omnes praedictas videtur esse intelligibilior et veritati vicinior.” Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.
For more details on matter in the Franciscan school, see the fine study by Pérez Estévez, La materia.
See Thomas Aquinas, In Phys. I, lect. 1, 56b: “Dicunt ergo quidam quod etiam in huiusmodi mutationibus principium activum motus est in eo quod movetur; non quidem perfectum, sed imperfectum, quod coadiuvat actionem exterioris agentis. Dicunt enim quod in materia est quaedam inchoatio formae, quam dicunt esse privationem, quae est tertium principium naturae; et ab hoc principio intrinseco generationes et alterationes corporum simplicium naturales dicuntur. Sed hoc non potest esse: quia, cum nihil agat nisi secundum quod est in actu, praedicta inchoatio formae, cum non sit actus, sed aptitudo quaedam ad actum, non potest esse principium activum. Et praeterea, etiam si esset forma completa, non ageret in suum subiectum alterando ipsum: quia forma non agit, sed compositum; quod non potest seipsum alterare, nisi sint in eo duae partes, quarum una sit alterans et alia alterata.” Cf. too In Metaph. VII, lect. 8, 352–353, n. 1442δ: “Haec autem opinio [scilicet, inchoatio formae] videtur propinqua ponentibus latitationem formarum. Cum enim nihil agat nisi secundum quod est in actu: si partes vel inchoationes formarum quae sunt in materia, habent aliquam virtutem activam, sequitur quod sint aliquo modo actu, quod est ponere latitationem formarum. Et praeterea, cum esse sit ante agere, non potest intelligi forma prius habere agere quam sit in actu.” For more on Thomas’s account of seminal reasons, see Scriptum super II Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, 450–454, and Summa theologiae I, q. 115, a. 2, 540–541.
Henry offers an extensive critique of the theory of inchoationes formarum in Quodlibet IV, q. 14, 192–200. For discussion of Henry, see Mazzarella, Controversie, 247–257, and Rodolfi, “Matière.” For Giles, see his discussion in Quodlibet II, q. 12, 79b–83b. For a comprehensive treatment of Godfrey, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, 293–314.
On James’s theory of seminal reasons, see also Pickavé and Côté, “James of Viterbo’s Philosophy of Nature,” 135–146, and Phelps, “The Theory of Seminal Reasons.” In this study I offer a historical reconstruction of James’s theory of inchoate forms that situates his thinking within the context of late thirteenth-century philosophy.
For James’s life and career, see Saak, “The Life and Works.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 65190–194: “Uno enim modo dicitur ratio seminalis inchoatio quaedam vel exordium formae quae per generationem acquiritur; et haec inchoatio est in ipsa materia rei fiendae quae per formam perficitur. Alio vero modo dicitur ratio seminalis quoddam activum principium per quod generatio ipsa completur.”
For a discussion of some fourteenth-century treatments of this problem in Averroes, see the article by Russell Friedman in this issue.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 66223–239. For these references to Averroes, see In Physicam I, c. 70, 41rE–F, and De substantia orbis, c. 1, 3vL.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 66240–244. For this in Giles, see Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis I, 24ra: “Dicendum quod in genere substantie possumus distinguere potentiam et actum. Nam sicut forma est essentialiter ipse actus, ita materia est essentialiter ipsa potentia. Potentia ergo dupliciter potest diffiniri: vel ut nominat respectum quendam fundatum in ipsa substantia materie, vel ut est in genere substantie et dicit ipsam essentiam materie.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 66245–250: “Sed haec distinctio dubitabilis est, quia nomen potentiae, ut videtur, numquam potest absolvi a significatione respectus, sed semper importat respectum ad aliud. Et ideo videtur probabilius esse dicendum quod potentia secundum nullum modum accepta dicit ipsam substantiam materiae secundum se, sed, vel dicit respectum quemdam materiae, vel dicit ipsam materiam cum huiusmodi respectu.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 67258–261 (quoting Averroes, De substantia orbis, c. 1, 3vL–M): “Sed posse quo substantiatur hoc subiectum, differt a natura subiecti, quod substantiatur per hoc posse, in hoc, quod posse dicitur respectu formae: hoc autem subiectum est unum existentium … per se, quorum substantia est in potentia.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 67262–280: “Est igitur sic intelligendum, quod materia substantiatur per posse, et quod potentia est eius differentia substantialis. Quia enim aliquid cognoscitur et specificatur per suam differentiam essentialem, ideo omne id per quod aliquid cognoscitur et specificatur, tenet locum differentiae essentialis, ut patet de subiecto respectu accidentis. Nam accidens cognoscitur et specificatur per suum subiectum proprium, et ideo subiectum ponitur in definitione accidentis loco differentiae; sic etiam, quia actus et habitus cognoscuntur et specificantur per obiecta, ideo obiecta sunt ut differentiae in illorum definitione. Similiter autem dicendum est in proposito. Materia enim cognoscitur et specificatur per respectum ad formam … Unde si definiatur materia eo modo quo sibi potest competere definitio, sic definietur, sicut Commentator ibidem insinuat, quod materia est substantia in potentia; in qua definitione, ut patet, potentia ponitur ut differentia, nec praedicatur de materia essentiali et directa praedicatione.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 67281–284: “Potest autem et aliter intelligi quod potentia est differentia substantialis materiae; quia est ut proprietas quaedam consequens inseparabiliter substantiam materiae, et dicitur de materia per se in secundo modo dicendi per se.”
One might note that James’s interpretation of Averroes is consistent with that of Siger of Brabant (d. 1284). The latter held that matter falls under being in potency. However, since the substance of matter is unknown to us, we use potency – which is known to us – in place of its substantial difference. Siger does not regard potency as an essential attribute of matter; it is rather a principle of our knowledge, for matter is intelligible to us only through its relation to form, and this is precisely what potency is meant to signify. Thus, neither James nor Siger see a conflict between Averroes’s remarks in his Physics commentary and in the De substantia orbis. For Siger’s text, see his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, Cambridge version, V, q. 32, 26490–97: “Unde, etsi materia sit essentialiter illud quod est in potentia, quamvis potentia ei accidat, non tamen essentialiter est in potentia secundum quod in potentia. Unde, cum materia cadat sub ente in potentia, quia substantia materiae nobis ignota est, loco differentiae eius substantialis utimur potentia, quae nota est, saltem secundum habitudinem ad actum. Et ideo dicit Commentator potentiam esse differentiam substantialem materiae, eo quod utimur potentia loco differentiae eius substantialis.” For more on Siger’s theory of matter, see Rodolfi, Il concetto di materia, 174–193.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 68318–69330: “Iste respectus non consequitur materiam, nisi quia caret forma. Materia enim respicit formam, quia est receptiva ipsius; ut enim dictum est, potentia materiae dicitur passiva et receptiva. Nihil autem est receptivum alicuius, nisi in quantum caret illo. Carentia vero est privatio vel negatio; materia igitur dicitur esse in potentia, secundum quod privata est et carens forma … Sed adhuc est considerandum ulterius, quod ex hoc solum quod aliquid caret aliquo, non dicitur esse in potentia ad illud. Lapis enim caret visu; nec tamen dicitur esse in potentia ad visum. Ad hoc ergo quod aliquid dicatur esse in potentia ad aliquid, non sufficit sola carentia illius, sed cum carentia requiritur aptitudo et idoneitas ad illud.”
James could have in mind the theory of dispositions developed by Godfrey of Fontaines. For this in Godfrey, see his Quodlibet II, q. 6, 89–95, and Quodlibet IX, q. 12, 251–253. For discussion, see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, 307–314. Godfrey appears to regard these dispositions as following upon a substantial form, and thus as not inhering directly in prime matter. John Buridan will later hold a different view, namely, that there are accidents that inhere directly in matter and dispose matter to receive certain substantial forms rather than others. For a discussion of this, see the article by Russell Friedman in this issue.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 69341–358: “Dicunt autem quidam quod materia dicitur habilis et apta ratione accidentium, quae dicuntur qualitates passivae in materia; et secundum hoc aptitudo materiae non est aliud quam praeparatio materiae per debita accidentia, ut verbi gratia: ex hoc quod aliqua materia est sic sicca vel unctuosa, dicitur esse apta ut transmutetur ad formam ignis. Addunt etiam, quod materia dicitur apta etiam ratione formae substantialis. Formae namque substantiales habent ad invicem ordinem quemdam in generatione, ita quod materia non est nata suscipere quamcumque formam post quamcumque. Non enim post formam terrae potest immediate recipere formam carnis. Quando ergo materia est sub aliqua forma quae immediatum ordinem habet ad aliam, tunc dicitur esse apta ad recipiendum illam aliam, et per consequens tunc dicitur esse in potentia ad illam … Unde licet materia simul sit in potentia ad omnes formas, quia tamen est in potentia ad unam alia mediante, ut ad formam mixti mediante forma elementi, ideo ad unam tantum formam est in potentia propinqua; ad alias autem in potentia remota.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 70373–377: “Sed licet praedicta veritatem contineant, non tamen videntur sufficere, si quis interius perscrutari voluerit. Recte quidem enim dictum videtur, quod potentia dicit respectum materiae cum carentia et aptitudine, quam talis respectus consequitur. Sed ratio aptitudinis vel habilitatis non videtur esse sufficienter et plene assignata.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 70382–71395: “Quid autem sit huiusmodi exordium vel inchoatio, sic potest declarari: forma enim quaelibet habet duplex esse, scilicet in potentia et in actu. Et quia compositum principaliter habet esse per formam, ideo secundum duplex esse formae accipitur etiam duplex esse compositi, scilicet in potentia et in actu. Potentia vero et actus potentiam perficiens non dicunt diversam rem, sed solum diversum essendi modum eiusdem rei. Hic autem diversus modus est perfectio et imperfectio, vel determinatio et indeterminatio, vel informitas et forma. Nam esse potentia dicit imperfectionem et indeterminationem et informitatem; esse vero actu dicit perfectionem, determinationem et formam sive speciem. Una igitur et eadem essentia formae quandoque dicitur esse in potentia, quandoque in actu; non quod forma secundum se existens sit vel potentia vel actu, sed in materia. Et hoc est compositum esse actu vel potentia.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 71398–413: “Cum itaque forma eadem secundum rem hanc habeat duplicem essendi modum, quandoque scilicet in potentia, quandoque vero in actu, ipsa forma ut est in potentia, est exordium et inchoatio formae producendae in actu, sicut esse imperfectum eiusdem rei dicitur inchoatio et exordium esse perfecti ipsius; quia prius est aliquid sub esse imperfecto, et consequenter sub esse perfecto. Sicut autem forma in actu ponit in numerum cum materia, ita quod materia et forma in actu sunt duae res ex quibus constituitur compositum in actu, sic forma in potentia ponit in numerum cum materia, ita quod materia et forma in potentia sunt duae res ex quibus constituitur compositum in potentia. Et haec forma in potentia dicitur aptitudo ad formam in actu, vel praeparatio, vel habilitas, vel via, et potest etiam dici appetitus materiae; et quia potentia est principium actus, et dicitur ad actum, ideo huiusmodi aptitudo, cum sit principium actus et dicatur ad actum, recte dicitur potentia et est potentia naturalis; quae pertinet ad secundam speciem qualitatis.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 72440–451: “Quod autem ponenda sit talis inchoatio formae, potest multipliciter ostendi. Primo quidem ex verbis Commentatoris, in VIII Metaphysicae, ubi loquens de generatione compositi, quae est transmutatio de potentia in actum, sic dicit: ‘Est igitur aliquod unum, quod primo est in potentia, et post transfertur de potentia in actum. Translatio enim eius non largitur ei multitudinem, sed perfectionem in esse.’ Ex quibus verbis evidenter accipitur quod per hoc, quod aliquid transmutatur per agens de potentia in actum, non acquiritur aliqua nova res, sed solum novus essendi modus. Si enim acquireretur res nova, tunc translatio de potentia in actum largiretur multitudinem, quia, transmutatione completa, essent plures res quam ante transmutationem.” For the reference to Averroes, see In Metaphysicam VIII, c. 15, 224rA.
For this see James’s discussion in Quodlibet III, q. 14, 190.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 75549–76563: “Si enim sola materia praeexistit, cum essentia formae sit alia ab essentia materiae, oportebit formam esse ex nihilo. Ad hoc enim quod forma non dicatur esse ex nihilo, non sufficit dicere quod materia habet ordinem ad formam. Ordo enim ille vel respectus, nec est forma, nec pars formae. Nec etiam sufficit dicere quod forma non fit ex nihilo, quia praesupponitur materia in qua recipitur. Nam et anima rationalis praesupponit corpus, et tamen dicitur ex nihilo esse. Nec item sufficit dicere quod forma non habet esse ex nihilo, quia fit per transmutationem materiae. Nam transmutatio materiae uno modo potest accipi pro motu ipsius materiae secundum accidentia, quae sunt dispositiones ad formam. Sed cum haec accidentia omnino sint extra essentiam formae, propter ipsorum existentiam in materia, non poterit dici quod forma non fit ex nihilo. Alio autem modo potest accipi transmutatio pro introductione ipsius formae; sed cum talis transmutatio sit ipsa forma secundum quod succedit alii formae, redit eadem dubitatio, et petitur quod in principio.”
Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, c. 8, 1033b17–18.
See Thomas Aquinas, In Metaph. VII, lect. 7, 348b–349a, n. 1423: “Forma enim proprie non fit, sed compositum. Sicut enim dicitur forma esse in materia, licet forma non sit, sed compositum per formam, ita etiam proprius modus loquendi est, ut dicamus compositum generari ex materia in talem formam. Formae enim proprie non fiunt, sed educuntur de potentia materiae, inquantum materia quae est in potentia ad formam fit actu sub forma, quod est facere compositum.” Other thinkers who hold this same view include Giles of Rome, Quodlibet II, q. 12, 83, and Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XIV, q. 5, 411–413.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 76564–576: “Item non sufficit dicere quod non est forma de nihilo, quia non fit forma, sed fit compositum. Licet enim non fiat forma per se, sicut non existit per se, sed fiat in materia, quod est fieri compositum, tamen ex quo res aliqua est et alia res a materia, oportet assignare unde habet suam entitatem. Non enim habet eam a materia, quae est ab ea diversa, nec habet eam ab agente, quia agens nihil inducit ab extra, nec causat [lege: creat] eam. Ex his ergo concluditur quod forma ipsa secundum suam essentiam praeexistit in materia, non quidem in actu sed in potentia; et in generatione per agens extrahitur de potentia ad actum; secundum quem modum potest magis verificari quod non fit forma, sed compositum. Quia enim totum compositum praeexistit, totum fieri dicitur; non quia nova res addatur, sed quia id idem et totum fit in actu, quod praeexistebat in potentia.”
For a helpful discussion of Simplicius, see Hauer, “The Notion of ἐπιτηδειότης.” For the Greek text of Simplicius, see In Aristotelis Categorias, 242–252. For the Latin, see Commentaire sur les Catégories, 331–346. For a detailed study of James’s use of Simplicius, see Cȏté, “Simplicius.”
Simplicius, On Aristotle Categories 7–8, 101–102.
Simplicius, On Aristotle Categories 7–8, 108.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 75535–540: “Si ergo huiusmodi potentia, quae dicit rem aliquam absolutam supra id de quo dicitur, cum sit qualitas, habet locum in omnibus quae qualitercumque perficiuntur, cum materia perficiatur per formam, oportet in ipsa ponere talem potentiam; quae quidem medium est inter omnino imperfectum et omnino perfectum, idest inter materiam ut caret omnino forma et ipsam ut habet formam in actu.” James also puts Simplicius’s notion of propensities to work in his account of the operations of the soul. For more on this, see Solère, “James of Viterbo’s Innatist Theory,” and Dumont, “James of Viterbo on the Will.”
Cȏté, “Simplicius,” 47, interprets James in his way.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet III, q. 4, 63218–64228: “Est autem transmutare educere aliquid de potentia ad actum. Unde transmutatio praesupponit subiectum aliquod quod sit in potentia. Et iste modus actionis convenit omni agenti creato. Nullum enim agens creatum agit aliquid, nisi praesupposita potentia alicuius subiecti. Non enim immitit aliquid ab extra creando aut novam rem producendo, quae prius non praeexisteret in potentia alicuius subiecti. Unde non aliter agit nisi educendo de potentia ad actum. Et sic non facit aliquid quod prius non esset, sed facit ut sit alio modo quam prius esset. Facit enim illud esse actu quod prius erat in potentia. Hic autem modus actionis est in omni naturali mutatione.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet III, q. 4, 64230–233.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet III, q. 4, 67332–337: “Ex his autem sequitur ulterius quod in actione, quae est inclinatio, non debent intelligi duo aliqua distincta, quorum unum sit movens et aliud motum, sicut accidit in actione quae est transmutatio, neque dicendum est, proprie loquendo, quod id quod agit secundum inclinationem agat in se vel moveat se; sed debet dici quod agit a se et movetur ex se, quia inclinatur ex se.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet III, q. 4, 67338–68343: “Verumtamen, quia actio quae est secundum transmutationem notior est nobis, secundum quam distinguitur movens et motum et dicitur aliquid ab aliquo moveri, ideo utimur hoc modo loquendi etiam in actione quae est secundum inclinationem, dicentes illud quod agit hoc modo movere se ipsum, et utentes uno ut duobus. Sic enim grave, per gravitatem inclinantem ad locum deorsum, dicitur moveri se ipsum.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet III, q. 4, 68348–356: “Secundum hunc modum etiam potentia quae est in materia, videlicet ipsa forma ut est in potentia, est principium inclinans ad actum, scilicet ad formam ut est in actu. Et secundum hoc materia dicitur se movere; non quia se transmutet ad actum, sed quia ex se inclinatur ad actum. Ex se autem dico, non quod per suam nudam essentiam inclinetur, quae nullius est inclinationis principium, sed quia per aliquid, quod est in ipsa superadditum eius essentiae, inclinatur. Et hoc non est respectus tantum, quia respectus non est principium inclinationis, sed est forma, secundum esse potentiale.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet III, q. 4, 69381–70405: “Amplius etiam considerandum est quod hae duae actiones, scilicet secundum transmutationem et secundum inclinationem, aliquando simul inveniuntur in aliquo motu, aliquando autem una invenitur sine altera. Nam in aliquo motu est actio quae est transmutatio absque actione quae est inclinatio; ut patet in motu violento cuius principium sic est a principio extrinseco movente quod nihil confert aut cooperatur id quod moveri dicitur, eo quod non est in ipso inclinatio ad huiusmodi motum. In aliquo autem motu est actio quae est inclinatio absque actione quae est transmutatio tunc existente, licet non sine praecedente; ut patet in motu gravium et levium, in quo solum est principium inclinans, quod est ipsa forma gravitatis et levitatis, non autem principium actu transmutans per se. Praecessit tamen aliquod principium transmutans in generatione ipsius gravis et levis, dans formam gravitatis et levitatis, et per consequens inclinationem ad motum provenientem ex forma. Et secundum hoc dicuntur moveri a generante gravia et levia, in quantum per transmutationem ab ipso tantum est principium inclinans ad motum. Dicuntur etiam per accidens moveri a se ipsis, in quantum removent prohibens dividendo medium. In aliquo vero motu simul concurrit utraque actio; ut patet in generatione naturali, ad quam requiritur agens exterius transmutans et formam educens de potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc est ibi actio quae dicitur transmutativa. Requiritur etiam potentia subiecti quae est principium inclinans. Et hoc principium est ipsa forma ut est in potentia.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 79687–80701.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 2, 2599–116.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 2, 25117–26130: “Alio modo attenditur diversitas in eodem, non secundum diversitatem rerum sed secundum diversitatem rei et modi; quod intelligendum est de modo rei qui est accidentalis ipsi rei, sicut relatio dicitur modus rei; non autem de modo rei qui est ipsius rei specificativus, sicut per se dicitur modus rei quae est substantia. Sicut autem diversitas rerum in eodem facit ut illud in diversis generibus esse dicatur, ita etiam diversitas rei et modi, qui est accidens illi rei, facit ut talis res in diversis generibus vel praedicamentis dicatur esse, ut patet in scientia, quae, cum importet rem quamdam et etiam modum relativum, ratione rei est in praedicamento qualitatis, ratione vero modi est in praedicamento relationis. Sic etiam forma substantialis, ratione rei quam importat, est in praedicamento substantiae; ratione vero modi accidentalis, qui est terminatio, est in praedicamento quantitatis; ratione autem modi, qui est distinctio, est in praedicamento qualitatis.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 2, 26136–150: “Est autem considerandum quod, quia res est principalior modo, ideo, cum aliquid idem propter diversitatem rei et modi pertinet ad diversa praedicamenta, in illo praedicamento dicitur simpliciter esse in quo reponitur ratione rei; secundum quid autem dicitur esse in illo in quo locatur ratione modi. Unde scientia simpliciter est in praedicamento qualitatis, quia ratione rei quam dicit ad genus qualitatis pertinet. Secundum quid autem est in praedicamento relationis, quia ratione modi pertinet ad genus relationis; et licet secundum quid dicatur esse in praedicamento relationis, tamen vere et secundum esse pertinet ad genus relationis. Similiter est dicendum de forma substantiali, quod simpliciter pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae in quo est ratione rei quam dicit; secundum quid autem pertinet ad praedicamentum quantitatis et qualitatis, quia in eis est ratione modi quem importat, quamvis etiam in his praedicamentis directe et vere sit.”
James’s talk of modes is reminiscent of the theory introduced by Giles of Rome in his Theoremata de corpore Christi. In Theorem 27, Giles explained that, while a thing is assigned to one of the categories by virtue of its essence, it is capable of taking on the mode of another category. Knowledge (scientia) is essentially a quality, but it is capable of possessing a relative mode; similarly, substantial form is in the category of substance, but it can possess a qualitative mode. Giles and James differ, however, on a very significant point: for Giles one and the same thing cannot belong to two really distinct categories. Thus, for Giles what is in the category of substance is an accident not secundum esse, but only secundum dici. On Giles’s theory of modes, see Trapp, “Aegidii Romani,” and more recently Adams, Some Later Medieval Theories, 102–104, and Cross, “Theology.”
Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XIV, q. 5, 410–411: “Si essentia formae sit aliquid indifferens ad modum eius essendi potentialem et actualem, realiter erit differens ab utroque, cum isti modi sint incompossibiles. Et secundum hoc etiam essentia formae non erit terminus generationis, quia per generationem non acquiritur; sed quidam modus formae erit terminus generationis; et dicetur generatio transmutatio modalis et accidentalis, non realis nec substantialis.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 78634–639: “Una enim et eadem res est, quae quandoque est in potentia, quandoque in actu. Per generationem ergo acquiritur, quia acquiritur forma in actu, et acquiritur non nova res, sed nova dispositio rei praeexistentis in alia dispositione; et econtra in corruptione non perditur res, sed dispositio rei, scilicet esse in actu.”
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 81734–757.
Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories, 2, 33783–33885.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 83797–84822.
James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 84846–851: “Actus enim est qui distinguit. Unde forma, ut est in actu, ponit in numerum cum materia, quia sunt duo principia compositi. Forma vero in potentia quodam modo ponit in numerum cum materia, in quantum dicit aliam rem ab ipsa, quodam modo autem non ponit in numerum cum ea, propter modum essendi potentialem, propter quem convenit cum materia et cum ipsa coincidit.”