Theory and Practice of European Crisis Management: Test Case Macedonia

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  • 1 Dr., Senior Research Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), Berlin, former Senior Non-Resident Research Associate at ECMI (2001). Research areas: ethnic conflicts, international crisis and conflict management, international terrorism.

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  • 1 Speech of EU Commissioner Chris Patten at the conference The Development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy - The Integration of the New Decade, Berlin, 16 December 1999, see at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/news/patten/speech 99-215_en.htm. 2 Boutros-Ghali defined preventive diplomacy as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur". See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (United Nations, New York, 1992), 11.

  • 3 Reinhardt Rummel, "The European Union's Politico-Diplomatic Contribution to the Prevention of Ethno-National Conflict", in Abraham Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.), Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World (Washington, D.C., 1996), 197-235. 4 For the concept of conflict prevention, see in particular Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (ed.), Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report (Washington, 1997); Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Confiict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, 1996); and Janie Leatherman, William DeMars, Patrick Gaffney and Raimo Vayrynen, Breaking Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crisis (West Hartford, 1999).

  • 5 These changes will gain a legal basis through the Nice Treaty (hereinafter "TEU-N").

  • 6 European Council in Nice (7-9 December 2000), Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, Annex III. 7 Ibid., Annex III.

  • 8 Ibid., Annex IV. 9 Ibid., Annex V. The 'Petersberg tasks', as defined by the WEU Petersberg Declaration (19 June 1992), cover humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis manage- ment, including peacemaking. 'o Ibid., Annex V. " European Council in Helsinki (10-11 December 1999), Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Annex 1.

  • 12 See European Council in Santa Maria da Feira ( 19-20 June 2000), Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Annex III; European Council in Nice, 7-9 December 2000, Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, Annex II. 1 For details, see Police Action Plan, concluded by the European Council in Gothenburg ( 15-16 June 2001), Presidency Report on European Security and Defence Policy, Annex I. 1° These targets have been specified by the European Council in Gothenburg (15-16 June 2001), see Presidency Report on European Security and Defence Policy, Annex III (New concrete targets for civilian aspects of crisis management).

  • '5 In future, the SC'HR as well as special representatives shall be elected by qualified majority voting (Art. 207 TEU-N). 16 See Amsterdam Declaration No. 6 on the Establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit.

  • " See Council Regulation, December 2000. z Examples for the former are Miguel Moratinos (Middle East, since 1996), Aldo Ajello (Great Lakes/Central Africa, since 1996) or Bodo Hombach (Stability Pact/South Eastern Europe, 1999-2001), examples for the latter are Wolfgang Petritsch (Kosovo, 1998-1999), Felipe Gonzales (Yugoslavia, June to October 1999) and Francois Leotard (Macedonia, June to October 2001). '9 See Council Regulation, 26 February 2001. See also Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, 11 April 2001.

  • zo See Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, 11 April 2001. 1. 21 Speech by Javier Solana, "Where does the EU stand on Common Foreign and Security Policy?" Deutsche Gesellschaft far Auswartige Politik, Berlin, 14 November 2000. 22 While the name UCK in Kosovo refers to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the same abbreviation is used by ethnic Albanians in Macedonia for the National Liberation Army (NLA). 23 Greece used its veto power within the EU in 1991 in order to prevent the recognition of Macedonia because of the name and the symbols of the new state. Later, due to the Greek position, the new state could only be internationally recognized and become a member of international organizations under

  • the name 'former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' (FYROM). Furthermore, the Greek-Macedonian dispute led to an economic embargo by Greece (February 1994 to October 1995), see Heinz Willemsen, Republic Makedonien: Innenpolitische Konflikte und Gefdhrdungen eines jungen Staates in einer insta- bilen Region, SWP-Studie (Berlin, 2001), 10-2. 24 However, when Macedonia recognized Taiwan in early 1999, UNPREDEP had to be removed because the mandate could not be extended due to a Chinese veto in the UN Security Council. 25 in 2000, ECHO was funding projects for an amount of E6.3m to address the needs of refugees from Kosovo and their host families, to support the most vulnerable groups of the population and to facilitate the transition from humanitarian aid to development projects; see ECHO press statement, 21 June 2001.

  • zb From 1992 to 1998, the Albanian PDP participated in the government led by Macedonian Social Democrats (SDSM) and had five ministers (e.g. from 1994 to 1996 the Minister for Culture was an ethnic Albanian). After the 1998 general election, the former Albanian opposition party DPA joined the governing coalition led by Macedonian Nationalists (VMRO-DPMNE) and also were given five ministerial posts, including that of Deputy Prime Minister. 27 see International Crisis Group, "Towards Destabilisation?" ICG Balkans Reports No. 67 (Skopje/Brussels, 1999); id., "Macedonia's Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf", ICG Balkans Reports No. 98 (Skopje/Brussels, 2000); Willemsen, Republik Makedonien ...; Farimah Daftary, "Conflict Resolution in FYR Macedonia: Power-Sharing or the 'Civic Approach"', 4 Helsinki Monitor (2001), ), 291-3I2, at 294-6.

  • Zg This was, however, also due to the fact that the regime in Belgrade closed the university in Pristina where many ethnic Albanians from Macedonia used to study in their language.

  • 29 This new South East European University opened in November 2001 after some delay.

  • 30 International Crisis Group, "The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion", ICG Balkans Reports No. 109 (Skopje/Brussels, 2001). " The Ground Safety Zone was set up by NATO at the end of the Kosovo war in order to prevent the return of the Yugoslav army into the province. The demilitarized zone, however, was misused by an increasing number of Albanian extremists (the so-called UCPMB) which attempted to annex the Albanian-dominated Presevo Valley to Kosovo. 'z For the following, see International Crisis Group, "The Macedonian Question ..."; id., "Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace", ICG Balkans Reports No. 113 (Skopje/Brussels, 2001); Farimah Daftary, "Testing Macedonia", ECMI Brief No. 4 (Flensburg, 2001); id., "Conflict Resolution ..."; and Ulrich Schneckener, "Die EU als Krisenmanager: Der Testfall Mazedonien", 5 Internationale Politik (2001), 43-48 as well as various press reports provided by the Macedonian news service OK.MK (www.ok.mk). See also the Electronic Map of Ethnopolitical Conflict (www.ecmi.de/emap/mk.html).

  • " At a press conference in Skopje (2 April 2001), Solana expressed his position: "The European Union is here to help, not to be a mediator in this dialogue ... This dialogue will bring Macedonia closer to the European Union.". '° For the first time, the EU Commission used the new Rapid Reaction Mechanism for allocating financial resources; however, it still took about a month before the money was available.

  • 'S International Crisis Group, "Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace ...", 14-6. '6 According to International Crisis Group, "Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace ...", 9, at least four Slav-Macedonian paramilitary groups were formed.

  • 37 Ibid., 10-2. '8 On the basis of the S.-1.-1. Macedonian was supposed to receive €-t'_m and special macrofinancial assistance of €SOm. As a matter of urgency, the EU would spend another zoom. including €2.5m for immediate reconstruction efforts transmitted byhe RRM. see Saddeutsche Zeitung (26 June 2001). )- In addition. ECHO announced E3.l5m in order to help refugees and displaced persons, see ECHO press statement, 21 June 2001. On the involvement of ECHO in Macedonia, see also International Crisis Group. "The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): Crisis Response in the Grey Lane'-. ICG Issues Briefing 1 Brussels. 2001). 14-5. 39 These contacts were mainly held by \ATO's special envoy, the Dutch diplomat Pieter Feidh. supported by the Austrian diplomat Stefan Lehne. member of Solana's Policy Unit. Both had already acted jointly during the crisis in southern Serbia (Presevo Valley).

  • '° Prime Minister Georgievski said in a statement (18 July 2001): "Not only the offered package, but also the international envoys' approach by which they are attempting to underestimate the Macedonian institutions is rather concerning.... Now, we practically have 95 per cent of Ali Ahmeti's [UÇK-leader] document on the table. It is clear that the international community decided on its position beforehand, and now is trying to realize it in Macedonia.". " First it was planned to hold the negotiations in Tetovo, but for security reasons the talks finally took place in Ohrid. 'z According to the agreement, Macedonian remains the only official language. But the parties agreed that in areas where a certain minority make up over 20 per cent of the population, the language of that community shall also be used as an official language in addition to Macedonian. Any person living in such an area may use the minority language to communicate with the regional office of the central government and any other central authorities, which are obliged in this case to use the minority language as well. With regard to the police, the parties concluded a timetable which shall guarantee that until 2004 the police will reflect the ethnic composition of Macedonia. As a first step until July 2002, 500 new police officers from the minorities shall be hired and trained. " Daftary,, "Confllict Resolution in FYR Macedonia ...", 301-5.

  • �* According to estimates. the crisis caused 100,000 refugees and displaced persons, including 26.000 ethnic Albanian refugees in neighbouring Serbia and Kosovo. However, the majority of internally displaced persons are ethnic Macedonians.

  • 45 Already in August a new group, the Albanian National Army, issued statements claiming to be fighting for Greater Albania. They also claimed responsibility for certain violent incidences in autumn 2001. 46 These terms had been a compromise between NATO and the government. While NATO wanted to send more soldiers and for a longer period of time, the government insisted on fewer soldiers for a short period. However, the mandate was renewed in December 2001 and, again, in February 2002. " The Macedonian Government had declared amnesty (9 October 2001), but in a very general and non-binding form; therefore the terms and conditions for amnesty were still disputed. 48 Leotard was later replaced as special representative by the French diplomat Alain LeRoy (12 October 2001). ). 49 On some occasions, they were accompanied by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Romania's Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana.

  • 10 The preamble now refers to Macedonia as a state of "all citizens, ... the Macedonian people. as well as the citizens living within its border who are part of the Albanian people". 51 This conference, co-chaired by the EU Commission and the World Bank, took place on 12 March 2002 in Brussels.

  • so Simon Nuttall, European Foreign Policy (Oxford, 2000), 25; Antonio Missiroli (ed.), "Coherence for European Security: Debates, Cases, Assessments", The Institute for Security Issues, Western European Union, Occasional Papers No. 24 (Paris, 2001).

  • 53 Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role". 31 Journal of Common Market Studies (September 1993), 310-4.

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