t This paper is a modified version of a comment delivered on occasion of the Sixth Annual World Conference of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) on 5 April 2001 (Resolving Self- Determination Conflicts Through Complex Power Sharing), Panel N15 (II), sponsored by the European Centre for Minority Issues). The comment relates to the presentations of Carmen Kettley. Florian Bieber, Farimah Daftary and John McGarry delivered at the ASN Conference, modified versions of which are reprinted in the present issue of the European Yearbook of Minority Issues.
1 The first Nigerian federal constitution is an example that ultimately failed in this respect.
2 For lists of violent and non-violent self-determination conflicts and assessments of their status in late 2000, see Ted Robert Gurr, Monty G. Marshall, and Deepa Khosla, Peace and Conflict 2001: A Global Suruey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy (College Park, MD, 2001 ). 14-8, 29-32. 3 Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexi6le Solutions to Ethnic Conflict ( Washington, 1996). See also, Farimah Daftary, "The Matignon Process and Insular Autonomy as a Response to Self-Determination Claims in Corsica", in this volume, at xx. 4 This is not to minimize the importance of disincentives or sanctions, rather to call for consideration of both.
5 What is at issue is not the specifics of institutional design, but the principle that minorities gain effective access to the design of policies affecting their collective interests. 6 It may also be desirable to formalize relations with diaspora groups, though I am not aware of any autonomy agreement that makes such provisions.