1 Dietrich Jung is a Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies in Copenhagen. He has been teaching at Aarhus University, Bilkent University (Ankara), Hamburg University and University of Copenhagen. His publications are on the political sociology of war, the modernization of Turkey, as well as on conflicts in the Middle East.
1. Article 3 of the Turkish Constitution. All quotations from the Turkish Constitution are taken from the English translation: 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupclca/cag. 2. Kemal Kirisci, 'Evaluating the Question of Minorities in Turkey in the Light of Turkish-EU Relations', in Bertil Duner (ed.), Turkey: the RoadAbeadP (Stockholm, 2002),105-18.
3 'Regulations Legalizing Kurdish Broadcasts on State TV Adopted', Turkish Daily News, 19 December 2002. 4 Quotes from Ramazan Gozen,'Two Processes in Turkish Foreign Policy: Integration and Isolation', 1-2 Foreign Policy (Ankara, 1997), 106-28, at 119. The Sevres Treaty of 1920 suggested a total partition of Anato- lia but was never ratified and later abrogated by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. 5 Die Zeit, 25 March 1999. 6 Cf. Kirisci,'Evaluating ...',109-13.
7 Feroz Ahmad, 'The State and Intervention in Turkey', 16 Turcica - Revue D Etudes Turques (1984), sol-64, at 51. 8 Art.6(l)FCNM.
9 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, 1981), 11-29. 10 Max Weber, From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology (London, 1991), 78.
11 Max Weber, Economy and Society. lln Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume I (New York, 1968), 56 and 215. 12 Cf.Klaus Schlichte, `State Formation and the Economy of Intra-State Wars', in Dietrich Jung (ed.), Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars: !1 Political Economy oflntra-State War (London and New York, 2003), 27-44, at 35-8. 13 Theodor Schieder, Nationalismus and Nationalstaat. Studien zum nationalen Problem im modernen Europa (G6ttingen, 1991), 17-8. 14 Ernest Gellner,'Introduction', in Sukumar Periwal (ed.) Notions ofNationalism (Budapest, 1995),1-7, at 2- 3.
15 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge 1990), at 9. 16 Id., 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983), 1-14, at 9. 17 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalims (London, 1983), 67-70. 18 Robert W Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York, 1987), 105.
19 Norbert Elias, The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development ofHabitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Oxford, 1996). 20 Cf. Id, The Society of Individuals (Oxford, 1991) and Pierre Bourdieu, Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht (Hamburg, 1992). 2I Hans-Peter Miiller, 'Kultur, Geschmack und Distinktion. Grundzuge der Kultursoziologie Pierre Bourdieus', in Kultur und Geselischaft, Sonderband der Kolner Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie und Sozialpsy- chologie (Opladen, 1986), 162-90, at 164. 22 Hatti Humayun, February 1856. For the whole text of this decree, see J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, a Documentary Record-1535-1914, Yol.1 I (Princeton, 1956),149-53, at 150.
23 For a detailed account of this complex 'Eastern question system', see Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East. Old Rules, Dangerous Games (Princeton, 1984). 24 Albert Hourani, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (Berkely and Los Angeles, 1981), 44-5.
25 For a more comprehensive analysis of the Ottoman reforms, see the chapter Reform and Decline in Dietrich Jung with Wolfango Piccoli, Turkey at tbe Crossroads. Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East (London, 2001), 28-58. 26 Roderic H. Davison, 'The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire', in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), Christians andJews in the Ottoman Empire. 1he Functioning ofa a Plural Society, Volume I, The Central Lands (New York and London,1982), 319-37, at 320-21. 27 Cf. Ilber Ortayli, 'The Ottoman millet System and its Social Dimensions', in Rikard Larsson (ed.), The Boundaries of Europe? (Stockholm,1998),120-26. 28 Halil Inalcik, 'The Status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch under the Ottomans', in 21-3 Turcica - Revue DEtudes Turgues (1991), 407-36, at 410.
29 Halil Inalcik, 'Turkey. The Nature of the Traditional Society', in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton,1964), 42-63, at 43-4. 30 Cf. Hough Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Walf and Crescent. Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (New York, 1997), at 38. 31 Kemal H. Karpat, `Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post- Ottoman Era', in Braude and Lewis, Christians and Jews ...,142-69, at 165.
32 Steven Rosenthal, 'Minorities and Municipal Reform in Istanbul, 1950-1970', in Braude and Lewis, Chris- tians andJews ..., 369-85, at 370. 33 Ibid., 378. 34 Cf. Poulton, Top Hat ..., at 47. 35 Rosenthal, Minorities and Munitipal Reform ..., at 382.
36 This structural argument does not mean that the Ottoman reforms were driven, irrespective of the motives and interests of the reformers, only by outer and inner constraints (cf. Jung with Piccoli, Turkey at the Cross- roads ..., at 43). 37 Ziya Gokalp, The Principles ofTurkism, translated by Robert Devereux (Leiden, 1968), 45-6. 38 Ayse Kadioglu, 'The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity', 32(2) Middle East Studies (1996),177-93, at 191. 39 M.T Ozelli,'The Evolution of the Formal Educational System and Its Relation to Economic Growth Poli- cies in the First Turkish Republic', 5 Interuational, jourual ofMiddle East Studies (1974), 77-92, at 81.
40 Cf. Niyazi Berkes, 'Ziya G6kalp: His Contribution to Turkish Nationalism', 8(4) Middle East journal, (1954), 375-90. 41 While the traditional order only knew three recognized millets, their number increased under foreign pres- sure to nine by 1875 and to 17 by 1914. See Poulton, Top Hat ..., at 52. 42 Serif Mardin, A \ote on the Transformation of Religious Symbols in Turkey', 16 Turcica - Revue D'Etudes Turques (1984), 115-27, at 119. 43 Irene J\lélikoffLls1am Heterodoxe en Anatolie, 14 Turcica - Revue DEtudes Turques (1982),142-54, at 143- 46. 44 Peter J. Bumke, 'Kizilbas-Kurden in Dersim (Tunceli, Tlirkei)', 74 Antfnopos (1979), 530-48, at 541.
45 Kemal Karpat, 'The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908', 3 International Journal of Middle East Studies (1972), 243-81, at 262-65. 46 Cf. the outstanding study on the Hamidian period of Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains. Ideology and the Legitimation ofPower in the Ottoman Empire,1876-1909 (London, 1998).
47 David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism (London, 1977),29-80. 48 Jan E. Ziircher, 7heYoungTurks-Children ofbarderlands?, NN'orking paper, Department ofTurkish Studies, University of Leiden (Leiden, 2002). 49 While in Europe the terms Turk,Turkish and Turkey were already used in relation to the Ottoman Empire, until the end of the nineteenth century the term Turk was alien to the Ottoman elite, implying the notion of an 'uneducated peasant'. See Poulton, Top Hat..., at 51. 50 Masami Arai,'Bet%veen State and \ation. A \ew Light on the Journal Turk Yurdu, 24 Turcica Revue D'Etudes Turgues (1992), 277-94.
51 Cf. Hans-Lukas Kieser,'From Muslim to Turkish Nationalism. Elite Socialization in the Turkish Foyers in Switzerland (1912-1922)', at http://www.hist.net/kieser/pu/wocmes.html. 52 Ziircher, The Young Turks ..., at 8. 53 British General Staff Memorandum, October 1922, quoted in L.A. Macfie, "The Straits Question: The Conference of Lausanne (November 1922 - July 1923)',15(2) Middle Eastern Studies (1979), 211-38, at 211.
54 J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy ire tbe Near ared Middle East, a Documentary Record 1914-1956, YoI.II (Princeton, 1956), 81-7. 55 Ibid., at 119-24.
56 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge, 1990). 57 For a detailed account of these reform steps, see Nilufer Gole, The Forbidden Modern. Civilixation and Veil- ing (Ann Arbor, 1996).
58 D. M. Alici, 'The Role of Culture, History and Language in Turkish National Identity Building: An Over- emphasis on Central Asian Roots', 15(2) Central,4sian Survey (1996), 217-31. 59 Metin Heper, 'Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A liddle Eastern Perspective', 35(3) Middle East journal (1981), 346-63, at 350. 60 Soner Cagaptay, 'State and Turkishness in Interwar Turkey, talk at the MESA conference in Washington DC, 24 November 2002.
61 The new ideology of secularism was for the Alevi minority a certain kind of relief. Although they were also not allowed to express their distinct religious identity in public, the state-controlled Islam of the secular republic did not interfere in their private religious affairs. Therefore, the Alevi population has been one of the strongest supporters of the RPP and its secularist ideology throughout decades. 62 Cf. SerifMardin,'Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey', in James Piscatory (ed.), Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge, 1983), 138-59, and Binaz Toprak, 'The Religious Right', in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul A. Tonak (eds.), Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives (Oxford, 1987), 218-35. 63 It was estimated that until the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, about five million Muslim immigrants from the Crimea, Caucasus and the Balkans had settled in Anatolia and in some parts of the Arab provinces. See Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics (Madison, 1985), 55. In addition, hundreds of thousands of Muslims fled to Anatolia during the Balkan Wars and the First World War. Almost half a million Muslims arrived in Anatolia between 1922 and 1929 as a result of the population exchange. See Justin McCarthy, 'Foundations of the Turkish Republic: Social and Economic Change', 19(2) Middle Eastern Studies (1983),139-51, at 141.
64 Poulton, Top Hat ..., at 117-8. 65 Ibid , at 122. 66 Kenan Evren, 12 September 1980, quoted in Memet A. Birand, The Generals' Coup in Turkey. An Inside Story ofl2 September 1980 (London et al., 1987),186. 67 According to the figures given by the junta leader, General Evren, the political crisis in Turkey claimed 5,241 lives during the two years before the military intervention alone. Ibid., at 193. 68 J.H. McFadden, 'Civil-Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic', 39(1) Middle East Journal, (1985), 69-85, at 69.
69 For a closer analysis of the international and domestic conditions in which this process took place, see Jung with Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads ..., 83-108. 70 In relation to this political autonomy of the Turkish army, see Cengiz Candar,'RedefiningTurkey's Political Center', 10(4) Journal of Democracy (1999), 129-141; Omit Cizre-Sakallioglu, 'The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Autonomy', 29(4) Comparative Politics z,151-65. 71 Cf. Mehmet A. Birand, Shirts of Steel. An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces (London, 1991). 72 In an interview with Le Monde, Giscard D'Estaing heavily criticized the acceptance of Turkey's candidacy and equated Turkey's possible accession with the end of the EU. See: 'Pour ou contre 1'adhesion Turquie a 1'Union europeenne', Le Monde, 8 November 2002.
73 For a comprehensive account of this diversity, see Stefanos Yerasimos et al. (eds.), Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism. Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey (Wurzburg, 2000).