Hegel's Conception of the Determinate Negation


“The determinate negation” has by Robert Brandom been called Hegel’s most fundamental conceptual tool. In this book, Terje Sparby agrees about the importance of the term, but rejects Brandom’s interpretation of it. Hegel’s actual use of the term may at first seem to be inconsistent, something that is reflected in the scholarship. However, on closer inspection, three forms of determinate negations can be discerned in Hegel’s texts: A nothing that is something, a moment of transformation through loss (like the Phoenix rising from the ashes), and a unity of opposites. Through an in-depth interpretation of Hegel’s work, a comprehensive account of the determinate negation is developed in which these philosophically challenging ideas are seen as parts of one overarching process.
Restricted Access


EUR €146.00USD $197.00

Biographical Note

Terje Sparby, PhD. completed his PhD-studies at the University of Heidelberg, and has been a postdoc at the Humboldt University. He has published articles on the German Idealism, including the recent The Problem of Higher Knowledge in Hegel’s Philosophy.

Table of contents

1 Introduction
1.1 The Problem
1.2 Overview
Part One: The Background to the Conception of the Determinate Negation
2 Kant’s Doctrine of Determination
3 After Kant: Fichte and Schelling
4 Hegel in Jena
5 Review and Outlook
Part Two: The Determinate Negation in the Science of Logic
6 Determinate Negation within the Program of WdL
7 Determination and Negation in The Doctrine of Being
8 Determination and Negation in the Doctrine of Essence
9 Determination and Negation in The Doctrine of The Concept
10 Conclusion


Specialists and post-graduate students with an interest Hegel’s philosophy, particularly the interpretation of his logic both in a historical and systematic regard.


Collection Information