Defeasibility, most generally speaking, means that given some set of conditions A, something else B will hold, unless or until defeating conditions C apply. While the term was introduced into philosophy by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in 1949, today, the concept of defeasibility is employed in many different areas of philosophy. This volume for the first time brings together contributions on defeasibility from epistemology (Mikael Janvid, Klemens Kappel, Hannes Ole Matthiessen, Marcus Willaschek, Michael Williams), legal philosophy (Frederick Schauer) and ethics and the philosophy of action (Claudia Blöser, R. Jay Wallace, Michael Quante and Katarzyna Paprzycka). The volume ends with an extensive bibliography (by Michael de Araujo Kurth).
Preface Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen & Marcus Willaschek: Introduction Michael Williams: Knowledge, Ascriptivism and Defeasible Concepts Klemens Kappel: Knowledge, Defeasibility, and the Gettier Problem Mikael Janvid: The Challenges of Traveling without Itinerary: The Overriding Case Hannes Ole Matthiessen: Entitlement and Public Accessibility of Epistemic Status Marcus Willaschek: Strawsonian Epistemology. What Epistemologists Can Learn from “Freedom and Resentment” Claudia Blöser: The Defeasible Structure of Ascriptions of Responsibility R. Jay Wallace: Comment on Claudia Blöser “The Defeasible Structure of Ascriptions of Responsibility” Claudia Blöser: Reply to Wallace Katarzyna Paprzycka: Can a Spasm Cause an Action? An Argument for Responsibilist Theories of Action Michael Quante: Autonomous by Default. Assessing “Non-Alienation” in John Christman’s Conception of Personal Autonomy Frederick Schauer: On the Open Texture of Law Michel de Araujo Kurth: Selected Thematic Bibliography of Work on Defeasibility in Philosophy and Related Disciplines