What is the relationship between the general, abstract norm and the singular, concrete case that sometimes affirms a parallel, contrasting, norm? The present essay engages with this question. The argument stems from an analysis of extraordinary singular cases that sometimes emerge, sometimes are “produced” or “promoted” as exemplary (for strategic reasons, like in law). In this essay Angela Condello argues that approaching normativity in art and law from the perspective of the singular case also illustrates the theoretical importance of interdisciplinary legal scholarship, since the singularity creates room for extra-legal values to emerge as legitimate demands, desires, and needs.
The Normativity of the Singular Case in Art and Law
Angela Condello, Ph.D. (1984), is a legal philosopher. She has been teaching law and humanities and legal philosophy since 2013. Her work covers critical approaches to classical legal theoretical themes, and in particular metaphor and analogy. She has published widely on exemplarity, casuistry in law, law and literature, law and humanities. She was awarded fellowships among which the “Law as Culture” Fellowship (Bonn), Fernand Braudel (EHESS), and others to teach and work at University of California at Berkeley, Max Planck Institute for International and Public Law (Heidelberg), Australian University at Canberrra, Cardozo Law School (New York), and McGill Law School. . Her monograph "Analogica. Il doppio legame tra diritto e analogia" (Giappichelli, 2018) is forthcoming.
Table of contents
Between Ordinary and Extraordinary The Normativity of the Singular Case in Art and Law Angela Condello Abstract
Part 1: The Extraordinary in Art
Part 2: The Extraordinary in Law