Non-Evidentialist Epistemology

Series: 

This is the first edited collection entirely dedicated to non-evidentialist epistemology or non-evidentialism—the controversial view that evidence is not required in order for doxastic attitudes to enjoy a positive epistemic status. Belief or acceptance can be epistemically justified, warranted, or rational without evidence. The volume is divided into three section: the first focuses on hinge epistemology, the second offers a critical reflection about evidentialist and non-evidentialist epistemologies, and the third explores extensions of non-evidentialism to the fields of social psychology, psychiatry, and mathematics.

Prices from (excl. VAT):

€127.00$153.00
Add to Cart
Luca Moretti (Ph.D. in Philosophy, KCL, 2003) is Reader of Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen. His research areas and interests include general epistemology, epistemology of perception, social epistemology, formal epistemology, philosophy of education, and philosophical logic.
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (Ph.D. in Philosophy, Arché Research Centre, University of St. Andrews, 2006) is Professor of Philosophy at Underwood International College, Yonsei University. His research areas and interests include general, epistemology, social and formal epistemology, truth, metaphysics, value theory, and the philosophies of logic and technology.
Preface
ContributorsI

1 Non-Evidentialist Epistemology: Introduction and Overview
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen and Luca Moretti

part 1: Hinge Epistemology


2 Inescapable Hinges: A Transcendental Hinge Epistemology
Luca Zanetti

3 Extended Rationality and Epistemic Relativism
Natalie Alana Ashton

4 Hinge Epistemology and Alethic Pluralism
Sebastiano Moruzzi

5 Hinges, Radical Skepticism, Relativism and Alethic Pluralism
Annalisa Coliva

part 2: Criticisms of Evidentialist and Non-Evidentialist Epistemology


6 Problems for Wright’s Entitlement Theory
Luca Moretti

7 Epistemic Entitlement: Intellectual Desires and Epistemic Rationality
Junyeol Kim

8 Epistemic Conservatism: A Non-Evidentialist Epistemology?
Kevin McCain

9 Weak Non-Evidentialism
Tommaso Piazza

part 3: Extensions of Non-Evidentialist Epistemology


10 Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Pragmatist Stance
Anne Meylan

11 The Certainties of Delusion
Jakob Ohlhorst

12 Cornerstone Epistemology: Scepticism, Mathematics, Non-Evidentialism, Consequentualism, Pluralism
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

Index
Specialists, post-graduate students and advanced undergraduates who have a background in analytic epistemology and would like to go deeper into recent discussion on non-evidentialist epistemology.